This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL EWWT SENV BG PK IN INDO PAK
SUBJECT: GOI WATER ISSUES FLOWING SLOWLY WITH PAKISTAN AND 
BANGLADESH 
 
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In recent meetings with SA Bureau's S&T 
Officer for Pakistan and Bangladesh Marcella Szymanski, the 
MEA emphasized GOI commitment to working with Bangladesh to 
create water sharing agreements to benefit both countries and 
to resolving its water issues with Pakistan consistent with 
the Indus Water Treaty (IWT).  MEA Bangladesh Desk Officer 
Puneet Kundal noted that Bangladeshi opposition has slowed 
progress on the controversial river linking projects.  India 
and Bangladesh share 54 rivers, but have only one water 
sharing agreement for the Ganges signed in 1996 and are 
working to link more of its rivers to drought-prone areas. 
 
¶2.  (C) MEA Director for Pakistan Monica Mohta noted that 
while preferring to negotiate water issues with Pakistan 
bilaterally, the GOI would follow the IWT provisions to solve 
the Baglihar and Kishenganga dam issues.  As India and 
Pakistan prepare for the first Baglihar Dam meeting with 
World Bank-appointed water expert Raymond Lafitte in Paris on 
June 9-10, ongoing talks at the level of Permanent Indus 
Commissioner in New Delhi were put on hold.  Mohta underlined 
New Delhi's resolve not to use water as a weapon as the two 
countries work through the disputes during a time of improved 
relations.  End Summary. 
 
River Linking In Feasibility Stage 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Since the last meeting of the Water Minister-level 
Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) in September 2003, the only 
discernible progress between India and Bangladesh on water 
sharing issues is the start of a joint feasibility study on 
the project, according to MEA's Puneet Kundal.  At that time, 
India agreed to involve Bangladesh in future discussions on 
its river linking projects, which it began considering in 
¶1986.  He explained that the JRC created the Joint Committee 
of Experts (JCE), which was entrusted to find water sharing 
formulas for seven of the shared rivers.  The JCE met last on 
September 2004 and decided to prioritize the Tista River, a 
tributary of the Brahmaputra River.  To explore the Tista 
project, the JCE began a feasibility study which is scheduled 
to be completed at the end of 2006.  According to Kundal, the 
idea of the river linking project is to utilize excess 
surface water wasted in flood areas by connecting it to 
drought areas.  Areas of abundant water will be diverted to 
scarcer areas through hundreds of canals, reservoirs and 
dams. 
 
Bangladesh Opposes Environmental Impacts 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Although the JCE is still studying the feasibility of 
this project, Indian media continues to report stiff 
opposition in Bangladesh to the river linking project, noting 
that the GOB MFA is "very much concerned" about the project, 
while environmentalists warn that diverting water to India 
could damage the country's fish and farming sectors by 
turning parts of the country into a desert.  In response to 
charges that India is "drying out" Bangladesh, MEA's Kundal 
remarked that "40 to 50 percent of Bangladesh is under water 
at any one time" and that "desertification wouldn't happen 
even if we tried our best."  He stressed that no investment 
decisions will be made until the feasibility study is 
complete in 2006.  When the governments reach the negotiation 
stage, the GOI is committed to ensuring that the agreement 
gives Bangladesh certain "minimum command areas" that are 
dependent on a certain volume of water.  He posited that 
these command areas would ensure that Bangladesh does not 
face desertification. 
 
No Meeting Date Set 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) On May 9, the Indian media reported that Bangladesh 
Water Resources Minister Hafiz Uddin Ahmed called for the 
next meeting of the JRC, protesting that the council is 
supposed to meet at least two times each year but has only 
met once in the last four years.  The GOI agreement to 
include Bangladesh in the negotiations at the September 2004 
JCE meeting reportedly led Ahmed to comment that "We believe 
the Congress government in India has softened on the issue." 
MEA's Kundal told Poloff that there was still no date set for 
the next JRC or JCE meetings.  However, he stressed that 
under the bilateral Science and Technology Agreement signed 
with Dhaka, the GOI had trained Bangladeshi science teachers, 
shared flood forecasting data, and gifted supplies such as 
arsenic contamination detection kits and water measurement 
tools. 
 
GOI Prepares for Neutral Expert on Baglihar 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) On Pakistan, MEA Director Monica Mohta praised the 
Indus Water Treaty as a "model," adding that with the 
exception of Baglihar, there have never been any problems 
under the treaty since it was signed in 1960 "in spite of the 
ups and downs" in the overall Indo-Pak relationship.  This 
was a sign that the GOI would never use water as a weapon 
against the Pakistani people, she noted.  Calling the 
Baglihar problem "political and not technical," Mohta said 
that Pakistan opposes all projects in J&K.  Whenever the GOI 
proposes a project there, Pakistan "either says that it will 
flood us or deprive us, because Musharraf wants the people to 
be alienated from the GOI at the expense of the benefits of 
the project."  She claimed that when Delhi asks Islamabad to 
quantify the objections, they usually come back empty-handed. 
 
¶7.  (C) On the Baglihar hydropower scheme, Mohta confidently 
observed that the GOI was "convinced that its designs are 
within the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty."  After 
receiving Pakistan's six objections, the GOI said they had 
solved "two and a half and are waiting for concessions from 
Pakistan."  Pakistan responded by invoking Article Nine, 
which allows them to consult an expert.  Mohta believed this 
was premature, but said the "GOI had no objection to an 
expert" and that this process could be positive because it 
"sets a precedent for future projects."  However, when asked 
what the GOI would do if the expert found India in breach of 
the treaty, she predicted that "this will not happen." 
 
¶8.  (U) On June 3, "The Hindu's" Gargi Parsai (who has 
written extensively on water issues) reported that Pakistan 
and India will meet World Bank-appointed water expert Raymond 
Lafitte in Paris on June 9-10 to address the Baglihar 
dispute.  The five-member Indian delegation will include J. 
Hari Narayan, GOI Water Resources Secretary, Fali S. Nariman, 
the lawyer who will present India's case, and Shankar Das, a 
prominent specialist on international law.  After the 
announcement, Parsai reported that Pakistan Commissioner 
Jamait Ali Shah was recalled to Islamabad, breaking off the 
ongoing Permanent Indus Commissioner-level talks in Delhi 
focused on the Kishenganga River Dam.  "Hindustan Times" 
Foreign Correspondent Vinod Sharma told us the talks were put 
on hold in order to give the Commissioner and his colleagues 
time to brief the Pakistani delegation before they travel to 
Paris. 
 
Kishenganga River Dam Still in Negotiation Stage 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9.  (C) On May 9, after talks broke down between India and 
Pakistan over a 103 meter high dam on the Kishenganga River 
in the Gurez Valley, India's Commissioner for Permanent Indus 
Waters Commission offered Pakistan a July 15 deadline to 
resolve differences.  The MEA's Mohta hoped that the two 
governments would be able to solve this bilaterally, but 
explained that if the parties did not reach a solution in the 
next two months, Pakistan could invoke Article Nine and ask 
for an expert to resolve the dispute, as in the case of 
Baglihar.  According to "The Hindu," before Permanent Indus 
Waters talks were stopped on June 2, the two sides reached 
convergence on four of the six issues, namely the flood value 
in the design of the damn, the location of sedimentation 
sluices, the water intake level and the release of water 
downstream.  Although there was no resolution on 
inter-tributary transfer and protection of existing 
agriculture and hydro-electric uses before talks were ended, 
both sides reportedly agreed to meet again before the July 
¶15.  Despite the disagreement, the GOI has not suspended work 
on the project.  Mohta termed stopping work "denying people 
development" and recalled the GOI experience when they gave 
in to Pakistan's demand to stop work on the Tulbul Navigation 
Project in 1987 and have never been allowed to resume. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The idea for the river linking project in India's 
Northeast has been around for some 19 years and refuses to go 
away.  The UPA government slightly improved the situation in 
September 2004 by agreeing to include Bangladesh in the Tista 
negotiations, but has not responded to GOB calls to cooperate 
further on water issues during a time of strained ties with 
Dhaka.  As the wealthier upper riparian state with the most 
to gain from river linking, the ball is in India's court to 
make concessions, which it has been reluctant to offer, 
perhaps as a sign of unhappiness over other issues (e.g. 
Bangladeshi migrants in India and Indian insurgent groups 
reportedly in Bangladesh). 
 
¶11. (C) We understand that instructions to proceed with the 
neutral expert on Baglihar came straight from the PM, and 
expect the GOI to follow his findings.  Permanent Indus 
Commissioner-level talks on the Kishenganga issue were cut 
short to focus on the Baglihar meetings in Paris, which 
decreases the chances of resolving the matter bilaterally 
before the July 15 "deadline."  The Baglihar process will 
signal whether the IWT is truly a "model" for bilateral 
dispute resolution, will reveal how each country reacts to 
outside mediation, and may foreshadow whether this outcome 
will influence Pakistan's decision to invoke Article Nine on 
the Kishenganga dispute. 
BLAKE