This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2026 
TAGS: PREL PINS PGOV KISL KPAO KE
SUBJECT: MALINDI: MIXING SUN, DRUGS, CORRUPTION AND A 
MARGINALIZED ISLAMIC MAJORITY ON KENYA'S COAST 
 
Classified By: A/PolCouns L. Peterson, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  The Kenyan coastal resort town of 
Malindi is schizophrenic:  hundreds of Italians - and 
upcountry Kenyans - dominate the town,s economic lifeline, a 
tourism industry that caters to tens of thousands of European 
sun-seekers annually.  Some are involved in feeding the 
town,s skyrocketing illegal drug consumption; a resident 
Italian (and his Venezuelan wife) were arrested in connection 
to last December,s one-ton record haul of cocaine (from 
Venezuela).  Political and/or police protection is likely. 
The town,s Muslim majority, meanwhile, shun (or are denied) 
jobs in the beer-drinking, pork-eating and immodest tourist 
trade.  Muslim-Christian tensions are on the rise, although 
Muslim leaders say they strongly support the overall 
financial benefits of tourism for their community.  Muslim 
elders eagerly sought "a real partnership" with the U.S., 
even as they criticized the "U.S. war on Islam" and confessed 
doubts about U.S. genuineness and intentions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Mmm, Malindi 
------------ 
 
¶2. (U)  Settled over the centuries by Arab traders, the 
Portuguese and the British, Malindi was only "discovered" by 
modern-day Italians in the 1980s.  Today, one is more likely 
to hear Italian than Kiswahili spoken at the finer local 
restaurants in this sun-kissed town of 65,000.  At least 700 
Italians are year-round residents.  Hundreds more have bought 
large tracts of choice real estate, established businesses 
and become part-time residents and absentee landlords. 
Italians own some 4-5000 villas around the town, which cater 
to the 15-20,000 Italian tourists who descend on Malindi 
during Italy,s winter months.  Local Muslim leaders and the 
Italian consul (a 27-year resident) concur that Italians have 
become -- and are resented as -- the town,s business elite. 
 
Trouble in paradise?  Crime -- piccolo e grande -- in Malindi 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶3. (U)   Muslim leaders, police and the Italian consul (a 
27-year resident) all agreed that local drug consumption has 
skyrocketed since 2000.  Muslim youths shun working in the 
hotel industry - the main business in the one industry town - 
due to alcohol and pork consumption.  Others are denied 
"downstream" employment providing services and supplies, as 
Italians prefer to do business with fellow expatriates. 
Unemployed local youths have turned to drugs - cocaine, 
hashish, "brown sugar" (heroin), and marijuana.  They both 
use and sell to the tens of thousands of European tourists 
who flock during Europe,s winter months.  Some long-term 
resident Italians are evidently involved in the trafficking. 
 
¶4.  (C) Crime rings often involve current or former police, 
frequently working with some level of political protection. 
The Italian consul (strictly protect throughout) termed the 
local MP, mayor and politicos "corrupt," and the police 
"worse than useless."  Kenyan police are involved in 
extorting tourists.  Local girls sell drugs to unsuspecting 
tourists - then the CID/police swoop in and demand payoffs 
not to prosecute the tourists.  Cops (who can double as 
prosecutors in Kenya,s legal system) are also shaking down 
Italian businessmen.  One, introduced to PolCouns, paid 4000 
USD to avoid a 7-year prison sentence for an illegal starter 
pistol.  At the same time, Italian consul noted that Kenyan 
authorities have a clear history of denying major extradition 
requests.  One Italian living openly in Malindi is facing a 
thirty year Italian prison sentence - if only Kenya would 
extradite him.  Other Europeans sought on drug charges have 
similarly avoided extradition by political payoffs and 
protection.  Malindi service is said to be so profitable that 
cops (Kikuyu) reportedly pay bribes to be assigned there. 
But this state of affairs worked for him, the consul 
volunteered, because he knew whom to contact to "get things 
done."  But for the locals, he said, it was a terrible state 
of affairs. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Large-scale narcotics, trafficking is also 
occurring in, or at least through, Malindi. Italian Angelo 
Ricci, age 73, and his wife were arrested last December after 
700-plus kilos of cocaine were uncovered in a speedboat at a 
house they rented out to tenants who were later charged in 
the affair.   This seizure, plus a related 300 kilos seized 
while being repacked in a Nairobi shipping container depot 
make up the largest single cocaine seizure in African 
history.  (The cocaine had evidently come from Venezuela for 
repackaging in Kenya for onward shipment to Europe.) Ricci, 
who has split his time between Malindi and Europe since the 
early 1990s, is locally known for his high-stakes gambling 
addiction. But "his Mafia history in Milan," said one who 
knew him, had always been just "small-time crime " never 
narcotics."  The ton of cocaine, perhaps not so 
coincidentally, came from the country of his wife,s origin - 
Venezuela. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Local police leadership is clueless at best. Deputy 
Police Commander for Malindi Division claimed to know nothing 
of that day,s page one headline "120 hardcore criminals 
targeted on Coast Police operations."  Nor could he identify 
which drug was most commonly abused or sold; nor was he aware 
that one of the Kikambala suspects just freed was likely to 
return to his family in Malindi. 
 
¶7.  (C)  All sides agreed that what used to be Kenyan-Italian 
tensions in Malindi are becoming Muslim-Christian tensions. 
Several wealthy Muslim families, with significant Saudi 
financial support, have doubled the number of mosques in the 
past five years.  And tensions are rising.  A gunbattle 
occurred in May between Muslims and Christians in a small 
town north of Malindi. Christian and Muslim youths gather and 
yell at each other from opposite sides of the streets after 
Friday prayers in Malindi.  The Consul said several Muslim 
"rabble-rousers" were working to increase tensions.  They 
were not working from the mosques, he claimed, but from the 
streets among the unemployed youth. 
 
"Is the hand shakeable?" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Poloffs and CJTF-HOA Civil Affairs team leader met 
with eight Muslim leaders from Malindi,s religious, 
business, educational and NGO communities.   The planned 
one-hour meeting stretched into two -- and then three -- as 
the group engaged in an increasingly frank dialogue.  Initial 
discussions on local education, youth unemployment and 
skyrocketing drug use turned to a freewheeling discussion of 
the U.S. and Islam.  Leaders were well aware of U.S. civil 
affairs efforts further north (Lamu) and South (Kilifi, 
Mombasa) along Kenya,s coast, and sought greater attention 
to Malindi,s own needs.  Interested in increased contacts 
with the USG, they requested U.S. college scholarships for 
local students; some expressed concern about the cutoff of 
U.S. military assistance to Kenya due to Article 98.  But 
they also readily admitted suspicions of U.S. motives for 
engagement.  Intrigued, they asked, "Why now?  What is your 
interest?  Is the hand (extended by the U.S.)  shakeable?" 
They repeatedly said they sought "a real partnership" with 
the U.S. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Muslim leaders nonetheless expressed a belief that 
the current U.S. administration was waging war "against 
Islam."  Many of their opinions also betrayed an underlying 
belief that the USG was omnipotent - and behind all that 
happens in the world, from the Algerian civil war to key 
decisions in Kenyan politics.   Behind the U.S., some clearly 
saw "the Jews."  The U.S., they asserted, could easily solve 
the Israeli-Palestine conflict -- if only we really tried. At 
the same time, Saudi and Egyptian leaders were 
pseudo-Islamists, using their positions to oppress the people 
while obtaining American largesse and political support. 
They complained that U.S. efforts to restrict terror 
financing had dramatically reduced Islamic NGO contributions 
to their communities. Among the few books emboffs were shown 
in the private elementary school,s library were 
Arabic-language texts donated by Kuwait: they appealed for 
U.S. book contributions. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Misinformation was evident, even as they appeared 
reasonably open to learning new facts.  One asked about the 
Internet rumor that 4000 Jews stayed home from work at the 
World Trade Center on 9/11.  The Taliban rose up, another 
claimed, because the U.S. sought to impose U.S.-style 
democracy after the Soviet pull-out (and not because the U.S. 
walked away thereafter).  The USG is now "going after" Sudan. 
 Yet another rumor: that the U.S. is seeking to rewrite the 
Koran. 
 
¶11. (SBU)  While they rejected U.S. political intervention as 
a matter of principal, they were not shy in asking the 
Embassy to pressure President Kibaki to accept a continuing 
role for khadis courts in the draft constitution. (We told 
them the issue was for Kenyans to determine; our concern was 
that some politicians were inciting (Christian) religious 
fervor to block passage of the draft constitution.)  Seeing a 
potential opening, one Imam asked if the United States could 
accept a country ruled by sharia, "you know, where a thief 
loses his hand, and an adulterer is stoned to death."  While 
he appreciated the direct answer, he was evidently not 
pleased when told we could not if that meant a regime that 
ruled like the National Islamic Front in Sudan or the Taliban 
in Afghanistan, denying fundamental rights to women and 
harboring international terrorists. 
 
¶12. (SBU)  After much criticism of U.S. policy and requests 
for clarifications of U.S. actions, emboffs asked why there 
was no criticism of Islamic suicide attacks on other Muslims, 
in Iraq or elsewhere.  "Because they are powerless," came the 
response.  They cannot attack the U.S. directly, so they 
attack U.S. "puppets," like Iraqis lined up to become police 
recruits.  "We oppose it," they claimed, "but do not expect 
us to directly speak out against it."  After complaints that 
Kenya,s Muslims remained marginalized from national politics 
and a request for U.S. political support, emboffs asked how 
that support should be expressed so as to not undermine the 
reforms the Muslims sought.  Quiet, private diplomacy, said 
some; high-profile public statements said others.  Asked how 
the U.S. could assist reform efforts in the Islamic world 
while avoiding situations in which anti-democratic forces -- 
Islamist or otherwise -- sought "one man, one vote, one 
time,"  they had no answer. 
 
¶13.  (C)  COMMENT:  Malindi leaders, particularly from the 
Muslim community, have complained in the past that the U.S. 
has not been engaged in their community.  Although there is 
substantial suspicion of U.S. motivations and policies, the 
Muslim leaders we met were clearly open to the possibility of 
engagement with the U.S. Whether through CA projects, public 
diplomacy outreach, or political engagement, Post will 
continue to foster a relationship with the communities in 
Malindi.  END COMMENT. 
 
BELLAMY