This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TUNIS 001257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB AND NEA/MAG 
STATE (DESKOFF LAWRENCE) PLEASE PASS TO COMMERCE FOR 
ITA/MAC/ONE (DAVID ROTH) AND ADVOCACY CENTER (CHRIS JAMES) 
AND TO USTR (DOUG BELL) 
CASABLANCA FOR FCS (GAIL DEL ROSAL) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD TS EFTA
SUBJECT: EVE OF TIFA COUNCIL: WHERE DOES TUNISIA STAND ON 
ECONOMIC REFORMS? 
 
REF: 04 TUNIS 2422 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. David Ballard; Reasons: 1.4(b),(d 
) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Tunisia has taken the fundamental decision 
to liberalize its economy after decades of state-control, but 
progress has been deliberate and mostly limited to sectors 
that do not threaten the GOT's prerogative or ultimate 
"sovereignty".  The GOT justifies its approach in terms of 
minimizing near-term unemployment that increased foreign 
competition will likely create, and managing the threat of 
Islamic fundamentalism which could feed on economic 
instability.  Nonetheless, the GOT knows that it must reform 
the economy (privatization, removal of trade barriers, and 
increased foreign investment) to satisfy internal demographic 
trends and demands and compete globally.  An important 
element of future reform hinges on a further privatization 
and modernization of banks; the banking sector suffers from 
excessive non-performing loans tied to weaknesses in an 
over-built hotel (vice tourism) industry.  Additionally, 
Tunisia's non-convertible currency, the dinar, limits foreign 
investment and movement of capital. 
 
¶2. (C) Tunisia's gradualist approach to economic reform is 
also linked to generous European Union assistance programs 
and an Association agreement that have permitted the 
Tunisians to defer reforms in the sensitive agricultural and 
services sectors, reinforcing at the same time the EU's 
historical presence as main trade and investment partner. 
That said, we believe the GOT leadership has made the 
political decision to pursue an FTA with the U.S. and is 
willing to take steps in that direction; what remains is 
working with the ministers and technocrats who are charged 
with making sure the process maximizes the benefits to 
Tunisia, minimizes or eliminates negative side effects, and 
does not exceed the usual deliberate pace of Tunisian 
reforms.  In that regard, the upcoming Council meeting could 
be an opportunity to demonstrate how decisive reform in the 
short term can result in an FTA which will effectively serve 
Tunisia's interests. End Summary. 
 
Economic Liberalization: Stability and Social Cohesion 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶3. (C) Tunisia has decided to liberalize its economy to 
sustain economic growth and job creation, which in turn 
support maintenance of the political status quo.  The GOT's 
liberalization efforts, however, have been slow and 
deliberate.  The most common concern is job loss, a 
legitimate issue since up the numbers of university graduates 
will rise steadily over the next five years from about 
300,000 a year to 500,000.  The unemployment rate is 
officially about 14 percent but is probably somewhat higher. 
The GOT links its focus on job growth to staunch policy on 
containing Islamic extremism (which posed a threat to the 
government 15 years ago and surfaced again in 2002 with a 
terrorist attack on a synagogue in southern Tunisia) and 
maintaining social cohesion.  In 1984, for example, Tunisia 
suffered several days of widespread rioting, violence 
resulting in 25 deaths, and property destruction due to 
increases in bread prices.  The memory of these "bread riots" 
is still fresh in the Tunisian collective consciousness. 
 
¶4. (C) Because, in their words, Tunisia is a "small country 
in a tough neighborhood," officials sometimes appear overly 
concerned with issues of "sovereignty"; in the economic 
sphere this means a tendency to retain control over 
significantly under-valued assets, rather than freeing 
resources to develop more profitable and gains-multiplying 
industries that could be subject to foreign whims. 
Consequently, Tunisia's economic growth has relied 
principally on public spending and less on private 
investment.  Tunisia views itself as largely self-sufficient 
and ready to absorb foreign influences, but determined to do 
so on its on terms. 
 
¶5. (C) Minister of Development and International Cooperation 
Jouini, who will lead the Tunisian delegation, recently 
reiterated to A/S Lash the GOT,s strong desire to improve 
the business climate and open more sectors of the economy to 
foreign participation.  He also claimed he wants to increase 
U.S. companies, participation for Tunisia's public tenders. 
Jouini's has recently been more forward-leaning on reform, 
stating that he hopes that Tunisia could eventually be seen 
as a &leader8 in the region through its economic reform 
efforts--in cooperation with the U.S.--and he has expressed 
dismay that the level of bilateral trade and commercial 
relations is far below its potential.  Jouini seems to accept 
the positive impact of increased trade and investment can 
have on job creation and living standards in Tunisia, but has 
cautioned that there are some in both the public and private 
sector who are unconvinced of the value of an FTA.  We have 
welcomed the fact that    Jouini and other key Tunisian 
officials are now more willing to discuss openly structural 
and policy shortcomings; however they so far continue to 
maintain that these issues must be addressed only after 
careful study and discussion.  Jouini told the Ambassador 
that he is coordinating an impact study to determine the 
effects of an FTA on the Tunisian economy. 
 
Privatization 
-------------- 
¶6. (C) As part of the GOT's trend away from macroeconomic 
control, it encouraged privatizations since the mid-1990s in 
limited, non-sensitive sectors; it has clearly decided to 
move more slowly in key industries such as energy and 
financial services. One successful private sector entrant in 
2003 was mobile phone operator Tunisiana, which now claims 
approximately slightly more than 40 percent of all Tunisia's 
mobile subscribers;  state-owned Tunisie Telecom holds the 
remainder.  Additionally, since 1988, 11 agricultural, 76 
industrial, and 98 services companies (mostly in the tourism 
sector) have been privatized in Tunisia, generating 
approximately 2.3 billion dinar (USD 1.9 Billion) for the 
GOT.  In the industrial sector, the four largest 
privatizations have been cement factories.  In the services 
sectors, trade, transportation, financial services have 
witnessed only limited private sector entries. 
 
¶7. (C) Among the notable privatizations due in the near term: 
Socit Nationale de Distribution Petroliere, Socit 
Tunisienne des Industries Pneumatiques, and Banque de Sud. 
(The GOT offered Banque de Sud for privatization in 2004, but 
the offer did not attract sufficient interest, probably 
because a prior bank privatization disclosed massive 
structural problems (Ref A)).  Efforts are now underway to 
re-launch a number of privatizations, including another shot 
at Banque de Sud, and a 35 percent share of Tunisie Telecom. 
 
Other Services: Financial and E-Commerce 
---------------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) GOT fears of capital flight and lack of 
competitiveness are behind the limits on foreign 
participation in the financial services sector.  Were foreign 
competition allowed for banking services, insurance and 
credit offerings, a substantial amount of currency would 
likely transfer quickly to better providers and significantly 
damage the current financial establishment.  Likewise 
E-commerce is under-developed in Tunisia;  Tunisians are not 
allowed to make credit card purchases over the Internet in 
currencies other than in the Tunisian dinar and ATM systems 
are limited and not linked.   Internet penetration is limited 
estimated at between six and seven percent of the population, 
many of whom access the Internet only infrequently at public 
internet establishments. 
 
Foreign Investment 
------------------ 
¶9. (C) U.S. foreign investment, while not facing explicit 
discrimination, is often excluded from greater participation 
because of cultural barriers, business practices, and 
language.  It is true that a number of U.S. companies have 
successfully entered into joint venture partnerships, 
including onshore manufacturing operations in metal casting 
for aerospace parts, snack food processing, heavy equipment 
refurbishing and sales, and electrical components.  But 
Tunisia's system of international tenders, for example, 
offers only two months notification to bidders, requires that 
documentation must be in French, and rejects bids that do not 
conform exactly to the detailed requirements.  For certain 
tenders, transparency is a concern, and this has not been 
addressed by the GOT.  Finally, Tunisia's small market 
(population 10 million and a GDP per capita of about USD 
2,800) has meant a traditionally limited U.S. company 
presence here and word of mouth experience is hard to come by 
for a potential investor.  However, since 1972, Tunisia has 
encouraged export-oriented, off shore investments, 
particularly in the manufacturing industry, and this 
continues to pose good opportunities for U.S. business. 
¶10. (C) Tunisian law regulates foreign investment and denies 
"national treatment" in the agricultural sector, which 
employs an estimated 22 percent of the population.  Onshore 
companies outside the tourism sector require governmental 
authorization where foreign capital exceeds 49 percent. 
Additional foreign investment is likely in the near term, but 
it will be heavily weighted toward European interests.  The 
GOT has announced intentions to offer concessions for the 
following major infrastructure projects:  a 
build-own-transfer project for the construction of an 
international airport at Enfidah, a desalination plant in 
Djerba, a deep water port at Hergla, a waste water plant, and 
a sports complex - the latter four of which are limited to 
European Union (EU) companies due to EU financing. 
 
Intellectual Property Rights: Pharmaceuticals and Software 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
¶11. (C) The well-developed pharmaceutical industry in Tunisia 
is a significant source of complaints from multinational 
pharmaceutical producers who claim Tunisia operates outside 
WTO rules and principles.  Tunisia discriminates against and 
bans foreign pharmaceutical products upon request by a local 
manufacturer.  The GOT has agreed to abolish this practice by 
the end of 2006, as well as to step up adherence to WTO 
intellectual property rights principles (TRIPs), but we 
remain cautious in our assessment of these promises until 
they are realized. 
 
¶12. (C) Software piracy in Tunisia is significant and appears 
to be a growing problem.  A recent Business Software Alliance 
report estimates that in 2004, 84 percent of software used is 
pirated, an increase from 82 percent in 2003.  Pirated CDs 
and DVDs are also ubiquitous in Tunisia, even at major retail 
establishments.  The GOT is well aware of the problem and has 
expressed the desire to increase enforcement, but blames lack 
of resources and a "cultural mentality" that does not respect 
IPR concepts.  In this regard, there is also an unstated 
justification that sales of counterfeit, pirated, and other 
black-market goods serves to support a significant 
underground economy that offers employment to many who would 
otherwise have none. 
 
Market Access and the Removal of Trade Barriers 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶13. (C) GOT officials have stated that free trade discussions 
with the U.S. should offer Tunisia at least as good a deal as 
the Moroccan FTA.  Tunisia feels especially vulnerable to 
opening its agricultural sector, due again to high levels of 
employment and a popular, cultural connection to farming. 
Tunisia still maintains high tariffs protecting domestic 
product markets, especially on agricultural products.  U.S. 
companies also note that exporting to Tunisia is complicated 
and difficult for a number of reasons, including language, 
lack of local agent, customs delays and/or rejection of 
goods, and complicated regulations.  Tunisia signed a 
trade-liberalizing Association Agreement with the EU in 1995 
that will eliminate tariffs with the EU by 2008.  The 
discrepancy, however, between the EU's preferred tariff rates 
structure and most favored nation rates significantly deters 
non-EU trade with Tunisia. 
 
Transparency 
------------ 
¶14. (C) Tunisian trade-related laws and regulations are 
receiving better marks on some fronts; Transparency 
International recently upgraded Tunisia to a "country without 
a significant corruption problem."  Public comment on pending 
legislation is not a practice in Tunisia, although a system 
of "national consultation" on important issues does serve to 
bring stakeholders into the process and all newly-enacted 
legislation is eventually published in the Official Gazette. 
Once again, however, in key sectors tenders are closed for 
unexplained reasons and the arbitrary application of laws is 
a common complaint.  Certain voices within the business 
community bemoan the growing influence of and requirements 
for "political connections" to the President's family in 
order to effectively transact business.  In almost every 
sphere of important economic activity in Tunisia, one can 
point to if not prove a strong connection or involvement of 
President Ben Ali's extended family's interests. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶15. (C) Despite these challenges, we view our current trade 
and investment dialogue with the Tunisians as entering a new 
and positive phase.  The Tunisians have begun discussing 
obstacles and problems more openly, and are more disposed to 
working with us to address them.  The Tunisians who will 
participate at the upcoming Council meeting are a pragmatic, 
realistic group who will be interested in determining next 
steps.  The strong impact of a four-year drought and a 
tourism dip after the 2002 Djerba attack illustrated the 
structural weaknesses in the economy and in economic 
policies.  There is now a good recognition of the necessity 
of competing globally and adapting to changes such as the 
expiration of the WTO's multi-fiber agreement.  We view the 
coming TIFA Council as an excellent opportunity to echo our 
messages and to engage in exploring where our assistance 
programs might most positively be advanced. 
BALLARD