This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002413 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL MARR SO ET IT YE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ITALY REQUESTS CLOSER CONSULTATIONS 
 
REF: STATE 131526 
 
Classified By: Labor Counselor Candace Putnam, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  Although we may differ on what should be 
addressed first--nation-building or local assistance that 
supports peaceful development of a national government--Italy 
supports U.S. goals for Somalia.  In Italy's view the 
greatest threat Somalia faces is not renewed fighting by 
warlords but the growing and pernicious influence of Islamic 
fundamentalists.  MFA DG for Sub-Saharan Africa Dejak 
insisted that Italian Senator Raffaelli consults fully with 
SRSG Fall, and that the district-level reconciliation process 
Italy is funding was blessed by both Fall and UNDP. Dejak 
suggested closer Washington-Rome-Nairobi contacts to 
eliminate "confusion" over Italian objectives.  Please see an 
action request in para 10. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Labor counselor and poloff delivered reftel points 
to Stefano Dejak, Director General for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and Giancarlo Izzo, former Italian Ambassador to Accra who 
will replace Dejak next week.  Dejak is moving on to Nairobi 
to join the Special Italian Delegation for Somalia. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Dejak opened the meeting by expressing appreciation 
at what he described as the new (since March) level of U.S. 
engagement in Somalian affairs.  Throughout the meeting, he 
stressed that Rome and Washington were in agreement on the 
broad goals of reconciliation, the peaceful establishment of 
a functioning central government in Somalia, and the 
importance of coordinating activities through the UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).  He regretted 
that rumor and innuendo had perhaps confused Washington about 
Rome's commitment to those goals and suggested that the best 
way to eliminate this confusion was more communication.  He 
regretted that the proposed DVC with Brussels and other 
interested states had to be canceled for technical reasons. 
 
¶4.  (C)  In Dejak's view, the greatest danger Somalia faced 
today was not the prospect of renewed fighting by warlords. 
Rather the danger stems from (a) the inability of the 
international community to deliver tangible and timely 
progress on reconciliation that would forestall intervention 
by front-line states, and (b) the pernicious and growing 
influence of Islamic fundamentalists on Somali society. 
 
¶5.  (C)  According to Dejak, if the peace process fails and 
the international community does not deliver on its promises, 
Somalia will again descend into war.  Ethiopia agreed to 
restrain itself, but only as long as Addis is convinced the 
international community is making progress.  After their 
defeat in 1997, Dejak maintained, the Islamic fundamentalists 
changed tactics and adopted a new Turabi-inspired plan to 
permeate Somali society through the education, health and 
water services networks.  Since 40 percent of the population 
is under age 14, this presents a real and future danger, one 
that should be addressed through extensive civil society 
programs. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Dejak insisted that the MFA, and Italian Special 
Representative Senator Mario Raffaelli, every day urge 
Somalia President Yusef to cease unhelpful warlike rhetoric 
and noted that Raffaelli had gone to Addis earlier in the 
year to tell the Foreign Minister that Ethiopian troops must 
stay out of Somalia.  However, Dejak disputed our suggestion 
that Yusef's rhetoric would lead to renewed attacks by the 
warlords.  He said that the warlords had already established 
a pattern of dialogue; 
on March 17, the parties agreed that frontline states could 
help train Somali forces but that no foreign troops would be 
sent to Somalia, either under their own or an AU/IGAD flag. 
Dejak maintained that the warlords are united in saying that 
there be no/no AU/IGAD operation in Somalia and that 
Mogadishu remain the capital and the seat of the federal 
institutions. 
 
¶7.  (C) On the issue of Senator Raffaelli, Dejak insisted 
that Raffaelli fully supported SRSG Fall and closely 
consulted with him on a regular basis, including on 
Raffaelli's trip to Mogadishu.  Dejak regretted the 
"confusion" about this trip but pledged full and continuing 
cooperation with Ambassador Fall. 
 
¶8.  (C) On the issue of Italian funding for district-level 
reconciliation, Dejak was mildly annoyed at the suggestion 
that it was an "Italian" project.  Italy, he said, is trying 
to enhance dialogue among Somalis and does not want this 
funding to be perceived as "divisive."  He maintained that 
 
Italy was trying to foster local administration in the 
districts that are ready to do so, where there is no conflict 
or controversy.  Dejak said he understood there was concern 
in Washington about extending this project to the two regions 
of Somaliland but repeated Italy did not want to create 
division.  He noted that Italy's effort is aimed to show with 
this action that the international community goes beyond mere 
words.  Dejak claims that the Coordination and Monitoring 
Committee (CMC) approved the project and that it is part of a 
UNDP effort.  In addition, according to Dejak, SRSG Fall was 
aware of it from its inception. 
 
¶9.  (C)  With out prompting, Dejak took on the issue of the 
CMC and its effectiveness.  In Dejak's view the CMC is broken 
and has not met since April with Somalis.  Italy has asked 
SRSG Fall to convene a "real" CMC as soon as possible.  Dejak 
noted that Italy was part of the EU-Somalia Core Group that 
met regularly well before SRSG Fall's arrival.  Italy has 
suggested the idea of reconstituting this group and, 
according to Dejak, SRSG Fall is amenable. 
 
¶10.  (C)   Ambassador Izzo suggested that what we faced was a 
difference in focus.  The U.S. was more interested in first 
tackling nation-building, while Italy saw an urgent need to 
first provide funds on the ground to foster local 
institutions that would support a national government. 
Perhaps, he suggested, there was a way to meld our two 
approaches.  Dejak encouraged more specific communication on 
Somalia.  Italy maintains regular contact with the UK, 
Sweden, and the EU Commission on the Somali peace process, 
and the Italians would like to establish a similar link with 
the U.S. He proposed first a DVC among Washington, Rome, and 
Nairobi (he suggested that Raffaelli might be invited to a 
DVC through the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi).  Action Request: 
Please advise if Washington would like to organize such a DVC. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2005ROME02413 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL