This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001661 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PLAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Algeria is emerging from a decade of terrorist 
violence and massive bloodshed beginning in the early 1990's 
and is now looking to take necessary steps to allow the 
country to heal its wounds.  Much like his 1999 platform of 
Civil Concord, President Bouteflika's 2004 presidential 
campaign was anchored by his platform of "National 
Reconciliation".  Several sources and the press have 
commented that Bouteflika considers National Reconciliation 
to be his legacy and will invest considerable political 
capital to ensure that it happens.  What "National 
Reconciliation" actually entails has been the subject of much 
speculation and debate over the past year.  Bouteflika has 
not explained the details of National Reconciliation nor its 
major component, General Amnesty, to be presented for popular 
approval through a referendum.  This lack of specificity has 
not dissuaded many people from expressing support or 
disapproval for the referendum. 
 
¶2. (C) Bouteflika first proposed the holding of an amnesty 
referendum before a October 31, 2004 gathering of African 
Union terrorism experts.  The Algerian media have reported 
that the referendum will take place before the end of the 
year with President Bouteflika likely to clarify his 
intentions in an August 14 address. Our sense is that most 
Algerians are tired after over a decade of terrorism and 
would be induced to give the benefit of doubt to the national 
reconciliation process in the hope that it would be the death 
knell for remaining terrorist elements, now largely confined 
to mountainous areas.  That said, in light of statements by 
some Algerian Islamists in support of the recent murders of 
two Algerian diplomats in Iraq, Bouteflika may have lost 
support for granting amnesty to the same genre of terrorists 
who were involved in the Iraq murders.  Bouteflika may need 
to reconsider the type of amnesty included in the initiative 
in order to garner a convincing level of support to pass what 
he considers to be his legacy.  (End Summary and Comment) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Algeria is emerging from a decade of terrorist 
violence and massive bloodshed beginning in the early 1990's 
and has made great strides in normalizing daily life.  One 
element which led to the drastically improved security 
situation was the 1999 Civil Concord, in which 6,000 former 
terrorists and their sympathizers, who were not convicted of 
murder, were granted amnesty by the GOA.  Although the 
Concord led to a dramatic reduction in attacks and allowed 
warring elements back into society to live peacefully, it was 
not without its flaws.  The main flaws, as viewed by 
Algerians, were the lack of transparency (the trials were 
closed to the public) and the lack of thorough investigations 
into alleged criminal/terrorist acts perpetrated by those 
given amnesty.  Civil Concord was key to Bouteflika's legacy 
for his first term of office, and he reportedly views 
National Reconciliation as the next logical step in adding to 
the legacy in his second term.  However, the problem for many 
Algerians is that, unlike the 1999 Concord, the details of 
this General Amnesty and National Reconciliation plan have 
not yet been divulged. 
 
CHANGE FROM GENERAL AMNESTY TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (C) Bouteflika's emphasis has changed over the last two 
months from "General Amnesty" to "National Reconciliation" 
when he discovered the term "General Amnesty" was unpopular 
with a majority of Algerians, who closely linked the term 
with impunity.  Also, Algerians did not want to duplicate the 
mistakes of the 1999 Civil Concord, namely the lack of proper 
trials/investigations and transparency.  While the plan may 
not have changed, the term National Reconciliation was 
thought to be softer and less controversial than its 
predecessor.  From an Islamic point of view, reconciliation 
was viewed in a positive light and Bouteflika has used this 
to his advantage.  Additionally, after the murders of two 
Algerian diplomats in Iraq, the subsequent statements by both 
the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) and the 
former deputy head of the banned FIS (Islamic Salvation 
Front) condoning/encouraging the murders, and the obvious 
link between GSPC and Al Qaida, have led many Algerians to 
question how Bouteflika could amnesty the very people who 
perpetrated this barbaric act, further pushing Bouteflika 
away from an emphasis on amnesty. 
 
WHO WILL LIKELY BENEFIT FROM NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶5. (C) Although details about National Reconciliation have 
not been released, there has been speculation about who will 
likely benefit from the plan.  Embassy sources speculate that 
only members of terrorist groups will benefit from any 
amnesty included in the plan.  In his recent speeches, 
Bouteflika spoke highly of the Army and the Security Forces 
and continually referred to them as 'Martyrs of the Nation'. 
According to sources, in Bouteflika's view, the Security 
Forces in general have done nothing wrong, and any criminal 
acts attributed to them were perpetrated by individuals 
operating outside the scope of their authority.  To date, 
Bouteflika has skillfully handled the military by repeatedly 
praising its participation in defeating the Islamic terrorist 
threat to the republic, while pushing it towards a change of 
mission from internal politics to external defense of the 
country.  His focus on crimes perpetrated by terrorists 
rather than by the military follows the logic of an implicit 
trade-off between military acceptance of Bouteflika's 
exercise of civilian authority over military retirements and 
prosecutions in return for shielding the military from even a 
hint of retribution for "excesses" during the 1990s. 
 
WHAT IS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) President Bouteflika's 2004 presidential campaign was 
anchored by his platform of "National Reconciliation," the 
exact definition of which has been elusive at best.  During 
his July 5, 2005 Independence Day speech, Bouteflika shed 
some light on the big picture of National Reconciliation 
without divulging any details of the plan.  He stated that 
"Algerians should forgive but not forget, accepting thus 
another sacrifice on the altar of their country, which has 
bled enough for its independence, and since its independence. 
 It is starting from these considerations that I have 
launched the initiative of a policy of National 
Reconciliation, with the objective of putting a definite end 
to the violence and allowing our society to go beyond its 
antagonisms and heal its wounds."  Government officials have 
publicly given their full support to Bouteflika's plan, even 
without knowing its content.  The public does not yet know 
who will be amnestied (security forces and/or terrorists), 
what crimes will be amnestied (economic, murder, rape, 
supporting terrorism), or if those amnestied will be granted 
amnesty following judicial proceedings out of which the full 
extent of their crime would come to light. Additionally, the 
media reported that a referendum on National Reconciliation 
will take place before the end of the year, giving Bouteflika 
little time to hash out his plan in detail and then garner 
support for it. 
 
SETTING THE EXAMPLE 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) His symbolic step towards National Reconciliation was 
his cancellation of the June 19 holiday celebrating the 1965 
coup that brought former President Boumediene to power at the 
expense of then President Ben Bella.  Ben Bella recently 
publicly forgave all those involved in his overthrow and 
advised all Algerians to do the same.  To add further 
symbolism to the opening act of National Reconciliation, 
Bouteflika named the elderly Ben Bella as honorary President 
of the National Commission for General Amnesty.  He also 
treated -- and publicly embraced -- Ben Bella at a lavish 
November, 2004 ceremony celebrating the 50th anniversary of 
the war of liberation against France. 
 
WHO IS IN FAVOR OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The answer to this question was clearer before the 
murders of two Algerian diplomats in Baghdad July 27.  The 
public outrage at this barbaric act perpetrated by the same 
genre of terrorists that plagued Algeria for over a decade; 
the justification/encouragement of the killings by the number 
two man in the banned FIS party Ali Benhadj; and the GSPC's 
praise of the murders has led many to reconsider or qualify 
their support for the plan.  Yet, Bouteflika and his 
governing coalition still see National Reconciliation as a 
necessity, although with a less ambitious timeline in light 
of the current situation.  Foreign Minister Bedjaoui said 
July 30 that the referendum will go forward, but in light of 
the recent events it will need more reflection.  The leaders 
of the major political parties, FLN (National Liberation 
Front, RND (National Democratic Rally), MSP (Movement for a 
Society of Peace), and the Opposition Islamist Islah Party 
continue publicly to support the President.  President of the 
Human Rights Commission and the Ad Hoc Mechanism (for the 
disappeared) Farouk Ksentini also gave his enthusiastic 
support.  Others who support National Reconciliation include: 
President of the National Union of Algerian Zaouias (Sufi 
orders) Chaalal Mahmoud Omar, and far left Worker's Party 
leader Louiza Hanoune. 
WHO IS AGAINST NATIONAL RECONCILIATION? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Not surprisingly, the most outspoken groups against 
National Reconciliation are the families of the disappeared, 
who have been vehemently opposed to the General Amnesty 
portion of the plan.  While some of the Disparus groups are 
against a General Amnesty in any form, most are willing to 
entertain the idea of a limited General Amnesty, if a type of 
"truth commission" is established.  Their major concern is 
extending an amnesty to people with blood on their hands. 
While the groups do not differentiate between those who 
committed the crimes (terrorists versus security forces), 
they are agreed that those who committed human rights 
violations, particularly rape and murder, must not be granted 
amnesty.  Joining the Disparus groups are international NGOs, 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who 
have been critical of Bouteflika's process of going about 
National Reconciliation and General Amnesty.  In addition to 
being opposed to the lack of transparency on the contents of 
the plan itself, the NGOs believe that any amnesty without 
some type of judicial hearings or truth commission will harm 
the country in the long run. 
 
¶10. (C)  Disparus groups SOS Disparus, Le Collectif des 
Familles des Disparus en Algerie, The National Association of 
the Families of the Disappeared, and the Algerian League of 
Human Rights (LADDH) all echo the same sentiment.  First and 
foremost they want the truth.  They want to know what 
happened to their family members and then, possibly, they 
might consider a reconciliation of some kind.  To these 
groups, the idea of National Reconciliation without judicial 
inquiries is premature. 
 
HOW WILL BOUTEFLIKA MAKE THE REFERENDUM SUCCEED? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶11. (C) Embassy sources and the majority of the press believe 
that Bouteflika will use all "weapons" at his disposal to 
make sure the referendum passes.  The first weapon Bouteflika 
has in his arsenal is the influence of the Presidential 
alliance, led by its standard bearer, FLN, but also joined by 
the RND and the MSP political parties.  Mobilizing the 
members and student organizations of the MSP could be 
especially crucial to the outcome of the referendum.  Former 
Foreign Minister and current Minister of State Belkhadem in 
his capacity as head of the FLN can almost certainly secure 
the votes of the conservative former FIS members.  Second, 
Bouteflika can probably count on the support of the senior 
military, security apparatus, and those aligned with them. 
They are hopeful an amnesty will help eliminate any residual 
support for terrorist groups, which have been increasingly 
marginalized.  Third, and most critical, the President will 
play on the fears of ordinary citizens reminded by recent 
terrorist acts, including the execution of two Algerian 
diplomats in Iraq.  Bouteflika is expected to argue that the 
alternative to National Reconciliation -- as embodied by the 
referendum -- is further Algerian disunity and the potential 
for slippage toward more insecure times.  It is this fear, 
ripe for exploitation on the heels of recent prominent 
terrorist acts, that in the view of dispassionate Embassy 
sources will ultimately turn the tide in Bouteflika's favor. 
ERDMAN