This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

030517Z Jul 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001820 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KMCA KMPI YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION COALITION PREPARES FOR 2006 ELECTIONS 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Nabeel Khoury for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In recent weeks Sanaa has been abuzz with 
rumors that the opposition party coalition, the Joint Meeting 
Parties (JMP) plans to nominate a challenger to President 
Saleh in 2006.  In late May, members of the JMP central 
committee, comprised of one designated representative from 
each party, discussed the upcoming elections with poloffs. 
The JMP has yet to obtain agreement from all parties on a 
reform agenda, let alone a candidate for the Presidency, but 
the leaders were hopeful that a JMP reform initiative would 
soon be released.  End Summary. 
 
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Al-Ahmar an Obstacle to Islah and JMP Unity 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) As Yemen's leading opposition, Islah dominates the 
JMP.  Islah, in turn, remains in the shadow of Party head 
Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, the powerful Speaker of Parliament 
and Yemen's leading tribal chief.  Al-Ahmar is not a reformer 
and does not share the views of most Islahis active in JMP 
politics.  For JMP to run its own candidate in 2006, it must 
overcome not only disunity within coalition parties, but also 
the split in Islah between powerful al-Ahmar and more 
progressive elements within the party.  Another mystery in 
this regard is the position of the Salafi tendency within 
Islah, led by Abdul Majid al-Zindani. 
---------------- 
What is the JMP? 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (U) The JMP was formed in 2002 and consists of dominant 
opposition party Islah, along with the Yemeni Socialist Party 
(YSP), the Nasserite Unionist Popular Party, the Union of the 
Popular Forces (UPF), the Arab Socialist National Baath Party 
and the Haq party.  The coalition lacks by-laws or 
infrastructure and functions through a central committee of 
one representative from each party.  JMP decisions require 
consensus of the multipartisan committee, followed by 
ratification by the leadership of the individual parties. 
 
---------------------- 
Political Reform First 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Mohammed Qahtan, Islah party representative to the JMP 
central committee, said that the coalition was concentrating 
its efforts on releasing what will be called the "Political 
Reform Initiative" as the first step in developing a JMP 
platform for 2006.  Abdul Malik al-Mutawakil of the JMP 
central committee from the UPF added that the JMP position is 
that "political reform must come first" and that nothing can 
be done without it.  Other JMP representatives have echoed 
his call to other diplomats in forums throughout Sanaa. 
 
¶5. (C) Although the release of the JMP reform initiative has 
been anticipated for some time, to date the individual party 
leaderships have been unable to agree on a unified position. 
JMP representatives are tight lipped on the document's 
content although YSP MP and JMP representative Aidroos Nasser 
noted that the themes of the initiative would entail, "an 
initial demand for political and economic reform, followed by 
a call for a correction in the balance of power and a true 
fight against corruption." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
An Opposition Candidate Who Can Survive the Campaign 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶6. (C) According to Qahtan, the JMP reform agenda is to serve 
as a platform for a competitive opposition candidate in 2006. 
 The JMP party representatives insisted that no one has been 
picked, but that they were seeking a "national, non-military 
figure" willing to challenge Saleh head-on.  "If such a 
candidate can survive three months into the election without 
assassination," quipped Qahtan, "he would surely win."  There 
have been rumors that Qahtan himself might be the candidate, 
but he denied this saying that whoever is chosen would not 
likely come from a political party within the coalition. 
 
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Where Will Party Loyalties Lie? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Many in the coalition worry about the position that 
Islah leader al-Ahmar would take in the end.  In 1999, Islah, 
through Ahmar, endorsed President Saleh even before Saleh's 
own party, the General People's Congress (GPC), did and 
Saleh's competition for the Presidency was a fellow GPC 
member.  Qahtan dismissed this possibility, insisting that 
Islah would not nominate Saleh in 2006.  "This option," said 
Qahtan, "would be worse for Islah than any other possible 
challenger to Saleh, regardless of party affiliation." 
Qahtan, however, is not considered an al-Ahmar insider.  Post 
interlocutors further point out that Sheikh al-Ahmar 
currently denies that a JMP reform initiative even exists. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Ruling GPC Reaches out to Opposition 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) In May Saleh commissioned GPC Secretary General Dr. 
Abdul Karim al-Iryani to renew a "National Dialogue" with the 
opposition parties.  These meetings have largely failed.  In 
early June, the JMP accepted Saleh's invitation with the 
stipulation that they would coordinate on the agenda, but 
failed to get agreement.  Reports have surfaced that Saleh 
conducted one-on-one meetings with the Islahi, Nasserite and 
YSP leaderships, outside of the JMP context.  JMP 
representatives insist that there are no unannounced agreements 
between any party and the GPC on the 2006 elections.  Only as 
a coalition, they insisted, can the JMP really challenge the 
President. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: With the 2006 Presidential election 
approaching, JMP feels challenged to produce a detailed 
reform initiative.  If JMP members can avoid the temptation 
to cut separate election deals with the ruling GPC, they 
might have a chance to present an alternative agenda that 
focuses on Yemen's festering corruption and poverty.  With 
Islah still in the shadows of the GPC and tribal elite, 
however, the JMP faces a significant challenge in asserting 
its own identity.  Given domestic politics, the fact that the 
JMP has lasted since 2002 is in itself something of an 
accomplishment.  As Mutawakil expressed it, "Hopefully every 
party will represent itself one day, but for now we need a 
strong coalition if we are to play a role in shaping Yemen's 
future."  End Comment. 
Khoury