This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 002748 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PARM ZK IR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED - EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS TROIKA, JULY 
13, 2004 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kyle Scott. Reason: 
1.4(B)(D) 
 
¶1. (C) Following a luncheon discussion with all 25 EU 
Political Directors on transatlantic relations, the EU's 
neighborhood policy, and the Middle East (reported septel) 
A/S Fried met with the EU "troika" led by UK Political 
Director Sawers, Council DG for CFSP Robert Cooper, and 
Commission RELEX DDG Karel Kovanda to discuss Guantanamo, 
Iran, Uzbekistan, China, the Western Balkans, and Africa. 
Key action items to emerge from the discussions include: 
 
-- An EU request for the U.S. to invite the UN's Special 
Rapporteur to visit Guantanamo; 
 
-- An EU question on whether the U.S. would be willing to 
de-list the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization from our 
recent non-proliferation executive order if European 
diplomacy with Teheran yields an agreement; 
 
-- A U.S. proposal for closer U.S.-EU consultations on 
support for reformers and civil society in Iran; 
 
-- A call for close U.S.-EU coordination of next steps in 
Uzbekistan, as both U.S. and some EU member states face the 
same dilemma of how to influence Karimov while not 
jeopardizing valuable basing rights in that country; 
 
-- A call for informal G-7 coordination regarding Russia's 
upcoming G-8 presidency; and 
 
-- The U.S.-EU "Strategic Dialogue" on East Asia should 
continue, with more emphasis on economic themes.  The EU 
wants close coordination with U.S. on the question of 
market economy status for China.  End Summary. 
 
Guantanamo 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Council Director Robert Cooper urged the U.S. to 
invite the UN's Special Rapporteur to visit Guantanamo.  He 
noted that U.S. indications that it would be willing to do 
so had been important in gaining EU support to oppose the 
Cuban resolution on this issue at the UNHRC.  A/S Fried 
agreed to look into the issue. 
 
Iran 
----- 
 
¶3. (C) Sawers said diplomacy with Iran had entered a 
"tricky phase" following the elections.  It could no longer 
be said there was a range of views within Iran's ruling 
elite -- all institutions are now in the hands of the 
hard-line/radical camp.  The EU will judge the new regime 
by its actions -- on nuclear issues, regional stability, 
support for terrorism, and human rights.  He expressed 
European appreciation for U.S. support to the EU-3's 
diplomatic efforts, and said the EU was on the hook to 
present new proposals to the Iranians "sometime this 
summer" -- although when exactly was still vague.  The 
situation was sensitive, but Sawers assured Fried the EU 
was still sticking to its red line that Iran not be 
permitted to develop any fuel cycle 
activities.  Sawers said he would consider it a success to 
get to the autumn with the current suspension intact.  He 
noted that this would mark nearly two years in which Iran's 
work has been effectively suspended. 
 
¶4. (C) The EU's strategy is to maintain a position where 
Europe sticks by its commitments to the Iranians, so that 
any violations will be clearly the fault of the Iranians. 
If this happens, Sawers said the EU would initiate an 
emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and seek 
UNSC referral. 
 
¶5. (C) A/S Fried agreed that the threat of referral to the 
UNSC clearly worried the Iranians.  Looking at Iran 
strategically, he suggested there was a relationship 
between Iran's nuclear timeline and an internal timeline 
where domestic pressures for reform and democracy could 
build over time.  He suggested the U.S. and EU should look 
for ways to hasten the reform timeline in Iran, reaching 
out to Iranian civil society and bolstering the forces for 
change in that country. 
 
¶6. (C) EU officials agreed with the idea, but wondered 
about the appropriate approach.  Council Director General 
for CFSP Robert Cooper said he was not sure the Iranians 
were ready for another revolution, since the last one had 
proven such a disaster for the nation.  Sawers also said he 
saw a certain passivity in the Iranian people, especially 
among those who loathe the regime, while those who support 
the current regime have sustained their activism.  The real 
challenge, in his view, was to strengthen those who want 
gradual change in Iran without stigmatizing those who 
receive the support of the west.  The modernizing pressures 
of WTO membership was one such approach, he suggested. 
Commission DDG Karel Kovanda noted that the eighth round of 
the EU's Trade and Cooperation Agreement negotiations 
(taking place the week of July 12) and the EU's periodic 
human rights dialogue with Iran (next scheduled for 
September) aimed to bolster this segment of Iranian 
society.  EUR/ERA Director Chase suggested experts hold 
U.S.-EU discussions on supporting civil society in Iran. 
He suggested this issue be put on the agenda for DRL AA/S 
Davies' next discussions with EU officials on human rights. 
¶7. (C) EU officials expressed concerns about the recent 
executive order on non-proliferation which specifically 
added Iran's Atomic Energy Organization to the list of 
sanctioned entities.  Sawers noted that if EU diplomacy 
succeeded in getting Iranian objective guarantees that 
their program would not support a nuclear weapons program, 
it is precisely this agency that would be expected to carry 
out the activities -- and the agency European entities 
would be cooperating with.  He suggested it would be useful 
if the U.S. could state that a long-term agreement on 
peaceful use of nuclear energy with the IAEO would lead to 
de-listing that organization from U.S. sanctions. 
 
Uzbekistan 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Fried said trends in Uzbekistan were not good. 
Karimov has retreated into a Russia/China embrace, and is 
trying to use the leverage of our base usage to get the 
U.S. and other European nations to back down.  The U.S. 
does not plan to withdraw from base use in Uzbekistan, but 
is beginning prudent planning on possible next steps.  He 
noted the U.S. has already put in place restrictions on 
other military cooperation (bilateral and 
via NATO).  But he stressed that our basing interests would 
not stop us from pursuing our democracy agenda in 
Uzbekistan either. 
 
¶9. (C) Cooper suggested this was an area for possible 
U.S.-EU cooperation, but admitted that there were not many 
good options.  Some EU member states share the U.S. dilemma 
on basing rights, and have therefore been hesitant to adopt 
policies currently being considered, including an arms 
embargo (with a time limit) or a visa ban.  Cooper said he 
doubted the EU would be able to agree on these steps at 
next week's GAERC, but Sawers said the conclusions would 
certainly signal that these options are under 
consideration.  Cooper noted that Germany, in particular, 
was already studying alternatives to its current base 
activities in Uzbekistan. 
 
Russia and the G-8 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The EU is also placing discussion of Uzbekistan on 
the agenda of their consultations with Russia and China. 
He wondered whether Russia's upcoming G-8 presidency and 
their theme of focusing on the former Soviet states 
might be turned to our advantage.  Sawers suggested there 
was a need for more thorough consultations among the "old 
G-7" on how to approach Russia's G-8 presidency.  Since 
they could not be too obvious in this effort, Sawers 
suggested the G-7 countries might use the opportunity of 
meetings in New York on the margins of the UNGA. 
 
China 
-------- 
 
¶11. (C) Sawers said the EU was pleased with the results of 
the strategic dialogue on East Asia that was launched in 
May.  It was a good start, he stressed, but could not be 
considered a one-off event.  Fried agreed, and said he 
hoped EAP A/S Hill would be able to brief European 
ambassadors in Washington on the results of the Secretary's 
recent visit to China. 
 
¶12. (C) Sawers noted that an EU-China summit was one of the 
big meetings on the calendar for the UK presidency.  The EU 
is currently negotiating a new Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement (TCA) with China, and hopes to modernize their 
now 25-year old agreement to include issues such as 
non-proliferation and counter-terrorism cooperation, and to 
also discuss issues with China such as energy, climate 
change, and market economy status.  Kovanda stressed that 
market economy status was a key goal for Beijing.  He 
stressed the importance of remaining on the same page on 
this issue with the U.S. and other OECD countries.  Cooper 
urged the U.S. to keep an eye on the details of the TCA 
negotiations, suggesting obliquely that it may touch on 
U.S. interests.  He also noted that while the arms embargo 
issue was not moving, it was also not dead as far as EU 
member states were concerned. 
 
Western Balkans 
---------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Future EU Presidency country Austria (Mayr-Harting) 
took the lead for the EU side on the Balkans.  He emphasized 
that the status quo in Kosovo is unsustainable, and that 
concerted pressure was needed on Serbian and Kosovar 
leadership.  He suggested there might be merit in more 
direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina.  The EU also 
supports the naming of a UN status envoy, but suggested 
that he should be assisted by a support team in including a 
group from the EU. 
 
¶14. (C) A/S Fried agreed on the need to keep the pressure 
on.  The Kosovo Albanians need to be told that they cannot 
just continue to wait and find final status dropped in 
their laps.  They need to earn it through action. 
Belgrade, for its part, needs to hear that attempting to 
play the nationalist card is a losing game, and not a 
viable option.  For both sides, Fried stressed that the 
prospect of EU integration had to be part of the solution. 
Cooper replied that the EU perspective remained viable -- 
even if people would not shout it from the rooftop after 
the "no" votes in France and the Netherlands.  Sawers 
agreed, but noted that an EU perspective had not had as 
much impact on the behavior of states as the EU would have 
wanted.  He stressed that to get Belgrade to come along, 
the EU and NATO had to be in a position to offer them more 
once final status negotiations begin. 
 
¶15. (C) A/S Fried also urged the EU to continue pushing the 
Bosnian Serbs on police reform, Karadzic, and to continue 
to support Paddy Ashdown's efforts.  He also urged the EU 
not to "give a pass" to Croatia on Gotovina.  Sawers 
replied that the conditionality on Croatia is clear and 
remains: full cooperation with ICTY is necessary for to 
begin negotiations.  Mayr-Harting agreed that full 
cooperation was needed, while at the same time suggesting 
not all countries in the region are equal, and it is clear 
that Croatia is far better prepared for EU membership than 
the rest of the region.  Their progress to membership would 
send a signal to the others and strengthen the effect of 
the prospect of EU membership on the others. 
 
Sudan/Africa 
----------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Sawers noted the challenges in Sudan/Darfur 
remained huge.  The EU is supporting the AU on the ground, 
and NATO's engagement offers a welcome complementarity. 
The Abuja talks were off to a good start, and he emphasized 
the importance of a success to help bolster the role of the 
AU throughout the continent.  While Sudan remained a 
crucial test case, he said the international community also 
needed to put greater emphasis on the success stories in 
Africa, such as the overall reduction in the number of 
conflicts on the continent, and the recent G-8 
commitments.  Sawers complained that recent U.S. approaches 
urging the EU to do more on aid to Sudan failed to note all 
the EU is doing.  Chase explained that the U.S. approach 
was targeted to the issue of food assistance in Southern 
Sudan, and not to the EU's overall effort in the country. 
Sawers suggested more needed to be done to correct the 
mis-impression that U.S. concerns were broader. 
 
¶17. (C) Fried raised U.S. concerns about events in 
Zimbabwe, urged support for elections in the region, and 
also suggested that the EU engage more broadly in the 
Community of Democracies to build a useful global network 
of democratic countries.  Chase also urged EU support for 
the UN Democracy Fund. 
 
McKinley 
 
.