This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 007191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR T. SHANNON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON ETRD MOPS CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT URIBE'S VISIT TO CRAWFORD 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
------------------------ 
Introduction and Summary 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. (C) President Uribe's visit to Crawford comes at a key 
moment and will serve as an opportunity to advance several 
items in our bilateral relationship.  Uribe will thank the 
President for U.S. political support and financial assistance 
for the counter-drug, counter-terror, and development effort. 
 He will repeat that we are his best ally in the region, and 
he is ours.  He will thank us for support for Ambassador Luis 
Albert Moreno's successful bid for the presidency of the 
Inter-American Development Bank.  Uribe may discuss his 
thoughts for the new Colombian ambassador to Washington. 
 
Key topics likely to come up during the visit include: 
 
--U.S. support in out years.  Colombia wants reaffirmation of 
political support and assistance levels, and continuation of 
Plan Colombia. 
 
--Demobilization and reinsertion of almost 6,000 former 
paramilitaries and several thousand more expected.  Colombia 
wants continued U.S. political support and program 
assistance; U.S. wants rigorous enforcement of demobilization 
law and continued extraditions. 
 
--Human rights.  Colombia wants continued U.S. support; U.S. 
wants faster improvements in military accountability. 
 
--Growing concern about Venezuela and region.  Colombia wants 
an enhanced bilateral defense relationship, and suggests a 
positive agenda for the region and Latin America which all 
can join. 
 
--Military progress and Plan Patriota.  Colombia wants 
continued or higher levels of U.S. assistance, especially 
helicopters and help against high value targets. 
 
--Record-breaking drug eradication and seizures.  But manual 
eradication, spraying in parks, and competition for 
helicopters remain issues. 
 
--Status of U.S. hostages.  Colombian cooperation is superb. 
 
--Free Trade Agreement negotiations.  Colombia wants 
agriculture concessions and a faster pace; we want a faster 
pace too.  Agreement to form a plant and animal health 
working group and brand-naming Colombian coffee are two 
possible initiatives. 
 
--Judicial reform.  The civilian oral accusatory system is 
working and popular.  We want faster improvements in military 
justice system. 
 
--Presidential re-election.  The Constitutional Court 
decision is expected in late September; too close to call. 
 
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U.S. Support 
------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In its four front war -- narcos, FARC, ELN, 
paramilitaries, Colombia is fighting each of the fronts with 
a different mix of political, military, police, and 
diplomatic measures, all of which are expensive and at times 
controversial.  Requested U.S. assistance tops $556 million 
in FY06, divided among military, police, development, 
humanitarian, and other accounts, continuing the steady 
decline from about $602 million in FY03.  Serious helicopter 
shortages continue to create a competition between 
counter-drug and counter-terrorism operations.  Colombia 
hopes to begin mutual defense agreement negotiations in the 
autumn and may ask for increased intelligence sharing.  Human 
rights certification, the Justice and Peace law, the Andean 
free trade agreement, aid to paramilitary demobilization, and 
the FY06 budget may have created a "perfect storm" on the 
Hill, at a time when we need U.S. congressional support even 
more than usual. 
 
¶3. (C) Uribe will press for continued, outspoken budgetary 
and political support.  Plan Colombia expires in 2006; Uribe 
would welcome U.S. support for renewal or follow-on 
multi-year commitment.  Uribe will probably request DOD 
assistance to sustain Plan Patriota operations through FY 
2010 and continued FMF at the FY05 levels ($99.2 million). 
 
------------------------------ 
Demobilization and Reinsertion 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) The GOC has requested U.S. aid for the paramilitary 
demobilization and reinsertion process, including police aid 
to prevent FARC inroads in areas formerly under paramilitary 
domination.  Until a recent DOJ decision, the U.S. was unable 
to assist the demobilization program and it reflects the lack 
of U.S. input.  We need to develop congressional support and 
identify funds.  Although the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Ireland are providing modest bilateral assistance, the EU 
refuses to help, partly at the behest of NGOs.  We have 
provided some assistance to verification aspects. 
 
¶5. (C) Colombia passed the Law of Justice and Peace, which 
governs demobilization for ex-paramilitaries, on June 22. 
NGOs, some Europeans, and some on the Hill believe it is too 
lenient.  The Colombian priority is to increase security for 
civilians by demobilizing paramilitary combatants and 
dismantling their organizations.  But administration of the 
justice and reparations aspects, key to NGO support, has been 
slow and weak.  Uribe is not happy with the pressure we are 
putting on him to demonstrate firmness by extraditing key 
paramilitary leaders or take some other visible step.  He 
also has told us he will "suspend" extradition decisions for 
a few, selected key narcotics traffickers as a lever for 
their good future behavior. 
 
¶6. (C) Since 2003, over 6,000 paramilitaries (AUC) have 
demobilized collectively and another 7,000 from all illegal 
armed groups have deserted.  Violence against civilians is 
sharply down in all areas where demobilization has occurred. 
The GOC says that the remaining 10,000 paramilitaries will 
demobilize by the end of 2005, and the "justice" aspects will 
begin then. 
 
¶7. (C) In related peace processes, the ELN has again refused 
GOC overtures, this time under Spanish facilitation.  The 
FARC has steadily refused peace talks or an acceptable 
humanitarian prisoner exchange, in spite of Colombian 
efforts.  A French mission, with GOC knowledge, recently met 
with a FARC senior commander to secure the release of FARC 
hostages, including dual French-Colombian citizen and former 
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.  The FARC or ELN 
are unlikely to make any concession before the re-election 
issue is settled; they would not want to give Uribe a prize 
and would prefer to deal with a successor government. 
 
¶8. (C) We should offer support for demobilization, but 
underline that we can only support a tough process with full 
implementation of the justice and reparations provisions of 
the law.  We should press for an early show of firmness, -- 
ideally extradition of prominent paramilitary leader Don 
Berna  -- to demonstrate that the government, not the 
paramilitaries, is in the driver's seat. 
 
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Human Rights 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress in 
human rights, but needs to do more to ensure accountability, 
strengthen the military justice system, break military ties 
to paramilitary groups, and end corruption.  The pending 
human rights certification will release about $60 million of 
the blocked $90 million in FY04 and FY05 funds.  Progress has 
been steady but slow in several high profile human rights 
cases involving abuse or collaboration with the 
paramilitaries by the Colombian military.  The GOC has 
recently taken positive steps on several outstanding cases. 
 
¶10. (C) Even though the vast majority of human rights abuses 
crimes are attributable to the illegal armed groups, the 
government has a difficult dialogue with NGOs, the United 
Nations, and some foreign governments.  In 2004, homicides 
fell by 16 percent, kidnappings by 42 percent, and forced 
displacements by 37 percent. 
 
------------------------ 
Venezuela and the Region 
 
¶11. (C) The Colombians want to manage the Venezuela problem, 
rather than confront it.  Rather than taking Venezuela 
head-on, which risks splitting Latin America in a year with 
nine major elections, including four in the Andes, they have 
urged the U.S. to develop a "positive agenda," which would 
take the social agenda away from Chavez and give them and 
others something to join.  In addition to trade, Colombia's 
key Venezuelan concerns are counter-terror and counter-drug. 
They persuaded Venezuela to extradite one high profile FARC 
operative and sign several slightly forthcoming declarations 
on counter-terror and counter-drug.  The Colombians will 
engage in cross-border operations into Venezuela whenever 
they think they have a clear terrorist target.  Long-term 
concerns about Venezuela are prompting diversion of planning 
and resources away from the internal counter-drug and 
counter-terror threats and, for instance, are one reason for 
renewed Colombian interest in A-10s.  The Colombians view the 
Venezuela threat as real, if not imminent, and will ask for a 
U.S. commitment to an enhanced defense relationship to meet 
the threat. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Military Progress and Plan Patriota 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The Plan Patriota military offensive in south-central 
Colombia is putting the FARC stronghold under pressure.  But 
the logistical strain of keeping 15,500 troops in the dense, 
hostile jungle, hundreds of miles from their supply bases, is 
huge, and they have yet to kill or capture a top level FARC 
leader.  DOD funding for Plan Patriota has diminished in 
recent years. 
 
¶13. (C) The FARC has been more aggressive in 2005, primarily 
in vulnerable peripheral areas against indigenous towns, 
local civilian leaders, electrical towers and rural highways, 
in addition to military and police outposts.  Most recently, 
the FARC has staged a series of roadblocks and attacks in 
southern Putumayo Department; they shut down all 
transportation in the area, interrupted basic services, 
kidnapped 16 civilians, and displaced some 500 families. 
 
----------------------------- 
Drug Eradication/Interdiction 
----------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Progress and cooperation with Colombia remain 
excellent, in spite of the competition for helicopters 
between the counter-terror and counter-drug priorities. 
Eradication and interdiction are at record levels.  Over 
100,000 hectares of coca and 1,000 hectares of opium poppy 
have been sprayed since the beginning of the year and 12,000 
hectares of coca and poppy were manually eradicated, well 
ahead of 2004.  Ground fire against spray planes is below 
2003 levels but remains problematic.  We lost a helicopter 
and a Salvadoran civilian contractor last month as a result 
of ground fire.  Manual eradication, inefficient but 
environmentally uncontroversial and employment generating, is 
an issue.  Spraying in national parks, some of which have 
high concentrations of mature, highly productive coca, is 
also unresolved. 
 
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U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
¶15. (C) The three U.S. contractors captured by the FARC in 
February 2003 are now the longest U.S. terror captives in the 
world.  Their safe release continues to be one of our top 
priorities, and embassy cooperation with Southcom is 
excellent.  The Colombians are providing full assistance. 
Uribe renewed his assurance to Under Secretary Burns that he 
will insist that our hostages be included in any humanitarian 
exchange and that he will cooperate with U.S. efforts to free 
the hostages.  The Colombian military has done its best to 
avoid military operations that might unnecessarily jeopardize 
our hostages. 
 
---------------------------- 
Free Trade Agreement/Economy 
---------------------------- 
¶16. (C) This will be the first opportunity to renew our 
commitment to an Andean free trade agreement following House 
approval of CAFTA.  Agriculture issues are a key, especially 
relating to chicken, corn, rice, and wheat.  The U.S. just 
replied to the wholly inadequate agriculture offer made by 
Colombia in May; the Colombians may complain that our delay 
and sudden response did not give them enough time to respond 
before Crawford.  Agriculture bilats are scheduled for early 
August.  The twelfth round of Andean free trade talks in 
Miami ground out some progress; the next full round is 
scheduled for Colombia in September or early October. 
Colombian negotiators want to complete the agreement this 
year so election complications don't put it on hold until 
late 2006 or later.  The economy is generally sound and 
strengthening. 
 
¶17. (C) Uribe will again press for a more forthcoming U.S. 
approach on free trade.  Uribe would welcome U.S. endorsement 
of a Colombian proposal to create a post-treaty working group 
to accelerate solutions on plant and animal health issues, 
which would give Uribe a win with no concrete trade effects 
on the U.S.  An even bigger win would be U.S. endorsement of 
brand-naming Colombian coffee, again without trade costs to 
us, but it would complicate some related WTO discussions and 
is resisted by some U.S. coffee retailers. 
 
--------------- 
Judicial Reform 
--------------- 
 
¶18. (C) The U.S.-backed switch to an oral trial system has 
been successful and popular.  The Colombian military justice 
system is reforming slowly.  The new Defense Minister has 
promised to make it a priority. 
 
----------------------- 
Presidential Reelection 
----------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) Congressional elections will take place next March; 
presidential elections next May.  The Constitutional Court 
will rule on the possibility of presidential re-election in 
September; the outcome is uncertain.  Positioning relating to 
the elections is dominating and confusing politics.  If Uribe 
can run, he will win.  He is above 65 percent approval in 
polls.  The FARC is also electioneering: after a disastrous 
2004, they have launched a limited, high profile, violent 
campaign to discredit Uribe's "democratic security" policy 
and weaken support for him and his supporters in the run-up 
to elections. 
WOOD