This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2010 
TAGS: PGOV NI EPET SOCI DELTAVIOLENCE
SUBJECT: NIGER DELTA REMAINS TENSE 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 1715 
     ¶B. ABUJA 2004 
     ¶C. LAGOS 507 
     ¶D. LAGOS 945 
     ¶E. LAGOS 1073 
     ¶F. LAGOS 1107 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell per 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  In a July 6 meeting, NGO Director and 
Obasanjo associate, Judith Asuni, told the Ambassador 
tensions remain high in the Niger Delta.  Small arms 
proliferation, cult/gang violence, and oil bunkering are all 
rampant, she said.  The Peace and Security Strategy (PASS), a 
joint government-NGO initiative begun last year to foster 
greater stability in the region, was now fully articulated 
and petroleum presidential adviser (cum Minister)  Edmund 
Dakuro recently had circulated the strategy in Western 
capitals, including the U.S.  However, actual implementation 
of the PASS was lagging, Asuni said.  The Ambassador and 
Asuni concurred that President Obasanjo must keep a close eye 
on the region and stay engaged.  Nigeria's economic reforms, 
of which the President is justifiably proud, are not 
sustainable without a stable, productive Niger Delta region. 
End Summary. 
 
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Niger Delta Ever Tense 
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¶2.  (C)  American citizen (AMCIT) Judith Asuni has lived in 
Nigeria for more than 30 years and is a long-time Mission 
contact.  Asuni's NGO, Academic Associates Peace Works 
(AAPW), focuses on conflict resolution, early warning 
systems, and youth reintegration.  Asuni told Ambassador the 
Delta region remains fragile and tensions are high.  Cults 
and gangs continue to splinter, proliferate, and re-arm. 
Asuni stated that by failing to provide demobilized youth 
with employment and training opportunities, the Rivers State 
government had reneged on the deal rival militias and federal 
government struck last year which ended a particularly 
intense round of violence in Port Harcourt.  This violence 
which pitted the two main militias in the area -- Dokubo 
Asari's Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and 
Ateke Tom's Niger Delta Vigilante Group (NDVG) -- against 
each other, had resulted in dozens of deaths and had caused 
hundreds to be displaced from their homes (refs A and B). 
Asuni claimed that contrary to the provisions of the PASS, 
Rivers State governor Odili had only provided sporadic 
employment/training opportunities to disarmed youth.  She 
asserted that the governor "wanted to do the right thing," 
but is often thrown off course by "those around him." 
 
¶3.  (C)  The gun-buy-back program, another element of the 
PASS, had also failed to achieve intended results.  Gang 
members often turned in dilapidated, non-serviceable weapons. 
 However, the government did not reduce its already overly 
inflated payback based on weapon condition.  Gang members 
were thus able to purchase two weapons for every one 
surrendered, Asuni asserted.  Asuni confirmed rumors that 
Odili's chief-of-staff was complicit in corrupting the 
gun-buy-back program (ref C).  She  said she had confronted 
the governor about this issues, but he has "stood by his 
man."  Lastly Asuni said serial numbers of some surrendered 
weapons have been traced to South Africa.  The Ambassador 
counseled that if true, the GON should convey all relevant 
information to the GoSA so that South African authorities 
could hold accountable illegal gun traders, and more 
importantly, help prevent future shipments. 
 
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Obasanjo Must Stay Engaged 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The Ambassador elicited Asuni's vies on how to 
increase stability in the Delta region.  While not offering 
specific suggestions, Asuni said the president's sustained 
attention and engagement were critical.  The Ambassador 
concurred.  Nigeria's economic reforms, he said, and her 
vision for the future in terms of poverty alleviation and 
infrastructure development, are predicated upon the country 
maintaining a certain level of crude oil production. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Energy companies can and do adjust to 
peculiarities in the working environment, shifting operations 
off-shore in response to community unrest, for example. 
However, these modifications come at a cost.  It is 
dramatically more expensive to produce oil off shore, than it 
is on-shore.  Similarly, energy companies incur enormous 
insurance premiums working in environments as risk-filled as 
the Niger Delta. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The Ambassador said one of his biggest worries is 
that at some point the cost-benefit ratio might no longer 
tilt in Nigeria's favor, leading energy companies to 
significantly reduce operations here.  The Ambassador and 
Asuni agreed that each would emphasize with the President the 
need for his active, sustained involvement on Niger Delta 
issues. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7.  (SBU) As the euphoria of debt relief and the favorable 
supreme court decision recedes, Obasanjo will need to 
re-focus on the Niger Delta region.  Contacts Mission-wide 
are reporting heightened concerns and apprehension in the 
region.  Over the past few weeks and months, Port Harcourt 
has witnessed a slew of armed robberies and a spectacular 
prison riot, staged to break free a feared militia leader 
(ref C).  In addition, there have been at least two oil 
installation take-overs and/or hostage takings in the past 
several weeks.  The fist incident which occurred in Bayelsa 
state, ended peacefully when community leaders released the 
two German expatriates they had held hostage for four days 
(ref C).  The second incident, in Billie, Rivers State is 
still on-going.  Shell Petroleum Development Corporation was 
forced to shut down a minor flow station in order to prevent 
an imminent take-over.  SPDC confirmed that as much as 40,000 
bpd have been disrupted as a result of this action (ref F). 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Lastly, cults, gangs, and "youth-groups" have 
engaged in a fair amount of saber-rattling in association 
with the South-South's demand for increased resource control 
at the stalled National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) 
(ref E).  NDPVF leader Asari has vowed to shut down oil 
installations if the region's demands are not met.  Other 
groups, with less of a proven track record than the NDPVF, 
have issued similar threats.  (Note:  The NPRC disbanded July 
11 when delegates were unable to reach consensus on resource 
control and presidential tenure.  See Septel). 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Any one or even two of these factors, would 
constitute traditional fare for the rough-and-tumble Niger 
Delta region.  However, the accumulated impact, alongside the 
ever present potential for political violence as the nation 
moves closer to the 2007 elections, has people jittery.  The 
president appears to have given Dakuro the lead on Niger 
Delta stability and implementation of the PASS.  It remains 
to be seen whether these latest initiatives will have any 
appreciable impact on this Nigeria's most knotty problem. 
 
CAMPBELL