This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001575 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2015 
TAGS: PTER PREL AG IZ
SUBJECT: ALGERIANS OUTRAGED BY MURDER OF TWO DIPLOMATS IN 
BAGHDAD, IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR IRAQ POLICY UNCLEAR 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 1539 
     ¶B. ALGIERS 1560 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Marc Sievers, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary and Comment.  Algerians reacted with shock 
and outrage to the announcement July 27 by Al-Qaida in Iraq 
that it had executed the two kidnapped Algerian diplomats, 
Ali Belaroussi and Azzedine Belkadi.  Within two hours of the 
posting of the Al-Qaida announcement on a jihadist website, 
the Presidency confirmed that they were dead, reportedly 
based on information obtained by a GOA working group in 
Amman.  President Bouteflika issued a strongly worded 
statement condemning the murders, which he termed "odious" 
and "cowardly," expressed condolences to the families, and 
warned that Algeria would "pursue with cold determination" 
those who perpetrated the kidnapping and murder of the two 
men.  Foreign Minister Bedjaoui convened the MFA staff to 
express his personal outrage and grief.  In comments to the 
press afterward, Bedjaoui admitted for the first time that 
the GOA had sought to contact the kidnappers but without 
success.  Public opinion is clearly angry, with much of the 
fury now directed at the terrorists and their Algerian 
sympathizers, especially former FIS number two Ali Benhadj, 
who was arrested in Algiers after making a statement to 
Al-Jazeera that appeared to call for killing the two 
diplomats since they were "agents of the occupation."  At the 
same time, some anger is also directed at the Iraqi 
government for allegedly failing to protect the diplomats, at 
the U.S. for invading Iraq in the first place, and at the 
Algerian Government for not mobilizing public opinion and 
Islamic organizations in its efforts to seek their release. 
While it is not yet clear how this event will affect the 
GOA's cautiously supportive position toward the Iraqi 
Transitional Government, our sense is that statements such as 
Belhadj's and the calls by the Algerian terrorist group GSPC 
for the two diplomats to be executed, will underscore the 
links between Algerian terrorist groups and Zarqawi, and 
could help undermine Algerian popular sympathy for the Iraqi 
"resistance."  Meanwhile, high-level expressions of sympathy 
and support should help Bouteflika fend off pressures to 
close the embassy and scale back contact with the Iraqi 
Transitional government.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
Al-Qaida Announces and GOA Confirms 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Algerians reacted with outrage to reports 
mid-afternoon on July 27 that Zarqawi's Al-Qaida in the Land 
of the Two Rivers had announced on a jihadist website that it 
had executed the two Algerian diplomats who were kidnapped in 
Baghdad July 21.  Within two hours of the appearance of the 
announcement, the Presidency issued a statement confirming 
that the two men were dead.  A well-informed source told us 
the confirmation was based on specific information obtained 
by the MFA working group in Amman.  Whatever the basis, the 
confirmation was done in an authoritative manner that left no 
room to question the GOA's certainty.  President Bouteflika 
condemned the killings as "cowardly," offered his personal 
condolences to the families, declared that these crimes had 
no justification and had nothing to do with the Islamic 
religion, and warned that after a suitable period of 
mourning, Algeria would pursue the killers with "cold 
determination."  A minute of silence at noon July 28 was 
widely observed in Algiers and other major cities. 
 
¶3.  (U) Foreign Minister Mohammed Bedjaoui, flanked by 
Minister Delegate Messahel and Secretary General Lamamra, 
addressed the MFA staff at about the same time that the 
Presidency made its announcement.  Appearing at a press 
conference at the MFA, Bedjaoui said Algeria was "stunned," 
and "could not understand the motivations of this vile 
crime."  Bedjaoui admitted for the first time that the GOA 
had made two attempts to contact the kidnappers, but without 
receiving any response and without the kidnappers offering 
any demands.  Bedjaoui said he hoped Algeria would be able to 
regain the corpses, but added that he was doubtful.  Bedjaoui 
insisted the GOA had not made a mistake in deciding to send 
its diplomats to Iraq in 2003.  He deflected a question 
whether Algeria held the Iraqi authorities responsible for 
not providing better security for diplomats in Baghdad, and 
said that after the mourning period, the GOA would "take the 
steps it sees as appropriate."  Bedjaoui also condemned the 
statements issued by the GSPC terrorist group for 
contributing to the kidnappers' decision to kill their 
prisoners. 
 
Benhadj Arrested; Backlash against Islamists 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) Press commentary has paralleled Bedjaoui's outrage at 
the statement issued by GSPC July 26, in which the largest 
Algerian terrorist group expressed its solidarity with 
Zarqawi's organization and its joy at the kidnappings, called 
both diplomats "apostates," and accused Belkadi of having 
been an officer in Algerian intelligence service allegedly 
"responsible" for two massacres of Algerian civilians in 
1990s, and called for them to be killed.  The French language 
daily El Watan published a front page photo July 28 of 
Belaroussi taken while he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca 
in refutation of GSPC and Al-Qaida's claims that the men were 
"apostates" or converts. 
 
¶5.  (U) Former number two leader of the banned Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) Ali Benhadj, who was released from 
house arrest by the GOA in 2003 on condition that he refrain 
from making political statements, was arrested at about the 
same time as the announcement of the deaths of the diplomats 
July 27.  Benhadj had earlier granted an interview to 
Al-Jazeera in which he praised Al-Zarqawi's group, and 
appeared to justify killing the two diplomats on the grounds 
that they were "agents of the occupation."  Benhadj also 
referred to the "corrupt and rotten" Algerian regime, which 
he contrasted with the Algerian people's alleged 
identification with the Iraqi "resistance."  Benhadj 
expressed his support for "the brothers in the land of 
Jihad," saying that he prayed to God to make them victorious 
against the occupiers.  Benhadj was reportedly being held for 
questioning at the Algiers central police station. 
 
Angry Public, Uncertain Impact 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) The Algerian public as well as the GOA are angry over 
the killing of these two men, but the impact on Algerian 
policy toward Iraq remains unclear.  Since the kidnappings 
July 21, most GOA spokesmen have emphasized that Algeria 
opposed the invasion of Iraq and always supported the 
restoration of Iraq's sovereignty, unity, and territorial 
integrity.  The two diplomats were described in public 
statements as "administrative staff" sent to provide 
assistance to the 300-odd Algerian residents in Iraq, whose 
presence did not signal any particular support for the Iraqi 
Government.  The GOA's public statements ignored Algeria's 
record of quiet cooperation with the three Iraqi governing 
bodies established since the war, its acceptance of the 
credentials of an Iraqi Ambassador to Algiers in 2004, and 
its support in the UNSC for the transfer of sovereignty and 
legitimation of MNF-I.  Seeking to avoid stirring up a public 
opinion strongly opposed to the invasion and occupation of 
Iraq, the GOA's failure to explain the true nature of its 
policy has put it in an awkward position and opened itself up 
to criticism that it sent Algerian diplomats into harm's way 
in Baghdad only to appease the Americans and British. 
Although we are encouraged by the assurances offered to 
Charge and UK Ambassador by Minister Delegate Messahel (ref 
b), made one day before the announcement of the killing of 
the two diplomats, that the Algerian Embassy in Baghdad would 
remain open, we anticipate that the GOA will be under 
considerable pressure from the public and even its own MFA 
staff to close it.  Sympathy and encouragement from us and 
other coalition members, as well as from the Iraqi 
Transitional Government, are needed to help President 
Bouteflika hold the line. 
 
¶7.  (C) Even if the GOA's failure to level with its own 
public about its own reasons for cautiously supporting the 
Iraqi government is now exposing it to criticism, by far the 
largest part of the public's anger appears directed at the 
terrorists.  By its gleeful statements of support for Zarqawi 
and his organization's criminal acts, GSPC has helped clarify 
for any Algerians who had doubts, the true nature of its 
relationship to the terrorists in Iraq.  By accusing two 
average Algerian diplomats, one of whom was clearly a pious 
Muslim, of being "apostates" who deserved to die, GSPC has 
underscored that it remains at war with all elements of the 
Algerian state, not just the security services.  By offering 
his own voice in support of murdering two helpless prisoners, 
in contradiction to all traditional Islamic values and 
traditions, Ali Benhadj has succeeded in reminding the 
Algerian public of what might have been their fate had the 
FIS come to power through the ballot box. 
 
¶8.  (C) Several Algerian contacts, all of them admittedly 
secular in outlook, have already commented to us that this 
incident has raised new doubts in their minds about President 
Bouteflika's plans for general amnesty.  The vicious rhetoric 
of the kidnappers and that of their Algerian admirers, with 
their gross distortions of Islamic values, have served to 
underscore the deep fault-lines in Algerian society.  By 
stirring up memories of the traumas experienced by every 
Algerian household in the 1990s, the kidnapping and killing 
of the two diplomats is likely to have serious repercussions 
for Bouteflika's national reconciliation program, as well as 
for his Iraq policy. 
 
SIEVERS