This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 002738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF 
STATE PASS AID 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
USUN FOR D'ELIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2025 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA -- NEED TO RALLY BEHIND THE SRSG 
 
REF: AF/E N.GAREY - SOMALIA WATCHER M.ZORICK EMAILS 
 
     OF 28-30 JUNE 05 
 
Classified By: LISA J. PETERSON, ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR, REASONS 1. 
4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  This is an action request -- see para 19. 
 
¶2.  (C) SUMMARY: Divisions among members of the Somali 
Transitional Federal Institutions are now being mirrored by 
schisms in the international community.  Moves to finance 
projects in district-level reconciliation, pushed by specific 
EU member states, raise the specter of international 
financial support fueling the very conflicts that we seek to 
help mediate.  A divided international community cannot hope 
to promote stability and security in Somalia.  Needed now is 
a return to the principles set down in Stockholm, and a rapid 
move to strongly support the UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG) as the only person mandated to speak 
 
SIPDIS 
on behalf of the international community.  Positioning the 
international community behind the SRSG, and assisting him in 
developing proposals for compromise for the members of the 
Somali Transitional Federal Institutions, could be the last 
best way to help bring governance back to Somalia.  If the 
international community continues to show itself to be 
fragmented, and dominated by one former colonial power, we 
will quickly become a big part of the Somali problem.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
US-EU COORDINATION -- OR NOT 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Per ref emails, post awaits instructions to proceed 
with a demarche, either alone or jointly with the EU, to 
Somali Transitional Federal President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed 
as soon as possible in Nairobi, and the Mogadishu-based 
warlord Ministers / MPs in Somalia.  The impetus behind this 
initiative is recent reporting that Yusuf plans to take 
military action against Mogadishu-based members of the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and that these 
Ministers / MPs may be preparing pre-emptive offensive or 
defensive actions, giving rise to concern for the survival of 
the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). Post is 
aware that the Department's Office of East African Affairs 
held on June 29 a digital video conference with European 
Commission representatives to discuss (a) the possibility of 
such a joint demarche, (b) donor coordination for engagement 
with TFIs, and (c) the prospect of EC funding for a 
reconciliation project, at the level of the Somali districts, 
that elements of the TFG allied with President Yusuf have 
proposed to the international community (IC). 
 
¶4.  (C) Somalia Watcher met July 1 with officials of the UK's 
Department for International Development (DFID), at their 
request, visiting Nairobi from London to consult with IC 
representatives at this critical juncture.  The officials -- 
Mr. Desmond Curran, Head of the Great Lakes and Horn of 
Africa Department, and Ms.  Anna Lake, Head of the Horn of 
Africa Unit -- wanted to discuss exactly the same points as 
those set out for the June 29 DVC described above.  Curran 
began by stressing that the two officials participating in 
the Brussels-Washington DVC did not have the authority to 
approve or initiate a demarche, this being the prerogative of 
the EU Presidency -- a position the UK had just taken on July 
¶1.  Curran noted that the content and target of the proposed 
demarche points were completely in line with the UK's 
positions, a fact of little import since such diplomatic 
actions had to receive approval from all 25 EU members. 
(NOTE: Proposed demarche points are: (a) supporting the 
process of establishing governance in Somalia; (b) opposing 
all actions taken outside the ongoing peaceful reconciliation 
process or the framework of the TFIs; (c) calling for respect 
of the will of the Somali people; (d) urging all parties to 
seek consensus of a broad quorum of the Somali MPs on 
contentious issues; and (e) making clear that violence or 
military action by any members of the TFG or other 
individuals is unacceptable.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶5.  (C) Curran stated that, in fact, the proposed points for 
demarche had run into immediate trouble with a single EU 
member state -- Italy.  He stressed that, within member state 
councils, the demarche initiative and the message to be 
delivered had been directly tied to any future decision to 
provide financial support to the TFG's district-level 
reconciliation plan. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
ATTEMPTS TO PUT EC MONEY BEHIND ITALIAN FUNDS 
FOR DISTRICT-LEVEL RECONCILIATION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  (C) Curran and Lake confirmed what Somalia Watcher has 
learned from other sources: that EC representatives at the 
Mission of the European Commission in Nairobi are fighting a 
rear-guard action to resist pressure from Brussels to release 
funds into the TFG's district-level reconciliation project. 
They noted that Italy's Special Envoy for Somalia in Nairobi, 
former Senator Mario Raffaelli, is in charge of releasing 
EUROS 2.7 million to the UNOPS agency for disbursement to the 
project, channeled through the UNDP's Emergency Budgetary 
Support Project (EBSP).  (NOTE: According to Raffaelli, 
speaking to the IC in the last meeting of the international 
members of the Somalia Coordination and Monitoring Committee 
(I-CMC), Italy has made "a political commitment" to disburse 
these funds "immediately".) 
 
¶7.  (C) Somalia Watcher noted that, according to EC 
representatives in Nairobi, Raffaelli is pushing very hard to 
get EC money into the pipeline as well, apparently to avoid 
the image that the district-level reconciliation project is 
an Italy-only financed affair.  In private conversations with 
Somalia Watcher, these EC officials, as well as Somalia 
experts in several EU member state missions (especially 
Denmark, Sweden, UK, Netherlands), have expressed strong 
displeasure at this pressure coming down on them from 
Brussels, saying that they see the district-level 
reconciliation project as fatally flawed in several respects. 
 Perhaps the most glaring of these flaws is that the project 
includes TFG reconciliation engagement in the northern 
Somalia districts of Sool and Sanaag.  Such activities would 
inevitably trigger a violent reaction in the otherwise 
largely peaceful breakaway Republic of Somaliland, 
particularly now when the Somaliland public is focused on 
parliamentary elections. 
 
-------------------------------- 
NO DEMARCHE THAT TARGETS YUSUF, 
OR BLOCKS FUNDING 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) DFID's Curran opined that the idea of a joint US-EU 
demarche would never get past the Italians, irrespective of 
any attempts to ensure that, although the action would be in 
part directed to President Yusuf, it would not indicate 
support for individual leaders or faction.  Curran thought 
that at this point in time, Senator Raffaelli seems convinced 
that recent USG actions and statements indicated USG support 
for the Mogadishu-based warlords and their civil society 
backers -- an opinion Curran and his UK colleagues did not 
share.  This idea aside, Curran felt it would be impossible 
to move the demarche idea forward as long as it was tied in 
Italy's mind to disbursement of support for district-level 
reconciliation.  He said there was to be a DVC among key EU 
member states Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the Commission on 
July 5 to discuss the issue, but doubted if it would move 
much further.  "It may be that you (the USG) will have to do 
this on your own," he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT UN AS LEAD FOR THE IC 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) DFID officials Curran and Lake next inquired as to 
what we thought could be an appropriate way to break the 
logjams before us -- both within the IC, and within the TFIs. 
 Somalia Watcher stressed that there seemed to be significant 
pitfalls in the approach that we have been taking so far, 
dominated as it has been by bilateral interaction with 
individuals in the various factions of the TFIs.  We noted 
that, in the discussions that the IC had undertaken in 
Stockholm in October 2004, we had established that the 
Stockholm Declaration of Principles would form the basis for 
discussions with the TFG, and welcomed the readiness of the 
UN to play a leading role in the proposed Somali Coordination 
and Monitoring Committee.  We stressed that, in the new UN 
SRSG's courtesy call on Ambassador, we had strongly welcomed 
his arrival as the concretization of these discussions, and 
expressed the hope that he would be quickly ready to engage 
in the tough negotiations and mediation efforts needed to 
help close the rifts in the TFIs. 
¶10.  (C) Curran wondered if the UN SRSG, Ambassador Francois 
Fall, was up to the task of uniting the IC behind him.  He 
repeated concerns we had heard from EC representatives in 
Nairobi and from representatives of EC member states in 
bilateral missions, that the increasing concerns expressed in 
the EC's Brussels offices as to Fall's abilities were in fact 
part of the personal agenda of Italy's Senator Raffaelli.  He 
agreed with the contention that Raffaelli had already on at 
least four occasions attempted to put himself or an ally in 
jobs at a nexus of interaction between the IC and the TFIs, 
in an apparent attempt to dominate the agenda in dealings 
with the Somalis.  Curran echoed EC representatives here in 
saying that other member states, with the possible exception 
of UK as the EU President, were largely powerless to confront 
in Brussels Raffaelli's tactics inside the commission, given 
the limited expertise or interest other member states have in 
Brussels on Somalia questions. 
 
------------------------------------- 
SRSG WINS SUPPORT -- FOR A STATEMENT 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The SRSG came to the regularly scheduled Tuesday 
meeting of the I-CMC (July 5) armed with a strong statement 
hitting the same points as the proposed U.S./EU demarche.  He 
had met with the UK's Curran and Lake on July 1, and had 
clearly taken on board their ideas on the need for a clear 
reminder from the international community that armed conflict 
among members of the TFIs would be a "Game Over" event.  The 
UK and Italian representatives reported on their 30 June-2 
July trip to Jowhar and North Mogadishu, wherein they noted 
that PM Ghedi had struck a very reconciliatory tone in his 
speech for Somali Independence Day (July 1 for the former 
Italian Somalia).  Also notable: that a rump parliament 
meeting on July 1 in Mogadishu, finding itself without a 
quorum, decided to confine their actions to choosing a 
5-member committee from among themselves to seek a dialogue 
with the PM. 
 
¶12.  (C) A short editing session among the gathered I-CMC 
members produced the following statement for the SRSG's 
release, which occurred the afternoon of July 5: 
 
BEGIN SRSG STATEMENT TEXT 
 
-- The international community welcomes the completion of the 
relocation of the Transitional Federal Institutions into 
Somalia and the reconciliatory tone of the Prime Minister's 
speech on the Somali national day as well as the leadership 
shown by Somali leaders in opening dialogue among themselves. 
 We urge Somali leaders to continue to work towards dialogue 
and reconciliation within the framework of the TFIs. 
 
-- However, the international community has been concerned 
over certain developments inside Somalia including the 
reported inflow of weapons and an increase in the general 
level of tension both in terms of media rhetoric and reported 
movements of militia. 
 
-- The international community calls attention of all Somali 
leaders as well as regional countries to the 1992 United 
Nations arms embargo on Somalia and recalls the declaration 
by all the Somali leaders in Kenya to avoid arms as solution 
to differences.  The international community demands a halt 
to the delivery and reception of arms and calls for the 
respect of the arms embargo. 
 
-- We call on all leaders in Somalia to exercise maximum 
restraint and take effective steps to reduce tension.  Any 
resort to military force either in offence or pre-emptive 
defense will be unacceptable to the international community 
as the way out for dealing with the current differences 
within the Transitional Federal Institutions. 
 
END SRSG STATEMENT TEXT 
 
----------------------------- 
WHAT IS THE WAY FORWARD? 
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) The concerns the DFID officials expressed to us are 
in lock-step with our own regarding the current splits in not 
only the TFIs, but also in the international community.  It 
appears to us that we may be best served by trying to steer a 
course back toward re-invigorating the IC in its commitments, 
as set out in the Stockholm Declaration of Principles, to 
pursue unity of action, support for an inclusive Somali 
transitional government of reconciliation, and avoidance of 
undermining existing areas of tranquility. 
 
¶14.  (C) At this point in time several external 
interventions, whether through funding or public statement, 
are generating controversy and perceptions of bias towards 
one wing or the other of the divided TFIs.  These include the 
Italian /EC financing for the district-level reconciliation 
project, which is creating fear of distortions to local 
processes, aggravations of political divisions, and financing 
of conflict.  The June 21 USG public statement -- although 
carefully crafted, and warmly welcomed by the Mogadishu 
public as the only visible support for civil society engaged 
in Mogadishu stabilization, has also been characterized by 
President Yusuf's wing as USG support for Mogadishu warlords. 
 
¶15.  (C) At the same time, there are clearly factors that 
would support additional USG efforts to push for the 
continued survival of the Somali TFIs.  Among them: 
 
(a) Somali civil society has gained strength over two years 
of warlord absence from Mogadishu; 
 
(b) Somalis throughout the country have expressed a profound 
desire for a functioning government; 
 
(c) Tough mediation efforts of the "informal core group" in 
April-May left a clear message that division of the TFIs 
would result in a lose-lose ending: The IC could support only 
an inclusive transitional process; and 
 
(d) Somalis on both wings of the TFIs fear sanction by the 
international community (IC) against 'spoilers'; some even 
seem to think that there is a threat of future indictment for 
war crimes. 
 
¶16.  (C) We believe that, in keeping with the decisions the 
IC took in Stockholm, it is critical at this time to bring 
the UN SRSG, Ambassador Fall, to the fore as the honest and 
neutral broker representing a united IC.  This is especially 
important as a way of countering the impression that the IC 
is itself divided.  We can reduce such impressions if the IC 
can again unite behind basic principles.  In order for the 
elements of the TFIs to have any hope for IC assistance in 
establishing governance in Somalia: 
 
(a) Bellicose language, military maneuvering, attempts at 
military solutions, must cease; 
 
(b) The litmus test for TFI actions will be conformity with 
the Transitional Federal Charter and the Declaration of 
Principles; 
 
(c) The IC will only support an inclusive reconciliation 
process; 
 
(d) The IC itself must unite behind the SRSG, and not 
tolerate any further "slippage" in the commitment to unity of 
action; and 
 
(e) A return to the principle of "Do No Harm" is an absolute 
necessity -- the release of financial resources to projects 
highly likely to ignite conflict must be avoided or stopped. 
 
¶17.  (C) The idea of a joint EC/US demarche is perhaps a 
non-starter, given Italy's reported strong objections.  The 
question may now be overtaken by events, with the SRSG 
receiving approval to issue a statement, in the name of the 
IC, setting down many of the same markers first mooted for 
the U.S./EU demarche.  Those were: 
 
-- The IC supports the process of establishing governance in 
Somalia.  We will not support anyone or any part of the TFG 
that acts outside the ongoing peaceful reconciliation process 
or outside the framework of the TFIs; 
 
-- You must respect the will of the Somali people and work 
within the framework of the TFIs to find agreement on all 
issues based on the consensus of a broad quorum of the Somali 
MPs; and 
 
-- Violence or military action by any members of the TFG or 
other individuals is unacceptable.  You must reach out to the 
other members of the TFIs to find a peaceful solution to any 
current disagreements. 
 
Once the SRSG's message becomes public, we would recommend 
following with a firm public statement on the part of the 
USG, expressing our strong support for the SRSG and the 
points he has made. 
 
¶18.  (C) Lastly, once the message of "What the IC does not 
like" has been delivered, it would be constructive to 
indicate what it is we believe the Somalis must do to ensure 
the survival of the TFIs.  The SRSG has proposed a plan of 
action over the next weeks to September, to push forward with 
a mediation initiative among all relevant leaders in the 
TFIs.  His initial broad-brush ideas received guarded support 
from the I-CMC on July 5.  He is tasked with fleshing out his 
ideas, based on the critiques he heard, before he leaves July 
8 for New York to attend the UNSC's discussions on Somalia. 
As his proposals come together, he will need strong support 
from the IC to develop the necessary consensus behind a 
compromise for the two wings of the TFIs -- perhaps through 
inclusion of specific language in any Statement of the 
Security Council President emanating from the UNSC's July 14 
discussion of Somalia.  END COMMENTS. 
 
--------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
--------------- 
 
¶19.  (C) Unless Department instructs otherwise, Post will 
issue a short public statement, in the spirit of that 
released June 21, acknowledging the SRSG's statement.  Text 
proposed as follows: 
 
BEGIN PROPOSED U.S. STATEMENT TEXT: 
 
U.S.  DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
 
For Immediate Release July X, 2005 
 
The United States welcomes the recent statement, issued in 
the name of the international community by Ambassador 
Francois L.  Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General, calling the attention of all Somali leaders as well 
as regional countries to the 1992 United Nations arms embargo 
on Somalia, and recalling the declaration by all the Somali 
leaders to avoid arms as solution to their differences. 
 
The United States strongly supports the SRSG's call on all 
leaders in Somalia to exercise maximum restraint and take 
effective steps to reduce tension.  In particular, we stress 
that we will not support anyone or any part of the 
Transitional Federal Institutions that acts outside ongoing 
peaceful reconciliation processes. 
 
The United States calls on all leaders in Somalia to respect 
the will of the Somali people and work within the framework 
of the Transitional Federal Institutions to find agreement on 
all issues based on the consensus of a broad quorum of the 
Somali MPs.  Violence or military action by any members of 
the Transitional Federal Institutions or other individuals is 
unacceptable. 
 
END PROPOSED U.S. STATEMENT TEXT 
 
BELLAMY