This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 002126 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS MO QA BA ES UNGA
SUBJECT: EL SALVADORS'S EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY - ARAB 
ALLIES 
 
REF: A. SAN SALVADOR 553 
     ¶B. SAN SALVADOR 723 
     ¶C. 2004 SAN SALVADOR 3103 
     ¶D. 2004 SAN SALVADOR 795 
     ¶E. SAN SALVADOR 1983 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Mark Silverman, Reason 1.4 (b). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Following a July 20 visit by Morocco's 
Health Minister, leading daily "La Prensa Grafica" led July 
25 with a 3-page spread detailing El Salvador's evolving 
political strategy and rapprochement with the Middle East. 
The article discussed El Salvador's hopes of gaining an 
ECOSOC, or even a non-permanent UNSC seat, and echoed Embassy 
reporting from January (Ref A) that, in 2004, El Salvador 
supported additional anti-Israeli resolutions at the UNGA. 
The article also provided a historical backdrop to current 
GOES efforts to gain favor with countries such as Qatar and 
Morocco. 
 
¶2. (C) As noted in reftels, the GOES is adopting a more 
"practical" foreign policy and is leveraging what little 
political weight it has on Middle-East issues (Ref A), on 
China/Taiwan recognition (Refs B,C), and even on votes that 
the U.S. once took for granted, such as the annual UNGA Cuban 
human rights resolution (Ref D).  El Salvador's more nuanced 
foreign policy and political calculus may affect Salvadoran 
positions in the lead-up to, and plenary of, the 60th UNGA - 
including on such critical topics as UNSC enlargement, 
though, as noted in Ref E, El Salvador is not likely to 
support the G-4 proposal on UNSC reform.  End Summary. 
 
 
UN VOTE PACT WITH MOROCCO 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) A full-page article in the leading daily, "La Prensa 
Grafica", noted the July 20 visit of the Moroccan Health 
Minister, and quoted FM Lainez as stating that El Salvador is 
changing its diplomatic strategy by reaching out to 
non-traditional allies such as Morocco and Qatar.  The 
article detailed a vote swap: Salvadoran support for 
Morocco's candidate to the International Court of Justice, in 
exchange for Moroccan support for El Salvador's bid to gain 
an ECOSOC seat.  The story referred to the December 2003 
visit to Morocco by then-FM Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Avila 
as the starting point of the current relationship, and 
detailed official communications discussing the vote swap. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The article also discussed other bilaterals with NEA 
leaders, such as Saca's September 2004 visit with Qatar's 
Emir in New York and Vice President de Escobar's June 2005 
visit to Qatar.  Additionally, the article said that reaching 
out to the Middle East began under former President Flores, 
who in 1999-2000 established diplomatic relations with 
Bahrain and Qatar and that, as part of this turning point, 
then-FM Brizuela de Avila made a November 2001 speech before 
the UNGA defending the Palestinian right to 
self-determination. 
 
 
UNSC REFORM and THE ANTI-ISRAELI VOTES 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) An adjoining full-page article noted El Salvador's 
ambition to secure not only an ECOSOC seat, but also a 
non-permanent UNSC seat.  In an over-simplified manner, the 
article outlined UNSC reform possibilities as the U.S. 
position of maintaining the status-quo, versus the 
"EU/Japan/Brazil" position of increasing the number of 
permanent seats.  The article transitioned into a discussion 
of, and, eventually, a separate full-page article describing 
El Salvador's vote shifts on Israel/Palestinian resolutions 
at the 59th UNGA, and implicitly inferred that this was a 
strategy to distance itself somewhat from US/Israel policy 
and to increase NEA support for El Salvador's participation 
in UN bodies.  (Note: Ref B reported on El Salvador's 
ideological retreat on Israel at the UN and the emerging 
"practical" approach of the Saca administration, and 
commented that El Salvador is trying to show some 
"independence" at the lowest possible cost to the 
all-important bilateral relationship with the U.S.  End 
Note.)  (Comment: As post outlined in Ref E, El Salvador is 
not likely to support the current G-4 UNSC expansion 
proposal.  End Comment.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) The pair of articles described how El Salvador 
changed its vote on A/RES/59/123 - "Israeli Settlements in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory", and noted that El 
Salvador voted in favor of many pro-Palestinian resolutions. 
(Note: Ref B highlights six "anti-Israeli" resolutions that 
El Salvador abstained on at the 58th, but supported at the 
59th UNGA.  End note.)  The articles discount the possible 
fallout with Israel, and quote Israeli Ambassador to El 
Salvador Jonathan Peled as stating that El Salvador's voting 
will not affect the bilateral relationship, and that El 
Salvador, like any independent country, at times votes more 
in favor of Israel, and at times less. 
 
INTERVIEW WITH FM LAINEZ 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Part of the coverage was a four-question interview 
with FM Lainez.  Lainez was quoted as stating, "foreign 
policy is dynamic and evolutionary, and El Salvador must find 
its place within the new globalized world, and to do so you 
can see El Salvador is taking new postures with respect to 
various policies, not just the Near East."  In response to 
questions on whether El Salvador had changed from its 
predictable past voting on Arab-Israeli policy issues, and 
what risk this might imply regarding traditional allies, 
Lainez stated that the government's decisions have been the 
"fruit" of an analysis of the issues, that each decision is 
discussed with the involved parties, and that El Salvador has 
always tried to take rational and principled votes. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Comment.  While the articles trace this evolving 
diplomatic strategy back to the Flores Administration, 
Embassy has noted significant changes under the Saca 
Administration.  This could be in part due to the 
transaction-oriented business backgrounds of both Saca and FM 
Lainez and their willingness to look at strategy through that 
optic and depart from the status-quo.  Additionally, the 
Salvadoran Ambassador to the UN, Carmen Gallardo, is thought 
to be more oriented toward the European Union, and is also 
likely an advocate of a revised Salvadoran foreign policy. 
As reftels have noted, however, the bilateral relationship 
with the U.S. is all-important; this fact limits major 
departure from long-time support of key U.S. foreign policy 
priorities.  This said, El Salvador's continued deployment in 
Iraq has allowed the GOES to secure political capital with 
the U.S., and small exercises of independence and leveraging, 
such as changing posture on anti-Israeli votes, or even 
supporting UN reforms that are not the first choice of the 
U.S., can be expected from time to time. 
 
¶9. (C) As noted in Ref D, El Salvador is not in favor of, and 
has stated concern with, the G-4 UNCS enlargement proposal, 
particularly in that Brazil would be allotted a permanent 
seat.  Despite GOES "concern" and recurring statements that 
UN reform should be carried out in an integral way, El 
Salvador has still not firmly committed to voting against the 
G-4 proposal.  Interlocutors continue to tell Emboffs that El 
Salvador is waiting to see all of the proposals to develop a 
firm stance.  End Comment. 
Barclay