This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 001317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
MCC FOR ROD NORMAN 
TREASURY FOR LUKAS KOHLER, ALEX SEVERENS, JOHN RALYEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2010 
TAGS: EAID KMCA GH MCA
SUBJECT: GHANA PRESIDENT KUFUOR AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS WAY 
FORWARD ON MCA 
 
REF: HARRINGTON/LANDBERG EMAIL 07/01/05 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Mary C. Yates for Reasons 1.5 (B and D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Ambassador Yates met July 1 with President 
Kufuor to discuss ways to accelerate Ghana's Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA) program.  Ambassador delivered Ref A 
talking points, emphasizing that both sides needed to 
increase engagement in order to conclude an agreement within 
a reasonable timeframe.  Kufuor stated that he had already 
assigned a new, senior level point of contact -- Deputy 
Finance Minister George Gyan-Baffour -- to oversee a 
full-time, dedicated MCA team.  He agreed that solid program 
design was essential for successful implementation, and 
acknowledged this would take time.  He called for greater MCC 
presence in Ghana, and showed interest in arranging an 
interim, public agreement.  End Summary 
 
¶2. (C) On July 1, a ghanaian holiday, during an informal 
meeting at her residence with President John Kufuor, 
Ambassador verbally delivered the MCA talking points (Ref A) 
jointly developed by Post and the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC).  Ambassador also provided a hard copy for 
Kufuor to pass to Ghana's MCA team.  The Ambassador noted 
that the MCC delivered the same demarche in Washington to 
Ghana's Ambassador Poku on June 30.  Kufuor said he had not 
yet received Poku's report. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador explained that Ghana's draft MCA 
concept was extremely complex and ambitious, and therefore 
would require greater care, resources, and time to complete. 
She emphasized that it was important to spend the extra time 
and resources upfront to develop a solid, well-designed 
Compact.  She commented that good design was critical to 
implementation, noting that the MCC officials have clearly 
stated in past meetings with GoG leadership that it will pull 
funding of MCA Compacts that are improperly implemented. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador emphasized repeatedly that the team had 
to work full time and the senior-level leader had to be 
available daily for consultations.  She diplomatically asked 
if the President felt current team leader Michael Ansah had 
adequate field experience to be in charge of MCA planning and 
project implementation.  She also pointed out that our recent 
experience has been that when MCC experts visited Ghana they 
had not found GoG counterparts who were prepared or 
knowledgeable. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador assured Kufuor that the MCC was 
prepared to increase its financial and personnel commitment 
to the Ghana MCA process, in order to complete a mutually 
acceptable (and fundable) MCA program.  She added that the 
MCC would send out a high level delegation July 7-8 to begin 
discussions with the Ghana MCA team on next steps. 
 
¶6. (C) President Kufuor responded that he met with the Ghana 
MCA team on June 29 and had already taken the actions the MCC 
was looking for: 1) he appointed Deputy Finance Minister 
Gyan-Baffour to serve as lead-GoG contact for the MCC and 
focus exclusively "over the next three months" on completing 
an MCA agreement; 2) Michael Ansah will continue to serve as 
MCA team leader, but Kufuor left open the option of bringing 
on someone with more field experience as co-team leader; and 
3) he instructed the Finance Ministry to hire all Ghana MCA 
team members on a permanent basis, and ensure adequate 
compensation packages for them. 
 
¶7. (C) Kufuor said he would meet soon with Finance Minister 
Kwadwo Baah Wiredu and Deputy Minister Gyan-Baffour to 
discuss the talking points with them, re-emphasize that MCA 
would be Gyan-Baffour's priority for the next three months, 
and motivate the Ghana MCA team for the July 7-8 meetings 
with the high-level MCC team. 
 
¶8. (C) While Kufuor seemed to accept that the GoG was 
partially responsible for delays to date, he was adamant that 
Ghana has the capacity to design and implement its MCA plan. 
He acknowledged that Michael Ansah is more of a consultant 
than project manager, and discussed the possibility of 
bringing on someone with project design and implementation 
experience.  He gave the example of the person who is 
currently in charge of the Presidential Special Initiative on 
oil palm.  However, he was open to suggestions, including 
from the Embassy or MCC on possible candidates.  (Comment: 
Kufuor stated unequivocally that Michael Ansah would stay as 
team leader.  Unstated was Kufuor's clear understanding that 
there are concerns -- within his own government and the MCC 
-- about Ansah's ability to manage this unwieldy project. 
Nevertheless, Kufuor stated that Ansah was highly motivated 
to succeed, not least because he might have political 
ambitions.  End Comment) 
 
¶9. (C) The President stated that he wants the MCA process to 
operate more as a joint venture between Ghana and the MCC, 
and called for a more robust MCC presence in Ghana.  He 
acknowledged that it would take time to design the program, 
but stated that his government was prepared to do the 
necessary to speed up the process.  He pointed out that the 
GoG was even planning to purchase the 28,000 hectares 
necessary to implement Ghana's agriculture-focused MCA plan, 
and commented that this should eliminate land title issues 
for investors and also obviate the need to negotiate with 
local Chiefs. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment:  Kufuor did not comment directly on the 
statement in the talking points about developing an interim 
agreement, encompassing both MCC and GoG plans to increase 
engagement.  However, we know from his meetings in 
Washington, as well as our conversations with GoG officials 
that he wants some kind of public dividend from the GoG's MCA 
commitment.  Although the President was reassuring on the 
GoG's capacity to design and implement this complicated 
project, we at Post are less assured.  The GoG has many 
extremely intelligent and competent people, especially at the 
Ministry of Finance and Bank of Ghana.  However, they are all 
already in positions of great responsibility and are 
overworked.  It will be difficult for many of these people to 
leave their day jobs to work on MCA full-time.  Furthermore, 
Post believes that even the capable GoG officials lack 
experience in designing and managing assistance projects, and 
therefore have little conception of the length of time and 
resources a project takes just to develop. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment Continued:  Michael Ansah himself emphasized 
this point to Econoff at Post's July 4 party, commenting that 
most GoG officials have only seen the implementation side of 
foreign assistance projects.  They have no experience with 
the massive preparation that goes on prior to implementation 
of a big project.  He added that it took him until March 2005 
to convince the President and Minister of Finance to 
appropriate just $500,000 to fund the GoG's own MCA planning 
process.  He concluded that the GoG should have put in 
millions ("at least 1%" of projected funding) at the 
beginning, but GoG leaders did not -- and likely still do not 
-- understand that it often takes money to get money. 
Ansah's private comments bolster this Embassy's strong belief 
that the real solution to the capacity issue is to hire a 
consulting company or large team of consultants, with 
experience implementing large assistance projects in Ghana. 
Most donor countries' assistance agencies (USAID, DFID, EC) 
do at least some of their work through private consulting 
companies, so it might make sense for Ghana to consider a 
similar arrangement.   End Comment 
YATES