This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 004324 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY, EAP, EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OVIP TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THAILAND 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (a and d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (C)  Madame Secretary, all of us in Thailand look forward 
to your visit to Phuket.  The Royal Thai Government is 
particularly enthusiastic about hosting you:  Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra (Prime Minister TOCK-sin) and Foreign 
Minister Kantathi Suphamongkhon (Minister KHAN-ta-tee) plan 
to join you for meetings there.  Deputy Prime Minister and UN 
Secretary General Candidate Surakiart Sathirathai (Deputy 
 
SIPDIS 
Minister SUR-a-ki-aht) plan to escort you as you tour tsunami 
recovery sites.  Coming six months after the devastating 
December 26 tsunami, your visit will give you an opportunity 
to showcase private and public sector assistance to the 
region and highlight the resilience of the Thai people as 
they rebuild their lives.  In your meetings with senior 
leaders, you can tap into the good will generated by 
America's historic response to the tsunami to advance a 
number of key foreign policy objectives.  On the security 
front, you can express our willingness to deepen dialogue 
about strategic issues while urging Thailand to provide more 
material support for recovery operations in Iraq and to 
endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative.  The Thai have 
strong relations with Beijing (Thaksin is there right now, as 
a matter of fact, celebrating the 30th anniversary of 
diplomatic relations) and will welcome hearing about your 
trip to Beijing and sharing views on China's growing role in 
Southeast Asia.  You can discuss our ongoing bilateral Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) talks and express our hopes that we 
conclude a comprehensive agreement.  With former FM 
Surakiart's UN candidacy a key Thai objective, you can expect 
your interlocutors will be ready and willing to discuss UN 
reform.  While supportive of constructive engagement with 
Burma, PM Thaksin has recently expressed growing frustration 
with the ruling junta in Rangoon and can share his views on 
prospects for reform in Rangoon.  Thaksin remains a key ally 
in the Global War on Terror and will welcome your thoughts on 
this subject as well as developments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 He will likely share his opinions on his largest domestic 
challenge -- unrest in the predominantly Muslim provinces of 
southernmost Thailand.  FM Kantathi plans to visit Pyongyang 
shortly after your visit and wants to discuss the North 
Korean situation.  End Summary. 
 
AFTERMATH OF THE TSUNAMI -- RECOVERY UNDERWAY 
 
¶2. (U)  The massive rescue and recovery operation undertaken 
by the U.S. military as a result of the December 26 tsunami 
was historic and will likely be studied as a model for years 
to come.  Mercifully, U.S. casualties were much lighter (two 
dozen confirmed or presumed dead) than those suffered by 
other countries.  Thousands of Thai, Europeans and other 
Asians were killed -- primarily in resorts north of Phuket -- 
a haven for vacationers during the holiday season.  Total 
fatalities will likely never be known; the official number is 
about 5,400 but Thai officials privately say they expect the 
final death toll to top 8,000. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  While previous dignitaries visiting the devastated 
area were able to focus on the destruction itself, your visit 
can highlight recovery efforts.  Such a message would be 
welcomed by senior Thai officials who are telling the world 
that Phuket is again open for business and asking foreigners 
to spend their tourist dollars there as a way to help locals 
recover.  The outpouring of assistance from around the world 
has been overwhelming.  There are a number of sites you may 
wish to visit to witness for yourself this generosity.  For 
example, students at the International School of Bangkok have 
raised over 800,000 dollars from children around the world to 
help rebuild a school in the Khao Lak area that was destroyed 
by the wave.  The project site, jointly supported by the King 
of Thailand, is a beehive of activity and is already the home 
of 700 students, including 181 tsunami orphans.  Other 
possible sites include new housing developments, repaired 
fishing boats and infrastructure projects. 
 
THE ASSISTANCE EFFORT ITSELF 
 
¶4.  (C)  U.S. disaster relief efforts, led by the U.S. 
military, had an immediate impact on affected areas in 
Thailand.  III MEF Commander, Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman, was 
the commanding general of Combined Support Force 536 (CSF 
536), which was based out of Utapao Thai Naval Air Station. 
CSF 536 worked closely with the Embassy and JUSMAGTHAI to 
ensure that requests for assistance were promptly addressed 
and to assist coordination of relief from civilian agencies, 
NGOs and corporate donors. The Royal Thai Armed Forces 
granted the U.S. military blanket overflight clearances for 
relief operations in the region, including for aircraft from 
the USS Abraham Lincoln Battle Group which operated off 
Sumatra.  In addition to permitting our use of Utapao, the 
Royal Thai Government integrated Thai officers into the CSF 
staff where needed.  During the height of operations, over 
1800 USG personnel operated out of Utapao.  We distributed 
over 660,000 pounds of supplies within Thailand including 
medicine, food, dry ice and body bags.  USAF C-130s made 
regular delivery runs from Utapao and Bangkok to affected 
areas for time sensitive supplies while bulk shipments tended 
to go overland.  USN P-3s positioned at Utapao conducted 
search and rescue missions in the region. Teams made up of 
medical specialists from the CDC, the Armed Forces Research 
Institute of Medical Science and the Joint POW/MIA Accounting 
Command in Hawaii were also deployed to Thailand to assist 
with victim identification.  U.S. Navy SEALS and a 
representative from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
worked closely with Thai military units to search for the 
remains of American and other victims of the disaster. 
Embassy Bangkok provided 24-hour American Citizens Services 
for weeks after the crisis to assist Americans, claim Amcit 
remains and coordinate USG relief efforts and operated a 
virtual Consulate in Phuket City to assist Americans.  The 
coordination among U.S. military and civilian officers 
forward deployed in the Phuket area was a model of 
cooperation.  Longer-term assistance is being provided by 
USAID in the form of replacement of small fishing boats and 
the provision of start-up loans for the recovery of 
small-scale aquaculture and tourism-related businesses. 
Thailand is also eligible for a USD $150 million soft loan 
facility OPIC is making available to tsunami-affected areas. 
The Thai seek assistance in setting up a tsunami early 
warning system and will welcome assurances from you that we 
are providing technical assistance to help countries in the 
Indian Ocean Basin establish a network. 
 
 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Bilateral relations with Thailand are excellent. 
The goodwill generated by America's quick and massive 
response to the tsunami is palpable.  American businesses 
have over $20 billion in direct investment in Thailand.  The 
United States is Thailand's largest export market and second 
only to Japan as a foreign investor.  U.S. visitors to 
Thailand during the past few months have included former 
Presidents Bush and Clinton, former Secretary Powell, 
Governor Jeb Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary 
Zoellick, and then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Nonetheless, there are several points of friction. 
Human rights remain a key concern.  On October 25, 2004, 
poorly trained Thai military and civilian security forces 
forced nearly 1,300 Thai Muslim protesters into trucks to be 
transported to a military base nearly three hours away.  78 
protesters died en route.  The Department's annual human 
rights report, which in 2004 voiced concern over the lack of 
accountability for approximately 1,300 extrajudicial killings 
in 2003 during a "war on drugs" promoted by the Prime 
Minister, rankles the Thai Government.  The United States 
also has a substantial (about USD 10 billion) trade deficit 
with Thailand. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Thailand's policy of "constructive engagement" with 
the military junta in Burma and provision of economic 
assistance to Rangoon is a source of continuing frustration 
for us.  The Thai government supports democracy in Burma but 
maintains, not altogether convincingly, that engagement with 
the SPDC is the only realistic approach it has to make 
progress on the major cross-border flows of refugees, illegal 
economic migrants, and methamphetamines it faces from Burma. 
Recently PM Thaksin has voiced growing frustration with 
Rangoon and his Ministers tell us that Thai policy may become 
less favorable towards Burma. 
 
¶8.  (C)  China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast 
Asia is evident in business, the arts, and the media.  While 
Thai military links with the United States are deeper and far 
more apparent than Sino-Thai links, the Thai military has 
increased contacts with the PLA and a number of Chinese 
weapons systems in its arsenal.  Recent visitors have found 
PM Thaksin to be an engaging interlocutor when discussing 
China -- he would likely welcome a chance to discuss China's 
role in the region.  He is there at the moment, celebrating 
the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. 
 
THE DOMESTIC SCENE -- PM THAKSIN'S DOMINATION OF THAI 
POLITICS 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Prime Minister Thaksin was returned to power with 
a strong majority in early February, winning 377 of the 500 
seats in Parliament.  His Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) 
political party dominates domestic politics.  This election 
was the first time in Thai history that an elected civilian 
Parliamentary government filled out its entire term and was 
reelected.  The Prime Minister's populist policies, public 
relations savvy and a booming economy resonated well with the 
Thai electorate.  Thaksin comes from a prosperous Sino-Thai 
family in Thailand's second largest city, Chiang Mai, and 
placed first in his class at the National Police Academy.  He 
spent several years studying in the United States -- earning 
a master's degree in Criminal Justice from Eastern Kentucky 
University and a Doctorate in Criminology from Sam Houston 
State University.  (Thaksin jokingly likes to refer to 
himself as an "honorary Texan.")  After a few years with the 
police, he left government service to run the family business 
(Shinawatra Corporation or Shin Corp), which he turned into 
Thailand's largest telecommunications company, making himself 
a multi-billionaire in the process. Thaksin characterizes 
himself as a "CEO Prime Minister" and portrays himself as a 
decisive leader.  Critics, with some justification, accuse 
him of stifling dissent within his government and filling key 
government positions with family members or classmates. 
Following several meetings in Washington and the very 
successful October 2003 Bangkok APEC Summit, Thaksin believes 
that he enjoys a special relationship with the President. 
 
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 
 
¶10.  (C)  Prime Minister Thaksin's biggest domestic challenge 
is the unsettled security situation in the far southern part 
of the country.  Southern Thailand, in particular the 
southernmost Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, has experienced episodic violence since it was 
incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902.  However, 2004 
witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of violence, with 
over 500 people killed either by militants or by security 
forces.  Local Muslim separatist militants have attacked 
symbols of Thai and Buddhist authority, and there continue to 
be almost daily incidents of violence, notably even after the 
tsunami disaster of December 26.  Attacks most often involve 
 
SIPDIS 
isolated shootings of local officials, although increasingly 
sophisticated bombing attacks have become more common.  While 
there is no credible evidence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or 
al-Qaeda direction of the violence, there is concern that 
they might attempt to exploit the local violence for their 
own purposes. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Thaksin has recently acknowledged that the problem 
in Thailand's south is not simply the work of criminal gangs 
as he once declared, and that recent RTG policies towards the 
South have failed to halt the violence.  Thaksin recently 
appointed a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed 
by highly respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun 
to look for alternative solutions to the long-running 
insurgency, and has indicated that he might replace martial 
law with something less harsh.  Until recently, this violence 
was directed primarily at RTG institutions with no evidence 
of attacks directed towards foreign interests.  On April 3, 
however, simultaneous bombs exploded outside a French-owned 
Carrefour supermarket and at an international airport, 
killing two persons.  Since then there have been no other 
attacks on foreign-owned targets.  You may wish to point to 
our current efforts to improve human rights training for Thai 
soldiers and officers who will rotate to the south.  We are 
working with U.S. experts to develop a multi-faceted training 
program to educate enlisted soldiers, mid-level officers and 
senior Thai leadership.  Thaksin -- and most Thais -- are 
sensitive about any perception that the U.S. wants to 
establish a security presence in the south. Outrageous but 
widely circulated rumors that the U.S. has fomented violence 
in the South also need to be considered when discussing 
offers of possible U.S. assistance. 
THAILAND AND IRAQ 
 
¶12.  (C) Thailand has played an important role in supporting 
the Global War on Terror.  In addition to capturing terrorist 
mastermind Hambali -- the link between the Jemaah Islamiah 
and al Qaeda -- Thailand sent troops to both Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Thailand dispatched two six-month deployments to Iraq 
as part of OIF.  In December 2003, two Thai soldiers were 
killed by a car bomb while on duty in Karbala.  Thailand's 
second six-month deployment of 443 medics and engineers to 
Iraq ended on September 20, 2004.  While participation in OIF 
has not caused the domestic furor in Thailand that it has in 
other countries, Thaksin's critics have used Thailand's 
deployments to Iraq against him.  Several RTG officials have 
told us that Thailand's deployments have been used by 
militants to stir up dissent in the Muslim south.  Recently, 
CJCS General Myers sent a letter asking Thailand to consider 
sending staff officers to man the OIF Multinational 
Headquarters.  Although in recent meetings with PACOM 
Commander ADM Fallon and Deputy Secretary Zoellick Thaksin 
had said that he would consider some "humanitarian" presence 
in Iraq, at a private dinner wit me on May 12, Thaksin seemed 
extremely sensitive to the issue, particularly the symbolism 
that a Thai presence in Iraq would have among Muslims in 
southern Thailand.  Thaksin stressed that as an ally Thailand 
supported the U.S. on Iraq, but asked us to be sensitive to 
his own efforts to manage the situation in Thailand's south. 
 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
¶13.  (C)  The massive U.S. military response offering relief 
to tsunami victims and our use of Utapao Thai Naval Air 
Station as the hub for our relief efforts in Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka and Thailand was possible in large part to our having 
more than fifty years of close cooperation with the Thai 
military.  Thailand also affords the United States a unique 
platform in Asia to work jointly with other Asian military 
forces, including those from Japan and Indonesia, and to 
conduct multinational peacekeeping, disaster relief, and 
other exercises.  Our largest exercise, Cobra Gold, is 
America's only annual joint/combined multinational training 
exercise in the Asia Pacific region.  We are working with the 
Thai military to build a National Training Facility (NTF) -- 
which could become a regional center -- to improve Thai 
peacekeeping and counterterrorism capabilities.  Further 
expansion of our cooperative exercises with Thailand coupled 
with our expected use of the NTF could go a long way toward 
establishing a near-continuous U.S. presence in Southeast 
Asia in support of our stability and security goals.  We are 
exploring at the working-level the possibility of improving 
strategic talks with the Thai MFA and military to share views 
on the region and to shape Thai thinking about proliferation, 
terrorism, threats to the free flow of commerce and the 
future role in the region of China and India. 
 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA) 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Our premier economic initiative with Thailand is 
a bilateral FTA.  Initiated in mid-2004, talks have 
progressed, albeit at a moderate pace.  The FTA we seek is 
far more comprehensive than previous trade deals inked by 
Thailand:  areas of concern include inclusion in the FTA of 
labor rights and environment safeguards, financial services, 
and stronger intellectual property laws and enforcement. 
Thailand is pressing us on improved access to the United 
States for Thai workers.  With other Southeast Asian 
countries eager for an FTA with the United States, it is an 
open question how long we will continue to devote the bulk of 
our negotiating resources to the slow-moving Thai talks. 
 
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
 
15  (C)  After a year and a half of lobbying from the U.S. 
and others, Thailand apparently has made the basic policy 
decision to be more supportive of PSI and is moving through 
the final steps towards endorsement of the PSI Statement of 
Interdiction Principles (SOP).  However, despite recent 
assurances by both the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime 
Minister that official Thai endorsement of PSI awaits only 
final Cabinet approval, the Royal Thai Government has failed 
to move forward with the initiative.  Prime Minister 
Thaksin's final scrutiny of the decision will be key, and his 
endorsement cannot be taken for granted given his mercurial 
decision making style.  Thai leaders told Secretary Rumsfeld 
that Thailand will likely endorse PSI only after another 
ASEAN nation besides Singapore does so. 
 
F-16 SALE 
 
¶16.  (C)  Thailand recently announced its plans to purchase 
18 fighter aircraft to replace aging F-5s in the Royal Thai 
Air Force (RTAF) fleet.  Thaksin has made it clear that the 
company winning the contract must be willing to engage in 
barter/countertrade for Thai agricultural products.  Bidders 
on the contract include Sweden's Saab's Gripen fighter, 
Russia's Sukhoi SU-30 and Lockheed Martin's F-16.  Senior 
U.S. leaders visiting Thailand, including Deputy Secretary 
Zoellick and Secretary Rumsfeld have urged Thailand to 
seriously consider Lockheed Martin's F-16.  You also raised 
the issue with FM Kantathi in Washington in May.  The F-16 is 
demonstrably a better aircraft and Lockheed Martin recently 
made it clear that it is willing to offer a 100 percent 
barter trade financing package.   The Embassy believes that 
continued pressure from senior U.S. officials like yourself 
is essential for Lockheed Martin's prospects.  It is our 
belief that a transparent competition that takes into 
consideration capability of the aircraft, interoperability 
with U.S. forces, and cost would result in F-16 winning the 
contract. 
 
BURMA 
 
¶17.  (C)  Although Thailand remains committed to its 
engagement strategy with Burma -- and you can expect frequent 
reference to the 2,400 kilometer long border the countries 
share -- PM Thaksin has recently confided to us his 
frustration with the SPDC.  He will be prepared for you to 
urge Thailand to take a tougher stance with Burma.  FM 
Kantathi will probably tell you that the SPDC will postpone 
Burma's turn in the ASEAN chair rotation and could make such 
an announcement in Vientiane. 
 
REFUGEES 
 
¶18.  (SBU)  We are in the latter stages of refugee 
resettlement programs for 15,500 Hmong and about 2,500 
Burmese.  We recently reached agreement with the Thai on 
starting another major resettlement effort which will draw 
from the 145,000 Burmese currently residing in nine refugee 
camps along the Thai-Burma border.  This is likely to be a 
multi-year project that will move tens of thousands of 
Burmese refugees to the United States.  Thai cooperation on 
these programs, which serve the interests of both sides, has 
so far been excellent. 
 
IN CLOSING 
 
¶19.  (U)  We are excited about your visit.  The Thai are 
honored that you are going out of your way to visit their 
country on a trip that will take you to Tokyo, Seoul and 
Beijing.  We look forward to helping make your visit a 
success. 
BOYCE