This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PANAMA 001553 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2025 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PM POL CHIEF
SUBJECT: (C) VISAS DONKEY: CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA 
REVOCATION: WINSTON SPADAFORA 
 
REF:  A. 04 PANAMA 1274 
     ¶B. 03 PANAMA 3294 
     ¶C. 04 PANAMA 0823 
     ¶D. PANAMA 0629 
     ¶E. PANAMA 0778 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR LINDA WATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
Action Request 
--------------- 
¶1.  (C) Embassy Panama is seeking a security advisory opinion 
under section 212(f) of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act in accordance with Presidential Proclamation 7750, 
suspending entry into the United States and revoking the visa 
of Winston Spadafora (DPOB: 22 DEC 1941; Panama).  Embassy 
information indicates that during his ongoing tenure as a 
Supreme Court Justice, Spadafora has directly benefited from 
public corruption, specifically bribery, which has had and 
continues to have a direct and serious adverse effect on U.S. 
national interests, as defined narrowly and broadly.  End 
Action Request. 
 
Who Is Winston Spadafora? 
------------------------- 
¶2.  (C) Widely rumored to be Moscoso's lover, Winston 
Spadafora ran Mireya Moscoso's successful 1999 presidential 
campaign.  He then served as Minister of Government and 
Justice until Moscoso named him to the Supreme Court in 2001. 
 The Legislative Assembly by a single vote confirmed him and 
fellow Supreme Court magistrate Alberto Cigarruista on 
January 9, 2002 in a proceeding marred by egg throwing and 
accusations against President Moscoso for allegedly bribing 
legislators.  Spadafora entered politics following the brutal 
torture and murder of his brother, Hugo Spadafora, in 1985 at 
the hands of Manuel Noriega's Panama Defense Forces.  The 
murder marked a turning point for the dictatorship's 
fortunes.  Spadafora worked unceasingly to publicize 
Noriega's involvement in his brother Hugo's murder, meeting 
frequently with U.S. congressional staff, and even going on 
an extended hunger strike.  Blacklisted by Noriega, Spadafora 
was forced to close his law practice for lack of business. 
Not surprisingly, the experience left Spadafora a rabid 
opponent of the Democratic Revolutionary Party or PRD, which 
at that time was the party of the dictators. 
 
What Did Winston Spadafora do? 
------------------------------ 
¶3.  (C) Embassy possesses credible and compelling information 
indicating that during his 2002-2005 tenure as a Panamanian 
Supreme Court Justice (magistrado), Spadafora has willfully 
participated in and personally gained from an established 
system of bribery in which payoffs are actively solicited or 
accepted from claimants with cases before the high court.  In 
some cases he actively solicited and accepted bribes on his 
own.  Spadafora is hardly alone.  He is part of a group of 
seven justices on the nine-member Court, who routinely accept 
bribes and issue legal decisions contrary to reason.  He 
epitomizes everything that is wrong on the Court, where 
unbridled venality and a culture of entitlement to ill-gotten 
riches continue to reach new depths.  (Note: Embassy may seek 
security advisory opinions for several more Court magistrates 
of varying political stripes.  End note.) 
 
Panama's Justice Problem 
------------------------ 
¶4.  (C) The Supreme Court's corruption, exemplified by 
Winston Spadafora, is a fundamental cause for the Panamanian 
public's lack of confidence in the rule of law.  The 
politicized judiciary stands at the axis of a dangerously 
delegitimized political system.  Increasing public disgust 
and cynicism about the system are fueled by accurate 
perceptions of official impunity, a culture of shameless 
entitlement, and growing indices of poverty and income 
disparity.  The Court's actions and the attitudes they breed 
directly undermine Panama's democratic institutions.  The 
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of disputes relating to 
interpretation of the law and must rule on issues relating 
directly to Panama's constitution.  To the extent that 
justices base their decisions on personal enrichment instead 
of applicable law, they undermine not only the Court, but the 
legislative branch which enacts the laws and the executive 
branch which enforces them. 
 
How Judicial Corruption Affects U.S. Interests 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶5.  (C) Panama's politicized, corrupt Supreme Court damages 
U.S. interests in two ways: narrowly, through corrupt Court 
actions that negatively affect specific U.S. policy 
objectives; and broadly, by undermining respect for the rule 
of law, taxing an already impoverished polity, and corroding 
the bases of popular support for democracy.  Both are serious 
impositions on U.S. interests, though the broad effect is the 
more dangerous one over time, as poor, cynical voters may 
turn for relief to anti-democratic populist demagogues, a la 
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.  More concretely, the Embassy's 
principal Mission Program Plan objectives include 
anti-corruption and increasing transparency in government. 
The actions of the Court have thwarted both objectives and, 
in the process, frustrated a sizable USAID program (see Para 
12).  The Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section also is a major 
contributor to improving judicial processes, in particular 
with its "Culture of Lawfulness" program. 
 
The Corrupt Court and the Torrijos Government 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶6.  (C) How to reform Panama's judicial system is a conundrum 
for President Martin Torrijos.  Torrijos, who was elected in 
2004 on a "zero corruption" pledge, has not yet found a 
method of legally attacking the corrupt justices and forcing 
Panama's dysfunctional judicial system to take action against 
the obviously corrupt figures from the previous 
administration.  In February 2005, after public name-calling 
among Magistrates unloosed a public outcry for Torrijos to 
fire them all, the president appointed a commission to 
investigate judicial reform.  That commission will make its 
findings known in August 2005.  (See PANAMA 0629, "PANAMANIAN 
SUPREME COURT FRACAS BLURS GOVERNMENT FOCUS ON SOCIAL 
SECURITY REFORM," Reftel D.)  Embassy believes that revoking 
Spadafora's visa will give a big fillip to Torrijos's resolve 
to "do something" about the Court. 
 
Shameless Cases, Senseless Decisions 
------------------------------------ 
¶7.  (C) Panama's Napoleonic-law-based legal code requires the 
Supreme Court to adjudicate every case brought before it. 
Thus, virtually every important Panamanian legal case, quite 
regardless of merit, eventually winds up before the Court. 
And anything can become a legal case.  (See Para  12.)  Must 
the former President's sister account for $8.5 million in 
public funds donated by Taiwan?  Must the former President 
produce receipts and vouchers to show how she disposed of $25 
million in "discretional" spending?  Is a company under 
investigation for fraudulently obtaining government subsidies 
entitled to "damages" because of the investigation?  Can a 
known drug trafficker be investigated and tried in Panama? 
Is a Panamanian-flagged ship illegally carrying arms to 
Colombian guerrillas and bearing falsified Panamanian police 
documents a proper subject for investigation?  Does a 
developer (and close associate of Spadafora's) have to pay 
$2.1 million back taxes to the authority that administers the 
reverted areas in the former Canal Zone?  All these and more 
are standard fare for the Court, which always seems to come 
out on the wrong side of justice, contrary to the dictates of 
reason, with Magistrate Spadafora in the lead. 
 
Running the Court as a Racket 
----------------------------- 
¶8.  (C) The Court sets the tone for society which has grown 
ever more cynical by the Court's own example, and that tone 
can be summed up as, "Everyone lies, cheats, and steals and 
no one is punished, so why shouldn't we?"  Crudely put, the 
Justices run the Court as a racket.  Panama's Supreme Court 
magistrates decide cases based on a careful calculation of 
political or financial benefits, to themselves, their 
friends, and their political patrons.  They run the Court as 
a money-making venture, without regard for the law, the needs 
of the country, or the public good.  Very often, the arcane 
legalisms and arguments that are the Court's stock-in-trade 
make it very difficult for the average person to follow what 
is going on and act shields the magistrates from public 
scrutiny.  Nonetheless, people assume that venality rules at 
the Court and they are right. 
 
For Sale to the Highest Bidder 
------------------------------ 
¶9.  (C) A well-placed, reliable source recently detailed for 
EmbOff the path of a typical Supreme Court case in Panama. 
He explained that in virtually every case brought before the 
high court, Justices openly discuss among themselves the size 
of the payments they expect and exactly how each Justice will 
rule.  The Justices decide cases based on each party's 
perceived ability to pay.  They then negotiate the price of 
their votes with the attorney from the designated "winning" 
party.  They even prepare well-argued dissenting opinions to 
elicit money from the losing clients and attorneys, who pay 
to maintain good relations with the Court in the future. 
Legal arguments are irrelevant.  Precedents are used 
arbitrarily, if they fit the Court's needs of the moment. 
"There is no such thing as a successful trial attorney in 
Panama," the source said.  Everything depends on money.  (See 
04 PANAMA 1274, "SOMETHING'S ROTTEN IN PANAMA'S SUPREME 
COURT," Reftel A.) 
 
Follow the Money 
---------------- 
¶10.  (C) The Magistrates ask those who come before the Court 
"What ruling do you want?  What do you want us to do?  And 
how much are you prepared to pay?"  After decisions are set, 
negotiations begin between the Justices and parties to the 
case.  Once the bribe money is agreed upon, the Justices 
split it evenly, including those who lodge dissenting 
opinions.  Settlements often are six figures and up.  The 
source noted that even attorneys who believe they have an 
iron-clad case are willing to pay off the magistrates to 
build "good will" for future cases.  (Comment: Magistrate 
Adan Arjona, whose personal relations with the  other 
magistrates are bad, verging on openly hostile, appears not 
to participate in this graft.  His frequent lone, dissenting 
vote is an indication of his probity.  End Comment.) 
 
Institutionalized Conflict of Interest 
-------------------------------------- 
¶11.  (C) The orchestrated logistics of the Court's purchased 
decisions are chillingly crass.  Many of the Justices' 
alternates (Suplentes) work for and receive salaries from 
both the high court and influential Panamanian law firms 
pleading cases before the Court.  They are the nexus between 
the Supreme Court and prosecution and defense attorneys. 
(Comment: "Conflict of interest" does not exist as a concept 
in Panamanian political culture, including the courts. 
Politicians and Supreme Court magistrates routinely use 
public office for private gain.  The heart of the Supreme 
Court's business, in other words, is routine, 
institutionalized conflict of interest.  End Comment.) 
 
Thumbnails of the Court's Misdeeds and Spadafora's Role 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶12.  (C) The Court's already notorious judicial behavior 
seemed to decline even further during the nine-month tenure 
of Cesar Pereira Burgos as Chief Justice, and continued after 
his October 2004 ouster (having passed the retirement age of 
75 for public officials). 
 
During 2004-2005, Panama's Supreme Court has 
 
-twice ordered restitution of a controversial government 
contract and freeing of assets blocked by Comptroller Alvin 
Weeden, concerning the Ports Engineering Consulting 
Corporation (PECC) scandal (see Reftel B).  (Spadafora voted 
with the dissenters on 6/11/2004 in the 6-3 vote, apparently 
to protect his good friend Weeden, who had gone after former 
president Ernesto Perez Balladares and Martin Torrijos's 
cousin, Hugo Torrijos.) 
 
-quashed an investigation (9/17/2003) of several legislators 
who allegedly took bribes to approve the controversial CEMIS 
case, even after one legislator admitted taking a bribe on 
television.  (Spadafora voted with the 6-3 majority.  Arjona 
dissented.  See Para 16.) 
 
-in separate cases, threw out well substantiated charges 
against an Israeli arms trafficker on 3/30/2004 (see Para 13 
below), and a Colombian narcotrafficker on 4/30/2004 (see 
Para 14 below), and freed them both.  (In both cases, 
Spadafora voted with the 8-1 majority and Arjona dissented.) 
 
-thumbed its nose in (late May 2004) at $170,000 in FY2004 
USAID funds to improve judicial transparency by pulling the 
plug on instant internet publication of Court decisions, an 
Arjona initiative.  (This decision involve a ruling by chief 
justice Pereira Burgos, not a formal Court vote.  According 
to a Court insider and Embassy confidant, Chief Justice 
Pereira and Spadafora in particular were "very interested" in 
keeping the Court's activities and decisions as much out of 
the public eye as possible.) 
 
-blocked an investigation and public disclosure (5/11/2005) 
of how former presidents Moscoso and Perez Balladares each 
spent $25-million-plus in "discretional" funds.  (Spadafora 
was not involved in this provisional decision.  Arjona was 
the lone dissenter.) 
 
-blocked an audit (2/28/2004) into the use of $12 million in 
funds donated by Taiwan, purportedly to build Museo del Tucan 
and a public hospital, because the funds were deposited in 
Mar del Sur, a private foundation  controlled by former 
president Moscoso's sister, Ruby Moscoso.  (Spadafora voted 
with the 8-1 majority.  Arjona was the lone dissenter.) 
 
-blocked an order (6/22/2005) from a state finance bureau 
requiring the Figali Convention Center to pay $2.1 million in 
back taxes.  (Spadafora voted with Magistrate Hoyos in this 
2-1 provisional decision.  Arjona dissented.  Jean Figali is 
a close friend and business associate of Spadafora.  See Para 
19 below.) 
 
-blocked an ongoing investigation (6/24/2005) at Pana 
Habanos, a Panamanian cigar company under suspicion for 
fraudulently collecting $2.3 million in state subsidies, and 
ordered the state to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
damages.  (Spadafora again voted with Magistrate Hoyos in 
this 2-1 decision.  Arjona dissented.  See Para 20.) 
 
Yelenik-Otterloo -- Insufficient evidence? 
------------------------------------------ 
¶13.  (C) The Yelenik-Otterloo case (See 04 PANAMA 0823, 
"PANAMANIAN SUPREME COURT THROWS OUT CHARGES AGAINST ISRAELI 
ARMS SMUGGLER," Reftel C) involved a group of alleged 
conspirators, led by Israeli citizen Shimon Yelenik, who used 
a Panamanian-flagged vessel (the Otterloo) to smuggle arms 
(among them 5000 AK-47s and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition) 
from Nicaragua to Colombia, for use by the Colombian AUC 
Paramilitary Forces (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia). 
Investigators of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
determined that Shimon Yelenik had fraudulently claimed to 
represent the Panamanian government in making the arms 
purchase and had used forged Panamanian National Police 
purchase orders to arrange the sale.  The Otterloo filed 
documents claiming its destination was Panama, though in fact 
its true destination was Turbo, Colombia.  Panama's Supreme 
Court Justices found the evidence did not link the case 
"sufficiently" to Panama and ruled they had no jurisdiction. 
They ordered Yelenik, who at that time was incarcerated in 
Panama, to be released immediately. 
 
What About Henao Montoya? 
------------------------- 
¶14.  (C) Reminiscent of Yelenik, the Court more recently 
ruled (date) that Panamanian prosecutors had not presented 
sufficient evidence to continue to hold known drug trafficker 
and money launderer Lorena Henao Montoya.  They ordered her 
immediate release.  La Prensa reported the ruling in an 
article titled "Another Ruling to Remember" that begins, 
"While the Supreme Court of Justice frees presumed 
narcotraffickers in Panama, in Colombia they put them behind 
bars."  (Note: Colombian authorities arrested Lorena Henao 
Montoya immediately upon her arrival in Bogota.  She is the 
sister of convicted drug dealer Jesus Arcangel Henao Montoya, 
who was remanded to USG custody in DATE after residing for 
several months in Panama under an assumed identity.  Arrested 
in Panama in January 2004, she also was the wife of Ivan 
Urdinola Grajales, who headed the Colombian Valle Norte drug 
cartel until his murder in prison in 2002.  Lorena later 
married Urdinola's bodyguard; both were suspected to be 
complicit in Urdinola's murder.  End note.) 
 
28 Volumes of Evidence Were Not Enough 
-------------------------------------- 
¶15.  (C) Supreme Court Magistrate Adan Arjona (protect), the 
Court's outspoken reformer and one of only two justices not 
in the Embassy's 212(f) cross hairs, gave AID Director and 
POL Counselor a copy of his dissenting opinion in the Henao 
Montoya case.  Arjona's dissent notes that the arrest order 
contained 28 volumes of evidence and alleged that Lorena 
Henao Montoya used her driver's name to register her illicit 
property in Panama.  Investigators presented evidence that 
allegedly identifies her as "the true leader of a 
macro-criminal apparatus."  Arjona said that the Court's 
ruling on Lorena Henao Montoya and similar cases have had an 
extremely demoralizing effect on dedicated government 
prosecutors.  (Note: The other justice who has not attracted 
negative attention from the Embassy is Esmeralda Arosemena de 
Troitino, whom President Torrijos appointed in September 2004 
to finish out the term of then-Chief Justice Pereira Burgos. 
End note.) 
 
A Good Month For Bribes 
----------------------- 
¶16.  (SBU) Spadafora's role in the CEMIS corruption case has 
linked his name inextricably with a scandal that probably has 
evoked the most public revulsion in Panama's history.  CEMIS 
-- an ambitious, $400 million air, land, and sea 
infrastructure project, to be built on reverted land near 
Colon -- was approved by the Assembly on December 29, 2002. 
In highly contentious, controversial votes on January 9, the 
Assembly confirmed Winston Spadafora and Alberto Cigarruista. 
 Then-President Mireya Moscoso allegedly bribed several PRD 
legislators in the PRD-controlled Assembly, one of them 
Carlos Afu, to ensure the confirmations.  The new justices 
took the oath of office on January 12, and Moscoso signed the 
CEMIS bill on January 15.  On January 14, 2002, PRD 
legislator Balbina Herrera (now Minister of Housing) publicly 
denounced Afu for taking a bribe to vote for Spadafora and 
Cigarruista.  On January 16, 2002, Afu appeared on TV waving 
a large wad of cash, claiming it was a $6,000 down-payment on 
a $20,000 bribe to vote for CEMIS and crowing that he was not 
the only PRD legislator whose vote had been bought.  (Note: 
During 1/16/2002 news conference, Afu kept his mouth shut 
about any Spadafora/Cigarruista bribes.  Afu got away with 
bucking the PRD on the Spadafora/Cigarruista and CEMIS votes, 
kept his seat in the Assembly, never was prosecuted, and 
finally won reelection as an Arnulfista (Panamenista) in the 
2004 election.  The CEMIS bribes allegedly came from the 
privately owned San Lorenzo Consortium.  See PANAMA 0778, 
"PANAMA ATTORNEY GENERAL TESTS TORRIJOS ADMINISTRATION, 
REOPENS CEMIS AND SUPREME COURT BRIBERY CASES."  See Reftel 
¶E.  End note.) 
CEMIS And Spadafora 
------------------- 
¶17.  (C) Following Afu's widely viewed TV escapade, the 
Public Ministry mounted an investigation into CEMIS for its 
allegedly corrupt practices, which CEMIS challenged before 
the Supreme Court.  The Embassy has developed specific and 
credible information of a substantial payoff made to 
Spadafora for a favorable ruling in the CEMIS case. 
According to Embassy information, Spadafora, though his 
agent, solicited a bribe of $500,000 to rule in the 
claimant's favor.  The claimant eventually was successful in 
negotiating the payoff amount down to $250,000.  After the 
payoff, the case was decided in the claimant's favor. 
Following a Public Ministry investigation, in September 2003, 
with Spadafora voting with the majority, the Supreme Court 
voted 6-3 to close and nullify the Public Ministry's 
investigation.  CEMIS construction never got under way. 
 
Spadafora Shakes Down a Banker 
------------------------------ 
¶18.  (C) A Panamanian banker recently told POL Counselor the 
following story that implicates Spadafora in what essentially 
was a shakedown.  A year or two ago a Panamanian company 
stopped making payments on a six-figure loan to his bank, 
only several months after the loan was made.  The banker 
moved swiftly to seize the firm's major new equipment assets, 
which the firm had bought with the loan, as was his right 
under the terms of the loan.  The firm's partners protested 
the seizure and threatened to sue.  The banker then received 
a visit from one of the attorneys regularly associated with 
the Supreme Court.  The attorney said, "We think you'll have 
to settle for 30%."  "Why should I settle for 30%?" the 
banker countered.  The lawyer then made a call on his cell 
phone.  "Winnie," he said, "can you fax over that decision 
(fallo)?"  (The banker confirmed that the lawyer was talking 
to Winston Spadafora.)  The case had not actually reached the 
Supreme Court yet, the banker explained to POL Counselor, but 
Spadafora had written a decision in advance, with the 
expectation of spurring a speedy out-of-court settlement and 
pay-off.  The "decision" finding in favor of the plaintiffs 
arrived by fax and the banker read it.  The banker said he 
had no choice but to settle out of court for 30% of the 
principal.  He assumed some portion of the remaining 70% was 
split between Spadafora and the attorney. 
 
Figali Convention Center 
----------------------- 
¶19.  (C) The Moscoso administration awarded a development 
permit to Jean Figali under terms that critics called overly 
generous.  The result was the Figali Convention Center on the 
Amador causeway outside of Panama City and within the 
"reverted areas" under the jurisdiction of the Interoceanic 
Region Administration (ARI).  An Embassy contact told EmbOff 
that in return for a "favor" Spadafora had done for him at 
ARI, Figali had paid part of the costs of Spadafora's luxury 
apartment.  Figali by 2005 was in arrears to the tune of $2.1 
million in back taxes owed to ARI.  Spadafora's Court 
decision suspended Figali's payments. 
 
Pana Habanos 
------------ 
¶20.  (C) Pana Habanos collected $2.3 million in export 
subsidies based on what the Comptroller General claimed were 
inflated cigar export figures.  The amount of subsidy due to 
the firm based on what the Comptroller determined to be the 
firm's actual level of exports should have been $472,000. 
Thus the firm owed the state something over $1.8 million, 
exclusive of damages and a criminal fraud prosecution.  But 
in the world of Panama's Supreme Court the ordinary laws of 
physics don't always apply.  Spadafora's Court decision 
reversed logic and found that the state had falsely accused 
Pana Habanos and owed it an unspecified amount of damages. 
 
Why Proclamation 7750 applies 
----------------------------- 
¶21.  (C) Through sustained action that represents serious 
adverse effects on the national interests of the United 
States and severely undermines the democratic institutions of 
Panama, Winston Spadafora knowingly chose to abuse his 
position in Panama's highest court for his own personal 
enrichment.  Spadafora represents much of what is wrong with 
Panamanian politics and exemplifies the overwhelming 
difficulty the GOP faces in enacting meaningful judicial 
reform.  If corruption is rampant and unpunished at the 
highest levels of the its judicial system, Panama has little 
hope of success in confronting entrenched corruption 
elsewhere in government and the business community. 
 
Current Visa/Travel Plans 
------------------------- 
¶22.  (SBU) Spadafora has not been informed that he may be 
covered by Presidential Proclamation 7750, under section 
212(f) of the INA.  Spadafora currently has a valid B1/B2 
visa that will expire on 18-DEC-2005.  Embassy is not aware 
of any specific or immediate travel plans. 
 
Embassy Recommendation 
---------------------- 
¶23.  (C) Based on the facts of the case, Embassy recommends 
that Spadafora's visa be revoked, that he not/not be 
permitted to travel to the U.S., and that no waiver be 
granted should he apply for one. 
 
¶24. (SBU) If Department authorizes visa revocation, Embassy 
plans to confirm the statutory grounds for revocation and the 
fact that it occurred if consulted by the press. 
 
WATT