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Viewing cable 05KINSHASA1078, THE CURRENT FDLR SITUATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05KINSHASA1078 2005-07-01 10:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kinshasa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO RW CG UN
SUBJECT: THE CURRENT FDLR SITUATION 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reason 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  There has been substantial recent discussion 
in Kinshasa regarding the remaining FDLR presence in eastern 
DRC.  All parties concede that, while worthwhile, the 
GDRC/Sant, Egidio initiative to promote FDLR repatriation to 
Rwanda is stalled.  Problems focus on the lack of FDLR 
"leadership" credibility and senior field commander 
opposition, and a mixed GOR message.  GDRC officials assert 
they are seeking to by-pass the FDLR leadership to obtain 
field commitments to return to Rwanda, while also pursuing 
plans for military pressure per earlier announcements.  The 
latter will be hobbled, however, by a continuing lack of 
FARDC capability.  The Tripartite international Ambassadors 
propose several steps: a) seeking to strengthen a proposed 
GDRC statement as much as possible; b) supporting a proposed 
strong UNSC Presidential statement; c) concurrent messages 
from capitals, especially Washington and London, underscoring 
the history of safe return; d) whatever strengthened message 
is possible from the GOR to encourage returns; e) continued 
international support to train and equip FARDC integrated 
units to be able to conduct more effective operations in the 
Kivus; and f) complementary MONUC operations to apply 
pressure on FDLR units.  All, however, note that MONUC and 
especially FARDC military operations in the Kivus will 
inevitably involve significant civilian casualties.  End 
summary. 
 
Rome Initiative Stalled 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) There has been substantial discussion in Kinshasa in 
recent weeks regarding remaining FDLR combatants in eastern 
Congo, and the way forward.  The topic was extensively 
discussed by the International Committee to Accompany the 
Transition (CIAT) and three GDRC Vice Presidents during an 
&Espace Presidentiel8 meeting June 17.  Subsequently, the 
Ambassador convened heads of mission of the international 
observers to the Tripartite (U.K., Belgium, The Netherlands 
for E.U. Presidency, the AU Commission, and MONUC) to review 
the subject.  The latter group had a follow-up meeting on 
June 22 with Presidency security Special Advisor Samba 
Kaputo, Ambassador-at-Large Antoine Ghonda, and other 
Presidency staff. 
 
3. (C) All parties assert that the GDRC/Sant, Egidio 
initiative with European-based FDLR leaders to obtain an FDLR 
statement of willingness to return to Rwanda was worthwhile. 
All, however, also recognize that the process is stalled, 
with little prospect for progress.  The problems identified 
by most observers center on a lack of credibility of the 
European-based "leadership" among rank-and-file FDLR 
combatants in the field, continuing opposition by more senior 
field commanders, many of whom were likely directly 
implicated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and what is 
generally described as a somewhat mixed message from Kigali 
encouraging a Hutu return, but generally offering little to 
reassure would-be returnees about the security conditions 
they may confront. 
 
GDRC: Moving Beyond Rome 
------------------------- 
 
4. (C) In the June 17 meeting with CIAT members, and in more 
detail in a June 22 meeting with the Tripartite international 
observer representatives, Presidential security Special 
Advisor Kaputo spelled out GDRC current thinking.  In the 
wake of the unsuccessfulDRC visit of FDLR president Ignace 
Murwanashyaka which had yielded no repatriation movements, 
Kaputo indicated the GDRC concluded it would not be 
worthwhile to invest any further effort in him.  Instead, 
Kaputo reported, the GDRC had established a discussion with 
one or more field commanders to obtain a statement directly 
by them of a willingness to return to Rwanda without formal 
conditions.  In both meetings, Kaputo reiterated the GDRC,s 
position that it would not entertain any negotiation with the 
FDLR regarding political conditions for a return, and that 
the GDRC had on several occasions rejected FDLR arguments and 
appeals to that effect.  Kaputo stated that, instead, the 
GDRC simply insisted that the time has come for the FDLR to 
return home or face the risk of military pressure in the DRC 
against them. 
 
5. (C) In the June 17 and 22 meetings, Kaputo said that the 
GDRC intended to issue a statement renewing its call for the 
FDLR to return home.  The draft text he read to the 
Tripartite group June 22 stated that, failing that, the GDRC 
would "take up its responsibilities."  The Ambassador and 
others in that meeting strongly encouraged Kaputo to 
strengthen the GDRC language in the proposed statement as 
much as possible, and most importantly include a deadline 
date.  UN SRSG Swing suggested the GDRC could state in its 
communique that any FDLR remaining in the DRC following the 
deadline would be considered "enemies of the state," opening 
the door for military action at any subsequent point.  Kaputo 
took the suggestions under advisement.  He further indicated 
that a deal struck with one or more FDLR commanders called 
for an FDLR statement to be issued by field commander(s) two 
days after the GDRC statement, renewing the pledge to return 
to Rwanda.  He indicated, however, that the proposed FDLR 
statement would include a call for the international 
community to ensure adequate humanitarian and security 
conditions for the repatriation operation.  Quizzed on this 
point, Kaputo suggested such conditions meant ensuring such 
things as food and water for the return, as well as 
assurances, for example, that those who were under 10 years 
of age at the time of the 1994 genocide would not be swept up 
summarily in security sweeps in Rwanda following their return. 
 
6. (C) Subsequent to these meeting, the FDLR South Kivu 
commander issued a communique (septel) which did reiterate a 
commitment to return to Rwanda, but also repeated calls for 
an international committee to oversee the return, a concept 
that has been generally rejected by all western governments. 
The GDRC by contrast, has not issued a statement to-date. 
Embassy PolCounselor asked Kaputo about this on June 27. 
Kaputo indicated that the GDRC still intends to issue a 
statement, although he was vague on timing or details, and 
asserted that the FDLR statement did not change the basic 
framework of the strategy he had earlier outlined. 
Privately, however, he has told DCM and PolCounselor he feels 
that the international community should be more forthcoming 
regarding the oversight committee idea. 
 
Military Options 
----------------- 
 
7. (C) The Congolese and the Ambassadors all recognize that 
military pressure will be required against combatants in 
eastern DRC.  The real questions are the size of the target 
group, and the related issue of the size of forces and the 
scope of operations needed to target the FDLR fighters. 
Obviously, the more of existing FDLR combatants that can be 
induced to return peacefully, the simpler and more feasible 
the scope of the needed operations, an important factor given 
limited FARDC capabilities and the relatively modest size of 
MONUC forces.  In the June 17 and 22 meetings, and in even 
more detail in private conversations, Kaputo has stated that 
the GDRC intends to use newly-trained integrated brigades in 
North and South Kivu.  He recognizes, however, that many of 
these troops are not yet equipped with even basic gear such 
as boots or adequate arms, and the level of training provided 
to various units is at best inconsistent.  In addition, the 
Kitona and Kamina Brigades will still require air transport 
for the troops and equipment to the Kivu operational area. 
Hence, Kaputo has indicated that the GDRC has been reluctant 
to commit to a specific date absent confidence in at least a 
minimal degree of military readiness.  MONUC has been looking 
at its options as well, with a view toward stepping up more 
aggressive &cordon and search8 disarmament operations in 
the Kivus in essence targeting FDLR units, but MONUC clearly 
would like to coordinate its actions with the FARDC. 
 
8. (C) Looking at all the factors, the international 
"Tripartite" Ambassadors have proposed the following actions 
to encourage FDLR returns as quickly as possible: 
 
a) As previously noted, encouraging the GDRC to issue its 
proposed statement, including strong language to clearly and 
publicly communicate to the FDLR that the Congolese want the 
FDLR out of the DRC, and a deadline date for peaceful returns. 
 
b) A strong UNSC Presidential statement or other action 
reinforcing the need for rapid and peaceful FDLR repatriation 
to Rwanda, coupled with a call for humanitarian conditions 
for such a return, and noting the past record of successful 
Rwandan refugee returns. (Comment: The recent refoulement of 
refugees from Burundi took place after this recommendation 
was formulated.   UNSC statement text regarding successful 
past returns would need to be carefully drafted to maintain 
credibility in light of the Burundi situation.  End comment.) 
 The UNSC statement could reinforce the prospect of military 
action, potentially with reference to the GDRC deadline date 
if a GDRC communique with such a date is in fact issued. 
 
c) Concurrent messages from capitals expressing similar 
ideas, also underscoring the history of safe past Rwandan 
refugee returns, and the high degree of international 
community interest in the process.  Congolese and other 
Ambassadors expressed the view that statements from 
Washington and London would likely have the greatest 
potential impact. 
 
d) Whatever further statement(s) could be obtained from the 
Kigali government to provide reassurances of safe and humane 
conditions for potential returnees, including unambiguous 
assurances regarding those who were too young (e.g., under 
the age of 10) to have culpability in the 1994 genocide. 
Ideally, a senior-level GOR official traveling to eastern DRC 
in cooperation with MONUC could greatly enhance the impact of 
the message.  Absent any further GOR statement, MONUC should 
continue its ongoing program of publicizing past GOR 
statements to the maximum extent possible to encourage 
returnees. 
 
e) As great as possible international community support to 
equip and train FARDC units as quickly as possible to be 
ready for military operations in the Kivus targeting the 
FDLR.  A particular priority should be put on those units 
already integrated, but still lacking basic skills and 
equipment. 
 
f) Support for complementary MONUC operations to put pressure 
on FDLR combatants.  It was noted, however, the MONUC 
processing centers for FDLR members wishing to return should 
be maintained to accept all those wishing to return 
peacefully to Rwanda. 
 
9. (C) In reviewing these options, and particularly noting 
the inevitability of military operations in some form, all 
participants in the discussions in Kinshasa have noted that 
there will unfortunately likely be significant civilians 
casualties.  The nature of the terrain in the Kivus, 
population density, and the relative mobility and 
capabilities of FDLR forces suggest that civilian casualties 
are likely to be even higher than those incurred in ongoing 
operations in Ituri District targeting militia units. 
MEECE