This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO:  MEETING WITH FORMER MINISTER BOKO 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
n 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Togo's former Interior Minister Francois 
Boko visited the Embassy on June 8 to discuss his visa 
request and prospective travel to the U.S.  He also discussed 
events in Togo, stating that he had little faith that Faure 
was truly committed to democratic reform.  He discussed the 
role of the Eyadema clan in drug trafficking.  He also had 
little faith in UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio in his 
self-appointed role of "leader" of the opposition.  Boko was 
disappointed but not surprised by France's response to events 
in Togo, which he ascribed to France's long practice of 
supporting the "strong man" of the moment in the hope that 
that would lead to stability and continued benefit to France. 
 Boko expressed a willingness to consult with USG officials 
during his upcoming travel to the U.S.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  In good spirits, former Togolese Interior Minister 
Boko called on emboffs on June 8 in connection with his 
request for a visa to travel to the U.S. in the coming weeks, 
in response to an invitation from an Amcit in Florida who was 
a former Peace Corps Volunteer in Togo who lived with Boko's 
family during his PC service (1978-1980).  Boko has kept in 
close contact with him and with other ex-PCVs and visited him 
most recently in Florida in November 2004 when the PCV 
invited Boko to observe the elections process in the U.S.  We 
explained the visa process to Boko and are working with CONS 
to facilitate an early interview and appropriate courtesies. 
Boko said he was more than willing to travel to Washington to 
discuss Togo with USG officials should there be interest in 
his doing so. 
 
No Faith in Faure 
----------------- 
¶3.  (C)  Boko discussed the situation in Togo at some length. 
 He said that contrary to the image of moderation that Faure 
was trying to project, Faure, in Boko's view, was cynically 
trying to retain absolute power in the manner that Eyadema 
had.  After Eyadema's death, Boko said he had had several 
discussions with Faure, appealing to him that as members of 
the younger generation, it would be wise for them to engage 
in the kinds of reform that the Togolese public desired. 
However, Boko said that Faure has demonstrated little 
interest in reform and has tried to consolidate power in 
every way possible. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Boko said that Faure had no qualms about resorting 
to violence if necessary.  Boko said that the Togolese 
military was not as bad as perceived from the outside.  He 
said that in the pre-election period, he had met with 
military leaders and urged them to avoid hardline tactics 
before and during the elections.  Their attitude, he 
reported, was reasonable.  Boko blamed the violence and 
killings not so much on the military as on the immediate 
entourage surrounding Faure, most notably Col. Katanga (NFI), 
who Boko said was responsible for implementing the violent 
tactics of repression and intimidation that occurred during 
the election period.  Boko said he was very dismayed to learn 
that Col. Katanga was scheduled to come to France within a 
few weeks to begin a program at the Ecole Militaire.  He 
thought, however, that there was a chance the French would 
rescind his participation. 
 
Faure's "National Unity" a Sham 
------------------------------- 
¶5.  (C)  Regarding Faure's call for a government of "national 
unity/reconciliation," Boko said that this was a sham.  Faure 
wanted opposition members to sign on to such a government 
"blind," without anyone knowing in advance what form this 
reconciliation government would take and how powers and 
responsibilities would be shared.  Boko said that the 
government and opposition representatives should instead hold 
a round table and hammer out an agreement about how such a 
government would function.  Only then, when all parties 
agreed on a government structure and how power and 
responsibility would be shared, should the opposition agree 
to join with Faure. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Boko said that Faure was pursuing one of his 
father's strategies -- call for a government of national 
unity and then when the opposition balks due to uncertainty 
about its role in such a government, declare "well, I invited 
them, but they refused, so I guess I as president will have 
to run Togo without them."  Boko said that Eyadema operated 
in this manner and he suspected that Faure was following suit. 
 
No Faith in Gilchrist Olympio Either 
------------------------------------ 
¶7.  (C)  When asked whether he had had contact with other 
Togolese dissidents, such as Gilchrist Olympio, Boko said 
that he had not, in part because the French, in allowing him 
to come to France, told him to lay low and not be active 
politically.  However, he said that he also had problems with 
Olympio, and did not appreciate that Olympio had declared 
himself "head of the opposition."  The "opposition," Boko 
said, had not "elected" Olympio to be its chief.  Boko said 
that Olympio was carrying on the struggle with the Eyadema 
clan that started decades before with Olympio's father.  Boko 
criticized both the Eyadema and Olympio clans for continuing 
to fight these old battles, whereas Togo needed to get beyond 
the "fathers' war" and deal with today's reality.  Both 
Gilchrist and Faure seemed intent on continuing the paternal 
wars, which was unfortunate and which, in Boko's view, made 
Olympio unsuited to be considered the head of the opposition. 
 
Drugs 
----- 
¶8.  (C)  Boko described in some detail evidence showing the 
Eyadema family's involvement in drug trafficking.  He said 
that as Interior Minister, he had developed a 
counternarcotics program that worked well with the French 
security and intelligence services.  He said that with French 
cooperation, the two sides intercepted in 2004, near the Cape 
Verde islands, a ship bound for Togo from Colombia.  This 
ship contained a large quantity of cocaine.  When he first 
informed Eyadema of this operation, Eyadema's initial 
reaction was to state "make sure that ship isn't seized in 
Togo."  Boko said that later investigation established in his 
mind a direct connection between the Eyadema family 
(including Faure) and a longstanding cocaine trafficking 
operation.  Boko said that when shipments came to Togo, an 
army unit was told to off-load the cargo and store it at an 
army base, after which the shipments were delivered for 
further smuggling elsewhere to a "Mr. Ishay" (phon), whom 
Boko described as a person of Middle Eastern origin who was 
close to the Eyadema family and resided in Togo.  Boko said 
that the officer at the military base responsible for 
off-loading and storing the cocaine did not appear to know 
the nature of the cargo -- he was told that the cargo 
consisted of industrial chemicals and he had no reason to 
believe otherwise.  This officer later said that there had 
been "a dozen or more" such shipments in recent years. 
 
France and Togo 
--------------- 
¶9.  (C)  When asked about France and Togo, Boko said that 
many were disappointed with France's quick endorsement of the 
elections, despite countervailing views among EU observers 
and those from other countries such as the U.S.  (Boko at 
several points lauded the support the U.S. had provided to 
him personally and to the democratic process more generally 
during the election period.)  He attributed the French 
attitude to what he described as France's "traditional" way 
of dealing with its former African colonies -- support the 
"strong man" of the moment, seek stability as the first 
priority, and continue to benefit from what Boko called the 
very old tradition of Africa's "strong men" helping French 
leaders in a number of ways, including financial support. 
Some of these French political figures then go on to support 
publicly a return to "normal" relations with Togo, especially 
in the economic area. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Boko was highly critical of individuals such as 
French citizen Charles Debbasch, whom he described as one of 
the Eyadema clan's more unsavory advisors, and who had been 
rewarded by the Faure regime with a quasi-diplomatic status. 
Boko claimed that it was Debbasch who tipped off the Togolese 
security forces when Boko was trying to leave Togo quietly 
for Benin after his public declaration that the April 
elections should be postponed.  He noted that the Amcit he 
planned to visit in Florida was with Boko in Togo when he 
called for postponement of the elections, was with him in the 
car as they tried to leave Togo, and joined him at the German 
Embassy before Boko was finally able to come to France.  Boko 
also said that this Amcit had a copy of the dossier detailing 
the Eyadema family's involvement in drug trafficking. 
 
Donors Need to Tell Togo What Needs to Happen 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶11.  (C)  Boko said that the U.S. and Europeans needed to 
consult and then present Togo with a roadmap leading to 
democracy and reform, with the carrot being renewed foreign 
assistance.  Togo, he said, had to be told clearly what it 
needed to do to return to the good graces of the donor 
countries.  The evidence of the Eyadema clan's involvement 
with drugs could be used as powerful leverage over Faure, 
Boko believed. 
 
Why Were You a Part of It? 
-------------------------- 
¶12.  (C)  When asked about his own role in the Eyadema 
government, Boko said that he had received very strong and 
critical messages questioning his decision to join the GOT as 
Minister, many from the group of concerned former Peace Corps 
Volunteers with whom he has kept in touch.  He said that he 
explained to them that if people such as himself, who were 
interested in reform and progress in Togo, stayed out, then 
nothing would ever change.  He felt obliged, as a member of 
the younger generation, to give it a try.  Obviously, he 
said, he reached a point where he could no longer tolerate 
what he saw around him and said what he had to say, 
irrespective of the consequences. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Boko indicated that he planned to establish himself 
in France, where he had studied previously.  He said that his 
marriage to a French citizen would allow him to stay in 
France, regardless of whatever status the GOF might accord 
him as a "political asylee."  He mentioned also that a child 
of the couple was born in France, suggesting that this would 
strengthen his claim to French residency should there be any 
doubt. 
 
¶14.  (U)  We promised to keep in touch regarding Boko's visa 
request and said that we remained open to meeting again to 
continue the discussion. 
WOLFF