P 201453Z JUL 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8864
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 002386 
 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN/POUNDS, NEA/RA FOR CHARLES LAWSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015 
TAGS: KISL KPAL LE PGOV PTER SENV
SUBJECT: MGLE01: HIZBALLAH'S CABINET SHUFFLE 
 
REF: BEIRUT 2285 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Introduction and summary.  Hizballah gained all its 
cabinet demands as Prime Minister-designate Fouad Siniora on 
July 19 announced his cabinet lineup that included Fawzi 
Salloukh as Foreign Minister, Trad Hamadeh as Labor Minister, 
and Hizballah member MP Mohammed Fneish as Energy and Water 
Minister.  According to our Shia sources, Hizballah was 
sincere in demanding that it nominate the Foreign Minister in 
Siniora's cabinet.  It was not an issue of sabotaging 
Siniora's government formation, but rather an attempt to 
defend against UNSCR 1559's call for Hizballah disarmament. 
Hizballah and Amal nominated former diplomat Fawzi Salloukh, 
who is not a member of either party, but who would likely 
work against full implementation of UNSCR 1559.  Hizballah 
retained Trad Hamadeh at the Ministry of Labor because they 
are pleased with his job performance.  Hizballah sought the 
Ministry of Energy and Water mainly to provide an example of 
competence in the provision of public services and to protect 
the status quo in the Wazzani/Hasbani watershed.  Hizballah 
is not looking to create new water disputes with Israel, 
however.  As a part of its election deal with Amal, Hizballah 
will also gradually acquire two-thirds of the Shia Director 
General posts in the GOL ministries.  Speaker of Parliament 
Nabih Berri is increasingly viewed in the Shia community as 
beholden to Hizballah.  End introduction and summary. 
 
Hizballah sincere about Foreign Ministry 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  On July 15, Shia journalist Abbas Sabbagh told 
econoff that his sources in Hizballah sincerely sought a 
sympathetic Foreign Minister to hinder implementation of 
UNSCR 1559.  Hizballah's push to nominate the Foreign 
Minister in Prime Minister-designate Fuad Siniora's cabinet 
was not about sabotaging Siniora's government formation. 
Sabbagh interviewed Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim 
Qassim on July 12, who said that Hizballah wants a Foreign 
Minister who is "more flexible" on UNSCR 1559.  Hizballah had 
vetoed Hariri ally Ghazi Youssef for the post.  Qassim was 
adamant about a Hizballah-nominated Foreign Minister, 
according to Sabbagh, suggesting that Hizballah both placed a 
priority on the Foreign Ministry and believed it plausible 
that the party could choose the next Foreign Minister.  Amal 
and Hizballah jointly nominated former diplomat and 
nonpartisan Fawzi Salloukh (reftel). 
 
¶3.  (C)  In a separate meeting on July 15, Hizballah expert 
Professor Nizar Hamzeh of the American University of Beirut 
concurred that Hizballah sought a sympathetic Foreign 
Minister, rather than to sabotage Siniora.  Hamzeh, who has 
met Salloukh, said Salloukh would resist UNSCR 1559, but is 
not a tool of Hizballah.  Salloukh is closer to Speaker of 
Parliament and Amal leader Nabih Berri.  As current Secretary 
General of the Islamic University in Southern Beirut, 
Salloukh is also close to Berri ally and acting Chairman of 
the Higher Shia Council Sheikh Abed al-Amir Qabalan.  Another 
candidate for Foreign Minister, career diplomat and current 
Ambasador in London Jihad Mortada, was closer to Hizballah, 
but fell out as the second choice for Foreign Minister. 
 
Hizballah sought Labor and Energy and Water 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Sabbagh's sources in Hizballah consider the 
nomination of Salloukh a joint nomination with Amal, leaving 
two more posts to be filled by candidates closer to 
Hizballah.  Hizballah nominated the Labor and Energy and 
Water portfolios, leaving Health and Agriculture for Amal. 
According to Sabbagh, Hizballah wanted to retain close ally 
(but non-party member) Trad Hamadeh as Minister of Labor. 
Hizballah is satisfied with Hamadeh's performance in Prime 
Minister Najib Mikati's interim government, particularly in 
his decision to allow Palestinians to work in selected 
non-professional occupations.  Sabbagh explained that 
Hizballah has never been at odds with the Palestinians and is 
more sympathetic to their plight than other Lebanese parties. 
 Hizballah did not participate in the "War of the Camps" 
during the civil war.  Today, Hizballah remains close to 
Palestinian militant groups HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ).  Sabbagh said that when he went to interview 
HAMAS and PIJ officials in south Beirut, he found that 
Hizballah security agents manned the security perimeter for 
HAMAS and PIJ offices.  Only when Sabbagh entered the offices 
did he see Palestinian guards. 
 
¶5.  (C)  According to Sabbagh, Hizballah nominated MP 
Mohammed Fneish from Tyre, who is a member of Hizballah, to 
head the Ministry of Energy and Water (MOEW) because he has 
proven to be a quality MP and because he has a plan to reform 
electricity fee collection.  The water part of the portfolio 
is secondary.  According to Sabbagh, Hizballah wants to 
protect the status quo of Lebanon's water use in the 
Hasbani/Wazzani region, but is not interested in provoking 
new disputes.  Hizballah wants to keep the Shebaa Farms as 
its only "front" with Israel.  MP Mohammed Raad, head of 
Hizballah's 14 member Parliamentary bloc, was Hizballah's 
original choice, but the party preferred to keep him focused 
in the Parliament, according to Sabbagh. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Hamzeh opined that Hizballah's primary objective in 
its service ministerial portfolios will be to set an example 
of good provision of public services.  Similarly, leading 
Shia politician and MP Yassin Jabber told DCM in early July 
that Hizballah was seeking the energy portfolio in order to 
demonstrate that it could run this troubled ministry 
effectively, and thus draw a contrast with the two preceding 
Amal-affiliated energy ministers who failed to improve 
Electricite du Liban's notorious service and finances.  If 
services continue to lag under the tutelage of 
Hizballah-nominated ministers, then it could call on Iranian 
aid to bail it out.  For example, should the MOEW fail to 
provide adequate power, Hizballah could ask Iran to agree to 
sell fuel at cost to the MOEW.  Iranian aid would, of course, 
be limited to Hizballah-led ministries.  Hizballah's 
secondary objective will be to stay informed.  Hizballah had 
relied on Syrian intelligence during the Syrian occupation to 
keep it informed of cabinet decisions, but now it must rely 
on itself. 
 
The bill comes due: more DGs for Hizballah 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  Sabbagh told us that part of the cost for 
Hizballah's political rescue of Amal by forming a joint list 
in the parliamentary elections is Berri's obligation to allow 
Hizballah to nominate senior government officials.  Prior to 
the elections, Berri had control over nominating Shia 
government officials, and he rejected anyone with ties to 
Hizballah.  Hizballah is seeking two-thirds of the 
Shia-allocated Director General (DG) posts, including 
Director General of the Surete General, for its members and 
associates over the next few years.  Hizballah realizes that 
it will take time to acquire two-thirds of the DG posts 
because it must wait for current DGs to vacate their 
positions (retirement or resignation) in order to create 
openings.  Hizballah is not demanding the dismissal of 
sittings DG's. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Both Sabbagh and Hamzeh agree that Berri is seen in 
the Shia community as beholden to Hizballah for its election 
support.  They are also in accord that Berri's Amal would 
have lost many of its seats in the elections, and Berri 
himself would not have been re-elected as Speaker of 
Parliament without the Amal-Hizballah alliance.  Hamzeh 
suggested that Berri could become more and more a puppet of 
Hizballah. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Sabbagh's access to Hizballah may be more extensive 
than we previously thought.  Hizballah approached him in the 
last few weeks to offer him bribes to write favorably about 
the party in the Arabic-language newspaper, "An Nahar." 
Apparently, Hizballah was not satisfied with its previous 
inside man at "An Nahar."  Sabbagh told Hizballah that he 
welcomed increased opportunities to interview Qassim and 
other party officials, but said that he would not go as far 
as the party wanted in painting it in a favorable light.  End 
comment. 
 
 
FELTMAN