This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 005444 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC KNNP KSTC PARM TSPA IN NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIA COMPLETES THE NSSP, STILL PONDERING PSI 
 
REF: A. STATE 129958 
 
     ¶B. STATE 127794 
     ¶C. STATE 112244 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Paving the way for completion of the NSSP, 
MEA Additional Secretary (International Security) Meera 
Shankar delivered two non-papers to the Charge and PolCouns 
on July 14, one responding to USG questions about 
implementation of the WMD Bill (see text in para 5 and 
initial analysis in para 6) and the second listing GOI 
efforts on industry outreach and preventive enforcement (see 
text in para 12 and initial analysis in para 13).  Shankar 
confirmed that the Cabinet had approved harmonization with 
the MTCR and NSG guidelines and the new export control list 
was undergoing "post-approval procedures," but declined to 
estimate when the new list would be made public.  Based on 
our initial review, we believe these non-papers meet the 
remaining requirements to complete the NSSP, including 
adoption of the MTCR definition of "missile."  On India's 
acceptance of the PSI Statement of Principles, Shankar stated 
that the GOI will await formal notification of the 
termination of the Core Group before it considers other legal 
questions it has about the initiative.  End Summary. 
 
Agreement on Harmonization 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) Charge shared with Shankar the non-paper Under 
Secretary Joseph gave to Indian Ambassador Sen on July 11 
 
SIPDIS 
outlining the final steps for completion of the NSSP (Ref A), 
including harmonization of India's national control list with 
the MTCR and NSG.  Glancing at the paper, Shankar confirmed 
that the Cabinet had approved harmonization and the new 
export control list was "currently undergoing post-approval 
procedures," i.e., publication in the Indian equivalent of 
the Federal Register.  Noting that "private adherence" to the 
international control regimes would suffice for now, PolCouns 
expressed hope that the GOI would publicly adhere in the 
future.  PolCouns also pressed for more details about the 
mechanics of the "post-approval procedures," including when 
the list might be made public.  Pressed on timing, she only 
repeated, "soon."  Shankar demurred to give further details 
or an estimated date to release the new export control list, 
saying only that it would be "soon." 
 
Waiting for the Space Launch Agreement 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) After delivering the GOI non-papers, Shankar stated, 
"We consider we've fulfilled our obligations under the NSSP," 
then remarked that the GOI was still awaiting a response from 
the USG on the Space Launch Agreement.  Charge noted that 
unresolved issues on space cooperation had been separated 
from the rest of the initiatives and would not prevent the 
completion of the NSSP as a whole. 
 
Still Pondering PSI 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) In light of the pending decision to dissolve the PSI 
Core Group (Ref B), Charge asked whether the GOI would 
announce acceptance of the PSI Statement of Principles during 
the PM's visit to Washington.  Shankar stated that the GOI 
would await "more formal communication on the dissolution" of 
the Core Group, but still needed to have internal discussions 
about the legal aspects of interdiction. 
 
Non-Paper Responding to Questions about the WMD Bill 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Begin text of GOI non-paper: 
 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems 
(Prohibition of Unlawful Activities Act) 2005 
(Restricted-Releasable USG only) 
 
¶A.  (No part of this non-paper is quotable authority for any 
activity prohibited or regulated under the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of 
Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005 or other relevant Acts.  This 
non-paper is not meant for submission to any judicial 
process.) 
 
¶B.  Over the years, through the creation of laws, regulations 
and administrative mechanisms, India has instituted an 
effective domestic regime to exercise controls over the 
export of materials, equipment and technologies of direct or 
indirect application to weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery.  GOI has also taken measures to update its 
system of export controls through creation of new laws, 
legislative amendments, amendments to existing policy and 
procedures, strengthening of licensing procedures, firming up 
the administrative mechanisms in place, enhanced 
inter-ministerial coordination and enforcement related 
aspects, details of which have been shared with the USG from 
time to time. 
 
¶C.  The WMD Act, 2005 is an integrated and over-arching 
legislation on prohibiting unlawful activities in relation to 
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.  It 
builds upon the existing extensive regulatory framework 
related to controls over the export of WMD-usable materials, 
equipment and technologies.  The Act criminalizes a range of 
unlawful activities in relation to weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery.  It prohibits any 
person not duly authorized by the Central Government to deal 
with them.  It prohibits unlawful possession, manufacture, 
transportation, acquisition, or development of a weapon of 
mass destruction (nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive 
device, chemical weapon or biological weapon) or its means of 
delivery. 
 
¶D.  The WMD Act, 2005 fulfills the three core objectives of: 
(i) prohibiting unlawful activities related to weapons of 
mass destruction and their delivery systems, (ii) prohibiting 
transfers of WD-usable goods and technologies to terrorists 
and the transfer of radioactive or fissile material for use 
in terrorist acts, and (iii) updating controls over the 
export of WMD=usable goods and technologies. 
 
¶E.  Section 13(1) provides the authority to regulate export, 
transfer, retransfer, transit or trans-shipment of items and 
technologies notified under this Act or any other relevant 
Act.  This is a regulatory provision, and not a prohibitory 
one.  Section 3 elaborates the extent and application of the 
Act, which includes any person who commits an offense beyond 
India.  The definition of "re-transfer" at Section 4 (k) 
makes its applicability to foreign entities abundantly clear. 
 Re-transfer controls are already being exercised under 
existing regulations and procedures.  "Re-exports" from 
India, with or without value addition, of imported items that 
are controlled on the national export control lists are 
already subject to the same restrictions and procedures under 
existing policy and procedures as are applicable to exports 
(clause 2.35 of the foreign Trade Policy). 
 
¶F.  The Act imposes a general prohibition on brokering in a 
transaction that is prohibited or regulated under the Act. 
Section 12 read with Section 3 delineates the applicability 
of this provision to citizens of India residing in India and 
Indian citizens abroad.  In addition, Section 12 on 
prohibition on brokering is applicable to all residents of 
India, including foreigners while in India.  The provision is 
applicable to items not originating in India and to 
transactions that occur wholly outside India, is such items 
fall within the scope of this Act. 
 
¶G.  The extent and application of Sections 14-17 are as per 
the provisions of Section 3 which includes citizens of India 
outside India.  The existence or otherwise of compensation 
for facilitation is not a condition for the applicability of 
these Sections. 
 
¶H.  Section 11 on prohibition of export is applicable to any 
item whether or not notified on the national export control 
lists if the exporter knows that the item is intended to be 
used in the design or manufacture of a weapon of mass 
destruction or in its missile delivery system.  The 
implementation of the provision is sought to be facilitated 
by maintaining internal watch lists of suspect end-users 
which will be selectively or as required shared with the 
exporter community.  Public notification of suspect end-users 
or activities is not envisaged.  Section 11 covers transfers 
of technology as defined in Section 4(1). 
 
¶I.  Section 13 provides for controls over the transfer of 
technology as defined in Section 4(l) by regulating its flow 
from India or by Indians abroad as well as to foreigners 
while in India.  No clarification of the provisions is 
required.  The term person is not limited to individuals but 
encompasses juridical persons also.  It includes any company 
or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or 
not. 
 
¶J.  Definitions of the terms "specially designed" or "capable 
of" are proposed to be notified as part of the exercise that 
is currently underway to revise the national export control 
lists.  The requirement for additional end-use conditions for 
export of items or technology that bear the possibility of 
diversion to or use in the development or manufacture of, or 
use as, systems capable of delivery of weapons of mass 
destruction is also proposed to be covered. 
 
¶K.  Though Section 6 authorizes the appointment of Advisory 
committees by the Central Government for the purposes of this 
Act, the establishment of a new agency is not currently 
envisaged.  Government has a vast infrastructure in place to 
facilitate the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. 
During the exchanges held as part of the bilateral program of 
cooperation on export controls, presentations have been made 
to USG delegations by relevant GOI agencies on the spectrum 
of issues related to export controls and on the inherent 
strengths of the GOI system and how it is being gradually 
oriented to export controls.  End text of GOI non-paper. 
 
Initial Analysis of WMD Bill Implementation:  Looks Good 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The GOI non-paper reviews the objectives of the WMD 
Bill and provides further clarification on specific issues 
such as the scope of the law, definitions (e.g., "missile"), 
re-export, brokering, catch-all provisions, and intangible 
technology transfer (Ref C).  The non-paper also states that 
the WMD Bill is not stand alone legislation, but must be read 
in conjunction with previously existing GOI laws and 
regulations, e.g., the Foreign Trade Policy.  Issues of 
particular interest are noted below: 
 
¶7.  (C) Definition of Missile (para J):  The non-paper states 
that the MTCR definition of missile as well as additional 
end-use conditions will be incorporated into the implementing 
regulations. 
 
¶8.  (C) Re-Transfer and Re-Export (para E):  Section 13(1) of 
the WMD Bill provides the authority to regulate -- not 
prohibit -- the export, transfer, retransfer, transit or 
trans-ship items and technologies, and applies to any person 
in or beyond India. 
 
¶9.  (C) Brokering (para F):  All Indian citizens in India or 
abroad, as well as foreigners in India are subject to this 
law.  It is also applicable to items not originating in India 
and to transactions that occur wholly outside India. 
 
¶10.  (C) Catch-all (para H):  The non-paper indicates that 
the Bill is applicable to any item whether it is specified on 
the national export control lists or not if the exporter 
knows that the item is intended to be used in the design or 
manufacture of a WMD or its delivery system.  Internal watch 
lists of suspected end-users and activities will be 
maintained for GOI use, but public notification of suspected 
end-users or activities is not envisaged. 
 
¶11.  (C) Intangible Technology Transfer (para I):  The WMD 
Bill controls intangible technology transfer by regulating 
its flow from India or by Indians abroad as well as to 
foreigners while in India, including to businesses or 
associations. 
 
Non-Paper on Industry Outreach/Preventive Enforcement 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶12.  (U) Begin text of GOI non-paper: 
 
GOI Efforts on Industry Outreach and Preventive Enforcement 
 
¶A.  The Government of India is fully conscious of the 
importance of partnership with the industry for the success 
of its export control system. 
 
¶B.  Outreach meetings are conducted by relevant Departments 
of the Government to increase awareness among the exporter 
community about the GOI system of export controls, relevant 
laws, regulations and procedures, and any amendments made 
therein.  DGFT and its 32 regional offices spread across the 
country conduct outreach meetings with the exporter 
community, including through open house meets and personal 
interviews.  This existing infrastructure is available for 
industry outreach efforts on export controls.  Department of 
Chemicals and Petrochemicals routinely conducts region-wise 
outreach meetings to increase awareness among the exporters 
about the dual-use nature of the controlled chemicals and the 
importance of exercising due diligence.  Department of 
Bio-technology has also held outreach meetings. 
 
¶C.  The authority to conduct industry outreach activities 
flows from the relevant clauses in the Handbook of Procedures 
(Vol. 1), 2004-2009 notified under the Foreign Trade Policy 
which provide for the Directorate General of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Commerce to organize industry outreach meetings 
on a regular basis for exporters, in particular those dealing 
with SCOMET items, in close coordination with the relevant 
administrative Ministries/Departments. 
 
¶D.  Efforts are underway to encourage the involvement of the 
industry associations and chambers to conduct outreach 
events.  Department of Chemical and Petrochemicals, for 
instance, works in close coordination with associations such 
as the Indian Chemicals Manufacturers Association (ICMA). 
The assistance of cross-sectoral industry associations such 
as the CII and FICCI has also been solicited.  There are a 
number of sector-specific industry associations in the field 
of aerospace technologies, chemicals, machine tools, etc. 
which are proposed to be involved in the Government's 
outreach effort. 
¶E.  In organizing such events, there is recognition of the 
importance of conducting a mix of sector-specific and 
region-wise programs with a view to reach out to targeted 
audiences and it is proposed to accordingly structure the 
location, periodicity, and content of the outreach events. 
 
¶F.  Government has established an inter-ministerial group to 
make recommendations regarding specific measures on outreach 
to the industry on export controls and to evolve a 
department-wise but coordinated approach on the matter. 
These inter-ministerial consultations are presently underway, 
and are inter alia focusing on issues such as outreach 
through electronic means, circulations of print material, 
dissemination of information about the recently enacted 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems 
(Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005 and the 
proposed revision of the lists and notification of the 
general criteria for licensing. 
 
¶G.  Various agencies of the Government are empowered to 
enforce the provisions of the laws of the rules, regulations 
and orders issued thereunder, which form the legal and 
regulatory basis of India's system of export controls. 
Exporters are expected to comply with the provisions of the 
applicable laws and regulations.  Legislative provisions are 
in place for initiating quasi-judicial, departmental 
proceedings on the enforcement side, which may involve 
seizure/confiscation and imposition of penalties for SCOMET 
items exported or attempted to be exported in violation of 
existing GOI export control regulations.  Export or attempt 
to export in violation of export control regulations is also 
liable to criminal prosecution. 
 
¶H.  Concerted efforts are under way to enhance 
inter-ministerial coordination on preventive enforcement. 
Pre-license checks on end-users are conducted as appropriate 
through the intelligence agencies and our Missions abroad 
prior to the issue of license.  Guidelines on pre-license 
checks have been issued.  Risk management-assessment of 
exports is done at the implementation level with the 
objective of making it administratively possible for Customs 
officials to check exports from India with a view to ensure 
that all the relevant laws and regulations are being 
followed.  SCOMET controls have been incorporated as an 
important parameter into the GOI Risk Management System, and 
a briefing on the same was provided to the USG team that 
participated in the workshop on risk management and targeting 
held in New Delhi in April 2005. 
 
¶I.  Government has established an inter-agency group under 
the chairmanship of the Ministry of External Affairs to 
examine intelligence made available on potential transactions 
to suspect destinations.  This inter-agency group meets 
regularly and also works in close coordination with the 
Inter-Ministerial Working Group that considers export license 
applications, which is chaired by DGFT. 
 
¶J.  GOI has also constituted a Core Group on Training on 
SCOMET Enforcement under the aegis of the Central Board of 
Excise and Customs.  The Core Group is comprised of 
representatives of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Department 
of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, Department of Biotechnology, 
Defense Research and Development Organization, Department of 
Atomic Energy, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, relevant 
intelligence agencies, and the Ministry of External Affairs. 
End text of GOI non-paper. 
 
Initial Analysis on Outreach/Preventive Enforcement 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The non-paper notes an existing network of 32 
regional offices of the Directorate General for Foreign Trade 
(DGFT) that already does outreach and can be further utilized 
to educate industry and local governments about upcoming 
changes to India's export control regulations.  Further, it 
states that the GOI has established an inter-ministerial 
group to make recommendations and coordinate future outreach 
activities. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) A similar approach is taken on preventive 
enforcement, with an inter-ministerial group chaired by MEA 
to coordinate intelligence sharing between the various GOI 
agencies and missions abroad, as well as a separate 
inter-ministerial group chaired by Customs to conduct 
training on enforcement.  The non-paper also reflects GOI 
implementation of issues covered by EXBS workshops such as 
"Targeting and Risk Management." 
BLAKE