VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSK #0851/01 2091418
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281418Z JUL 05
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2700
INFO RUEHFSC/USOFFICE FSC CHARLESTON 1261
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 2852
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3089
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 2983
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3309
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1373
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0593
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

UNCLAS MINSK 000851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
State for EB/IFD/OIA, EB/IFD/OIA, EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV KCOR BTIU PGOV AFIN BO
SUBJECT: THE BANKING SECTOR, BELARUSIAN STYLE 
 
REFS: (A) MINSK 0638, (B) Minsk 0118 
 
¶1. Summary: The banking system in Belarus is 
characterized by its underdevelopment, lack of foreign 
competition, and constant government interference. 
The Belarusian economy still relies primarily on cash 
as a settlement instrument.  Cash outside the banking 
sector is the preferred method of payment because, 
what the GOB doesn't see, it can't confiscate or 
control.  GOB intervention in the operational 
activities of both private enterprises and government- 
controlled banks is the cause of most of the problems 
in the banking sector.  However, despite these 
systemic problems, public trust in the banking sector 
is growing.  End summary. 
 
¶2. The banking sector in Belarus remains relatively 
underdeveloped.  There are 31 registered banks in 
Belarus.  Eighty percent of the banking system is 
owned by the state or the central bank.  Four of the 
six largest banks are majority state owned, and the 
other two are minority state owned.  Only one western 
bank operates in Belarus, Priorbank, majority owned by 
Austria's Raiffeisen International Beteiligungs AG. 
Priorbank, Belarus' third largest bank, has greatly 
outperformed the state banks, accounting for over half 
of all banking profit in 2004 and with a return on 
equity of 22.3 percent.  The two largest state-owned 
banks had returns on equity of only 3.5 percent. 
 
 
TAKE THAT TO THE NATIONAL BANK 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. The banking system in Belarus is characterized by 
poor infrastructure, quality and reliability of 
accounting systems in place and a lack of skilled and 
educated labor in the financial sector.  Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP) and other 
internationally accepted methods of accounting are not 
taught inside Belarus.  They have developed their own 
standard called the "Belarus Accounting Regulation." 
 
¶4. The Laws "On the National Bank of the Republic of 
Belarus" (NBB) and "On Banks and Banking Activities in 
the Republic of Belarus" were passed in December 1990. 
All bank institutions of the USSR within Belarusian 
territory were declared the property of Belarus at 
that time. The NBRB was established on the basis of 
the Belarusian Republican Bank of the USSR State Bank. 
Specialized state banks were transformed into 
joint-stock commercial banks. 
 
¶5. The president has ultimate control over all aspects 
of the NBB.  Any member of the Board of the National 
Bank may be removed from office by the president with 
a simple notification to the National Assembly. 
Reasons for removal vary from expiration of one's term 
in office to the well-known Soviet scheme of 
"inability to carry out functions for health reasons 
on the basis of findings of medical examination."  In 
other words, non-observance of decrees, edicts and 
directives of the President of the Republic of Belarus 
will be cause for removal.  Officials like the 
Chairman of the NBB, a mining engineer by training, 
rely on the president's goodwill to remain in their 
positions. 
 
 
TAKE THE CASH AND LET CREDIT GO 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. In Belarus, cash is still the main form of 
settlement used by individuals. A large share of 
wages, retirement and welfare benefits are paid in 
cash, particularly by private employers. Most 
Belarusian workers do not maintain accounts with 
banks. 
¶7. Some large enterprises have started to pay wages by 
using a bank-sponsored corporate plastic card. 
However, cash is still the prevailing instrument used 
to pay wages.  Plastic cards were first introduced in 
Belarus in 1993. There are two types of bankcards 
currently in use in the country: cards issued by the 
Belarusian national payment system and those issued by 
international banking associations VISA and 
MasterCard/Europay.  The six largest banks are members 
of these international banking associations. Most 
bankcards in circulation are debit cards. Credit cards 
are used on a limited scale. VISA and MasterCard / 
Europay are not widely accepted by sales outlets for 
purchases. 
 
 
THAT INTERFERING GOVERNMENT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. Bank ownership and creditor rights are not well 
protected in Belarus. Banks are often distracted by 
unwarranted visits by tax inspectors, police and other 
controlling authorities. The current political 
situation in Belarus leaves banking institutions 
subject to various and frequent presidential decrees 
that have had significant impacts on the flow of, and 
access to, cash by its citizens.  The GOB chooses to 
impose its preemptive authority over the control of 
cash with little or no regard for the rule of law. 
Its consideration of the impact on society or the 
business climate in Belarus is secondary to its 
ultimate control of the cash economy for political 
ends, namely to ensure economic and social stability 
for the survival of the regime. 
 
¶9. According to IMF reports, the regime continues to 
strengthen its ability to assert control over every 
organization in Belarus through legislation, including 
presidential decrees.  Most recently, on July 25 the 
National Bank of Belarus, citing clauses in the 
state's bankruptcy law, took control of the private 
(and 80 percent foreign owned) Djem-Bank.  The NBB has 
transferred Djem-Bank's management rights for a three- 
month period to BelGazPromBank.  Djem-Bank management 
is appealing this move, has called it illegal and 
unfounded, and complained that BelGazPromBank is their 
main competitor.  [Comment: Djem-Bank's complaints 
seem valid.  According to NBB statistics, Djem-Bank is 
not bankrupt.  Their assets (USD 47.7 million) 
outstrip liabilities (USD 36.6 million), deposits are 
up 13 percent for the year, and they earned USD 70,000 
in profits in the first half of the year.] 
 
 
DIRECTED LOANS 
-------------- 
 
¶10. The 2005 IMF report on Belarus lists directed 
loans to be a major tool of government control over 
the economy.  The GOB often orders banks, both state- 
owned and private, to direct lending to certain 
institutions, usually state owned, for political 
reasons.  The state often directs such loans to allow 
unprofitable state enterprises to meet salary 
payments.  Such loans could become more common since 
for the past decade the GOB has mandated across the 
board wage increases, in dollar terms, that greatly 
outstrip any rise in productivity.  This is having the 
effect of decapitalizing many enterprises. 
 
¶11. In 2004 directed loans accounted for 3.4 percent 
of GDP, or half of all new bank lending.  The majority 
of these loans have gone to agriculture, with another 
large segment directed towards new housing 
construction.  Private banks have not been immune; for 
example, in 2003 the GOB ordered Priorbank to lend USD 
36 million to the Krinytsa Brewery. 
 
¶12. The high level of directed lending, with no 
 
consideration of the enterprises' ability to repay the 
loans, leads to liquidity crises toward the end of 
each year.  To rescue its banks, the GOB annually 
recapitalizes the largest state banks from the state 
budget.  From 2000 to 2004 the GOB transferred 1,540 
billion rubles (USD 716 million) to three banks, 
Belagrombank, Belarusbank, and Belpromstroibank.  At 
its peak, in 2002, this recapitalization accounted for 
62 percent of all banking system capital 
.  That had 
dropped to 25.2 percent for 2004.  The IMF concludes 
these banks could become insolvent in the absence of 
further recapitalizations, posing significant systemic 
risk.  However, GOB officials told the IMF they see 
such policies as being successful, and see no need to 
phase out directed lending. 
 
 
EVERGREENING, BUT NO TREES IN SIGHT 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13. The IMF also noted that Belarus' banking sector, 
while reporting sound indicators, is in reality 
"increasingly vulnerable" because of Non-Performing 
Loans (NPL). The GOB follows a policy of leniency with 
their problem borrowers to avoid having to increase 
their own loan loss reserves, which would further 
impair needed capital. This has lead to a policy of 
"evergreening" loans: banks extend additional loans to 
troubled firms to enable them to make interest 
payments on already outstanding loans to avoid or 
delay bankruptcy. By keeping the loan portfolios 
artificially current, the banks can make their 
official balance sheets look better and are not 
required to show such problem loans as non-performing. 
However, such practice makes banks dependent on state 
bailouts and removes any incentives for practicing 
good banking practices. 
 
¶14. The NBRB required registered banks to ensure that 
the level of NPLs fell below specific thresholds by 
the end of 2003.  In Belarus, when the government 
wants something to happen it does, at least on paper. 
The targets were met and NPLs reportedly fell from 
14.4 percent of the loan portfolio at the end of 2001 
to less than 4 percent at the end of 2003.  [Comment: 
Amazing how far a little "cooking of the books" will 
get you.] 
 
¶15. In May Lukashenko declared 2005 as the "Year of 
raising the efficiency of economic activities and 
saving resources" (Ref A).  In his comments, the 
president stressed that his prior targets were not met 
and ordered the NBRB to investigate. He again ordered 
the NBRB to reduce bad debts.  If evergreening worked 
once, why not try it again.  He also "suggested" the 
GOB should continue its efforts to transfer accounts 
of industrial giants to state-controlled banks. 
 
 
A REAL INDEPENDENT VIEW 
----------------------- 
 
¶16. Post's FMO, a CPA, obtained a copy of the audited 
financial statement of the largest private bank 
operating in Belarus.  The notes to the financial 
statement offer a glimpse of what the bank views as a 
major concern for its operations in Belarus.  The bank 
and its independent auditors, Ernst & Young, signed 
off on listing the GOB as a contingent liability in 
the financial statement. 
 
¶17. Accounting standards require the presentation of a 
Balance Sheet, Statement of Income and a Statement of 
Cash flows.  In addition to those reports significant 
issues not reflected on the books of the entity must 
be described in notes to the financial statements. 
Failure to disclose these items could have a 
significant impact on an individual's understanding of 
the financial condition of an entity in its entirety. 
 
¶18. In the bank's note on "Allowances for Impairment 
of Financial Assets" it says, "The Bank is not in a 
position to predict what changes in conditions will 
take place in Belarus and what effect such changes 
might have on the adequacy of the allowances for 
impairment of financial assets in future periods."  In 
its note on "Taxation," it says, "Tax returns, 
together with other legal compliance areas are subject 
to review and investigation by a number of 
authorities, who are enabled by law to impose 
extremely severe fines, penalties, and interest 
charges.  These facts create tax risks in Belarus 
substantially more significant than typically found in 
countries with more developed tax systems." Failure to 
discloses these remarks would have a major impact on 
the readers understanding of the bank's financial 
operating environment in Belarus. 
 
 
BUT TRUST IS GROWING 
-------------------- 
 
¶19. Despite these systemic problems, public trust in 
the banking sector is growing.  Ruble deposits grew 74 
percent in 2004.  However, this growth was still not 
enough to offset the sector's liquidity crisis in late 
¶2004. 
 
 
NO BUYERS IN SIGHT 
------------------ 
 
¶20. In January 2005 the NBRB announced it was 
interested in selling its interest in three banks 
operating in Belarus.  Shares of Belvnesheconombank, 
Paritetbank and Bank Mezhdunarodnoy Torgovli i 
Investitsiy (Bank for International Trade and 
Investments) are up for the highest bidder.  As of 
July these banks are still listed as available.  This 
suggests limited interest by potential buyers when the 
GOB's current stated policy is to transfer accounts 
away from private banks and into state controlled 
institutions. 
 
 
CHINA; THE FINAL FRONTIER IN BANKING 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶21. It was recently reported in a GOB-owned newspaper 
that the NBB is considering opening a branch of one of 
Belarus' banks in China.  The paper reported that the 
idea was being considered after a recommendation came 
from the Belarusian Embassy in China.  The NBB sent a 
letter to all registered banks in Belarus "suggesting" 
that they consider such a move.  Given the level of 
influence by the president and the NBB, it won't be 
long before Belarusian Rubles will be available at a 
local branch in Beijing. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶22. The GOB continues to impose its agenda on and 
exercise significant control over all facets of life 
in Belarus.  Its ability to significantly control the 
financial sector in Belarus will continue to keep 
western influences in check for years to come.  Its 
strong-arm tax strategies combined with intrusive 
presidential edicts will make it difficult for 
financial institutions to operate in Belarus, at least 
according to western standards.  The state's economic 
policy is directed at keeping the economy under strict 
government control.  While this may work in the short 
term, ignoring fiscal realities over the long term can 
only lead to destabilization.  Nevertheless, growing 
consumption, spurred by economic growth, is forcing 
more Belarusians to turn to the banking system for 
credit and deposits. 
 
 
KROL