This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 001218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KAWC CB AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA DOES NOT SUPPORT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
FOR KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 
 
REF: A. STATE 126728 
 
     ¶B. HURTADO-CROWLEY EMAIL 7-11-2005 
 
¶1.  (SBU) On July 11, Poloff delivered ref A demarche to 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) ASEAN, Burma, 
and Cambodia Director Lynette Wood and Executive Officer 
Gillian Walker seeking to gauge Australian interest in 
establishing a Management Committee for the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal.  Walker asked a few questions regarding the 
structure and function of the Management Committee, such as: 
whether the Committee would work with the Cambodian part of 
the KRT or with the organization as a whole; whether the U.S. 
would support funding the Cambodian government or the UN for 
such an endeavor; and whether the U.S. had discussed the 
proposal with Japan.  Poloff sent these questions to the 
Department (ref B) for guidance.  Without waiting for the 
response, however, on July 15, DFAT International Law and 
Transnational Crime Director Michael Bliss informed us of 
DFAT's decision. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Bliss stated that, while the GOA strongly supported 
the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT) and shared U.S. concerns about 
monitoring the KRT's development, the U.S. and Australia had 
probably "missed their chance" to establish a Management 
Committee if that was an option.  The current structure of 
the KRT simply did not allow for a Management Committee, 
according to Bliss.  The Australians would prefer to monitor 
the KRT through their embassies in relevant countries abroad 
and through the UN.  Bliss added that the degree to which the 
Committee was inserted into the KRT and exerted control might 
be problematic and not the best way to project our interests. 
 Cambodian political will was key to the KRT's success, Bliss 
emphasized, and donors might send the wrong signal if we 
pushed to take over too much control of the process.  Bliss 
passed us a non-paper with the Australian response which is 
reproduced in para 3.  Australian officials were open to 
hearing more concrete thoughts from the U.S. as to how a 
Management Committee would function, but they stated that 
their position would likely remain the same. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Begin text of Australian response: 
 
KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
 
--  Australia thanks the United States for the opportunity to 
provide our views on its proposed management committee for 
the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT). 
 
--  Australia believes the KRT is the best mechanism we have 
to address impunity for the gross violations of human rights 
that occurred under the rule of the Khmer Rouge between 1975 
and 1979.  We are firmly and actively committed to the KRT 
and to its success. 
 
--  We share the United States' view that it is important to 
ensure that the KRT meets international standards of justice, 
fairness and due process of law. 
 
--  However, we do not regard a formal management committee 
as the most appropriate mechanism through which donors and 
other interested States may ensure these international 
standards are met. 
 
--  We note that: 
 
             --  a formal management committee is not 
envisaged in the 'Agreement between the United Nations and 
the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution 
under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea' (Agreement); 
 
             --  the Agreement expressly contemplates that 
international involvement, including through the provision of 
personnel and financial support, is contingent on the KRT 
continuing to meet international standards.  In particular, 
Article 28 (which provides that the United Nations may 
withdraw its participation in the KRT should the Cambodian 
Government change the structure or organization of the KRT or 
otherwise cause it to function in a manner that does not 
conform with the terms of the Agreement) is designed to 
provide international oversight, via the United Nations, of 
the KRT to ensure it meets these international standards; 
 
             --  it is not clear how such a management 
committee would relate to, or engage with, the work of the 
Cambodian Khmer Rouge Trials Task Force; and 
 
             --  the proposal is likely to encounter 
resistance from the Cambodian Government, particularly as it 
is being raised a considerable time after the finalization of 
the Agreement. 
 
--  Although the KRT is a hybrid tribunal, it operates within 
the existing Cambodian court structure as Extraordinary 
Chambers.  This domestic operation of the KRT (albeit with 
international involvement and assistance) is distinct to that 
of the Sierra Leone Special Court (SLSC) which operates 
independently of, and has primacy over, the national courts 
of Sierra Leone.  We note that the SLSC Management Committee 
was set up contemporaneously with the SLSC itself and was 
expressly contemplated in the 'Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone' (Article 
7). 
 
--  Australia is of the view that donors and other interested 
States should closely monitor the establishment and operation 
of the KRT, including through close cooperation with the 
United Nations and Cambodian Government to ensure the KRT's 
process is credible and legitimate.  Australia looks forward 
to working with donors and other interested States in Phnom 
Penh, capitals and New York (as appropriate) to informally 
discuss and monitor the KRT's progress, including its 
conformity with international standards. 
 
--  Australia would welcome a financial contribution by the 
United States to the KRT. 
 
End text. 
 
STANTON