P 181608Z JUL 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8816
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY VATICAN 
NSC WASHDC
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5//

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 002355 
 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN/POUNDS 
LONDON FOR TSOU 
PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  MARONITE PATRIARCH ON CABINET FORMATION: 
TRYING TO BE HELPFUL, BUT PESSIMISTIC AND NONCOMMITTAL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) The Maronite Patriarch suggested that, while he was 
trying to help Prime Minister-designate Siniora's efforts to 
form a Cabinet, he was at a loss as to what one of the 
principal obstacles, Michel Aoun, really wanted.  Aoun's 
supporters might take to the streets if Aoun is left out of 
the next Cabinet, an unwelcoming possibility.  The Patriarch 
was noncommittal about whether the gravity of the situation 
justified pressuring President Lahoud -- the other Maronite 
obstacle facing Siniora -- to start pushing rather than 
slowing down the process.  The Patriarch suggested that 
rearranging Siniora's proposed distribution of Cabinet 
portfolios might ease Christian discontent -- thus depriving 
Aoun and Lahoud of a reason to keep on raising objections -- 
but, even on this point, he was less than certain. 
Suspecting Damascus of playing an unhelpful role in all this, 
the Patriarch said that he wanted the establishment of 
Lebanese-Syrian diplomatic relations to be a priority.  End 
summary. 
 
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Up in the Mountain, thinking about a Cabinet 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The Ambassador and poloff paid a call on the Maronite 
Patriarch, Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, on July 18. 
The Patriarch, who relocated earlier this month to his summer 
residence near Diman, which is perched high up in Mount 
Lebanon and overlooking the Qadisha Valley, historic center 
of Maronite monastic life and seat of the Maronite 
Patriachate in previous centuries.  Moving to a considerably 
more remote location for the summer, the Patriarch noted with 
his characteristic good humor, had done nothing to reduce the 
number of his official visitors. 
 
¶3.  (C) One of those recent official visitors was Prime 
Minister-designate Fouad Siniora, who had called on the 
Patriarch the day before, July 17.  The Patriarch said he had 
discussed with Siniora the urgency of forming a Cabinet.  He 
recalled Siniora claiming to have done everything possible to 
reach an agreement on this with all the major political 
players.  Since an agreement was impossible with some of 
them, Siniora had told the Patriarch that he was going to 
form a Cabinet relying on cooperation with the rest. 
 
¶4.  (C) Siniora still appeared intent on forming a Cabinet in 
which those groups and figures outside the "Bristol 
opposition" bloc -- President Lahoud and Michel Aoun among 
them -- had less than one-third-plus-one of the seats in the 
Cabinet.  This would deny them a "blocking minority" in 
Cabinet votes.  This would be a bad development, in the 
Patriarch's opinion, because Michel Aoun and his supporters 
would likely take to the street in protest. 
 
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What does Aoun want? 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The Patriarch admitted that he did not understand 
Aoun's thinking on Cabinet formation.  Issam Abou Jamra, 
Aoun's strange choice for Justice Minister -- once the Hariri 
bloc decided to cede that portfolio to Aoun -- was clearly 
unacceptable.  Abou Jamra knows nothing about justice, the 
Patriarch laughed.  As for Aoun's second Cabinet nominee, 
Eddie Abi Lama, the Patriarch added that no one in Lebanon 
knows anything about him.  The country would be "better off" 
were Aoun to participate in the Cabinet, but Aoun's 
unqualified Cabinet choices made this prospect less likely. 
"I don't know" how to satisfy Aoun, the Patriarch said. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Patriarch had made clear his opinion that 
demonstrations against the new Cabinet, purportedly in the 
name of a disenfranchised Christian population, would be 
"useless."  If Aoun's supporters were to take to the streets, 
their opponents would simply organize counter-demonstrations 
twice the size.  The Patriarch agreed that, should Aoun not 
participate in the Cabinet, Aoun should try to influence 
political decision-making through his parliamentary bloc 
instead. 
 
¶7.  (C) At the same time, the Patriarch did not believe that 
the 72-member alliance of parliamentary blocs led by Sa'ad 
Hariri was broad enough to form a Cabinet on its own. 
Lebanese politics was not a two-party system, as in the 
United States, he said.  That is, there was no clear-cut 
governing party-opposition party relationship in the 
Parliament on which a Cabinet could be based. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Better portfolios, "real" Maronites 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The Patriarch said he had conveyed to Siniora the 
dissatisfaction of the Christian community with Siniora's 
latest proposed Cabinet lineup.  The portfolios allocated to 
Maronites were not very weighty, for one thing.  Also, the 
proposed Minister of Finance, Jihad Az'ur, while a Maronite, 
was seen as a "collaborator" of Siniora.  (Comment:  Michel 
al-Murr, political boss of the Metn region of Mount Lebanon, 
claimed to senior political specialist today that the 
Patriarch had put it even more bluntly to him:  Az'ur, the 
Patriarch allegedly told Murr, was "not a Maronite."  End 
comment.) 
 
¶9.  (C) While he pointed out, laughing, that Siniora "doesn't 
have my benediction," the Patriarch tried to sound supportive 
of Siniora's efforts.  However, he seemed at a loss when 
asked how to ease unhappiness in the Christian community with 
a Siniora-led Cabinet.  Doing so would presumably remove any 
grounds on which Lahoud and Aoun could object to -- and 
attempt to obstruct -- Siniora's plans.  "Some say" that a 
re-arrangement of Cabinet portfolios -- giving a few 
weightier ones to the Maronite and other Christian members -- 
might satisfy Christians, the Patriarch suggested cautiously 
-- "perhaps." 
 
------------------------------------------ 
A Hizballah Foreign Minister?  No, thanks. 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) The Patriarch noted Hizballah's demand to name the 
Foreign Minister in Siniora's Cabinet.  "That's not 
acceptable now," he said.  Hizballah's reported first choice 
for the job, career diplomat Fawzi Salloukh, while otherwise 
"good," was unacceptable because he was a reliably 
pro-Hizballah Shi'a.  Hizballah seemed to entertain the idea 
that control of the Foreign Ministry would allow them to 
alter the policies of the United States and European 
countries toward Lebanon, "but it's not so," the Patriarch 
chuckled. 
 
--------------------------- 
And what is the SARG up to? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) "Some say" also that the Syrians are quietly 
interfering in the Cabinet-formation process, the Patriarch 
added.  How else to explain, for example, Aoun's ability to 
return to Lebanon when he did, or the likelihood of Samir 
Ja'ja''s release (septel) at a time when it threatened to 
make a difficult political situation even worse?  The current 
political impasse unhelpfully lent credence to the Syrian 
line that the Lebanese could not govern their affairs on 
their own.  Recent Syrian actions, including restrictions 
placed on cross-border cargo traffic and the detention of 
Lebanese fishermen, further complicated matters, and they 
were "no coincidence," the Patriarch added. 
 
¶12.  (C) Asked if this was all the more reason to pressure 
President Lahoud to support the Cabinet-formation process, 
the Patriarch shrugged and stared out at the panoramic view 
of Mount Lebanon from his balcony.  "I don't know," he said. 
If there was a SARG game in play to frustrate Cabinet 
formation, did Aoun realize he was playing a role in it?  The 
Patriarch laughed again, saying that "some say the Syrians 
are behind the door!"  It was strange that Aoun -- who 
clearly was eyeing the Presidency -- allowed himself to be 
used in such a way, he said. 
 
¶13.  (C) As to the object of a Syrian game, the Patriarch 
supposed that the SARG wants "a Cabinet on its side." 
Perhaps the SARG wanted its "good friend," Najib Mikati, in 
Siniora's place.  It would be a negative development for 
Siniora to give up on Cabinet formation and for Mikati to be 
designated Prime Minister in his place.  At the same time, 
the Patriarch added pessimistically, he was also afraid of 
the alternative:  that Siniora would withdraw and be 
re-designated as Prime Minister.  This risked a new round of 
the same impasse, he suggested. 
 
¶14.  (C) His suspicions about Syrian maneuvering 
notwithstanding, the Patriarch said it was not in Lebanon's 
interest to be in conflict with Syria.  Syria just needed to 
start treating Lebanon like a genuinely sovereign neighbor. 
For this reason, the Patriarch's key objective is to see 
bilateral diplomatic relations established between the two 
countries, he said. 
 
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Comment 
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¶15.  (C) The Patriarch was disappointingly noncommittal about 
the need to pressure President Lahoud to cease being a drag 
on the Cabinet formation process.  His concerns about 
weakening the Presidency of the Republic, an institution 
reserved for the Maronites, continue to outweigh his concerns 
-- although he clearly has them -- about the implications of 
this political impasse continuing for much longer. 
 
 
FELTMAN