This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 002155 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS TREASURY FOR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY GLASER 
AND AJOVES 
FINCEN FOR RMILLER AND WBAITY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015 
TAGS: ETTC KTFN KCRM EFIN PTER SNAR SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE CITES OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED FINANCIAL 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT (FIU) COOPERATION 
 
REF: SINGAPORE 1706 
 
Classified By: Acting Economic and Political Counselor 
Paul Horowitz, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Singapore's Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU), the Suspicious Transaction Reports Office (STRO), 
told its U.S. FinCEN FIU counterpart that it was willing to 
share financial crimes-related information, but that it 
would be unable to do so unless such information were 
traceable to the limited number of names (about 10,000) 
available in its database of suspicious transaction reports 
(STRs).  STRO agreed to explore ways to improve FIU-to-FIU 
cooperation based on the recently concluded Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU).  It noted, however, that it would be 
difficult to broaden cooperation given that, with the 
exception of cases involving drug trafficking and terrorism 
finance, Singapore's bank secrecy laws prohibited financial 
institutions from divulging account holder information 
unless an STR had been filed.  STRO suggested that FinCEN 
and U.S. law enforcement agencies provide more detailed 
information in their suspicious transaction requests in 
order to facilitate STR database searches.  In response to 
USG law enforcement's frustration with the low level of 
positive responses to information requests, STRO asked FinCEN 
for a list of pending cases and offered to provide relevant 
updates, including explanations for any processing delays. 
See para 7 for a list of follow-up action items.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Rena Miller, FinCEN Regional Specialist (East 
Asia and Europe), met June 3 with Mr. PEH Chin Wah, Head, 
Suspicious Transaction Reports Office (STRO), Singapore 
Police Commercial Affairs Division (CAD), and Mr. GOH Tee 
Jong, CAD Deputy Superintendent of Police, to discuss ways 
to begin cooperation under the FIU MOU signed by FinCEN and 
STRO in December 2004. 
 
Limits to Singapore,s Assistance 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Peh stressed that STRO was willing to share 
available information with FinCEN and, with the FIU MOU in 
place, to make the necessary disclosures on an FIU-to-FIU 
basis using the Egmont Secure Web system.  He cautioned, 
however, that a number of procedural and legal restrictions 
impeded its ability to extend its cooperation, in 
particular: 
 
-- STRO can potentially access a broad range of databases to 
process requests from U.S. law enforcement, but only if a 
"hit" is first generated in the STR database.  The STR 
database is small, containing no more than 5,000 - 6,000 
suspicious transaction reports and approximately 10,000 
names.  Once a "hit" has been identified, STRO can then 
access several other databases, including those used for 
criminal records; the Registry of Companies and Businesses; 
the Registry of Marriages, Births and Deaths (including 
information for suspects' immediate relatives); residential 
addresses; vehicle registries; and telephone directories. 
The Singapore Police's investigations database can confirm 
whether an investigation is pending or has been conducted 
previously, even in the absence of any subsequent formal 
court proceedings.  Peh noted, however, that any information 
related to the investigation beyond confirmation of its 
undertaking would not be made available to us.  (Note: 
STRO's current practice when conducting an STR database 
search is to provide a "negative response to our queries that 
yield more than one possible name.  End note.) 
 
Goh said that STRO began collecting STRs only in 2000 
following its establishment as Singapore's FIU; it processed 
1,760 STRs in 2004.  Peh estimated that roughly three to five 
percent of STRs investigated resulted in 
prosecutions.  STRO received roughly 150 STRs each month, Peh 
said, and investigated most of them, usually by checking bank 
account information that included ownership details and 
transaction history. 
 
-- Singapore's bank secrecy laws limit STRO to providing 
account information only for those individuals whose names 
appear in the STR database.  Under the Banking Act (Chapter 
19, Section 47), a financial institution cannot share a 
customer's account information without a court order -- 
unless the suspected offense involves drug trafficking or 
financing of terrorism.  Goh explained that a court order was 
relatively easy to obtain so long as "reasonable grounds" for 
suspicion could be established. 
 
(Note:  Even with access to account information, the quality 
and breadth of data is limited by the fact that the Singapore 
government relies on only one type of report -- the STR. 
Singapore does not collect currency transaction reports, 
which monitor high-value cash transactions, or currency and 
monetary instrument reports, which monitor cross-border 
currency movements -- all of which, along with a number of 
other reports, are compiled in the United States.  Banks and 
other financial institutions themselves have record-keeping 
requirements related to customer due diligence and customer 
transactions, for example, but again, we do not have access 
to this information without an STR "hit."  End note.) 
 
STRO Suggests Ways to Improve Cooperation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Assuming individuals were subjects of an STR "hit," 
Peh emphasized that, if FinCEN wanted detailed information 
about them, it should indicate this on the investigations 
request form, i.e., note what specific databases it would 
like searched.  He asked that, where possible, FinCEN note 
whether the suspect was a Singapore citizen or permanent 
resident (the STR database is divided into these two 
categories), and whether FinCEN lacked certain information 
such as a name, passport number or an address in an effort 
to avoid processing delays. 
 
¶5.  (C) In response to Miller's query about whether STRO 
used a networking system similar to FinCEN's, whereby a 
requesting law enforcement agency could be put in direct 
contact with the receiving law enforcement agency, Goh said 
that it did not, but that STRO could instruct the relevant 
agency to engage directly with its counterparts in the 
United States.  Goh admitted, however, that such 
instructions from STRO were rare, and that the common 
practice among Singapore law enforcement agencies was to 
submit a request through Interpol in Washington, where it 
would be transferred to the appropriate U.S. agency.  Goh 
said that the STRO would be interested in participating in 
FinCEN's networking system. 
 
¶6.  (C) Miller noted that U.S. law enforcement agencies 
were frustrated by difficulties in obtaining responses from 
STRO, even when requests for information had been channeled 
through FinCEN.  Peh replied that these delays were most 
likely due to a lack of basic information or incorrect 
information such as a misspelled name.  Goh noted that STRO 
had worked with Drug Enforcement Agency and Customs and 
Border Protection representatives in the past, but that in 
some cases it was impossible to provide the requested 
information.  This was especially true of cases involving 
individuals resident in Indonesia, he said, since Singapore 
and Indonesia lacked any agreement to facilitate this type 
of law enforcement cooperation.  He suggested that both the 
FIU MOU and the Drug Designation Agreement (DDA) were good 
channels by which to facilitate investigations opened in 
the United States. 
 
Follow Up Action Items 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) In an effort to expand bilateral FIU cooperation, 
FinCEN and STRO agreed to the following action items: 
 
-- FinCEN will provide STRO with a list of any pending 
requests so that STRO can respond with the information and 
any relevant explanations for processing delays. 
 
-- Both sides will explore ways to improve information 
sharing, including the possibility of participating in an 
international analyst exchange in which designated FinCEN 
and STRO staff would be given access to their respective 
counterpart's databases to research specific cases of 
interest. 
 
-- With FinCEN's assistance, U.S. law enforcement agencies 
will endeavor to facilitate better database search results 
by providing STRO with more detailed information requests. 
-- In cases where database searches generate a number of 
possible matches, STRO will try to provide, upon request from 
FinCEN, a list of these names, up to between 10 and 30 total. 
 End note.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The FIU MOU was a first step, but much work remains 
to be done.  With few names in its database of STRs, 
especially relative to Singapore's size as a financial 
center, and 
no authorization in most cases to reach beyond that 
database, STRO possesses limited ability to provide 
investigative assistance to U.S. law enforcement entities. 
Our past record of cooperation is weak, and STRO has rarely 
availed itself of FinCEN's services, having submitted 
relatively few requests since it began operations in 2000. 
Even with the Drug Designation Agreement in place, 
cooperation on this front has been spotty at best.  In 
conjunction with FinCEN and other USG agencies, we will 
continue to push the GOS to increase its responsiveness. 
 
¶9.  (C) In our broader discussions on law enforcement issues, 
GOS officials typically convey a conviction that cooperation, 
where available, is excellent.  They have, however, begun 
signaling that there has been a change in mindset internally 
to do more with us in areas where cooperation heretofore has 
been limited or nonexistent (e.g., mutual legal assistance, 
tax fraud, etc.).  We are vigorously pursuing this purported 
willingness to change across the spectrum of law enforcement 
activity here. 
 
¶10.  (U) Rena Miller cleared this cable. 
FERGIN