This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 001162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2009 
TAGS: AG ETRD IZ KPKO MARR MO PGOV PREL PTER SNAR
SUBJECT: US-MOROCCAN MILITARY CONSULTATIONS:  THE MOROCCANS 
WANT MORE 
 
REF: A. RABAT 1071 
     ¶B. RABAT 1069 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Timothy Lenderking for Reasons 1.4. (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The third annual US-Morocco Defense 
Consultative Committee took place in Rabat on May 18-19, 
2005, led on the US side by ASD Peter Rodman and on the 
Moroccan side by Minister Delegate to the PM in Charge of the 
Administration of National Defense Mr. Abderrahmane Sbai. 
During the executive committee and plenary sessions on May 
18, attended by all of Morocco's top brass, the Moroccan 
message to the US was clear:  Morocco values its expanding 
military relationship with the US and seeks to strengthen it 
further.  The Moroccans specifically acknowledged the need 
for a five-year strategic bilateral defense plan, and 
advocated expansion of military exercises, and an annual plan 
to augment Moroccan participation in workshops and training 
seminars.  The Moroccans praised the Utah State Partnership 
Program and indicated support for sending a liaison officer 
to CENTCOM.  Minister Sbai reaffirmed Moroccan readiness to 
provide training to Iraqi security forces, in Morocco, if the 
Iraqi government asked, and Rodman encouraged the Moroccans 
to work directly with the Iraqi leadership to pursue this. 
The Moroccans cited battling illegal immigration as a major 
preoccupation of the Moroccan military and sought US 
technical assistance in this area.  ASD Rodman briefed on the 
status of the US-Algerian military dialogue, latest 
developments in Iraq, and termed the current situation 
concerning Middle East peace a "moment of hope."  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) The third annual US-Morocco Defense Consultative 
Committee took place in Rabat May 18-19.  The US delegation 
was led by ASD Rodman, while the Moroccan side was led by 
Minister Delegate to the PM in Charge of the Administration 
of National Defense Abderrahmane Sbai.  All of the senior 
Moroccan military leadership attended the meeting.  Present 
were General Abdelaziz Bennani, Inspector General of the 
Royal Armed Forces; General Hosni Benslimane, Commandant of 
the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie; General Bouchaib Arroub, 
Commander of the Third Bureau; Chief of the DCSD (Fifth 
Bureau) Lieutenant General Mohamed Belbachir; Vice Admiral 
Mohammed Triki, Chief of the Royal Moroccan Navy; and 
Lieutenant General Ahmed Boutaleb, Chief of the Moroccan Air 
Force.  US members of the Executive Committee included 
Ambassador Riley, Major General Scott Gration (EUCOM J-5), 
Mr. Paul Hulley (OSD) , Mr. John Moseley (DSCA), and Embassy 
Rabat Acting DATT, ODC Chief, and Polcouns. 
 
¶3.  (C) Sbai opened by stressing convergence and solidarity 
in the US-Morocco bilateral relationship.  He underscored the 
GOM's commitment to good neighborliness and regional 
stability, and to continuing to prosecute the war on terror. 
He noted the GOM sought to exert greater control on a variety 
of illegal activities, among them illegal migration through 
Morocco to Europe.  He described the US-Morocco military 
relationship as one of "quality" and hoped for US support for 
military upgrades.  Sbai reiterated that Morocco's offer to 
train Iraqi security forces was still open, if the Iraqis 
asked.  He described Morocco as a "laboratory" in which an 
Arab, Islamic country could make progress promoting democracy 
while adhering to the tenets of Islam.  May 16, 2003 --the 
day of the  Casablanca terrorist bombing-- had been a tragic 
day for Morocco, in which "the forces of darkness" had 
manifested themselves.  In response, the GOM recognized the 
importance of fighting unemployment through economic 
development, as well as combating terrorism.  He highlighted 
the training of imams and promotion of religious tolerance as 
an important reform underway in Morocco.  Morocco believed 
that Islam was a religion of progress; the fundamentalists 
were seizing on only part of Islam.  Religious reform was 
important because in times of social strife, religious 
"illiterates" were vulnerable to extremism. 
 
¶4.  (C) ASD Rodman responded that the US-Morocco relationship 
was more important than ever, and expressed appreciation that 
the US and Morocco were on the same side in a new era. 
Morocco is a leader in many fields and had shown moral 
courage in spearheading regional efforts to promote 
democracy.  He was pleased that Morocco was pursuing a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US and that Morocco had 
qualified for support under the Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA).  He hoped the Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement 
(ACSA) would go forward as it would facilitate aspects of the 
bilateral military relationship.  He thanked Morocco for 
facilitating contingency operations and hoped to continue our 
bilateral education and training opportunities.  He saluted 
recent military exercises such as Majestic Eagle and African 
Lion.  Rodman reaffirmed the US offer to station a Moroccan 
liaison officer at CENTCOM and hoped Morocco would take 
advantage of it.  He appreciated the GOM's green light to a 
NATO security agreement.  Med Dialogue and NATO were 
important security fora, he said, and the US encouraged their 
growth, as the Sahel region was assuming greater strategic 
importance.  He applauded Morocco's contributions to 
international peacekeeping and the GOM's open and effective 
handling of the issue of sexual abuse by peacekeepers in the 
Congo. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶5.  (C) ASD Rodman said important, historic progress was 
being made in Iraq.  Rodman stressed that while coalition 
forces were making progress in defeating the insurgency, the 
US strategy in Iraq was as much political as military.  The 
January 30 elections were a dramatic event.  Iraqi 
institutions were forming and filling the political vacuum. 
Legitimacy is the most powerful weapon against the 
insurgents.  The different communities were showing a 
commitment to a unified Iraq.  The Sunni community is 
splitting, with some now joining the political process; 
twenty percent of the positions in the new government were 
reserved for Sunnis, which tracked with the Sunni percentage 
of the population.  Iraqi leaders were showing statesmanship 
and learning compromise and coexistence.  The enemy is 
frustrated and losing ground.  Violence continued because 
killing civilians is easy.  The strategic goal of the 
extremists is to derail the political process, however they 
are failing.  The US was confident its strategy was working. 
 
¶6.  (C) Rodman underscored that the primary mission of the US 
forces in Iraq now is training Iraqis.  Iraqi forces now 
numbered around 165,000.  The US wanted Iraqis to assume 
control of their country -- to turn Iraq back to Iraqis -- as 
soon as possible.  Morocco's offer to train Iraqi security 
personnel goes to the heart of the international strategy. 
Rodman encouraged the GOM to deal directly with Iraqi 
officials on how to implement this offer and how to 
prioritize specialized training  for police and security 
officials.  Sending a liaison officer to CENTCOM would assist 
this process.  Sbai noted that Morocco stood ready to assist 
with training Iraqi security forces "if the Iraqis so 
requested." 
 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Rodman called the present "a moment of hope" in the 
Palestinian conflict.  The democratic election for the 
Palestinians was an important development.  Gaza withdrawal 
presented an opportunity for the Palestinians to take their 
destiny into their own hands.  The US was committed to 
getting the process underway. 
 
Comments from the Moroccan Generals 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) General Bennani highlighted illegal migration as a 
priority area for the Moroccan military.  This has been a 
growing problem over the last five years, with more 
immigrants coming from South Asia in addition to sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Crossing the Straits of Gibraltar to Europe was 
still the goal, but migrants were heading in larger numbers 
for the Canary Islands.  King Mohammed had ordered the 
Moroccan military to seal the borders from illegal migrants, 
but the classical means of combating illegal migration had 
limitations.  There was an alert on Morocco's borders 
virtually every hour.  Groups were using the Sahel more for 
transit, and the GOM was concerned about what items these 
groups could be infiltrating into Morocco.  Morocco sought US 
assistance in this area.  Rodman agreed this was an important 
strategic problem and said the USG could link the GOM with 
its border experts. 
¶9.  (C) Bennani continued that the GOM sought a five-year 
strategic plan with the US that would be defended before the 
US Congress.  The 1973 plan needed to be reworked, with an 
equipment plan incorporated into it.  Rodman said he was 
pleased with the idea and was eager to see the GOM follow 
through on this.  He thought a five-year plan would be 
received positively by the US Congress. 
 
¶10.  (C) General Benslimane discussed the challenge of 
fighting drug trafficking and crime.  He said organized crime 
networks have developed and are being exploited by 
international organizations.  These networks, which reach 
Dakar and Bamako among other places, needed to be destroyed. 
He said 500 such networks have been destroyed since 1997. 
There were branches of some organizations operating in the 
"southern provinces" (Western Sahara), as adduced by periodic 
concentrations of vehicles the GOM spotted.  The GOM concern 
was ensuring that terrorist organizations were not able to 
take advantage of these networks.  Morocco could benefit from 
assistance from US security organizations. 
 
¶11.  (C) General Arroub ticked off the following items in a 
short presentation: 
 
-- He hoped to expand the number of Moroccan students going 
to the US for training from the current level of 25-30 per 
year.  Morocco was pleased to have welcomed 68 American 
officers to the staff college over the years. 
 
-- Morocco was ready, willing, and able to expand the number 
of military exercises with the US each year, and ACSA would 
provide a working framework. 
 
-- He urged the two sides to develop an annual plan for 
seminars and workshops and said Morocco was ready to send 
more officers. 
 
-- King Mohammed has ordered that English teaching be 
institutionalized in all military schools in Morocco, for 
cadets and NCOs both.  Morocco had been pleased with the 
American training resources used in the instruction.  Morocco 
would welcome an American assessment team to provide 
expertise and support on how to implement this program most 
effectively in the future. 
 
-- He hailed the Utah State Partnership Program as 
"excellent," adding that Morocco was honored that the 
Moroccan Armed Forces would be able to participate in an 
upcoming exhibition in the Utah State military museum. 
 
-- Morocco was ready to send a liaison officer to CENTCOM. 
"This was established," Arroub said.  The GOM and US now 
needed to discuss modalities on how to make this happen. 
 
-- He noted there would be a June 6-7 signing ceremony on 
ACSA in Germany, which General Tamdi (B-4) would attend. 
 
-- He invited the US to participate in a series of exhibits 
covering World War II to be held in Morocco on May 14, 2006, 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces. 
 
¶12.  (C) Vice Admiral Triki, in very brief remarks, 
highlighted the need for additional resources to combat 
terrorists transiting the Straits of Gibraltar. 
 
US-Algeria Military Dialogue 
---------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) ASD Rodman briefed the plenary session on the recent 
visit to Washington of Algerian Ministry of Defense Director 
General Senhadji and the status of the US-Algeria military 
dialogue.  Rodman stressed that the dialogue was in an early 
stage and assured the Moroccans there would be no surprises. 
The US-Algeria military relationship would not harm Morocco. 
The US objective was stability and harmony in the Maghreb, 
and any influence the US gained through the dialogue with 
Algeria would be applied toward that end.  Rodman explained 
that Algeria's support for the global war on terror was 
driving the Algerians closer to the US.  The military 
dialogue would be gradual, proceeding by small steps.  The US 
was aware of the balance of power in the Maghreb and did not 
intend to alter it.  Rodman said the US was pleased with the 
progress that Morocco and Algeria were making in their 
bilateral relations, exemplified by the King's April visit to 
Algiers, and that the two sides had participated in a EUCOM 
conference in December.  He urged further such contact and 
progress.  Rodman stressed the US would keep in close touch 
with Morocco as the military dialogue with Algeria evolved 
and that Morocco could have confidence in the US. 
 
¶14.  (U) ASD Rodman has reviewed and cleared this cable. 
RILEY