Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05BOGOTA6521, CODEL THOMAS DELIVERS HARD MESSAGE TO COLOMBIANS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05BOGOTA6521.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BOGOTA6521 2005-07-12 17:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 006521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT PLS PASS USTR FOR RVARGO AND BHARMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EAGR FTA
SUBJECT: CODEL THOMAS DELIVERS HARD MESSAGE TO COLOMBIANS 
ABOUT ATPDEA AND THE FTA 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified -- please protect accordingly. 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  During his meetings in Bogota, Chairman 
Thomas delivered a clear message that ATPDEA will not be 
renewed and that the window for successfully negotiating a 
U.S.-Andean-FTA was closing rapidly. President Uribe, 
Agricultural Minister Arias and Trade Minister Botero all 
argued that the security situation in Colombia merited 
special consideration, but Chairman Thomas was clear that 
while we could be creative within the framework of the 
agreements already negotiated, new, special mechanisms were 
out of the question.  Chairman Thomas also held a press 
conference during which he repeated these assertions.  End 
Summary. 
 
The Chairman,s Message 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  During his meetings in Bogota, Chairman Thomas 
delivered the same message:  he was visiting Colombia, Peru 
and Ecuador because he was worried about the current state of 
play of the FTA negotiations and he wanted to tell this to 
the leaders of the countries.  He added that ATPDEA would not 
be renewed by the U.S. Congress, therefore failing an Andean 
FTA, Colombia would face the worst scenario: no ATPDEA, no 
FTA, and Central America-DR, Mexico and Chile all enjoying 
free access to the U.S. market.  Thomas, third major point 
was that the window for negotiating an Andean FTA was really 
in late 2003 and early 2004.  After a tough CAFTA fight, he 
explained, it was difficult to imagine much support for 
pushing through the Andean agreement, with its similarities 
to CAFTA on sugar, labor, environment and agriculture. 
Finally, Chairman Thomas made clear that the U.S. Congress 
considered previous FTA,s as the template that had to be 
followed and it would be impossible to approve any agreement 
that featured radically different mechanisms, such as 
permanent safeguards against distortions caused by internal 
subsidies.  Democratic Codel member Stephanie Tubbs-Jones 
noted her opposition to CAFTA and was emphatic on the need 
for a strong labor chapter. Reps. Shaw, Weller and Nunes 
echoed the chairman,s messages. 
 
Minister Arias 
-------------- 
2.  (SBU)  Minister Arias emphasized the importance of 
gaining special treatment for Colombian agriculture due to 
the importance of the rural sector in the fight against drugs 
and terrorism.  Chairman Thomas responded by noting that 
there are many countries asking for special treatment for 
different reasons, but any agreement will have to fit into 
the overall framework of what we have agreed with other 
countries.   Min. Arias pressed for the need for real access 
to the U.S. market and a clear and agile mechanism for 
handling SPS issues.  He then concluded by complaining about 
the lack of response to Colombian agricultural and SPS 
proposals.  Chairman Thomas responded that as long as they 
are making proposals that don't fall into the framework of 
what was done previously in other U.S. FTA's, then the U.S. 
couldn,t move forward.  The U.S. wants to move, but it has 
to be in the context of opening the market.  The Chairman 
went on to say that delaying the negotiations is not to the 
advantage of Colombia.  Colombia has had a window of 
opportunity to negotiate the FTA, but this is closing fast. 
 
Minister Botero/Chief Negotiator Gomez 
-------------------------------------- 
3.  (SBU)  Minister Botero responded to Chairman Thomas, 
comments by stating that Colombia also faces political 
realities and has to negotiate a deal that could pass in its 
Congress.  Botero also stated that while Colombia had 
demonstrated political will to move the agreement forward, he 
had not seen comparable will on the part of U.S. negotiators 
due to the CAFTA approval process.  Botero, like Minister 
Arias, pointed out that the U.S. had yet to respond to many 
offers on the table and until the GOC saw U.S. engagement, it 
was difficult to put anything but the most conservative 
offers on the table.  Botero stressed the need for real 
access to the U.S. market for Colombian agriculture.  He 
stated that without this, and the SPS permanent committee 
needed to achieve this, then Colombia would gain very little 
in the agriculture sector under an FTA.   Chairman Thomas 
committed to getting a response from the U.S. on Colombia's 
agriculture proposals.  FTA lead negotiator Gomez added that 
the GOC was worried about the timetable and the lack of U.S. 
response.  He and Botero stated that the GOC was looking for 
pragmatic solutions to the remaining issues, but both sides 
had to engage to achieve those solutions and the U.S. was not 
engaging.  The key, according to Gomez, was a balanced 
agreement where one side does not get primary products and 
the other everything else.  Gomez added that Colombia 
understood it had to open up many markets, but in some areas 
of agriculture, they had to insure the survival of some 
domestic production to maintain the rural sector populated, 
or else face increasing instability and insecurity. 
 
President Uribe 
--------------- 
4.  (SBU)  The President welcomed the Codel and thanked the 
chairman for his efforts to support Colombia, especially 
during the renewal of ATPDEA.  He stressed the important link 
between agricultural employment and security and explained 
this was the reason why Colombia needed additional 
flexibility to protect a basic group of products (corn, 
chicken leg quarters, rice, beans, and oilseeds).  The rural 
sector was also important because it was a quarter of the 
Colombian population, and there were many more in the cities 
that depended on the sector and agro-industry for their 
livelihood.  Uribe added that he understood that a bilateral 
FTA could not hinder the U.S.,s ability to use internal 
supports for agriculture, but he felt that the agreement must 
then allow countries some mechanism to offset the 
distortionary effects of those subsidies.  Chairman Thomas 
responded that the Congress would simply not approve such 
mechanisms, but he pledged to work with Colombia and use all 
his creativity to find solutions for these issues that fell 
within the existing framework created by previous agreements. 
 President Uribe also asked the Chairman,s assistance in 
obtaining U.S. responses to the Colombian agricultural, SPS 
and intellectual property offers.  Chairman Thomas promised 
to contact USTR upon his return to get the process moving. 
Uribe also made a geopolitical argument about the importance 
of the FTA, stating that Colombia was a strong supporter of 
the U.S. while Brazil was trying to supplant the U.S.,s 
leadership and Venezuela was trying to buy a leadership role 
with cheap oil.  Uribe also pointed out the instability in 
the region and the negative signal that would be sent if the 
U.S. were unable to conclude an FTA with as strong an ally as 
Colombia. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Congressman Weller asked President Uribe about 
implementation of the peace and justice law.  The President 
responded that over 12,000 members of terrorist groups had 
turned themselves in, of which 55 percent were AUC and 45 
percent guerillas.  The President defended the law, stating 
that this time there would be penalties and no amnesty, like 
there was for the M-19.  Moreover, those who were solely 
narco-traffickers would not have any benefits under the law, 
and those who committed human rights abuses would have to 
serve sentences and would have no amnesty or pardon.  The 
President also stated that extradition would be permitted 
under the law and used the case of AUC leader Salvatore 
Mancuso to demonstrate his point.  The President suspended 
the GOC,s consideration of the extradition so long as 
Mancuso lived up to the terms of his demobilization.  If he 
were to violate them, then the President would allow the 
extradition process to move forward. 
 
6.   (SBU) Congresswoman Tubbs-Jones raised the issue of 
labor violence with the President.  He responded that the 
cornerstone of his administration was the concept of security 
for everyone.  He related that when he took power in 2002, 
161 labor leaders were killed and 400 of 1096 mayors could 
not exercise their duties because of guerilla threats. 
Today, there might be one or two mayors that are having such 
security problems and the Colombian government is doing 
everything in its power to eliminate these problems.  The 
President added that this year only five labor leaders have 
been killed, but that is five too many.  His goal was to 
eliminate violence against labor leaders, against mayors, and 
against the civilian population.  According to the President, 
the only way to ensure continued support for his democratic 
security program was to make sure that everyone shared in its 
benefits. 
 
Press Play 
---------- 
 
7.  (U)  Chairman Thomas, comments during his press 
conference received wide coverage in both print and 
television.  Front-page headlines in top business dailies 
repeated his statement that ATPDEA would not be renewed and 
his concern that the negotiations were not moving fast 
enough.  Minister Botero, in a statement published on the 
presidency,s website, characterized the visit as positive 
and highlighted the Chairman,s promise to seek U.S. 
responses to Colombian offers on agriculture.  The 
Chairman,s message has also resonated with the business 
community, who appreciated his frank appraisal of the 
situation. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  Overall the visit was successful in ensuring the 
GOC understands the political realities of trade 
liberalization in Washington.  Chairman Thomas' clear 
explanation of what the U.S. was seeking helped the ministers 
and President Uribe see our positions in a realistic light. 
Post has already followed up with the Codel's Colombian 
interlocutors to reinforce the message starting with a phone 
call by the Ambassador to Minister Botero.  We will continue 
to follow-up before the next round in Miami.  End Comment. 
WOOD