This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER KISL PGOV AG LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES ALGERIAN STABILITY, 
VIEWS ON ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Over lunch at the Residence August 6, newly 
arrived Libyan Ambassador Abdel Moula El-Ghadbane described 
to Ambassador and DCM his views on President Bouteflika's 
role in stabilizing Algeria's internal political situation, 
as well as his critique of Islamic extremism in Algeria and 
throughout the region.  El-Ghadbane, who previously served as 
Ambassador to Algiers in the early 1990s, described 
Bouteflika's role as crucial to a dual process of 
marginalizing Islamist terrorism while also containing 
divisions within the Algerian ruling elite.  El-Ghadbane 
expressed support for Bouteflika's promotion of National 
Reconciliation, stated that Libyan security services 
cooperate fully with their Algerian counterparts, and 
described new Libyan investment in Algeria as partly intended 
to support Algerian stability.  El-Ghadbane asserted that 
Libya had recognized the threat from Islamist extremism 
already in the 1980s, and described some of the steps the 
Libyans had taken to counter it.  Ambassador noted that we 
hoped Libya could serve as an example for other countries, 
such as Syria, of how changed behavior can put bilateral 
relations on a positive track.  El-Ghadbane said Libya could 
use its influence to counter the charge that the U.S. was 
pursuing an anti-Arab policy.  At the same time, he hoped 
that the U.S. would remove Libya from the list of state 
supporters of terrorism and commented that bilateral 
relations should be conducted on the basis of dialogue and 
not pressure.  End summary. 
 
Bouteflika Bringing Stability to Algeria 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador invited newly arrived Libyan Ambassador 
El-Ghadbane to a working lunch at his residence August 7. 
DCM also attended and translated for El-Ghadbane, who 
understands English but does not speak it well.  El-Ghadbane 
began by noting that this was his second posting as 
Ambassador in Algiers, having previously served here from 
1991-94, at the height of the armed Islamist attempt to seize 
power.  He gave Bouteflika most of the credit for the 
tremendous improvement in the security situation in Algiers 
since his previous posting.  Bouteflika, he said, had been 
the only Algerian leader able to marginalize the Islamic 
extremists while also balancing competing power centers 
within the regime.  Bouteflika had done this by recognizing 
that counterterrorist efforts by the security services needed 
to be complemented by political, economic and social 
components, including Bouteflika's National Reconciliation 
program which El-Ghadbane noted was "not supported by 
everyone" in the Algerian regime.  Now, with the Algerian 
treasury flush with oil revenues, Algerians able to express 
their views and not be confronted by government 
"provocations," and a major public works and housing program 
slated for implementation over the next five years, 
El-Ghadbane said he was optimistic that Bouteflika would 
succeed, and in the process help stabilize the entire Maghreb 
and trans-Sahelian regions.  Libya was doing its part through 
private sector investment in Algeria's tourist sector, as 
well as longstanding close cooperation between the two 
countries' security services.  Libya has 800 kilometers of 
frontier with Algeria, he noted, and it was crucial to 
Libya's security that Algeria remain stable "so we don't face 
another Afghanistan on our border." 
 
Algerians Marked by Violence 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Describing the internal Algerian situation in the 
early 1990s, El-Ghadbane said that Algerians were a product 
of their history.  The violence of their struggle for 
independence from France had left a mark on their mentality, 
convincing them that violence was the best means to achieve 
political change.  Many veterans of the independence struggle 
offered intellectual justifications of violence that the 
Islamists then put to their own uses.  FIS leaders Madani and 
Benhadj publicly pretended to play by the rules of the 
electoral system in place at the time, but they had no real 
control over the mass of armed terrorists, many of them 
veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, 
waiting to wage jihad against an "apostate" Algerian state. 
After a string of unsuccessful Algerian leaders, Bouteflika 
had been the first to recognize the importance of building up 
moderate Islamic institutions, both formal ones such as the 
High Islamic Council, and informal ones such as the Sufi 
orders, which formed important elements of the President's 
support base around the country.  Education reform was also 
essential, especially doing away with Islamic studies 
programs at the secondary and university level since such 
programs produced graduates who had no skills except the 
ability to interpret the Quran, often according to extremist 
conceptions. 
 
Libyan Methods for Countering Islamic Extremism 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (C) Turning to Libya, El-Ghadbane said his country had 
been among the first to recognize the threat from Islamic 
extremism.  Ambassador noted that during its attempt at 
Arabization of the education system, Algeria had imported 
thousands of teachers from Egypt, many of whom turned out to 
be members of the Muslim Brotherhood.  El-Ghadbane said Libya 
had done the same, but had expelled any Egyptian teacher who 
advocated Brotherhood viewpoints.  As an example, he cited an 
Egyptian teacher working in a small Libyan village school who 
had cursed the memory of Nasser.  The parents of the students 
immediately demanded that the teacher be expelled.  Libya 
also banned Islamic studies as an area of academic 
specialization.  Any college graduate who studied the Libyan 
version of liberal arts (largely Arab history and language) 
could lead Friday prayers at a mosque, for example.  Libya 
had also recognized the potential for young Arabs to become 
radicalized by the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, 
and had actively blocked young Libyans from volunteering to 
fight there.  It also prevented the few Libyan veterans of 
that war from returning home. 
 
Libya as a Model 
---------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ambassador said he was pleased to see the changes in 
Libyan policies that had made possible the subsequent 
development of U.S. relations with Libya, since Libya could 
serve as an example for other countries that still supported 
terrorism and pursued WMD.  El-Ghadbane agreed, noting that 
Libya could help counter the widely held Arab view that U.S. 
policies were anti-Arab.  "You are only against a small group 
of Arabs who are the enemies of everyone," he commented. 
El-Ghadbane added that Libya hoped the U.S. would remove it 
from the list of state supporters of terrorism.  El-Ghadbane, 
who appears to be in his mid-forties, told Ambassador that he 
was representative of his generation of Libyans, who "were 
not brought up to hate."  He said he hoped the U.S. would 
learn to tolerate some differences of opinion with Qadhafi, 
who he said was a man known for speaking his mind. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  We defer to USLO Tripoli as to the accuracy 
of El-Ghadbane's description of Libya's handling of Islamic 
extremism.  We found him very personable, well-spoken, 
thoughtful, and open to engagement with Ambassador.  His 
analysis of Algeria's internal situation tracks fairly 
closely with our own.  El-Ghadbane is not a career diplomat. 
He studied biology in Libya, received a doctorate in Hungary, 
and returned to Libya to teach at the university level. 
 
¶7.  (U) USLO Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
ERDMAN