This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV TU POLITICAL PARTIES
SUBJECT: TURKISH OPPOSITION PARTIES: DEVELOPMENTS ON THE 
LEFT 
 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor John W. Kunstadter, for reasons 1.4 (b) & 
(d). 
 
THIS IS A JOINT AMEMBASSY ANKARA/AMCONSUL ADANA CABLE. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Turkey's three main left-of-center parties 
have been unable to mount a serious challenge to the 
governing AKP.  The left-of-center parties share similar 
ideologies and compete for the same minor segment of the 
Turkish electorate but are unable to cooperate and are 
plagued by political infighting.  The parties are also 
seriously limited by a tradition of authoritarian leadership 
and an elitist unwillingness to engage in the unglamorous 
work of grassroots party building.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) AKP remains the most popular of Turkey,s political 
parties.  The party has made important political and 
tactical mistakes over the past several months, but the 
opposition parties have been unable to capitalize on 
AKP,s missteps.  The Republican People's Party (CHP) is not 
only fighting itself, but also fighting with the two other 
left-of-center parties:  the Social Democratic People's Party 
(SHP), and the Democratic Left Party (DSP). All have very 
similar ideologies.  Their differences are largely rooted in 
the historical struggles between personalities and  factions 
vying for the leadership of the Turkish left.  The three 
parties are competing for the same 20-30 percent of the 
Turkish electorate that has traditionally supported 
"secular", left-of-center parties.  Only a single 
left-of-center party has managed to cross the 10 percent 
electoral threshold in four of the six national elections 
since 1983.  In the other two national elections, two 
left-of-center parties crossed the threshold. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
TURMOIL CONTINUES IN THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE,S PARTY (CHP) 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶3. (C) Despite their steadfast opposition to AKP and their 
fear that AKP is trying to undermine the "secular" 
republic,s status quo, main opposition CHP continues its 
internecine struggle.  In the aftermath of the January 2005 
leadership dust-up, Chairman Baykal has launched a purge 
against his opponents within the party, according to 
several Embassy sources.  He is systematically removing all 
CHP leaders who supported his main rivals, CHP Sisli mayor 
Sarigul or CHP MP Livaneli, for the party chairmanship. 
Baykal has already removed 23 of the 81 provincial party 
chairmen and purged an additional 250 sub-provincial party 
leaders, according to former CHP MP Ersoy Bulut.  Forty-one 
CHP MPs signed a statement condemning Baykal,s removal of 
the popular chairman of Izmir province. 
 
¶4. (C) In January, Baykal promised that the party would hold 
another convention in the fall of 2005 and that he would not 
run as a candidate, but several Embassy contacts believe that 
Baykal will either cancel the October convention or run 
again.  Baykal continues to lay the groundwork for his 
control of the party whether or not he holds a convention. 
As he has done repeatedly in the past to retain control of 
the party, Baykal has registered 5,000 new, loyal party 
members in Izmir province in an effort to keep this large, 
"rebellious" province in line. 
 
¶5. (C) Several CHP MPs have told us that around fifty of 
CHP,s 159 MPs no longer attend parliamentary party meetings. 
 Five party members have already defected to SHP and three 
others have defected to the liberal, center-right Motherland 
Party (ANAP).  Several Embassy contacts with connections to 
CHP and SHP predict that 20-60 CHP MPs may leave the party 
over the next several months, especially if Baykal does not 
step down in October or if SHP appears to build momentum. 
Generally reliable, dissident CHP contacts like MP Hasan 
Aydin and former state minister Erol Cevik, however, predict 
that only a trickle of MPs will leave the party. 
 
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SHP BITES CHP'S ANKLES 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The defection of five CHP MPs to the SHP has added new 
life to a small party.  (Comment.  Later on, one of the 
five SHP MPs defected again, this time to the Motherland 
Party (ANAP). End Comment.)  The current SHP 
is the second incarnation of a party with the same name.  The 
first SHP existed from 1987 to 1995.  It was the second 
or third largest party in parliament and formed a coalition 
government at one point with the center-right True Path 
Party (DYP).  In 1995, however, SHP merged with CHP.  The 
second SHP was formed in 2001 when several CHP members 
defected from the party over concerns that Baykal had become 
too dictatorial.  SHP failed to pass the 10 percent 
electoral threshold in 1999 and 2002. 
 
¶7. (C) SHP Secretary General Cafer Yuksel describes his party 
as a contemporary social democratic party that seeks 
to combine modern social democracy with Turkish 
social-economic and constitutional realities and a respect 
for the Ataturkist elements of the state.  He admits that 
SHP's ideology is similar to CHP's and asserts that there are 
many "good people" still in CHP.  According to Yuksel,  most 
SHP members were people who had been members of CHP but left 
because of Baykal's excessive authoritarianism and their 
desire to create a truly internally democratic social 
democratic party.  Other Embassy contacts, including former 
SHP secretary general Fikri Saglar, claim that SHP's 
leadership is already moving in an authoritarian direction. 
The party's public image was badly damaged in 2002 when SHP 
flirted with an electoral alliance with a pro-Kurdish party. 
According to Saglar, the SHP's grassroots supported the 
merger, but party leader Murat Karayalcin blocked it. 
 
---------------------------- 
DSP WAITING TO MAKE ITS MOVE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Democratic Left Party (DSP) Secretary General Tayfun 
Icli says  his party is not a social democratic party like 
CHP and SHP, but a "nationalistic, leftist, secular, and 
democratic" party.  DSP won the 1999 election with 22 percent 
of the vote, but the party's popularity was decimated by 
corruption allegations, the twin economic shocks of 2000 and 
2001, and then-PM ecevit's frailty.  In the 2002 election, 
DSP received less than two percent of the vote.  DSP leaders 
do not expect DSP to come back to parliament anytime soon. 
DSP VP Huseyin Pazarci is not optimistic about DSP returning 
to parliament after the next election.  He believes it will 
take time for CHP to fully discredit itself, after which 
left-of-center voters would return to DSP.  SecGen Tayfun and 
DSP VP Ahmet Tan, moreover, do not expect many CHP MPs to 
defect to DSP.  The previous DSP-led coalition government was 
brought down by defections from DSP, so those who remain in 
the party have a strong aversion to accepting MPs defecting 
from other parties. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment.  For a number of reasons, Turkish center-left 
opposition political parties have been unable to capitalize 
on the inertia, missteps, and problems confronting Erdogan 
and the AKP.  The major reason is that the public views them 
as vehicles for elitist, authoritarian, and self-serving 
politicians who have failed in the past, either because of 
corruption or poor performance in government. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment, contd.: A second major reason for the 
left-of-center opposition,s failure is its refusal to engage 
in the unglamorous work of retail, grassroots party building. 
 AKP focuses precisely on this grassroots work, giving it a 
huge organizational advantage over its rivals.  Finally, 
left-of-center parties have failed to overcome the 
traditional lack of intra-party democracy in Turkey.  While 
AKP suffers from the same defect, internal party reform could 
breathe new life into parties on the left.  As things stand, 
party members are promoted for unthinking loyalty to the 
party leader, not for innovation or political skill.  This 
contributes to tactical and ideological stagnation,  and 
attenuates the center-left,s ability to mount a serious 
challenge to AKP.  End Comment. 
MCELDOWNEY