This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

011241Z Jul 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KWBG KPAL IS GOI INTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
SUBJECT: ISRAELI LEFT-WING LEADERS UNCERTAIN OF WHAT WILL 
FOLLOW DISENGAGEMENT 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment:  In a June 29 dinner hosted by 
the Ambassador, leaders of the Labor and Yahad-Meretz parties 
could not agree on what steps the GOI will -- or even should 
-- take following disengagement.  The group had divergent 
views on whether and to what degree Prime Minister Sharon 
would continue the disengagement process, although all of 
their scenarios included Sharon in a key decision-making 
role.  The group did agree that the government coalition is 
likely to change by the end of the year.  The significance of 
the discussion was that it once again demonstrated the 
difficulty in predicting post-disengagement scenarios, even 
when the analysts are experienced Israeli politicians who 
generally share similar views and party affiliations.  Vice 
Premier and Labor Chairman Shimon Peres, Minister and Labor 
leader Haim Ramon, Yahad-Meretz Chairman Yossi Beilin, 
Ambassador Avi Gil, Shimon Center Director Ron Pundak and 
others participated in the discussion.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Lack of Agreement on GOI Steps Post-Disengagement 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador asked what steps the GOI will take 
following disengagement.  Peres, who has told several CoDels 
that "disengagement first cannot mean disengagement last," 
conjectured that Sharon may decide to announce the withdrawal 
from additional West Bank settlements, but to retain all the 
major settlement blocks.  Peres believed this policy would 
leave the Palestinians with control over 60-70 percent of the 
West Bank.  Gil claimed that Sharon will drag the process out 
with a series of mini-disengagements, each one followed by a 
lengthy "time-out" to adjust to the new situation. 
 
¶3. (C) Ramon urged "a second disengagement to avoid a third 
intifada," calling the occupation of Palestinian territory an 
existential threat to the existence of Israel.  He advocated 
continued unilateral GOI steps coordinated -- when possible 
--- with the Palestinians.  His suggestion is to continue 
disengagement from the West Bank, removing approximately 
50,000 settlers while retaining the major settlement blocks, 
including Ariel.  He maintained that disengagement from 
settlements outside the security fence would leave the 
Palestinians with approximately 93 percent of the West Bank. 
Ramon said that Sharon can pursue this course regardless of 
what he tells his constituents, because the Prime Minister 
can always claim that he was forced to act by international 
pressure. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Disagreement on Addressing Final Status Issues 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4. (C) The Israeli leaders could not agree on whether the GOI 
should attempt to resolve final status issues following 
disengagement.  Gil said he thought Sharon would offer a 
return to the road map in exchange for an end to terror 
attacks, a condition he believed the Palestinians are 
unlikely to be able to meet.  Ramon rejected calls for a move 
to final settlement issues for two reasons, the lack of a 
Palestinian or Israeli partner capable of making tough 
decisions and what he believes is a clear lack of Israeli 
public support for addressing the Jerusalem and refugee 
issues.  Ramon added that President Abbas is too weak to 
negotiate final status issues.  Beilin, Gil and Pundak 
countered with claims that the intifada had increased the 
Israeli public's support for a move toward a final 
settlement, but that GOI leaders have not had the courage to 
take the necessary steps.  They criticized Ramon's plan as 
capitulation to Sharon's "go-slow" approach. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Agreement that the GOI will Change After Disengagement 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. (C) The left-wing politicians all agreed that the outcome 
of the disengagement plan would influence the composition and 
leadership of the next coalition government.  Peres noted 
that Sharon does not trust the Labor Party and is acutely 
aware of the need to maintain two coalitions, one with the 
right wing of Likud and one with the United States.  Ramon 
said that the Likud rebels are actively working to undermine 
the PM's power base in the party and predicted that Sharon 
will not be the Likud candidate in the next election.  Ramon 
conjectured that Sharon, Peres and Shinui leader Tommy Lapid 
might agree to form a new coalition government after 
disengagement is complete. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER