This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271205Z Jun 05

ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   USNW-00  INL-00   PERC-00  DS-00    
      EUR-00   OIGO-00  FBIE-00  H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    
      LAB-01   M-00     NEA-00   DCP-00   NSCE-00  OIC-00   OMB-00   
      NIMA-00  GIWI-00  FMPC-00  IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    SCRS-00  
      DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   G-00     SAS-00   SWCI-00    /001W
                  ------------------0A2459  271244Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1883
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI 
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T  NDJAMENA 001020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/ICI/ATA, 
DS/ICI/AF, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: CHADIAN REBELS, RUMORS, REALITIES, AND REACTIONS 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM IIR 6 890 0290 05 
 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 835 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 565 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 658 
     ¶E. NDJAMENA 946 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S NF)  Summary: Speculation about the existence of 
Chadian rebel groups continues to make Chadians uneasy about 
the regime's stability.  The often conflicting reports and 
wide-ranging opinions about the size, composition, 
capabilities, and agendas of Chadian rebel groups make it 
difficult to judge the nature of their threat to the regime. 
Most observers believe there are Chadian rebels, loosely 
defined, in several groups along the Sudanese border. 
However, no one agrees on the numbers of the rebels or the 
exact threat they pose to the Government of Chad.  The GOC 
acknowledges the existence of the rebel groups, but tends to 
play down its concerns to outsiders.  Nonetheless, the GOC 
itself is helping to heighten tensions by continuing to 
question, detain, and arrest journalists, who refuse to 
divulge their sources of open letters from allegedly rebel 
movements.  The journalists are being charged with printing 
information to incite a revolt.  We appreciate Embassy 
Khartoum's reporting on this issue.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
PLAN OF ATTACK 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (S NF)  In recent weeks, several Embassy sources 
including area residents, African Union observers, and 
members of the Darfur rebel movements have outlined pieces of 
a plan by Chadian rebels to launch an attack in July or 
August, during the raining season which corroborate reporting 
from Khartoum (Ref A).  The most specific report about rebel 
plans that we have received comes from Abdelkader Yacine 
Bakhit, who was an advisor to former Prime Minister Kabadi 
and is the uncle of the Sultan of Goz Beida.  The information 
passed to us from the Sultanate through Bakhit indicates that 
The various rebel groups have mobile training camps and move 
between Darfur and the Chadian border.  The rebels believe 
that it will be difficult for the Chadian military to 
maneuver to defend itself.  The Government of Sudan 
reportedly intends to use jandjaweed (many of whom are 
Chadian Arabs) and the Chadian rebel groups to attack Chad 
along the Kaja and Azoum Rivers during a three month window 
beginning in July or August. 
 
¶3.  (S NF)  According to this information, the rebels' actual 
targets are unspecified, but attacks allegedly might occur 
near Tissi, Dagassou, Modoihyria and Ade, in the Sila 
Department of Chad south of Abeche.  These sources in Goz 
Beida also believe that there may be a link between some of 
these rebel groups and Mahamat Nour.  Two other rebel leaders 
mentioned are Adeledigue and Al Jinead, who are allegedly 
being supplied by Khartoum.  Their goal, according to these 
sources, is regime change.  After seizing power from 
President Deby, the jandjaweed leaders associated with the 
Chadian rebels and others reportedly will be able to escape 
justice for crimes committed in Darfur. 
 
¶4.  (S NF) The Goz Beida sources identified nine training 
camps for Chadian rebels.  There also are reportedly five 
jandjaweed leaders from Arab tribes, including the Salamat 
and the Rachid tribes, and other individuals from the Mimi 
and Ouaddai tribes, who are involved with the Arab Chadian 
rebel leaders, which may include at least 12 colonels from 
the Chadian army.  It is not clear whether they are all 
deserters or are currently on active duty.  Increased 
criminal and rebel activity has resulted in the formation of 
self-defense forces in the Goz Beida region and caused the 
migration of many residents to Goz Beida and Goz Amir.  On 
May 15, UNHCR and ICRC reported 4,000 displaced Chadians in 
the area who are too afraid to go to their homes.  (Ref B.) 
On May 31, jandjaweed or Chadian rebels kidnapped three 
persons, but returned them to Goz Amir three days later. 
Some 200 women collected 5,000 Sudanese pounds to hire armed 
men to protect them and their livestock. 
 
¶5.  (S NF) A visiting British military officer traveled to 
Guereda to investigate some of the rumors about Chadian 
rebels in the area (Ref A).  Guereda is north of Abeche, east 
of Koulbous, a key border crossing area.  He told P/E officer 
and DATT on June 24 that there may be some 300 rebels in and 
around Guereda.  Some of the local residents described the 
presence of a large group of armed men between Guereda and 
the border with Sudan.  He also was told that the objective 
of the group was regime change, but that the capabilities of 
the group were not clear.  He also heard that Chadian rebels 
plan to attack during the rainy season.  Local residents also 
told him that the area was almost devoid of young men who may 
have joined up with various rebel groups. 
 
¶6.  (S NF)  Some Chadian Army officers may be in regular 
contact with jandjaweed members, Chadian Arabs, and Chadian 
rebels along the border.  The Chadian military often conducts 
raids near and across the border to retrieve stolen cattle 
and camels from jandjaweed and bandits.  DRL officers were 
present during a meeting between Chadian Army officer, 
jandjaweed, and other unnamed Chadian Arabs near Birak on 
March 27 where the return of stolen livestock was being 
negotiated.  All of the participants in the meeting were 
heavily armed, many were wearing watches showing Sudan time 
on them.  Local residents and humanitarian organizations note 
that these types of interactions occur frequently along the 
border as the various players, government and non-government 
negotiate and barter over valuable commodities like cattle, 
camels, arms, and fuel. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
CHAIN REACTION 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (S NF) We also are attempting to corroborate information 
that there may be some attempts by rebel political and 
military factions to coordinate their anti-government 
activities.  At the same time, there is some collaboration 
among the political opposition and some army officers in 
N'Djamena to counter an attempt by Mahamat Nour, Chadian 
rebels, or coup plotters to seize power.  On June 28, P/E 
officer discussed the recent press articles about Nour and 
his forces with General Damyo, the former Governor of Moyen 
Chari who is now in N'Djamena.  Damyo knows Nour well and 
said that his objective is seizing power in N'Djamena.  In 
Damyo's opinion, a Nour-launched attack could start a chain 
of events which would quickly get out of control.  He doubts 
that Nour could seize power, but his actions could prove 
destabilizing.  According to Damyo, he and other army 
officers are worried that there is no real plan in place to 
manage a non-violent transition should the Deby regime fall. 
Damyo said that there have been a number of meetings between 
army officers to come to agreement on scenarios for a smooth 
political transition. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
KEEPING A REBEL SCORECARD? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (S NF) We have pieced together tidbits of information 
from a variety of sources, including local press and offered 
other information in previous reporting.  (Refs C and D.) 
There is some speculation that ethnic factors might be 
inhibiting coordination among these groups.  Allegedly, the 
Arab leaders refuse to submit to the Tama-dominated groups. 
The difficulty of movement posed by terrain, beefed up border 
patrols, and lack of communications also may be hampering 
various players from coalescing into a cohesive movement.  In 
terms of numbers, we have heard a range of figures from 300 
to 1,000. 
 
¶9.  (U) Mahamat Nour clearly is the most talked-about Chadian 
rebel.  A former member of the National Alliance for the 
Resistance (ANR), Nour and his group allegedly received 
training and support from the GOS and Libya.  Nour was 
trained in France and Senegal.  He was pictured and quoted in 
the independent newspaper Le Temps (May 18-24) as saying that 
he intended to take power, put in place a transition that 
would last one year, and organize free and fair elections in 
Chad.  His group includes Bechir Hamdan, Abdallah Gogue 
 
(operations commander), and Ismail Idriss.  Another member of 
the former ANR with alleged ties to Nour, Col. Saroua, was 
arrested in Chad by the National Security Agency (ANS) on 
September 24, 2004.  He may have been released, but we have 
no current information on his whereabouts. 
 
¶10.  (U) United Democratic Liberation's (UDL) leader is 
Ousman Fall.  No other information available. 
 
¶11.  (U) Revolutionary Movement's (MMR) leader may be 
Abdullah Ramadan (not the same Ramadan of the Sudan 
Liberation Movement).  Ramadan is a former FROLINAT member 
who worked closely with Abass Koty. 
 
¶12.  (U) Democratic and Revolutionary Council's (CDR) 
political leader is Acheikh Ibn Omar, former Foreign Minister 
and Chadian Ambassador to Washington, now living in Paris. 
CDR's military wing may be led by Colonel Hassan Saleh Al 
Ghadam, better known as Al Jineidi.  He is a army officer of 
Arab descent who was trained at the military academy in 
Tripoli.  Al Jineidi reportedly operates in the Dar Sila and 
Salamat area of Chad.  His forces allegedly work closely with 
the jandjaweed, but also benefit from the complicity of local 
officials. 
 
¶13.  (U) National Resistance Council (CNR) is rumored to be 
led by Hissein Koty, a relation of assassinated Zaghawa-Kobe 
leader Abass Koty.  This group courts disaffected Zaghawa. 
 
¶14.  (U) We also have heard about the existence of another 
rebel group comprised of ethnic Ouaddai.  There also is rebel 
activity along Chad's southern border with the Central 
African Republic.  A gang of unidentified Chadian rebels or 
bandits reportedly attacked a village along the CAR and 
Cameroon on June 15.  Security forces reportedly killed ten 
members of the group which had been terrorizing villages and 
holding children for ransom.  The group include Zaghawas who 
helped bring CAR President Bozize to power. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
GOVERNMENT REACTION 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶15.  (S NF) RSO met with Minister for Public Security 
Abderahman Moussa on June 23.  Moussa identified Nour, Col. 
Soubiane (brother or nephew of the former Chadian Ambassador 
to the United States), and a third rebel by name.  Moussa 
expressed confidence that the Government of Chad knows the 
limitations and capabilities of these groups.  He also noted 
that the GOC is in the initial stages of creating a new 
security reaction force composed of gendarmes and nomadic 
guard, which a new decree has placed under his control. 
Local authorities report additional deployments of Chadian 
military in the east in response to the potential threat 
posed by armed banditry, jandjaweed incursions, ethnic 
conflict between the Zaghawa and Ouaddai tribes, and Chadian 
rebel groups. 
 
¶16.  (S NF) One indication of the government's concerns over 
the Chadian rebels and other opponents, such as the Kreida, 
is that several journalists have been picked up by the 
National Security Agency (ANS) or the Ministry of Public 
Security.  (Ref E) On June 16, Mahamat Garonde Djarma, a 
former Minister of Interior and occasional pundit, was picked 
up by the ANS on June 16 for an article published in Le Temps 
critical of the regime.  On June 22, Michael Didama, the 
director of Le Temps, was arrested for "printing material to 
incite a revolt".  On June 4, Samory Ngaradoumbe of 
L'Obserateur was arrested by the ANS and then released on 
June 6 by Public Security after the newspaper printed an open 
complaint letter from the Kreida ethnic group.  He was 
re-arrested on June 20, charged with publishing material to 
incite a revolt, and is in jail. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶17.  (C)  It is difficult to determine the exact threat the 
rebels pose to the Government.  We estimate that at the very 
least, the presence of a small, motivated group could have a 
 
 
destabilizing effect in the east and, if allied, with groups 
in N'Djamena, ignite a serious of anti-regime actions.  The 
GOC remains concerned about its opponents, regardless of its 
stated confidence.  The reported presence of the rebels in 
the east, public disapproval for the government voiced 
through the low turn-out for the referendum, the disaffection 
of the Kreida ethnic group along Lake Chad, insecurity along 
its southern and eastern border, and the circulation of 
rumors about President Deby's health all are contributing to 
heightened tensions in Chad.  Embassy N'Djamena appreciates 
the efforts of DAO Khartoum and other Embassy officers in 
passing along information from the Sudanese side of the 
border.  We are pursuing our efforts to collect and verify 
information about the Chadian rebels from this side of the 
border. 
 
¶18.  (U)  Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
NNNN