This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 003408 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BG BGD
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION UPS THE STAKES WITH AGGRESSIVE REFORM 
ULTIMATUM 
 
Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, Reason(s): 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Awami League's 31-point electoral 
"reform" program proposes major changes to the caretaker 
government system, the Election Commission, and general 
election procedures and qualifications.  The BNP criticized 
the proposals as unnecessary and divisive, and suggested the 
AL take to parliament its case for legal and constitutional 
changes.  The AL responded that it would only end its 
parliamentary boycott if passage of the proposals was 
guaranteed.  Demanding consensus on caretaker regime 
appointments and banning war criminals from elections appears 
geared more to solidifying opposition ranks and ratcheting up 
political pressure than promoting a serious reform agenda. 
The BDG might compromise on enhanced Election Commission 
capabilities, but Hasina, by making core demands she knows 
the BNP cannot accept, is laying the groundwork for an 
election boycott and, it seems, a campaign to replicate the 
1996 protests that led to the de-masting the first BNP 
government.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On July 15, the Awami League (AL) and its 11-party 
coalition announced a 31-point "reform" package addressing 
the formation and powers of the caretaker government and the 
Election Commission (EC).  In presenting the package, Dr. 
Kamal Hossain, president of the Gono Forum and an eminent 
constitutional lawyer recently reconciled with the AL, 
declared that implementation of the proposals would "bring 
genuine people's representation in parliament and help it get 
rid of the clutches of black money and muscle power."  AL 
president Sheikh Hasina and the leaders of several of the 
AL's leftist partners were also present.  Hasina said reforms 
are an essential remedy for the politicization of the 
caretaker government system by the BNP. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Key caretaker system changes include: 
 
-- Requiring the President, as the Head of State, to consult 
and achieve consensus with all political parties in selecting 
the leader and advisers of the caretaker government; 
-- Prohibiting the appointment of any advisor ever affiliated 
with any political party (Note: This targets the Chief 
Adviser presumptive for the next election, who once was 
international relations secretary for the BNP); 
-- Putting the defense ministry (i.e., the armed forces) 
under the caretaker government instead of the president; and 
-- Limiting the authority of the caretaker government to 
non-policy actions and assisting the Election Commission with 
holding general elections. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Key EC changes include: 
 
-- Appointing the chief election commissioner and other 
election commissioners in consultation with political 
parties, with majority rule deciding any differences (Note: 
consultation, not consensus). 
-- Creating a politically and financially independent 
secretariat with sufficient manpower to provide coverage down 
 
SIPDIS 
to the local level; and 
-- Granting the Election Commission control over the 
appointment of presiding and returning officers and the 
authority to discipline them as needed. 
-- Granting the Commission the power to schedule and postpone 
elections and to set time limits for the resolution of any 
election related litigation. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Key electoral procedural changes include: 
 
-- Campaign spending limits, financial disclosure 
requirements, and equal access to radio and television 
airtime; 
-- Prohibitions against physical intimidation and religious 
and fundamentalist campaigns; 
-- Procedural transparency, including prior public listing of 
presiding and polling officers; 
-- Increasing the number of and providing for direct election 
of women's reserved seats; and 
-- Stricter eligibility requirements to disqualify candidates 
in default on a loan, in possession of illegally obtained 
funds, who obtain their nomination through bribery, or who 
opposed the Liberation War and were war criminals. 
 
¶6. (SBU) BNP Secretary General Abdul Mannan Bhuyian 
criticized the reforms at a press conference, saying they are 
unnecessary, divisive, and aim to hinder the electoral 
process.  They are also, he said, illogical since with so 
many political parties it would be impossible to achieve 
consensus on any political matter.  Nevertheless, he asserted 
the BNP is open to dialogue, and suggested parliament as the 
proper forum for pursuing reforms. 
 
¶7. (C) On July 17, Jamaat Islami Assistant Secretary General 
Abdul Quader Molla told poloff that the banning of candidates 
who opposed the 1971 Liberation War is not a barrier to his 
party members because "we were not opposed to the Liberation 
War, we thought we could better solve the situation without 
civil war."  When asked about the proposal banning "religious 
based politics" and barring the use of religion in vote 
seeking, Molla said, "It's against international human 
rights" to prevent someone from talking about their religion. 
 Echoing Bhuyian, Molla said that "parliament is the main 
place to reform any system" and that the Awami League's 
proposals are "not for the benefit of the common people." 
 
¶8. (C) Awami League Parliament Whip Muhumad Faruk Khan told 
poloff that the AL would continue to pressure the government, 
threatening increased popular "movements" if they do not 
accept the proposals.  When asked about the BNP's stance that 
the reforms should be discussed in parliament, Khan said that 
they plan to have initial discussions outside parliament and 
return there once the BNP agrees to accept the proposals.  He 
maintained that the AL is already discussing these proposals 
at the standing committee level but can't discuss them in 
general sessions because "when we go to parliament, they 
don't allow us to speak." 
 
¶9. (C) PMO Principal Secretary Kamaluddin Siddiqui 
characterized the post-package political climate to CDA as a 
"gathering storm" over the "stiffening" positions of both the 
AL and the BNP.  The BNP, he said, is open to dialogue and 
possible compromise on minor points such as enhanced 
capabilities for the EC, but the idea of consensus on an 
important matter like caretaker adviser appointments in a 
land of hundreds of political parties is "stupid."  He urged 
the USG, in partnership with the UK, to mediate the AL-BNP 
gulf and promote free and fair elections as it did 
sensitively and successfully in the last general election. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: When we asked the AL two months ago if its 
pending proposal would allow minor parties to veto consensus 
decisions for caretaker regime appointments, we were told 
that perhaps the proposal could be limited to parties in 
parliament.  The AL, however, has apparently subordinated 
practicality to solidifying opposition ranks and setting the 
bar high enough for the BNP to ensure continued political 
stalemate.  Banning religion-based politics would require a 
constitutional amendment, is opposed by every parliamentary 
party except the AL, and is another apparent sop to the AL's 
leftist allies; Hasina, ironically, several days ago urged 
Islamic scholars to help un-seat the BNP-JI government.  The 
"war criminals" exclusion clearly targets JI leaders, 
including its two serving ministers, whom the AL has 
repeatedly denounced as war criminals.  While the BNP might 
accept EC reforms, it cannot accept the core demands related 
to the caretaker system or that would effectively rob it, on 
nebulous extra-judicial grounds, of its key coalition partner. 
 
¶11. (C) The AL is laying the groundwork for an election 
boycott and a challenge to the legitimacy of a re-elected 
BNP.  More ominously and more immediately, however, Hasina 
may be trying to foment a confrontational climate to 
replicate the popular protests in 1996 that ended up 
de-masting the first BNP government.  Confrontation seems 
like a risky strategy for a party that has failed to find an 
issue to rally popular support, especially since the AL 
today, unlike 1996, does not have JI or Ershad's Jatiya party 
as partners.  The BNP's retort that the AL should pursue its 
agenda in parliament seems hard to challenge, while the AL's 
refusal to end its boycott without preemptive BNP 
capitulation leaves it sounding increasingly strident and 
undemocratic. 
CHAMMAS