This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHUM TU PKK
SUBJECT: EUR/SE DEPUTY DIRECTOR'S VISIT TO ADANA: KURDISH 
ISSUES 
 
 
Classified By: (U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: 
 E.O. 12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
(U) This is a Consulate Adana cable. 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:Incoming EUR/SE Dep. Director Baxter Hunt 
visited Adana on July 19, meeting with local AK Party 
officials, attorneys and human rights advocates, and 39th 
Wing officials. AK party officials expressed confidence about 
the continuing appeal of the party and cited the lack of U.S. 
action in Iraq against the PKK as the chief problem in 
U.S.-Turkey bilateral relations, which they otherwise 
considered to be on a sound basis. An AK party mayor 
expressed concern about "Southern Kurdistan Republic 
Government"  stamps he claimed were placed in Turkish 
drivers' passports at the Turkish-Iraqi border. Lawyers and 
human rights advocates criticized what they saw as shallow 
GoT democratization efforts and poor implementation of 
newly-passed laws and judicial procedures. Several contacts 
described  strong Kurdish desires for more  cultural rights 
and Alevi desires to eradicate or reform the State Religious 
Affairs Department. Hunt visited the 39th Wing at Incirlik 
Air Base, receiving briefings on ongoing cargo hub and tanker 
support missions. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  Incoming EUR/SE Dep. Director Baxter Hunt visited 
Adana on July 19, meeting with local AK Party officials, 
including party provincial chief Abdullah Dogru and Seyhan 
mayor) Dr. Azim Ozturk. Both expressed confidence that AK 
Party is doing well in local constituents' eyes because of 
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan,s charismatic leadership, the 
AK party's "clean, honest image in comparison to its 
predecessors", the party's grassroots strength, its focus on 
raising living standards (citing fuel subsidies to regional 
farmers as an example) and its delivery of public services, 
especially infrastructure. Both predicted long-term AK party 
political success. Dogru and Ozturk claimed that AK also 
faces almost no effective domestic opposition and neither 
foresaw issues which would decrease significantly AK's 
internal party cohesion. In a later meeting, a human rights 
advocate and attorney, with self-described center-left 
political views, took issue with the latter internal AK 
assessment, saying that corruption allegations linked to the 
Albayrak group could weigh AK down and observed that "many 
people see the AK party's commitment to real reform as thin 
and just a game to deflect the military with an EU shield." 
Both Dogru and Ozturk downplayed the role of religious values 
in AK party internal deliberations on public policy. Dogru, 
saying that he himself was half-Kurd and that several AK 
ministers also were Kurdish, said that AK had done enough on 
the "Kurdish agenda," and that the Turkish government had 
higher priorities to address now with its scarce resources. 
He rejected a link between fighting terrorism and a broader 
democratization program addressing Kurdish activists' 
demands.  Ozturk, commenting on the GoT's democratization 
program, said that the GoT did not believe in democratization 
for a specific religious or ethnic group, but believed it 
should focus on initiative which benefited all Turks, citing 
efforts to improve housing, roads and living standards. 
 
¶3. (C)  Both Dogru and Ozturk cited the lack of U.S. action 
in Iraq against the PKK as the chief problem in U.S.-Turkey 
relations, which they otherwise considered to be on a sound 
basis. Ozturk drew attention to PM Erdogan's public comments 
about a possible unilateral incursion into Iraq to attack the 
PKK and said that such a step was avoidable if the U.S. would 
not move against the PKK there.  Hunt and AMCON ADANA PO 
repeated remarks by CJCS Myers about a possible Turkish 
incursion into northern Iraq.  Ozturk stated that it is 
particularly worrisome to the GoT and AK Party to see 
"Southern Kurdistan Republic Government" stamps placed in 
Turkish drivers' passports by Kurdish officials at the 
Ibrahim Khalil gate opposite Habur gate on the Turkish-Iraqi 
border.  In a meeting with a U.S. military official who 
manages the ground line of communication into Iraq through 
the Habur Gate, Hunt also heard a report of Kurdish troops 
(probably peshmerga or peshmerga-associated) at the Ibrahim 
Khalil gate starting to wear a new shoulder patch symbolizing 
the Kurdish Regional Government instead of central Iraqi 
authority symbols. 
 
¶4. (C) Lawyers and human rights advocates criticized what 
they termed as shallow GoT democratization efforts and poor 
implementation of newly-passed laws and judicial procedures, 
saying this was based on both entrenched state elite 
philosophical resistance to reform and case load constraints. 
 As an example, several lawyers cited judges' and 
prosecutors' resistance to allowing cross-examination of 
witnesses, citing likely prolongation of trials and already 
excessive case loads.  The lawyers declared that the National 
Police (TNP) is selectively shaping evidence in national 
security cases to exclude information contrary to State 
assertions and also suggested that there is inappropriate TNP 
conduct of operations in the case. They also claimed that, in 
these national security cases, there is a routine absence of 
basic physical evidence or analysis thereof.  An examination 
of victims' clothes and medial records could shed light on 
whether the authorities used torture or the manner in which 
defendants were killed or injured during TNP operations. 
Attorneys also said that pre-trial investigation still is 
conducted by police, not prosecutors. Two attorneys did say 
that there had been meaningful change in providing for 
defense attorneys for those arrested, notifying arrestees of 
their right to an attorney, and authorities, allowing the 
presence of defense attorneys during questioning. 
 
¶5. (C)  Several contacts described Kurdish desires for 
greater cultural rights, including Kurdish-language 
instruction in public schools, Kurdish-language broadcast 
rights, greater devolution of authority from governors to 
elected municipal leaders, reduction of the 10 percent 
electoral threshold, and recognition of a "legitimate group 
identity for Kurds" within the Turkish republic. When one 
contact tried to characterize U.S. efforts in Iraq as aimed 
at allowing a Kurdish state to form, Hunt and AMCON ADANA PO 
pressed back, pointing out U.S. support for Iraqi territorial 
integrity and the need for all Iraqi's to support the 
constitutional-drafting process. 
 
¶6. (C)  Another contact explained Alevi desires, that the 
Religious Affairs Department either be dissolved or changed 
to include support for Turkey's Alevis.  The Alevi contact 
said that Turkey's 12 million-member Alevi community (Note: 
This figure is exaggerated; the real number is closer to 7 
million. End Note) will resist what he called the "Sunni" 
Religious Affairs Department's assimilation policy. 
 
¶7. C)  All the lawyers with whom Hunt met asserted that the 
Turkish State and Government will not change without 
sustained pressure for change from outside and pressed for 
the U.S. to continue to support Turkey's EU accession 
process. Hunt assured them of continuing U.S. support. 
 
 
 
MCELDOWNEY