This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 002023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PINR TH ID BM SN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BOYCE'S JUNE 27 MEETING WITH MINISTER 
MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Franklin L. Lavin reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  On June 27, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand 
Ralph Boyce and Singapore's senior statesman, Minister Mentor 
Lee Kuan Yew, exchanged perspectives on Thai Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra's leadership style, prospects for a 
peaceful resolution to Thailand's problems in the South, 
Thailand's role in ASEAN as well as the Burma problem, 
Indonesian President Yudhoyono, and the next UN Secretary 
General.  In the hour-long meeting, Lee questioned Thaksin's 
long-term impact on the Thai political landscape and his 
prospects for improving the situation in the South, but 
welcomed his influence as a "pacesetter" in ASEAN.  End 
Summary. 
 
Thaksin's "Un-Thai" leadership style 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Asked for his views on Thaksin's leadership and 
Thailand's future, Ambassador Boyce noted that Thaksin's 
political style is significantly different from that of other 
Thai politicians, and that it may have transformed Thai 
politics.  Thaksin's party, he noted, was the first to win in 
both Bangkok and upcountry, the first to win reelection, and 
the first to campaign on real issues -- such as health care 
-- and then deliver on his promises.  In many ways, his 
personal style is "un-Thai," in that he is a strong 
"CEO-style" leader rather than a coalition-builder; he can 
also be impatient and is often too quick to react to 
criticism without thinking, Boyce observed. 
 
¶3. (C) Lee agreed that Thaksin's problem is that he does not 
have the ASEAN "style," and tends to step on corners.  Lee 
noted that Thaksin shoots from the hip and tends to make 
quick decisions without much advice, and as a result has 
antagonized both Prime Minister Abdullah in Malaysia and 
President Yudhoyono in Indonesia.  Lee questioned how much 
long-term impact Thaksin would have on the political culture 
of Thailand, however, noting that "he cannot change the Thai 
character" (characterized by forbearance, give and take, and 
a live-and-let-live philosophy).  Thaksin is not that kind of 
man, Lee said, but once he is gone Thai politics will revert 
to a more traditional style.  Lee noted that Thaksin will not 
be able to stop the "money politics" that have always defined 
Thai politics, and that he has in fact brought it to a whole 
new level. 
 
¶4. (C) Despite these concerns, the Minister Mentor said that 
from a Singapore perspective, Thaksin is a positive influence 
on ASEAN because he is willing to be "out in front" on many 
issues and his forward-leaning attitude is influencing other 
ASEAN members.  FTAs are an example: former Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir once denounced bilateral and regional FTAs, 
but now that Thailand has decided to pursue such 
arrangements, Malaysia has realized it too must follow this 
path; Indonesia is likely to follow, suggested Lee. 
 
The South 
--------- 
 
¶5. (C) Lee said that the situation in the South is the one 
serious problem that could upset much of the progress Thaksin 
has achieved in Thailand.  Ambassador Boyce noted that 
Thaksin's treatment of the issue as a simple law-and-order 
problem that could be fixed with a few arrests had 
exacerbated this situation, and turned a manageable problem 
into a full-fledged crisis.  Ambassador Boyce noted that many 
of the social programs in the South that had been dismantled 
by the Thaksin government had actually been working.  Lee 
agreed that the situation was grim.  The local "Muslim mafia" 
is involved, and that will not disappear easily, he said.  He 
noted that it is only a matter of time before international 
terrorists become involved, and the situation goes "the 
Mindanao route."  Ultimately, a way needs to be found to give 
Thai Muslims a standard of living closer to that which their 
brethren enjoy in northern Malaysia, Lee stressed.  Lee said 
that Thaksin's personality, his tendency to shoot from the 
hip, and to take hardline stands, may make the problem even 
more difficult to solve.  Ambassador Boyce noted that 
Thaksin's hardline on the South, although it did worsen the 
situation, was immensely popular in the rest of Thailand. 
 
¶6. (C) Lee asked about the commission appointed by Thaksin to 
make recommendations on resolving the southern problem. 
Ambassador Boyce said that while it has been suggested that 
the commission is merely an eyewash for the Bangkok elite, 
the person tapped to head the commission, Anan, is a serious 
character who is not afraid to speak out.  Ambassador Boyce 
said he is confident the inquiry is being done in the right 
spirit.  The recommendations, however, are expected to focus 
on culture, education, and public outreach.  The South will 
still have day-to-day law enforcement issues to cope with, a 
difficult task given that the worst of the police and 
military are still sent there as punishment, he said.  Lee 
asked if Thaksin might consider putting Anan in charge of 
implementing the commission's recommendations; Ambassador 
Boyce noted that this possibility has been discussed. 
 
Burma 
----- 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Boyce asked how ASEAN will deal with the 
issue of Burma's membership and potential chairmanship of the 
organization.  Lee noted that he thought expansion of ASEAN 
had been a mistake, but that it was one ASEAN now had to live 
with.  He said that expelling Burma at this point would be 
going too far, but that the junta must be told that they "are 
an embarrassment" and suspended from attending meetings until 
they change their ways.  Lee noted that convincing Vietnam of 
this would be hard, and Cambodia and Laos were not supportive 
either.  Lee also noted that Thaksin has not been 
particularly helpful on this issue.  Thaksin's instinct to 
"react to everything" has led to poor decisions, he said, 
such as distancing Thailand from initiatives like Malaysia's 
effort to persuade Burma to drop its claim to the 
chairmanship.  He is in danger of making Thailand appear to 
be a mouthpiece for the junta, Lee said. 
 
Yudhoyono 
--------- 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador Boyce asked Lee for his thoughts on 
President Yudhoyono of Indonesia.  Lee said that Indonesia is 
not on a rapid path to stability and prosperity, but that he 
is more optimistic than he was when Yudhoyono was first 
inaugurated.  Lee noted that Yudhoyono seems to have found a 
certain self-confidence, particularly in his dealings with 
Vice President Jusuf Kalla, where he now appears to be 
asserting himself on key matters.  According to Lee, 
Yudhoyono has decided that he is the President, he wants to 
be President, and he wants to leave his mark on the 
Presidency.  Yudhoyono won't get into a confrontation with 
Kalla, Lee said, but he does appear willing and able to keep 
Kalla in his place and not be pushed around.  Kalla, Lee 
noted, is a doer -- he is very smart, very quick, and will 
take over the job if given the opportunity; he will also 
become the wealthiest man in Indonesia if given a chance. 
 
The Next UN Secretary General 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Ambassador Boyce noted that Thaksin is determined 
that Deputy Prime Minister Surakiat Sathirathai should be the 
next UN Secretary General, and that Thaksin believes that 
ASEAN and China support Surakiat's candidacy.  Lee shared 
that he does not believe Surakiat is up to the task.  Lee 
also said that he thought it unlikely that most ASEAN 
countries and China support Surakiat, although they will not 
tell Thaksin "no" directly.  He questioned whether Surakiat 
has any hope of winning the position, asking, "will the world 
want to be saddled with Surakiat for five years?"  Lee 
suggested that the UN should "pass Asia," and allow the 
Secretary General to be selected from a different continent. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶10. (U) Ambassador Boyce cleared this cable. 
LAVIN