This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001625 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA 
DS/DSS/ITA 
DSERCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN POLICE DIRECTOR RESPONDS TO EMBASSY 
CONCERNS 
 
REF: A. PAP 1599 
 
     ¶B. PAP 1597 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Amid escalating violence and doubts 
surrounding the ability of the IGOH to ensure stability, 
Haitian National Police (HNP) Director General (DG) Leon 
Charles explained that he was having difficulty complying 
with Post's request to relinquish 21 long-guns to 
U.S.-controlled bunker storage. In a conversation with the 
DCM on June 7, Charles appealed for patience as he sought to 
secure substitute weapons for the affected officers so as not 
to leave them unarmed. The DCM reminded Charles that the 
return of the guns was an issue of great concern and could 
affect U.S. cooperation with the HNP. He also repeated Post's 
unease regarding the expansion of the 17th recruiting class 
and any attempts to increase the number of future recruits by 
lowering standards. Ahead of the handover of $2.6 million in 
U.S.-funded vehicles and other equipment for the HNP, Embassy 
Police Advisor explained that the U.S. would require written 
agreement regarding use, control and accountability before 
any equipment would be released. Charles also provided an 
update on HNP-MINUSTAH cooperation, police investigations, 
and the Palace Security Unit (PSU), and agreed to accept 
proposals for a new HNP field uniform. Charles' ability to 
respond to Embassy requests and Haitian security needs is 
eroding.  It is increasingly clear that the HNP requires more 
supervision and guidance. End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) After a brief discussion regarding recent events and a 
joint MINUSTAH-HNP raid in Bel Air on June 4 (reported 
earlier as ref A), the DCM told Charles that the latter's 
failure to comply with Post's request to return 21 
specifically-identified long-guns and place them in 
U.S.-controlled bunker storage could have severe consequences 
in terms of further U.S. cooperation with the HNP. (Note: 
Embassy Police Advisor noted that as of June 2 Charles had 
only surrendered 14 of the 21 guns and that subsequently on 
June 3 Charles gave instructions to retake 12 of those 14 
guns due to the worsening security situation.  End note). 
Charles begged for patience and understanding, saying that in 
the current climate of well-armed gang-led assassination 
operations against the entire HNP, he would provoke a mutiny 
in his ranks if he were to force his men to give up the few 
arms they had. He said, "my men will think I am trying to get 
them killed if I ask a unit of 30 guys with only 10 weapons 
to give 5 of them back." Charles said that he was trying to 
acquire more shotguns on the open market in order to provide 
his men at least some weapons in exchange, but that it would 
take time. The DCM acknowledged that the situation was dire, 
but reminded Charles that Post's instructions were clear: we 
must have the guns in our control and we want this to happen 
soon. He asked Charles to respect U.S. control over the 
bunker and to appreciate how seriously the U.S. takes its 
responsibility over the weapons therein. Charles agreed to 
respect the Embassy's control of the bunker. 
 
¶3. (C) The DCM declared flatly that Post's cooperation with 
the HNP required greater transparency and dependability from 
Charles. In particular, he said persistent setbacks and 
rumors surrounding the training program for new recruits 
constantly aggravated the U.S. partnership with the HNP. By 
placing 800 recruits into the 17th class without consulting 
Post, Charles had jeopardized programs for in-service 
training and compromised the quality of new cadet training. 
Suggestions that the HNP was possibly trying to lower 
standards or recruit special groups for the 18th promotion 
scheduled to start in September were equally unacceptable, 
the DCM said. Charles replied he was working closely with 
CIVPOL to ensure the 17th promotion received adequate 
training. He also claimed that he was running out of 
applicants who passed the examination in 2004, and was 
considering inviting those who scored near the pass line to 
enter the 18th promotion. (Note: According to the OAS vetting 
group, the pass rate used for the pool of recruits for the 
15th, 16th and 17th classes was 52%. The HNP could access 
roughly 2,200 potential recruits if it calls in those who 
scored between 48% and 52%. End note). 
 
¶4. (C) Furthermore, the DG said he wanted to admit roughly 
240 people fired from the PSU into the 18th class. Because 
this group received incomplete training toward the end of the 
Aristide administration, they were fired following Aristide's 
departure and many were now joining up with gang leaders out 
of anger at their dismissal. Charles hoped to include them in 
the 18th class to allow them to graduate and return to work. 
The DCM explained in no uncertain terms that the HNP could 
not use any special treatment to admit particular groups into 
the police - whether they be ex-military or ex-police or any 
other faction. He reminded Charles that the PSU was the 
center of corruption and criminal behavior under Aristide and 
that these individuals were not the kind of officers the HNP 
should be recruiting. If there is a shortage of recruits, the 
DCM offered to press CIVPOL to begin to organize a new test 
to replenish the supply of eligible candidates rather than 
scrounging for recruits among the dregs of previous entrants. 
 
¶5. (C) The DCM pressed Charles to explain troubling reports 
regarding the PSU, including attempts to grant the unit 
further autonomy and a dispute over an HNP helicopter. 
Charles acknowledged that the PSU was worrisome.  The unit 
supposedly had 700 M-14s prior to February 2004, Charles 
claimed, but now had only 60. Some PSU officers were 
allegedly providing ammunition to pro-Aristide gangs; five 
officers were arrested at the end of May for various crimes. 
Charles said he maintained very little operational and no 
budgetary control over the PSU. The unit requested custody 
over the one (broken) helicopter that Haiti possessed (which 
was operated by the PSU under Aristide) but Charles had 
instead promised the helicopter to the Haitian Coast Guard. 
 
¶6. (C) Charles offered an upbeat assessment of MINUSTAH-HNP 
cooperation that clashed with recent comments from CIVPOL 
Commissioner Dave Beer (ref B). Unlike Beer, who claimed the 
unit dysfunctional, Charles said the HNP-CIVPOL 
Anti-kidnapping unit was up and running with 3 HNP officers 
(led by HNP Press Spokesperson Gessy Coicou) and 4 CIVPOL 
officers. The unit was working diligently on recent cases, he 
said. Charles failed to mention any of the problems Beer 
described regarding HNP obstructionism towards the 
establishment of the Joint Command Center (JCC) as well, 
giving a vague but upbeat forecast for the opening of the 
CIVPOL-HNP JCC at the office of the Departmental Directorate 
of Operations (DDO) and of the MINUSTAH military-HNP JCC at 
Fort National. DDO Lochard has been reportedly the stumbling 
block in cooperation with CIVPOL. 
 
¶7. (C) Although previously reticent, the DG accepted a 
proposal from the Embassy Police Advisor to change the HNP 
field uniform. The all-black and typical camouflage outfits 
worn by CIMO (crowd control) and SWAT units are exceptionally 
easy to fake and pro-Aristide gangs have allegedly used fake 
or real uniforms when committing crimes in order to tarnish 
the image of the police. Charles repeated his desire to 
maintain the HNP "dress uniform" for use by normal officers, 
but agreed to accept proposals for a new uniform to be used 
in the field by special units. Embassy Police Advisor 
promised to provide several alternatives soon and pledged the 
U.S. would fund the new uniforms. 
 
¶8. (C) The DCM asked Charles again regarding the status of 
investigations into incidents of special importance to Post. 
Charles replied that the HNP had completed its investigation 
regarding the killing of an AMCIT girl during the February 10 
raid of Ravix's base on Route Freres, and the investigation 
of the December 1 prison riot. Investigations into the 
alleged shootings of protesters on February 28 and April 27 
were still ongoing, he said. He promised to provide a copy of 
the completed reports to Post. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: The fact that we have to continually press 
Charles on very basic, fundamental issues at the core of HNP 
behavior (not to mention the unrelenting deterioration in 
urban security) has made it clear that Charles is unable to 
deliver the kind of control and reform the HNP needs (and the 
U.S. demands) at this time. The problem is that Charles is 
arguably better than any of the alternative candidates. 
Without appropriate authority and support, nobody in the DG 
position is likely to have any better luck than Charles has. 
The HNP suffers not only from a dearth of strategic planning, 
but also from an inability to put any of those plans into 
practice. It has become increasingly apparent that what is 
needed is a new model for managing Haiti's security 
apparatus, including international oversight and authority 
over the HNP. We are working with our CIVPOL colleagues to 
finalize such a plan. Meanwhile, we will continue to monitor 
the HNP recruiting process, work with CIVPOL and the HNP to 
organize a new admissions test, and pay closer scrutiny to 
developments in the Palace Security Unit. End comment. 
 
FOLEY