This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2002
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI 
USMISSION GENEVA 
NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 001134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, PRM, 
USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR 
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA 
FOR REFCOORDS; NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL CD SU
SUBJECT: SCENARIOS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHAD 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 04 1992 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 909 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Chad is currently experiencing another 
period of heightened uncertainty.  Deby has been able to 
navigate through them in the past.  (Reftels)  Nonetheless, 
the removal of presidential term limits through a 
less-than-transparent public referendum has many observers 
wondering what the next power transition might look like in 
Chad.  This cable looks at possible scenarios for regime 
change over the near and long term.  End Summary. 
 
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NO CONFIDENCE 
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¶2.  (C) It came as no surprise that the Government 
manipulated the results to demonstrate a large turn-out and 
an overwhelming "yes" vote in favor of removing presidential 
term limits.  However, no one is fooled by the announced 
numbers.  Despite "victory", the regime was shaken by the low 
turn-out, not that unpopularity will likely deter the 
President and his Zaghawa clansmen from doing as they please. 
 Nonetheless, the referendum's announced outcome has sparked 
speculation over President Deby's health and his next moves. 
His family continues to weigh their political future as well. 
 The political opposition feels vindicated by the low voter 
turn-out for the referendum, but their ability to mobilize 
the Chadian public remains weak.  Chadian rebels continue to 
make noises from the east.  The next key event is the 
nomination of the ruling Movement for Patriotic Salvation's 
(MPS) candidate at its party congress later this year.  There 
also may be changes within the cabinet and the leadership of 
the ruling party, though not likely until the President 
returns to Chad from his recent extended stay in France for 
medical treatment. 
 
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SCENARIOS FOR CHANGE 
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¶3.  (SBU)  The announced results of the public referendum 
means that Chadian leaders can rule without legal limits on 
their "mandates".  Now that this possibility has materialized 
through the referendum, many observers are wondering whether 
or not there can ever be a peaceful transition of power in 
the country.  Chad's post-independence history provides no 
precedence for such a handover.  We thought it prudent to 
outline some of the possible political scenarios in Chad's 
near and distant future and our opportunities to influence 
the outcomes. 
 
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PRESIDENT-FOR-LIFE 
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¶4.  (C) In this scenario, President Deby returns from Paris 
after his medical treatment, likely reshuffles his cabinet, 
and takes steps to make changes within the ruling MPS.  Later 
this year, he is nominated for another presidential term. 
Security forces step up their efforts to maintain Deby in 
power, press harassment continues, and government opponents 
are harassed and jailed.  The current political and economic 
malaise grows as do ethnic tensions, particularly in the 
east.  President Deby proceeds with the communal elections in 
October, the MPS party congress in November, and the 
presidential and legislative elections from March to May 
¶2006.  He is re-elected in a less-than-transparent election. 
 
¶5.  (C) Most of the signs point in this direction, beginning 
with the faulty electoral census and the rigging of the vote 
count for the referendum to the continuing harassment of the 
press over its sources of open letters criticizing the 
regime.  This path, like the others, is fraught with the 
potential for instability.  Deby's refusal to transfer power 
will galvanize his opponents.  We would need to decide on 
whether or not to participate in the electoral process and, 
if so, how to avoid appearing to bless the outcome of a 
 
process that can be expected to be marred by irregularities. 
The actions of other key external actors, such as the 
positions of the French and the African Union, will have 
significant influence over how this scenario progresses. 
 
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PRESIDENT DIES WITH NO HEIR APPARENT 
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¶6.  (C) Deby's health is a never-ending source of 
speculation.  Some insiders say that the has been told not to 
drink or smoke, but continues to do so, aggravating his 
condition.  As a result, the possibility that Deby dies or is 
incapacitated without having adequately groomed an acceptable 
successor or prepared the ruling party for such an 
eventuality creates a power vacuum.  In this scenario, the 
potential for violence is high, most likely among the Zaghawa 
themselves, but some fear that an interethnic fight could 
emerge.  The independent media and some other observers 
believe that Deby's son Ibrahim is being groomed to succeed 
his father.  However, a member of the Deby family tells us 
that Ibrahim is unacceptable and would be prevented from 
assuming power by others. 
 
¶7.  (C)  No one seems to have yet identified a player with 
national stature behind whom others might coalesce.  There 
are some indications that the political opposition, the Army, 
and even possibly, the French are concerned enough about this 
scenario that they may be in the beginning stages of devising 
a plan to manage a transition devoid of violence.  The most 
important internal actors remain Deby's immediate family, and 
the Army's leadership.  External actors, such as France, the 
United States, and other AU leaders, will need to be ready to 
push together for a constitutional transition.  The 
groundwork, however, including sending signals to ambitious 
army officers or family members will need to be started in 
advance. 
 
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PRESIDENT DIES, CONSTITUTION CHANGED BY DECREE 
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¶8.  (C)  During Deby's last medical vacation in Paris, he is 
rumored to have issued a decree changing the presidential 
succession, according to members of the security services. 
The current Constitutional succession allows the President of 
the National Assembly, a southerner, to oversee elections 
within 45 to 90 days of the vacancy.  This makes many Zaghawa 
nervous, and indeed, it makes the current National Assembly 
President even more nervous.  He reportedly fears that if 
Deby dies, he will be killed to make way for the National 
Assembly's Vice President, a northerner, to manage the 
transition.  This scenario also invites violence between 
northerners and southerners as some view the NASS VP to be 
pushing an Islamic agenda.  In addition, the decree could 
designate someone outside the current succession plan, 
creating a potential for conflict.  The key players in this 
scenario are Deby and those closest to him.  Deby also would 
have had to coopt the security services into respecting the 
decreed successor.  Outside actors, with the exception of 
France, would likely be informed too late to make an impact. 
 
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PRESIDENT DIES, CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSION FOLLOWED 
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¶9.  (C) In this scenario, the legal mechanisms for a 
Constitutional transition are respected.  However, key groups 
maneuver to rig the election of the new President.  It is 
entirely possibly that a deal could be forged between ethnic 
powerbrokers to ensure that no violence erupts, but it could 
also degenerate into trouble if one group is given the 
opportunity to manipulate the transition while excluding 
others. 
 
¶10.  (C) In a second, but less likely scenario, opposition 
parties and other ethnic groups are allowed to compete 
freely.  However, whether or not they would call for 
prosecution of the Zaghawa for crimes committed during their 
tenure in power or offer amnesty could be an important factor 
in the level of competition allowed.  The opposition must 
 
back a single candidate to have a chance of winning the 
election and/or the MPS must produce a strong candidate.  The 
acceptance of this outcome by others will be critical to the 
transitions sustainability.  Key players include the NASS 
President, the MPS, the Zaghawa, and the opposition.  The 
emergence of this scenario could mean that the international 
community must be prepared to react quickly to bolster a 
positive outcome and support a free and fair electoral 
process should one emerge. 
 
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PRESIDENT OVERTHROWN OR DIES IN A COUP D'ETAT 
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¶11.  (C) The issues underlying last year's May 16 coup 
attempt remain.  Some have been exacerbated.  First, it is 
even more clear to others that Deby may want to be 
President-for-life, which will make it difficult for another 
Zaghawa to come to power.  In addition, a deep rift between 
Deby and his half-brother Daoussa has developed over 
management of the Darfur crisis which includes other members 
of the family.  Deby and his son Ibrahim are working closely 
with a marabou called Sheik Badradine to destroy the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM) and bring a Zaghawa, Mini Minawi, 
the current Secretary General, to the top of the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM).  Daoussa, General Mahamat Ali 
Abdullah, and Timan Deby, the President's younger brother, 
reportedly oppose this strategy and are trying to strengthen 
the movement by helping it organize itself better to overcome 
its leadership problems. 
 
¶12.  (C) Daoussa and the Erdimi brothers, according to a 
family member, allegedly viewed the referendum as a vote of 
no-confidence in Deby and may be looking for ways out of the 
current situation.  One assumption in this scenario, is that 
the President has lost sufficient respect from within the 
family and the Army to be vulnerable to a take-over. 
 
¶13.  (C)  A putsch could be limited to the confines of the 
palace and/or family, as was last year's attempt.  However, 
who leads the coup could be an important factor as to whether 
or not it would stand or there would be counter-coup 
attempts.  Another question is whether or not a coup leader 
would remain in power or hand it over to the National 
Assembly President.  Another variation of this scenario would 
be if the President is overthrown but survives.  He is either 
arrested or escapes into exile.  If Deby survives, the 
international community may have to consider supporting 
Deby's return to office. 
 
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PRESIDENT DOES NOT RUN, MANAGES A PEACEFUL TRANSITION 
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¶14.  (C)  This is a best case scenario for Chad's immediate 
and long-term future.  Deby decides because of his health or 
for other reasons not to seek a third term.  He could come 
under other pressure, perhaps from the family, or the Army, 
to cut a deal before being forced out of power.  In a 
scenario in which Deby decides not to run, the key factor for 
whether or not there would be violence, is how he manages it. 
 He would most likely work within his immediate family, his 
extended Zaghawa clan, and the Army to find an acceptable 
candidate.  He could even make overtures to the political 
opposition, armed rebel groups, and other ethnic groups in an 
effort to forge a consensus on Chad's new leadership, which 
could include some opposition members of government. 
 
¶15.  (C)  For this scenario to emerge, internal and external 
actors would need to present Deby with an acceptable exit 
strategy.  A coordinated effort beginning now would have the 
most likelihood of success.  Options for his retirement could 
include working for the United Nations or African Union in 
some capacity.  The French, the United States, and other 
members of the international community would need to work 
together to persuade Deby that by leaving power he can build 
a strong legacy and not put Chad on the path to civil war. 
In this scenario, we might have to accept a 
less-than-democratic change of government (i.e. back someone 
Deby's choice) or accept less-than-perfect election results 
to ensure that a change in power occurs. 
 
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KEY CALCULATIONS 
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¶15.  (C) There are probably many permutations of these 
scenarios.  We acknowledge that the Chadian military and 
security forces. have an important, if not essential, role to 
play in how a transition emerges because they will likely 
determine the level of violence and instability that would 
accompany a change of power. 
 
¶16.  (C)  The role of public apathy, another important 
factor, is difficult to measure.  The level of public hatred 
for the Zaghawa is reportedly very high.  Chadians expressed 
their disaffection with the current regime by not voting, but 
the opposition has yet to produce a candidate attractive 
enough for Chadians to rally behind.  Our assessment is that 
the Chadian public wants peaceful change through legal means, 
but lacks the mechanism to produce it.  The general mood 
seems to be one of acquiescence to Deby's plan if the 
alternative means forcing a change and provoking instability. 
 We often hear that Chadians look to the U.S. to push for 
political change. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶17.  (C)  Any of the above scenarios could emerge.  We are 
constantly looking for ways to play a positive role in 
managing outcomes here.  We have a great deal at stake in 
what happens next in Chad.  U.S. programs such as the 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSTCI), 
Anti-Terrorism Training (ATA), assistance for Sudanese 
refugees, and support for the oil revenue management plan 
could all be put at risk with an irregular change of power. 
A disruptive transition could also hamper Darfur diplomacy 
and have an adverse impact on other neighbors.  To be 
effective, however, we need to work closely with key internal 
players and our international partners to maximize the 
likelihood of a peaceful transition. 
 
 
¶18.  (C) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
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