This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  WARSAW 002598 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR AND EUR/NCE 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP AND NEA/I 
STATE ALSO FOR PM/ISO, PM/RSAT AND PM/PMAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2015 
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL IZ PL
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE IRAQ COALITION: NO CHANGE IN POLISH 
PLANS - SMALL TROOP REDUCTION IN JULY, TRANSFORMATION OF 
STABILIZATION TO TRAINING MISSION 
 
REF: STATE 111082 
 
Classified By: DCM Cameron Munter. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Poland plans to reduce its military 
contingent in Iraq by roughly 300 for its fifth rotation that 
will begin in mid-July 2005, leaving approximately 1,400 
Polish troops in the Multinational Division Center South 
(MND-CS).  These troops will increasingly focus on training 
missions, as the Poles continue the process of handing over 
stabilization duties to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).  At the 
same time, the GOP will increase its training activities in 
Iraq outside the context of MNF-I, including bilateral 
programs, NATO training Mission Iraq and EU joint activities. 
 Although the current Polish government has recommended that 
Poland change the focus of its mission in Iraq entirely from 
stabilization to training, the actual decision will not be 
made until a new government is seated following parliamentary 
and presidential elections in fall 2005.  Poland is also 
deepening its political and economic cooperation with the 
Iraqi government, with a planned visit to Iraq during the 
summer by PM Belka, FM Rotfeld and MOD Szmajdzinski.  We 
believe that the two center-right opposition parties likely 
to form the next government will at the very least continue 
the current level of engagement in Iraq, if not increase it. 
Embassy coordinated delivery of reftel demarche with UK 
counterparts, who delivered the message on the margins of the 
June 15 visit of UK MOD John Reid.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MOD/MFA: No change in policy 
---------------------------- 
¶2. (C) DCM and DATT delivered reftel demarche on the Iraq 
Coalition to Andrzej Karkoszka, MOD Acting U/S for Defense 
Policy, during a previously scheduled meeting June 15. 
Karkoszka was unprepared for the Iraq discussion and said he 
could only respond "unofficially" but spoke nonetheless with 
an air of certainty.  He reported that he had participated 
the previous evening in a Polish interagency meeting on Iraq 
policy, convened in preparation for FM Rotfeld's 
participation in the June 21-22 Brussels Conference.  The 
meeting confirmed that there was no change in Poland's Iraq 
policy.  The GOP intends to remain in Iraq, but the character 
of its deployment will change from stabilization to training. 
 The fifth Polish rotation will arrive in Iraq in mid-July 
and will number some 1,400 troops, roughly 300 less than the 
current fourth rotation.  Although they will still be combat 
troops, the Polish contingent will spend less and less time 
on patrols and stabilization, and more and more focus on 
training Iraqi Security Forces.  After mid-January 2006, the 
Polish contingent in Iraq will cease to be an "operational 
force" and the GOP no longer intends to command MND-CS. 
Rather, the Poles will deploy a training element that is 
"highly visible but not substantial."  Karkoszka stressed 
that these would still be military personnel, but not 
predominantly combat and combat support troops.  Although he 
could not provide official numbers, Karkoszka speculated that 
the trainers plus their security and support elements might 
amount to something over 500 military personnel. 
 
¶3. (C) Karkoszka added, however, that final decisions on 
Poland's 2006 deployments would be up to the new government 
to be elected this fall. 
 
¶4. (C) Pol-Mil Chief and DATT delivered demarche separately 
to Amb. Krzysztof Plominski, MFA Director for Middle East and 
Africa.  Plominski's response was consistent with 
Karkoszka's.  There had been no change in Iraq policy since 
MOD Jerzy Szmajdzinski's announcement in March 2005 that the 
fourth Polish rotation would be reduced from 1,700 to about 
1,400 and their mission would be reoriented from 
stabilization to training, with a view to transferring 
security duties to ISF as soon as practicable and 
appropriate.  Plominski observed that, in fact, this is 
already happening during the fourth rotation, as recent press 
stories have reported.  He said that the current government 
has "recommended" or "expressed its intention" to end the 
mission in Iraq at the end of 2005 "when UNSCR 1546 expires." 
 However, the government realizes that it does not have the 
final say, as the annual decision on Polish deployments 
abroad will not be taken until December, by which time a new 
government will have taken office sometime after the 
September 25 parliamentary elections. 
 
¶5. (C) Plominski was aware of the May 31 UNSC appearance of 
Iraqi FM Zebari, and acknowledged the planning for a 
follow-on mechanism for MNF-I, either via UNSCR or some 
alternative legal vehicle.  He said that the Iraqi Embassy in 
Warsaw had informed him that a letter would be arriving in 
the near future from Zebari to FM Rotfeld, requesting that 
the GOP extend its presence in Iraq. 
 
PO/PiS unlikely to make waves, but looking for quid pro quo 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶6. (C) Plominski noted that Civic Platform (PO) and Law and 
Justice (PiS), the two center-right parties widely expected 
to form the next government, had not yet expressed a view on 
continued Iraq deployment.  However, he noted that PO and PiS 
had supported the original decision to go into Iraq.  He 
opined that the anticipated new government would be, if 
anything, more pro-American than the current center-left 
coalition, and would therefore be at least as well disposed 
towards continuing some form of Iraq deployment into 2006. 
In a separate meeting with Pol-Mil Chief, Polish NSC Director 
for Analysis Grzegorz Jazowski echoed this evaluation of 
PO/PiS. 
 
¶7. (C) During a wide-ranging discussion, Pol-Mil Chief also 
discussed the Iraq deployment with Pawel Soloch, PiS 
presidential candidate Lech Kaczynski's defense advisor who 
has been tasked with coordinating the party's national 
security policy.  Soloch noted that PiS had supported 
strongly the original Iraq deployment, and continued to 
support a strong security partnership with the U.S.  He 
stated that PiS, and to the extent he could speak for them, 
PO as well, were in general favorably disposed to a continued 
military deployment in Iraq into 2006.  However, he expected 
that Poland would seek an explicit linkage of the Iraq 
mission to U.S. help with defense transformation, including 
but not limited to FMF and other financial assistance.  PO 
leaders have not explicitly discussed their views regarding 
troop deployment.  However, both would-be PM Jan Rokita and 
once-and-future MOD Bronislaw Komorowski have publicly and 
privately reiterated their support for Poland's participation 
in Iraq, and they have told us that there would be no major 
changes in foreign or defense policy under a PO-led 
government. 
 
 
Polish non-military engagement with Iraq 
---------------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) After the discussion about military deployments, MFA's 
Plominski described the GOP's plan for expanding its 
political and economic ties with the new Iraqi government. 
He said that with an elected transitional government and 
interim constitution in place, it was now much easier to 
reestablish the strong political and commercial relationship 
that Poland had enjoyed before Desert Storm.  He said that 
just this week he had instructed the Polish Embassy Baghdad 
to propose a late July visit by PM Belka, FM Rotfeld and MOD 
Szmajdzinski, for discussions of a serious deepening of 
political cooperation on all levels.  Plominski added that 
the GOP would inform the USG when a concrete date is set, and 
would also request U.S. assistance with security and other 
logistics on the ground.  (Plominski said that Belka might 
combine his Iraq trip with a visit to Tehran, if the 
elections there go "fairly well" and there is a government 
for him to meet with.) 
 
¶9. (C) Plominski said that the GOP had been disappointed so 
far with the economic/commercial relationship with 
post-Saddam Iraq.  (Prior to 1990, Poland had significant 
Iraqi contracts in such fields as construction, oil services 
and chemical engineering.)  Exports to Iraq in 2004 had 
barely reached $18 million, in contrast with over $100 
million to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and nearly as much to 
several other Gulf states.  Plominski said that exports to 
Iraq should easily reach a similar level.  He was hopeful 
that the situation was improving, based on a 1st quarter 2005 
level of $10 million.  (Since 2003, Polish companies have 
signed procurement contracts with Iraq and the CPA worth more 
than $360 million.  As many of those goods are now being 
delivered, Polish exports to Iraq should be significantly 
higher in 2005.) 
 
¶10. (C) Plominski reported that FM Rotfeld would present to 
the Brussels Conference several proposals on increased 
economic cooperation.  The GOP hoped that the conference 
"will be a watershed" and would "end the divide between the 
U.S. and some European partners." 
 
¶11. (C) Plominski also told Pol-Mil Chief that a 
"three-pronged delegation" would be arriving from Baghdad o/a 
June 19 on a GOP charter flight.  Three provincial governors 
from the Polish sector will meet with the Ministry of 
Interior to discuss local/regional government partnerships. 
A group of Iraqi environment experts will explore 
possibilities for cooperation with the Polish Environmental 
Protection Agency.  Finally, Iraqi archeologists will consult 
with the Ministry of Culture on historic preservation issues. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT:  For the time being, the GOP seems to be 
maintaining a consistent position on Iraq, and MOD 
Szmajdzinski has refrained of late from making extemporaneous 
(and unhelpful) remarks on deployment.  The fifth rotation 
will deploy in mid-July, and the General Staff continues 
contingency planning for the follow-on mission after December 
31, whatever its nature may be.  As the election approaches, 
the current government is likely to avoid any major decisions 
on Iraq or any other contentious issues.  However, once the 
new government takes office in late October 2005, there will 
likely be a flurry of activity as it faces the December 2005 
statutory decision on overseas deployments.  We will stay in 
close contact with PO/PiS leaders and experts throughout this 
process. 
ASHE 
 
 
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