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Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI5616, PM SINGH'S US TRIP MEETS NEW DELHI'S HIGH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI5616 2005-07-20 13:23 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 005616 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP ETRD ENRG IN NSSP
SUBJECT: PM SINGH'S US TRIP MEETS NEW DELHI'S HIGH 
EXPECTATIONS 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 5445 
     B. NEW DELHI 5018 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Initial reactions to Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh's highly anticipated July 18-19 meetings in Washington 
have been overwhelmingly positive.  Most commentators believe 
that the US decision to normalize our civil nuclear 
relationship puts substance behind the US promise to assist 
India's rise as a global power.  Focusing on nuclear issues 
as the "litmus test" for the visit, to the exclusion of other 
parts of the joint statement, most Indian media and pundits 
seem convinced that President Bush is serious about 
addressing India's strategic needs.  Although the visit may 
not appear on the radar screen of the average Indian, the 
PM's visit has raised the profile of the transformation of 
US/India ties, making it part of India's domestic political 
debate for the first time in many years.  When the next 
Parliamentary session begins on July 25, skeptics from across 
the political spectrum will likely question whether the Bush 
Administration will deliver on its nuclear promises, and 
criticize US reluctance to endorse India's UNSC candidacy. 
Nevertheless, most political contacts have been upbeat, and 
Congress believes that opposition will be manageable.  End 
Summary. 
 
Visit Passes The "Litmus Test" 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Prior to the visit, Delhi-based strategists argued 
that the US must prove its stated intention to assist India's 
rise as a global player by either supporting India's UNSC 
campaign or making progress on the civil nuclear 
relationship.  Many had concluded that the US would likely 
embrace the nuclear concessions rather than support India's 
UNSC bid, but none anticipated the broad scope of what was 
agreed in the joint statement.  Foreign Secretary Saran 
downplayed disappointment regarding US opposition to the G-4 
proposal before the visit (Ref A), and celebrated the nuclear 
news afterwards.  Most Delhi-based analysts embraced Saran's 
emphasis from Washington that "the outcome of the 
meeting...exceeded even our own expectations."  While US 
silence on UNSC may be a point of domestic vulnerability for 
PM Singh, former Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar echoed many 
on commenting to Poloff that energy was New Delhi's number 
one priority, and Washington's concessions had demonstrated 
its seriousness about India's needs.  (The debate about 
Washington's ability to deliver on its promises, the 
affordability of nuclear technology and the effects of 
India's responsibilities on its domestic nuclear program will 
be dealt with Septel).  With immediate reaction largely 
restricted to the nuclear issue, other areas of the joint 
statement have been overlooked, and should become more 
apparent in the next few days.  (Business community reaction 
to the CEO Forum will be covered in Mumbai Septel). 
 
The Political Fallout 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (C). In contrast to former PM Vajpayee's official visit 
to Washington in 2000, Manmohan Singh was much more careful 
about domestic political reaction to his trip.  Even so, some 
have criticized the government's failure to "take the nation 
into confidence" before agreeing to the joint statement 
language on nuclear cooperation.  One well-connected senior 
editor remarked to us that many in the Congress leadership 
were unpleasantly surprised by the Washington announcement, 
but a former Ambassador to the US countered that the Congress 
hierarchy was similarly in the dark concerning the early 
years of India's nuclear weapons program.  Former FS Haidar 
placed this in context, explaining that during the 1990's, 
US/India relations were strained and the general public not 
interested in the bilateral relationship, resulting in little 
discussion of India's policy toward the US.  He believes that 
the dramatic improvement in ties has increased public 
interest and opened up the subject for domestic political 
discourse.  Haidar maintains that this has narrowed Congress 
options to take dramatic action, compelling it to adapt a 
more cautious approach.  Ironically, some of the strongest 
criticism of the visit has come from within the UPA Coalition 
(Ref B), putting increased pressure on the Prime Minister to 
win substantive concessions. 
 
Congress Reacts Enthusiastically 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Our Congress party interlocutors were satisfied with 
the overall results of the visit and particularly excited 
about the nuclear "breakthrough."  Congress Spokesman Anand 
Sharma maintained that the visit had brought the mainstream 
of the Congress leadership firmly on board with the US-India 
transformation while establishing a valuable public rapport 
between the PM and President Bush.  Remarking that the 
"Congress-led government had achieved a significant 
understanding," Congress spokesman Abhishesk Singhvi was in 
high spirits, giving credit to the PM for convincing the US 
to treat India as a "nuclear equal."  Kirip Chaliha, a 
Congress MP from Assam, emphasized that the visit shows the 
"natural coming together" of the two democracies in ways that 
are tangibly helping India.  Indians are united in welcoming 
what was perceived here as a discriminatory policy that 
treated India's nuclear sector as less legitimate than that 
of the P-5 (an idea that resonates deeply in India's 
hierarchical culture.) 
 
Communists Still Formulating Response 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (U) The Communist parties expressed vocal opposition to 
strengthened Indo-US defense ties after DefMin Mukherjee's 
visit, but have been more equivocal this time.  There are a 
few initial positive signals from the Left, with some stating 
that the Left Front (LF) will take a wait-and-see approach. 
With Communist Party of India (Marxist) General Secretary 
Prakash Karat still on a ten-day tour of China, the "Asian 
Age" reported that his party would "wait to react to 
developments" in order to "carefully study the implications 
and formulate an appropriate response."  Surprisingly, 
Communist Party of India General Secretary AB Bardhan hailed 
the US initiative as a "welcome step" for greater 
collaboration on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
although he said a full LF response would come only after its 
joint meeting scheduled for July 22.  Another anonymous CPI 
leader told the press that the UPA government has diverted 
from the Common Minimum Program's promotion of a multi-polar 
world by enthusiastically building military and nuclear 
relationships which support US hegemony.  Our Left Front 
contacts indicated they were waiting for the Prime Minister's 
briefing before preparing an official response. 
 
6.  (C) Congress contacts were hopeful that the US-India 
deliverables would make it harder for the Left to argue that 
India had given up too much without receiving enough in 
exchange.  Congress spokesperson Singhvi said that the 
agreement should quiet the "doubting Thomases on US-Indo 
cooperation", but that the Left would nevertheless "oppose 
anything that is American" for "their own audiences and not 
for the country at large."  Assam MP Chaliha also guessed 
that the Communists would stubbornly beat the non-alignment 
drum and argue that India has sold out in order to mobilize 
their cadre in the run up to elections in West Bengal and 
Kerala in early 2006. 
 
Nuclear Black Box Vulnerable to Conspiracy Theories 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
7.  (C) Some of the political complications arising from the 
Washington visit reflect the highly secretive nature of the 
Indian nuclear weapons program.  At a July 20 lunch hosted by 
the Charge, a group of very senior retired officials, several 
with long histories in India's nuclear sector, agreed that 
the proposal for separating India's military and civilian 
infrastructures and placing the latter under IAEA safeguards 
served GOI interests.  They dismissed the commentaries from 
several retired nuclear scientists who have condemned the 
US-India agreement, and cited approvingly an article by 
former PMO adviser G. Parthasarthy, who notes that separation 
of civil and military nuclear facilities had been advocated 
by Dr. Raja Ramanna, one of the architects of India's weapons 
program.  But even these advocates of US-India transformation 
acknowledged that the nuclear understanding would be 
controversial, since politicians without understanding of the 
technical details could be easily attracted by suggestions 
that India was "giving up its secrets" and "capping its 
military options."  Acting Deputy National Security Advisor 
V.K. Nambiar commented to the Charge that the PM would face 
questions in Parliament about the expense of separating 
military and civilian nuclear facilities and the extent to 
which the other nuclear powers have adhered to the changes 
that India is being asked to make. 
 
BJP Wants Credit 
---------------- 
 
8.  (C) The BJP and RSS have been largely silent, but party 
interlocutors were cautiously positive in private.  BJP 
Spokesperson Prakash Javadeskar still needed time to look 
carefully at the joint statement, but noted that his first 
impression was that the meeting "looked good," although US 
silence on "endorsing India's claim for a UNSC seat would be 
a sore point."  While still waiting for "expert opinions," 
Shyam Parande of the RSS International Affairs Council 
mentioned the results of the visit "looked very well," and 
that the RSS was "happy with the level of US/India 
cooperation."  Several BJP and RSS contacts were critical of 
the PM's failure to win Washington support for India's UNSC 
bid. 
 
9.  (C) NDA leaders complained that the PM did not give their 
coalition enough credit for its role in transforming US/India 
ties.  RSS Spokesman Ram Madhav called the PM 
"unstatesmanlike for ignoring the fundamental contribution of 
the NDA/BJP in building up India-US relations."  Hailing the 
visit, BJP MP Kalraj Mishra praised Congress for pursuing 
NDA government efforts after its skeptical stance while in 
the opposition.  BJP President for Uttar Pradesh Kesrinath 
Tripathi downplayed the PM's achievement, saying that he was 
"just carrying out the process of transformation of Indo-US 
relations initiated by the previous government."  Ultimately, 
we expect that this BJP history with the US, and the PM's 
pre-trip outreach to Vajpayee, Advani and Jaswant Singh, will 
blunt any effort to score political points.  Nonetheless, we 
do anticipate the BJP to harp on the UNSC issue during the 
upcoming session of Parliament. 
 
10.  (C) Brajesh Mishra is so far the most vocal BJP 
opponent, claiming in a press interview that separation of 
India's civilian and military nuclear facilities would amount 
to "accepting a cap on the size of our nuclear deterrent with 
a small number of nuclear weapons."  G Parthasarathy noted in 
the "Pioneer" that this contradicted Mishra's 2002 stance, 
when he proposed to designate certain nuclear facilities as 
entirely for peaceful purposes and open others to inspectors 
in exchange for access to western nuclear technology.  Mishra 
was less negative in a July 20 meeting with the Charge, 
(Septel) explaining that his main concern was India's failure 
to think through the full implications of its side of the 
nuclear bargain. 
 
Common Man Positive But Not Concerned 
------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Summarizing the "average Indian" opinion is 
difficult.  While general impressions of the US are improving 
around the country, this visit was largely off of the common 
man's radar screen.  The pomp of the South Lawn arrival 
resonated well, but the details of the visit did not break 
through.  Even in the capital, most people remain more 
concerned about what they view as more pressing issues such 
as infrastructure, power, health and education.  Sandeep 
Dikshit, a Congress MP from East Delhi and son of Delhi's 
Chief Minister, commented to the Charge that Indo-US 
relations do not affect his four million constituents. 
Agreeing that nuclear cooperation is of little or no concern 
to the average citizen, All India Congress Committee 
Secretary Manish Tewari commented that "the political elite 
 
SIPDIS 
and New Delhi think tanks will herald the accord as a major 
coup for India, but most of the population will ignore it." 
 
12.  (C) While recognizing that India has benefited 
economically from increased business ties, Sandeep Dikshit 
noted that most of the population still associates the US 
with unflinching support for Pakistan.  According to 
Jawaharlal Nehru University Professor of American Studies K. 
P. Vijayalaxmi, Indians will welcome President Bush's 
statement reaffirming the sanctity of the Line of Control and 
the need for an internal solution to Kashmir as an indication 
that the US is finally distancing itself from the Pakistani 
view of that issue.  Acting Deputy NSA Nambiar predicted that 
PM Singh would emphasize the ecnomic benefits of his visit, 
such as the creation of the CEO Forum and the Agricultural 
Knowledge Initiative that have not recieved wide publicity. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (U) This visit was well-timed, as a broad spectrum of 
Indian society has come to view US-India relations in a 
positive light and are ready for closer ties.  These positive 
attitudes are reflected in the latest Pew poll, a surge in 
the number of people traveling to the US, and deepening 
US-India economic ties.  The ruling UPA carefully gauged 
political reaction within and outside the ruling UPA 
coalition to shape the discourse, dampen opposition and 
ensure progress.  The US-India nuclear accord was 
particularly important in this context, since it took an 
issue that was a focus of US-India discord for 30 years, and 
turned it into an area for future cooperation.  BJP gripes 
that they did not get credit for contributing to US-India 
transformation, and Communist criticism that the UPA is 
veering away from non-alignment are expected and manageable. 
Mirroring debate in the US Congress, the greatest acrimony is 
likely to come from nuclear hawks and scientific 
nationalists, who will feed the Parliamentary debate over 
whether the PM is constraining India's nuclear options.  In 
this context, as Congress leader Anand Sharma pointed out, it 
will be important for the GOI to develop a short, plain 
language briefing that explains what was agreed and disarms 
the critics.  While initial reactions have focused almost 
entirely on our nuclear breakthrough, the range of 
deliverables from agriculture to the CEO Forum should spread 
the benefits of Indo-US cooperation to a broader range of 
Indian society and receive closer attention in the days 
ahead.  In this regard, the PM's visit has helped to convince 
the skeptics that the US is serious about engaging India, has 
furthered the momentum generated by Secretary Rice's visit in 
March, and sets us up for a successful Presidental visit in 
2006. 
BLAKE