This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR KISL MOPS YM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: ZAYDIS PERCEIVE PERSECUTION AS ROYG CRACKS DOWN ON 
DISSENT 
 
REF: A. SANAA 1723 
     ¶B. SANAA 2498 
     ¶C. SANAA 144 
 
Classified By: CDA Nabeel Khoury for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. With the second Saada conflict in a year 
between the ROYG and the "Shabab al-Moumineen" (Believing 
Youth), continuing to simmer in its third month, President 
Saleh is reportedly increasing efforts to silence prominent 
opposition parties and critics.  Recently these actions 
targeted several persons either linked or sympathetic to the 
Zaydi-Shi'a of Yemen.  (Ref. A).  Yemeni intellectuals point 
out that this is beginning to create the perception on the 
street that there is a targeted campaign against the Zaydis. 
End Summary. 
 
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Saleh Exploits Insurgency to Attack Opponents 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The strength of the 2004 Saada uprising caught the 
regime by surprise, leaving Saleh extremely sensitive to 
criticism of his handling of the crisis.  During the first 
three months of fighting (June - September 2004) the 
opposition, press, international community and Yemeni public 
remained largely in the dark on the situation in Saada. 
Major opposition figures complained publicly about ROYG 
secrecy on a matter of national importance and called for a 
peaceful end to the conflict.  Many opposition journalists 
who criticized Saleh during the ongoing battle were accused 
and some prosecuted by the regime for supporting the 
rebellion. (Ref. B). 
 
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Is the ROYG Zeroing in on Yemeni Zaydis? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Many in academic and opposition circles contend that 
Saleh's most recent attacks on his critics have focused in on 
those members of the opposition who also happen to be Zaydis 
(ref. c).  Intellectuals repeatedly point out several 
examples to substantiate their claims.  In his May speech to 
a joint session of Parliament and the Shura Council, Saleh 
publicly accused two relatively minor political parties, the 
Union of Popular Forces (UPF) and Al-Haq, of directly 
supporting the "Shabab" and being part of a military wing 
intent on overthrowing the regime.  Saleh's statement was 
immediately met with skepticism by local observers, noting 
that the two parties are irrelevant, have no seats in 
Parliament and are remarkable only for being identified with 
prominent Zaydi and Hashemite families.  Slain rebel leader 
and founder of the "Shabab" movement, Hussein Badr Eddin 
al-Houthi (ref A), was a founding member of Al-Haq before 
defecting to the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) party 
and being elected a Member of Parliament.  He was also a 
member of a prominent Zaydi Hashemite family 
 
¶4. (C) Sanaa University Professor and member of the UPF party 
leadership, Abdul Malik al-Mutawakil, who is Zaydi, reported 
that the UFP's party headquarters were stormed immediately 
following Saleh's speech.  Mutawakil said the building was 
taken over by the party's own security guards, likely under 
the orders of the Political Security Organization (PSO).  UPF 
has been unable to regain control of the building from the 
guard force. 
 
¶5. (C) In addition, Khalid al-Anisi, an attorney with the 
Sanaa based HOOD National Organization for Defending Rights 
and Freedoms, noted that the ROYG has closed "hundreds" of 
religious centers and schools, re-assigned Imams that it 
feels adhere to the "Shabab" movement's religious doctrine 
and is cracking down "wherever they see a challenge."  Both 
Anisi and Mutawakil pointed out that all these actions were 
overwhelmingly aimed at Zaydis and alleged that hundreds of 
Fundamentalist Sunni schools and Imams are still allowed to 
openly operate throughout the country.  Abdul Majid Fahd, a 
civil society activist and Saada native, concurs, adding that 
during his most recent visit to his home governorate he 
observed that almost all mosques are being rebuilt with money 
from Saudi Arabia.  This, he notes, means that they will only 
teach Sunni doctrine. (Comment: This is not necessarily good 
news as Wahabi doctrine is notoriously more conservative than 
Zaydi doctrine. End Comment). 
 
¶6. (C) Mutawakil also contends that despite what may be the 
reality, most Yemenis perceive that ROYG actions target 
Zaydis.  He points to two recent high profile cases as an 
example:  In early May a prominent Zaydi activist, Intisar 
al-Sayani, was arrested.  The ROYG charged that Sayani 
harbored al-Houthi supporters and stored grenades in her 
home.  She was released, although her son remains 
incarcerated on the same charges.  On May 29, the Special 
Penal Court for Public Danger sentenced Judge Yahya 
al-Dalaimi, a Zayidi judge, to death for conspiring to topple 
the government and supporting the Shabab movement. 
¶7. (C) UN Advisor to the Ministry of Human Rights, El-Obaid 
el-Obaid also noted to poloff that a recently leaked study 
out of the Ministry of Endowment and Guidance (Awqaf) that 
harshly condemned Zaydi teachings worried many in government 
circles. (Note: Post has been unable to confirm the existence 
of such a report, although post did find a report out of the 
Ministry of Education that noted concern with all 
fundamentalist schools, including those that taught Sunni 
doctrine. End Note). 
 
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Tensions Among Shi'a Surfacing 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Currently, a common theme in Yemeni intellectual 
circles is how much of an effect Saleh's targeted crackdown 
is having on Zaydis.   According to Mutawakil Zaydis are 
becoming increasingly alarmed by ROYG actions, afraid that 
the Yemeni population as a whole will begin to discriminate 
against them.  Prominent journalist Said Thabet notes that, 
"The Yemeni street has a general understanding that the 
'Shabab' favor Iranian-style Shi'ism but that the majority of 
Zaydis do not."  He warns, however, that as the Saada 
situation continues to fester, Zaydis are starting to feel 
threatened which pushes them to stress their "separate" sense 
of identity.  UN Advisor to the Ministry of Human Rights 
El-Obaid also points to signs of an emerging sense of 
identity.  "Many people who were not even aware they were 
Zaydi until Saada, are now becoming anxious about being 
targeted on that basis," said Obaid. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: ROYG insiders report that Saleh is 
increasingly paranoid about the upcoming Presidential 
election.  With his vision blurred by his second difficult 
military campaign in a year, Saleh is likely targeting anyone 
who might possibly threaten his rule.  Currently, this would 
be "Shabab" sympathizers and those from Saada; most of whom 
happen to be of Zaydi origin. (Ref. A).  True or not, 
perceptions are beginning to color reality in an already 
volatile situation in the run-up to the 2006 elections.  End 
Comment. 
Khoury