This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 004961 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM ETTC KSTC IR PK CH IN NSSP
SUBJECT: US-INDIA NON-PROLIFERATION DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 4719 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 4718 
     ¶C. NEW DELHI 4717 
     ¶D. NEW DELHI 4715 
     ¶E. STATE 112244 
     ¶F. NEW DELHI 3652 
 
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Arms Control A/S Stephen Rademaker and 
representatives from AC, NP, SA, OSD, and Embassy met GOI 
counterparts, led by MEA Additional Secretary (International 
Security) Meera Shankar on June 16 to continue the ongoing 
bilateral dialogue on strategic stability and 
nonproliferation issues.  The following cable reports on the 
nonproliferation session of the dialogue; strategic stability 
issues will be reported septel.  Topics included the NPT 
Review Conference, DPRK, Iran, India's new WMD Act, questions 
about NSG and MTCR adherence, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), nonproliferation amendments to the SUA 
Convention, pending onward proliferation cases, and the 
Tracker automated export control system.  The talks were 
candid and friendly, but Additional Secretary Meera Shankar 
noted that the GOI needed to find its own way forward on 
NSSP-required adherence to the NSG and MTCR.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) Before launching into the lengthy agenda, Shankar 
noted that the GOI was pleased with the "steady progress" on 
many legacy issues as both countries "updated their 
perceptions of the other," but observed "cautious progress" 
toward new opportunities. 
 
Review of NPT RevCon 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In her opening remarks, Shankar contrasted the 
failures of the NPT with GOI nuclear policy based on 
transparency, responsibility, predictability, and 
self-defense.  Despite being outside the NPT, Shankar stated 
that India adheres to the principles of the NPT, has a 
"pristine" record of nonproliferation, and wants to be a 
partner in strengthening the NP regime.  In addition, the GOI 
shares US concerns about the "arc of proliferation from North 
Korea in the east to Iran and Libya in the west."  The only 
way the NPT can be strengthened, however, she contended, is 
through a "forward-looking process."  Asked for his 
assessment of the recently concluded Five Year Review 
Conference, A/S Rademaker stated that the recent NPT RevCon 
was not a failure because there was discussion of critical 
issues such as Iran and DPRK compliance, although not 
agreement on a final text.  He attributed lack of agreement 
on substantive issues to Egypt's intransigence on procedural 
issues.  Noting that three of six previous RevCons had not 
produced an outcome document, he opined that real progress on 
substantive nonproliferation issues could be made in other, 
more effective fora in the future, such as the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the PSI. 
 
DPRK 
---- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) A/S Rademaker described the history of North 
Korea's abuse of the NP regime and new efforts to resume the 
Six-Party talks, buttressed by the international community's 
consistent message urging Pyongyang to re-engage.  Shankar 
expressed GOI support for resumption of the Six-Party talks, 
adding that the GOI would like the talks to address not only 
the DPRK's nuclear program, but also proliferation linkages 
which directly impact South Asia. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶5.  (C) Similar to North Korea in the 1990s, A/S Rademaker 
explained, Iran had been caught "red-handed" in its nuclear 
weapons development, and had compounded the problem with a 
pattern of excuses, discrepancies, and intractability.  The 
EU3 had been optimistic that a solution may be found if 
Rafsanjani were elected, but A/S Rademaker pointed out that 
Rafsanjani was the Iranian President for 8 of the 18 years 
that Iran had been in violation of IAEA rules.  He went on to 
ask the GOI to agree that Iran continue suspension of its 
enrichment program, that Iran should negotiate with the EU3 
on the objective guarantee of cessation and dismantling its 
sensitive fuel cycle activities, and, failing these, that 
India support reporting Iran to the UNSC. 
 
¶6.  (C) Shankar responded that the GOI encourages all 
signatories to abide by their NPT obligations and encourages 
Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and EU3, but asserted that 
the US is asking Iran to go beyond its NPT obligations. 
Recalling Iran's history of deception regarding the nature of 
its program, A/S Rademaker replied that the US will not 
accept "enhanced safeguards" as sufficient reassurance to 
allow Iran to keep its sensitive fuel cycle capabilities. 
Shankar responded that although India has close relations 
with Iran and has a strong interest in resolving this crisis, 
because of India's "semi-safeguarded" status, New Delhi would 
be "in a difficult position" to convince Tehran to give up 
its entire nuclear program. 
 
AQ Khan Network 
--------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Noting press reports that highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) particles on contaminated centrifuges in Iran had come 
from Pakistan, Shankar asked for confirmation about the 
source of the particles.  Noting that the results of the 
IAEA's testing were not yet known, A/S Rademaker stated that 
regardless of their origin, Iran has already admitted to a 
history of undeclared uranium enrichment that clearly 
violated its safeguards obligations.  Asked if the IAEA had 
questioned AQ Khan about his network's involvement in the 
Iranian program, A/S Rademaker said the Khan network was the 
focus of an international criminal investigation, but access 
to Khan himself was limited. 
 
¶8.  (C) Shankar responded that "Khan's network continues to 
unravel, driven by the dependence of Pakistan's nuclear 
program on clandestine procurement and fueled by Pakistan's 
drive to assert control over the Islamic world."  She went on 
to assert that the program was not the work of an individual 
motivated by greed or ambition but had explicit state 
support, citing examples of equipment delivered via Pakistani 
military aircraft.  Unlike in previous meetings, Shankar did 
not ask for more information about the network, saying 
instead that the GOI "does not want to complicate the work of 
the international community in unraveling the network." 
 
Concern about Nuclear Linkages between Pakistan and China 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) Shankar went on, however, to describe security 
threats to India arising from China's 20-year relationship 
with Pakistan.  She expressed dismay that China was allowed 
to grandfather the 300-megawatt Chashma II nuclear power 
plant in eastern Pakistan and fuel for the Chinese-supplied 
safeguarded reactors while the extent of the Khan network was 
being investigated.  Noting that the border between Pakistan 
and China is not monitored, according to Shankar, the GOI had 
intelligence that items such as propellants, night vision 
cameras, and gyro-stabilization devices were being 
transferred from China to Pakistan, and "unconventional 
financial transactions" from Pakistan to China have been 
detected, including via the US.  The GOI was disappointed 
that the international community tolerated proliferation from 
China, an NPT signatory, but still treated India as a pariah, 
Shankar concluded.  Later, Shankar passed two non-papers 
about proliferation linkages between China and Pakistan (Refs 
A and B). 
 
India's Nonproliferation Initiatives 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (U) Shankar described India's nonproliferation 
initiatives as "sui generis" (of its own kind); not as a 
result of the NPT, but because of India's own sense of 
responsibility to safeguard this technology.  She outlined 
GOI initiatives in the areas of nuclear safety, nuclear 
security, and export controls, among them: acceding to all 12 
UN mechanisms to combat terrorism, active participation in 
efforts to search and recover radiological sources, 
involvement with the US and the IAEA in the Regional 
Radiological Security Partnership, support for the IAEA's 
Code of Conduct, and continuing EXBS exchanges. 
 
Questions about India's New WMD Bill 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Chief among GOI nonproliferation initiatives was the 
newly enacted WMD Bill (Ref F) which extends GOI authority 
over the transit, trans-shipment, and brokering of WMD and 
related intangible technologies and includes "catch-all" 
language.  In particular, Shankar stressed the difficulty of 
including catch-all controls in the new legislation, 
explaining that some agencies thought such language was too 
broad. 
 
¶12.  (C) A/S Rademaker gave the GOI a non-paper containing 
several technical questions about the bill and its coverage 
(Ref E).  Rademaker stressed the US need for confirmation 
that these issues will be addressed in implementing 
regulations.  For example, the USG had noticed a difference 
between the GOI and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
definitions of "missile," and asked how the GOI would ensure 
that the broader MTCR definition would be the governing 
definition in Indian regulations.  Shankar responded that the 
GOI was still in the early stages of reviewing its 
implementing regulations and she could not comment on how 
regulations would be promulgated, but noted that the law's 
"missile" definition had been carefully chosen and changing 
it was unlikely.  Shankar did not respond to A/S Rademaker's 
question to clarify whether the GOI was reviewing its current 
regulations or would be drafting new regulations, but only 
said that the GOI hoped to complete the exercise before the 
PM's July 18 visit to the US.  She remarked that the GOI 
would welcome a statement of appreciation for the legislation 
from the USG. 
 
Discord about Harmonization and Adherence 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Broaching the most contentious issue of the meeting, 
A/S Rademaker asked about GOI plans for adherence to the MTCR 
and NSG regimes.  Shankar said that the procedure for 
accomplishing this had to be accepted nationally, and 
suggested that rather than the two-step process outlined in 
the NSSP, that GOI may accomplish adherence in a single step. 
 A/S Rademaker replied that in order to combine NSSP Phases 2 
and 3, the GOI must harmonize its control lists then adhere 
to the MTCR and NSG regimes, as laid out in the non-papers 
provided to the GOI in November 2004.  Shankar stated that 
the GOI had made no final decision about adherence and it may 
adhere "informally" by a mechanism different than the 
regime-standards laid out in non-papers previously presented 
by the USG.  Further, she asserted that harmonization and/or 
adherence was an autonomous matter that should be left to the 
GOI and implied that harmonization may be sufficient.  A/S 
Rademaker underscored that formal adherence is a condition of 
the NSSP, and that adherence and harmonization are two 
separate issues.  Shankar stated that the GOI is currently 
only focused on harmonization and reiterated that this is an 
autonomous process, appealing for "political space" for India 
to accomplish this its own way. 
 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) With the endorsement of more than 60 countries, A/S 
Rademaker expressed hope that the GOI would support PSI, 
regardless of the nebulous future of the Core Group.  He 
added that the success of PSI to date has been that the 
initiative is "self-propelled" and does not rely on the 
direction of the ad hoc Core Group, which, he pointed out, 
has not met in the last year.  Shankar explained that the GOI 
would defer its decision about whether to join PSI until a 
decision is reached on the status of the Core Group.  If the 
Core Group were disbanded, India would still seek "equal and 
non-discriminatory participation" in any PSI decision-making 
successor.  Noting that the Indian public is "very vigilant 
about any perceived diminution of Indian sovereignty," 
Shankar said that the GOI also had reservations about the 
authority of other countries to interdict and board Indian 
ships, a reservation shared by other countries, e.g., France. 
 Noting similar concerns in the US, A/S Rademaker explained 
that the USG did not consider PSI to allow "carte blanche" 
boarding of its own vessels and was seeking ship-boarding 
agreements with other countries that do not diminish national 
sovereignty. 
 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Convention 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Although the GOI supports the objectives of the SUA 
Convention, Shankar expressed concern that the proposed 
"catch-all" language may prevent the transport of dual-use 
items for civilian use, such as nuclear safety equipment. 
She noted that other countries, e.g., Israel, have also 
flagged this language for further review.  If this language 
is adopted, Shankar stated that the GOI may reconsider its 
support for the Convention.  A/S Rademaker stated that the US 
was "sensitive to forbidding actions that we would not want 
to forbid," and promised to look into the matter. 
 
Onward Proliferation Cases 
-------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) Describing India's record of nonproliferation as 
"mixed" because the GOI previously lacked the legal framework 
necessary to pursue certain cases the US raised in the past, 
A/S Rademaker lauded the recent passage of the WMD Bill 
giving the government greater authority to investigate and 
prosecute proliferators.  Shankar replied that MEA had 
recently established an interagency group to facilitate 
investigation of possible cases of proliferation, adding that 
"the compulsion to investigate these cases is not as strong 
in other agencies." 
 
¶17.  (C) A/S Rademaker gave the GOI a non-paper of 17 open 
cases of suspected proliferation with specific questions 
about each case (septel).  MEA Under Secretary (Disarmament 
and International Security) Nutan Kapoor provided non-papers 
on two cases, Phulchand and BARC (Refs C and D), and gave 
oral comments on the following cases: 
 
-- Phulchand:  (See text of non-paper in Ref C) GOI asserts 
that the transaction did not happen because of GOI 
intervention.  According to Kapoor, the end-use of the CW 
precursor was for gold mine extraction. 
 
-- Balaji Amines:  The GOI is waiting for more info from the 
US about the end-user. 
 
-- KG Global:  The GOI has decided hold a hearing on the 
firm's activities, but the specific transaction questioned by 
the US did not happen. 
 
-- Anu Technology:  According to Kapoor, this case is ten 
years old.  The GOI stopped the transaction at USG request, 
although there was no evidence.  The GOI continued to monitor 
the firm's activities and discovered relevant evidence based 
on a minor violation.  The GOI has begun legal proceedings 
against the firm. 
 
-- Graphite Technology:  Because of GOI intervention, the 
transaction did not occur, either with the Iraqi firm nor 
with the Jordanian front company. 
 
-- RJ Associates:  GOI investigations revealed no use for the 
AG-controlled chemical reactor vessels besides their stated 
purpose for pharmaceuticals. 
 
-- Sabero:  The Indian firm declined further requests for 
shipment of a CWC and AG-controlled chemical from the Iranian 
firm, although the transaction would be permissible under 
Indian law if the firm obtained the appropriate license. 
 
In addition, the GOI asked the USG to investigate the 
following possible cases of proliferation to Pakistan: 
 
-- Chlight:  (See text of non-paper in Ref B) GOI asserts 
that the equipment that Chlight sought to procure, although 
not a controlled item, contributes to Pakistan's nuclear 
program. 
 
-- Project Management Organization:  (See text of non-paper 
in Ref A) 
 
¶18.  (C) State's NP representative noted that Washington had 
made a political decision to drop three Iraqi cases from the 
list of open cases and the SA representative confirmed that 
the USG considered all other cases closed. 
 
¶19.  (C) Shankar asked about the USG policy to include 
conventional weapons transfers in the nonproliferation 
dialogue.  A/S Rademaker responded that although there were 
currently no open conventional cases in the USG-provided 
non-paper, we raise these in our nonproliferation discussions 
because of our differing perspectives and since some 
transfers could trigger US sanctions.  Toward that end, 
Rademaker strongly advised against arms transfers to Sudan to 
avoid the accusation of being complicit in genocide.  The NP 
representative added that providing Lethal Military Equipment 
to Sudan could also run afoul of US laws, leading to 
potential sanctions.  A/S Rademaker also cautioned against 
conventional and sophisticated weapons transfers to Iran and 
Syria as those weapons may be used against Coalition forces 
in Iraq. 
 
¶20.  (C) On Iran, A/S Rademaker added that conventional 
weapons transfers as well as WMD cooperation could compel the 
US to impose sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act 
(INPA).  "A close relationship with us precludes a close 
relationship with Iran," he concluded.  Shankar described GOI 
relations with Iran as "limited," adding that the GOI 
scrutinizes and monitors its joint activities.  On the case 
of the two Indian scientists sanctioned for cooperation on 
Iran's WMD program (Drs. Surendar and Prasad), Shankar 
reiterated the GOI belief that USG information about the two 
scientists was incorrect.  "We take your points seriously," 
A/S Rademaker said, adding, "The law is inflexible, but not 
infallible.  If we made a mistake, we can correct it." 
 
Tracker Automated Export Control System 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (C) Over lunch, A/S Rademaker outlined the USG offer to 
provide a Tracker Export Control System, and necessary 
hardware and training for the GOI to evaluate.  He noted US 
willingness to send a small team to New Delhi to demonstrate 
and discuss possible arrangements to collaborate on 
development and that the US was also prepared to discuss the 
possibility of establishing a small bilateral working group 
for future development -- the first such working group on 
Tracker.  Shankar was unsure of GOI interest in adopting 
Tracker in part or in whole but expressed willingness to 
learn more about the system. (Note:  Embassy delivered 
invitation to the Tracker workshop to Shankar on May 27.) 
 
Participants 
------------ 
¶22.  (U) USG Participants: 
State Dept. Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Stephen 
Rademaker 
Embassy New Delhi DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. 
State Dept. Arms Control Bureau Robert Gromoll 
State Dept. Arms Control Bureau Tom McIlvain 
State Dept. Non-Proliferation Bureau Kathryn Schultz 
Embassy PolMilOff Stacy Gilbert (Notetaker) 
Defense Dept. Office of the Secretary Stacie Konan 
State Dept. South Asia Bureau Matt Lowe 
 
GOI Participants: 
 
MEA Additional Secretary (International Security) Meera 
Shankar 
MEA Deputy Secretary (Americas) Santosh Jha 
MEA Under Secretary, Disarmament and International Security, 
Nutan Kapoor 
MOD Defense Research and Development Organization, Dr. Anup 
Chatterjee 
Dept of Atomic Energy, Dr. S.D. Misra 
Dept of Atomic Energy, Scientific Officer, Dr. A.B. Awati 
 
¶23.  (U) A/S Rademaker cleared this cable. 
BLAKE