Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI5318, INDIA REVIVES TOP-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT WITH BANGLADESH

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05NEWDELHI5318.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI5318 2005-07-11 12:47 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 005318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER KCRM KWMN ETRD ENRG BD IN
SUBJECT: INDIA REVIVES TOP-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT WITH BANGLADESH 
BUT SUSPICIONS LINGER 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 4330 
     B. DHAKA BG IIR 6 925 0054 
     C. NEW DELHI 5048 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Meetings between the Foreign Secretaries of 
India and Bangladesh in New Delhi on June 21-22 provided the 
first opportunity after a two year gap for the nations' top 
diplomats to turn around deteriorating relations by airing 
disagreements, reviving several working groups, and planning 
for additional exchanges before the SAARC summit in November. 
 Delhi-based analysts observed a sincere interest on both 
sides to improve relations and believe the GOI has realized 
the importance of greater engagement with Bangladesh as the 
first step towards mending the soured fences.  The Foreign 
Secretaries'  meeting is an important high-level effort, but 
 
SIPDIS 
real progress will require a perception in Delhi that Dhaka 
is addressing India's security concerns as well as a GOI 
commitment to hear Bangladeshi grievances and intensify 
economic cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
A Show of Top-level Bonhomie 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Despite the recent border tension and security 
concerns about insurgents in Bangladesh, Indian media 
reported that FS Saran's meetings with FS Heymayetuddin, who 
previously served as Dhaka's envoy to Delhi, were held in a 
"cordial atmosphere" in which both sides evinced a genuine 
interest in mending ties.  The meetings followed sharp 
criticism of GOI policy toward Bangladesh (Ref A) and calls 
from strategic analysts for top-level intervention to address 
piled-up issues and repair the neighborly rift.  Setting a 
positive tone for PM Singh's visit to Dhaka for the SAARC 
conference in November, FS Saran personally received his 
counterpart at the airport and thanked him for the June 16 
operation against anti-India military camps in Moulovibazar 
(Ref B). 
 
3.  (U) After seven hours of meetings, the Joint Press 
Statement listed the following results: 
 
-- Agreement to convene the bilateral Joint Working Group on 
Trade by August 2005, sign the revised Trade Agreement and 
the Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement 
(BIPPA), and send the Indian Minister for Commerce and 
Industry to Dhaka. 
 
-- Resumption of meetings of the Joint Boundary Working 
Groups (JBWG) in August 2005 to consider boundary-related 
issues such as boundary demarcation and exchange of enclaves 
and territories. 
 
-- Satisfaction at the commencement of coordinated patrolling 
by border forces of both countries and Bangladesh agreement 
to examine the Indian proposal for coordinated patrolling of 
the feasible sections of the riverine boundary. 
 
-- Need to convene the Joint Rivers Commission in Dhaka and 
Indian pledge not to take any unilateral action on the Indian 
River Linking Project which would harm Dhaka's interests. 
 
-- Indian invitation to Bangladeshi delegation to visit in 
July 2005 to discuss extension of USD 150 million line of 
credit for infrastructure projects. 
 
-- Explore bus services between Dhaka and Guwahati, Dhaka and 
Shillong and Dhaka and Siliguri. 
 
Diplomats Agree to Disagree 
--------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The Foreign Secretaries aired their views on other 
contentious issues, but agreed to nothing beyond future 
meetings.  The Joint Statement reflects differences over the 
two toughest disagreements, namely border fencing issues and 
anti-India insurgents.  Bangladesh insisted that India's 
plans to build border fences within 150 yards of the frontier 
do not conform with the 1975 border guidelines.  The GOI 
requested a high-level meeting on illegal cross-border 
activity and migration, which Dhaka continues to deny 
publicly.  Delhi stressed the need for greater information 
sharing and action against Indian insurgents in Bangladesh, 
but FS Hemayetuddin did not agree to the Indian request to 
share intelligence on Northeast insurgents.  Mashfee Binte 
Shams, Counselor at the Bangladesh High Commission expressed 
satisfaction over the meetings, stressing that the "negatives 
shouldn't outweigh the progress made in the discussions," but 
noted that Bangladesh is looking for greater economic 
concessions from India.  FS Saran emphasized to U/S Burns the 
progress on boundary and trade issues and the agreement to 
revive several joint working groups (Ref C). 
 
For India, Security Counts 
-------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The Foreign Secretaries agreed to increase 
coordinated patrolling as one method to decrease tension and 
corruption between Border Security Forces (BSF) and 
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR).  According to Shams, coordinated 
patrolling along the land border has already begun, and 
Hemayetuddin agreed to examine a new Indian proposal for 
expansion to the riverine boundary.  Institute of Defense 
Studies and Analyses Associate Fellow Sreeradha Datta told 
Poloff that this simultaneous patrolling is little more than 
increasing coordination between the guards regarding where 
they are at what time of day.  She noted that corruption is 
so endemic on both sides of the border that greater 
coordination between guards will do little to cut down on the 
win-win economics of facilitating petty smuggling and illegal 
migrant crossings. 
 
6.  (C) The BDG operation against anti-Indian insurgents one 
week before the meeting contributed to the improved 
atmosphere, but did little to ease the ongoing security 
concerns.  Calling the June 16 operation "cosmetic," IDSA's 
Datta told Poloff that this was a intentionally-timed 
maneuver before the meetings and not a symbol of commitment 
to rooting out insurgents.  To further beef up security, the 
"Hindustan Times" reported on the last day of meetings that 
the India Home Ministry will replace approximately 10 
battalions of BSF serving in the Kashmir Valley with the 
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in order to increase the 
number of guards available for the Indo-Bangla border. 
 
Improving Relations Through Economic Concessions 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7.  (C) New Delhi's "carrots" in its Bangladesh relationship 
are primarily economic and stem from Dhaka's one billion USD 
trade deficit with India.  In the revised Trade Agreement, 
which has been pending since 1999, New Delhi has offered to 
extend some economic concessions to Dhaka in the form of duty 
free entry for additional goods.  The details of this 
agreement, yet to be signed, are not public.  The Bilateral 
Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (BIPPA) has 
been under negotiations since 1982, and would guarantee that 
Indian investments in Bangladesh can't be expropriated, with 
the hope that other Indian companies to follow Tata's recent 
investment example.  Shams indicated that Dhaka would look 
more favorably on gas pipeline discussions if Delhi gave 
transit rights for Bangladeshi goods going to Nepal and 
Bhutan, facilitated the delivery of electricity from Nepal 
and Bhutan, and made efforts to reduce the trade gap. 
8.  (C) Delhi-based analysts viewed this economic leverage as 
an opportunity for the GOI to make simple gestures to improve 
quickly the atmosphere and take some pressure off Bangladesh. 
 Professor S.K. Pandey from Jawaharlal Nehru University told 
Poloff that as the "big brother neighbor," it was the GOI's 
responsibility to grant economic concessions as the next step 
towards improving relations.  Strategic analyst C. Raja Mohan 
called on Prime Minister Singh to de-link economic and 
security dimensions of its policy towards Dhaka in the same 
way that the GOI de-linked cross-border terrorism and 
normalization of ties with Pakistan.  By refusing to 
negotiate on the economic aspects until Dhaka acts on 
terrorism and migration, Mohan observed that India has 
blocked progress on either front. 
 
A Positive Note or Upward Trend? 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Indian analysts agreed that the Foreign Secretaries' 
meeting was a long overdue first step towards improving 
relations, but differed on their interpretations of results 
and next steps.  Noting the upcoming elections in Bangladesh 
and the anti-Indian tendencies of the BNP electoral base, the 
IDSA's Datta speculated that the improved relations would 
face a ceiling as long as the country was under BNP rule. 
Dr. Deba Prasad Nanda of Delhi University agreed that the 
traditionally anti-Indian stance of the BNP would be a 
limiting factor, but told Poloff that India will need to put 
more efforts into this relationship to avoid losing a 
burgeoning market and influence to China.  JNU's Dr. Pandey 
observed that the GOI showed greater maturity by restarting 
engagement, but needs to take additional steps to fulfill 
India's role as a stabilizing force in South Asia, primarily 
through greater economic engagement. 
 
Comment: Its a Start at Least 
----------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Whether this diplomatic overture spreads to a real 
improvement of relations will in the short term depend upon 
the upcoming meetings between the Home, Commerce and Water 
ministries and on the perception in India that Dhaka is in 
fact responding to its security concerns.  Given the recent 
terrorist incident in Ayodhya and the media sensitivity to 
perceived threats from Bangladesh, de-linking economic 
cooperation from cross-border issues in the current climate 
will be difficult and could open the Congress to BJP 
criticism ahead of elections in West Bengal (which the 
Communists are expected to win).  It is also not clear 
whether the GOI is ready to offer attractive market access to 
Bangladesh that would improve the latter's economy and reduce 
the large trade deficit.  Increasing concern about, and 
criticism of, the GOI's Bangladesh policy as well as PM 
Singh's visit to Dhaka for the November SAARC meetings are 
all incentives for New Delhi to remain engaged constructively. 
BLAKE