This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001628 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR HOSTAGE WORKING GROUP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2015 
TAGS: PTER ASEC MOPS AG IZ
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN TERRORISM EXPERT COMMENTS ON MURDER OF 
DIPLOMATS, DEFEAT OF ALGERIAN TERRORISM 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Algerian journalist and terrorism expert 
Mounir Boudjemaa told DCM August 6 that the GOA had 
deliberately avoided mobilizing popular support for the 
release of the two diplomats kidnapped in Baghdad July 21 
because the government expected them to be killed.  Boudjemaa 
was uncertain how the GOA confirmed their deaths, but thought 
it had been based on analysis of extremist websites, rather 
than any specific information such as video tapes. 
Boudjemaa said he thought average Algerians were focused on 
domestic issues and not very concerned by Iraq, but the 
killings of the diplomats increased their awareness of the 
links between Algerian terrorists and Zarqawi's Al-Qaida in 
Iraq.  Turning to the state of Algeria's terrorist 
organizations, he said their capabilities were greatly 
reduced, especially in the cities.  GSPC in particular 
continued to operate in some mountainous areas, but they now 
"lived like wolves" and had poor morale.  GSPC had links with 
Maghrebi terrorist networks in Europe, but Boudjemaa was 
skeptical of the GSPC's ability to support direct ties to 
Zarqawi, especially after the killing of the diplomats.  If 
Bouteflika's National Reconciliation plan is implemented, 
Boudjemaa predicted, it would effectively put an end to the 
remaining Algerian terrorist groups.  That said, some former 
terrorists have now turned to banditry, and Algeria faced a 
growing problem of violent street crime.  End summary. 
 
GOA Response to Kidnapping of Diplomats 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Mounir Boudjemaa is a journalist for the respected 
Algerian French-language daily Le Quotidien d'Oran, who 
writes on terrorism and national security issues.  Boudjemaa 
is one of the few journalists who has contacts with both the 
security services and Algerian terrorist groups.  In an 
August 6 conversation with DCM, Boudjemaa said his GOA 
contacts had told him that the Algerian government 
deliberately refrained from trying to mobilize public opinion 
and Islamic leaders to demand the release of the two Algerian 
diplomats kidnapped in Baghdad July 21 and reportedly killed 
July 27.  Algerian security services, he commented, had been 
convinced from the beginning that Zarqawi would kill the two 
captives shortly after taking them hostage, and therefore the 
GOA decided to impose a virtual news blackout and avoid 
getting the public involved. 
 
¶3.  (C) DCM asked specifically if Boudjemaa had any 
information about the basis on which the Presidency had 
confirmed the two diplomats' deaths less than two hours after 
the release of an Al-Qaida in Iraq statement announcing they 
had been killed.  Boudjemaa said his contacts had told him 
the confirmation was based solely on Algerian terrorism 
experts' monitoring of extremist websites and analysis of 
past practice by Zarqawi's organization.  He did not think 
the Algerians had received a videotape or eyewitness 
confirmation of their deaths. 
 
Impact on Algerian Public 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Asked about the popular reaction, Boudjemaa commented 
that Algerians generally were exhausted by the terrorist 
violence they had experienced in their own country in the 
1990s, and had little real emotional engagement with problems 
abroad.  While the Algerian media covered Iraq extensively 
and often with a slant hostile to what is usually described 
here as the "American occupation," Boudjemaa said that before 
the kidnapping of the two diplomats, genuine interest in Iraq 
was limited to Islamist and leftist circles.  He agreed, 
however, that the GOA's Iraq policy had been much more 
nuanced, that Algeria had supported Security Council 
resolutions that provided legitimacy to the transfer of 
sovereignty and to the role of MNF-I, even while these 
positions were never clearly explained to the public. 
Boudjemaa thought the intense attention in the press to the 
deaths of the two diplomats, and especially the statements by 
GSPC urging Zarqawi to kill them, had driven home the 
connections between Algerian terrorism and terrorism in Iraq. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Asked about former Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 
number two Ali Benhadj's remarks to Al-Jazeera in which 
Benhadj praised Zarqawi, justified taking the diplomats 
"prisoner" on the grounds that they were supporting the 
"occupation," and said it was up to Zarqawi to decide what to 
do with them (statements for which Benhadj is under 
indictment), Boudjemaa said it only proved that Benhadj is 
"not a politician" and "lives in the Middle Ages."  Boudjemaa 
thought it was equally revealing that former FIS leader 
Abassi Madani, who lives in Qatar, had issued an appeal for 
the release of a French woman journalist kidnapped in Iraq 
several months ago, but had said nothing about the Algerian 
diplomats until after they were dead.  Boudjemaa thought the 
former FIS leaders' off-key response to this incident would 
likely further undermine their reputations with ordinary 
Algerians and confirm the view that they are dangerously out 
of touch with reality. 
 
Algerian Terrorists "Live Like Wolves" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Turning to the security situation in Algeria, 
Boudjemaa stated that even the largest Algerian terrorist 
organization, the GSPC, now had minimal capabilities in any 
of the urban areas.  While terrorist ambushes of military 
patrols and military counterstrikes continue almost on a 
daily basis in several mountainous areas, Boudjemaa said he 
did not think GSPC could mount a serious attack in Algiers. 
In contrast to the mid-1990s, when GIA and GSPC "emirs" truly 
lived like princes in their mountain hideouts, today they 
"live like wolves," stealing sheep and wearing rags. 
 
¶7.  (C) Asked to project Algeria's security profile five 
years out, Boudjemaa said that if Bouteflika succeeded in 
introducing a National Reconciliation policy, including some 
kind of amnesty, it would take away the terrorists' last card 
and they would fade away within a few years. 
Violence-hardened ex-terrorists, stripped of their Islamic 
veneer but skilled at using weapons and without remorse, 
however, were already feeding a growing problem of banditry, 
and this kind of violent criminality would likely grow. 
Boudjemaa added that Algeria also faced a growing problem of 
violent juvenile delinquency.  Middle class urban Algerians 
no longer feared being killed by terrorist gangs when they 
went out at night, but that fear was starting to be replaced 
by a fear of being mugged by knife-wielding young thugs. 
 
Algerian Terrorist Networks 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Boudjemaa concluded the discussion by observing that 
Algerians, as well as Moroccans and Tunisians, were active in 
European terrorist networks, with the Algerians particularly 
active in France and the Moroccans in Spain.  While he was 
aware there were efforts to organize groups of young 
Algerians to join Zarqawi's terrorist cells in Iraq, 
Boudjemaa commented that he doubted these efforts would 
amount to much because Algerians were not very familiar with 
how to conduct themselves in Syria or Iraq and were not 
comfortable operating in the eastern Arab environment. 
Similarly, Boudjemaa said Algerian terrorists had established 
a network in Canada but he thought they had failed to do so 
in the U.S. for similar reasons.  DCM agreed this made sense, 
citing an MNF-I report that showed that Algerians only 
constituted about one percent of captured non-Iraqi 
terrorists held by U.S. forces in Iraq. 
 
¶9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
ERDMAN