This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 002618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF 
STATE PASS AID 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2025 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA -- CENTER OF GRAVITY NOW IN SOMALIA FOR 
TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 2488 
     ¶B. NAIROBI 2516 
 
Classified By: LISA J. PETERSON, ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR, REASONS 1. 
4 (B) AND (D) 
 
--------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Despite Yemeni efforts to mediate between the 
Transitional Federal President and the Speaker of the 
Assembly, talks in Sanaa on key issues separating two main 
camps in the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) appear 
to have ended in acrimony.  Prime Minister Ghedi has declared 
his government to be based in Jowhar -- and the controlling 
warlord has said nothing to disabuse the PM of this idea. 
The Somali rumor mill is rife with dooms-day scenarios in 
which President Yusuf takes military action in order to wrest 
from the hands of his opponents the presidency -- which no 
one is trying to take from him.  Members of the Assembly are 
streaming into Somalia, with some dispersing to their home 
regions -- either heeding the President's call to bring 
reconciliation to the district level, or avoiding what they 
might see as an unhealthy security situation in the capital 
-- and others going to Mogadishu to join the Speaker and 
other colleagues in a session of the Parliament, scheduled 
for June 25.  The idea that the President, with Ethiopian 
help, is setting in place the final pieces of a military 
strategy has taken on such currency as to be the driving 
force behind the actions of many political and civil society 
players in Somalia.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
PRIME MINISTER TO JOWHAR ... 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) As reported ref (B), President Yusuf departed 
Nairobi June 13 for the G-77 meeting in Qatar.  The next 
Somali notable to leave the Kenyan capital was Prime Minister 
Ali Mohammed Ghedi, who boarded a plane June 18 bound for his 
family home town of Jowhar, currently under control of his 
relative, the Hawiye Abgal-clan warlord Muhammad Omar Habeb 
(AKA "Muhammad Dheere").  Despite Dheere's announcement June 
14 that Jowhar was unsuitable as a temporary seat for the 
TFG, press reports were soon quoting the Prime Minister that 
he has led his government to its new home.  Reuters quoted 
Ghedi June 21 as saying "My government has finally moved to 
Somalia.  Jowhar is our base until Mogadishu is pacified." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The PM got additional press coverage when he laid a 
foundation stone in an expansion project at Jowhar airstrip 
-- an act of irony, given the fact that President Yusuf had 
stressed the inadequacy of the airstrip there when he 
declined to land there in the evening of June 13.   Reports 
of Ghedi's speech at the occasion said the PM had stressed 
that Jowhar airport needed a quick upgrade so that 
international leaders and foreign delegates, whom he and 
President Yusuf would be hosting soon, could use it.  This 
was apparently in keeping with the PM's conversation, prior 
to his departure from Nairobi, with UN Special Representative 
of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ambassador Francois Fall. 
Amb.  Fall told Somalia Watcher that, at a meeting June 16, 
the PM had informed him that henceforth, all gatherings of 
the consultative body the two men co-chair, the Somalia 
Coordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC), would have to be 
held in Somalia, and that the international community members 
of the committee should prepare for such a meeting in July, 
to be convened in Jowhar. 
 
---------------------------- 
PRESIDENT, SPEAKER TO SANAA 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Meanwhile, President Yusuf traveled O/A June 20 
from Doha to the Yemeni capital Sanaa.  Transitional Federal 
Assembly Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden joined him there 
for talks mediated by the good offices of Yemeni President 
Ali Abdallah Saleh.  The press and the Nairobi rumor mill 
reported that four issues were on the table between the two 
men: A series of appointments and sackings of Ministers and 
local government officials by decree of the Prime Minister; 
several motions on which sub-quorum gatherings of MPs had 
debated and voted since the last ill-fated parliamentary 
plenary on March 17; the seat of the government in Somalia; 
and the make-up of any future peace support mission that 
might deploy to assist the TFG with security.  Despite rumors 
on June 22 of a preliminary agreement, every indication of an 
energetic effort on the part of the Yemeni hosts, and at 
least one face-to-face discussion between the Somali 
President and Speaker, all indications on June 23 were that 
the talks had broken down in acrimony.  Somalia Watcher 
received calls late that night stating that the Speaker and 
his delegation were en route to Mogadishu, where a session of 
Parliament would be convened June 25, while the President was 
rumored to be departing Sanaa June 24 for Jowhar, with 
expected stops en route in Bosasso and Garoowe in his home 
region of Puntland. 
 
-------------------------------- 
TAKING HIS PRESIDENCY BY FORCE? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) However, the more enthusiastic of the rumor mongers 
have Yusuf landing in Bosasso, and heading for Garoowe, but 
from there crossing Ethiopian territory to the town Ferfer, 
roughly due north of Beletweyne, on the Ethiopia-Somali 
border.  He would link up there with some 800 Puntland 
militiamen that have reportedly been posted in the town since 
early June.  With a force in hand, Yusuf would then head for 
Huddur, in Bakol District, link up with Rahanweyne militias 
there, and execute the military campaign to wrest his 
(uncontested) presidency from the Hawiye warlords squatting 
on Mogadishu (see reftel B for discussion of this supposed 
strategy). 
 
¶6.  (C) Facts on the ground, and reports from various 
neighboring countries, might be interpreted as supporting 
these rumors.  For example, the UN's security chief for 
Somalia informed the international community members of the 
CMC (I-CMC members) that the Puntland militiamen referred to 
para 5 had in fact been pre-positioned in Ferfer -- as a 
presidential security force.  According to the UN, the force 
in Ferfer was to have been divided, with roughly half to have 
transferred to Jowhar for the President's close protection. 
Agence France Press (AFP) reports indicated that "well armed 
forces from Puntland (...) arrived in Jowhar" on June 20, 
"(...) armed with over 10 'technicals".  AFP quoted Mohammed 
Dheere as confirming that the force would guard the 
President's and ministers' residences. 
 
¶7.  (C) While personal protection in Jowhar seems a 
reasonable precaution for the President to take, the UN's 
information on the disposition of the other half of the 
Ferfer force -- that it is to move to Bakol District to join 
with the Rahanweyne militias -- is less easy to explain. 
Jowhar warlord Dheere is also quoted in the press as saying 
that part of the Puntlander force would depart for Huddur to 
reinforce an already existing force there.   Rumor buffs 
point to increasing press reports from Ethiopia, claiming 
that rebels of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 
were gathering in Galguduud District in Somalia, in 
preparation for attacks on Ethiopian troops.  Such reports 
have been used as justification for Ethiopian military action 
in their Ogaden region -- and cross-border, into Somalia. 
Taken together, these elements -- Puntland militias combining 
with Yusuf-loyal Rahanweyne forces, and a pretext for 
Ethiopian intervention in protection of valid security 
interests -- give plenty of fodder for the theorists that say 
Yusuf plans to mount a military operation with Ethiopian 
assistance to take control of Mogadishu -- in essence, 
mounting a coup d'etat against himself. 
 
------------------------------ 
PARLIAMENT SCATTERED ALL OVER 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The UNDP Chief in Nairobi, Max Gaylard, briefed 
I-CMC members on June 21 on his agency's attempts to assist 
the return of ministers/MPs and former Somali National 
Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) delegates from Nairobi to 
Somalia.  He characterized the operation as "relatively 
smooth for the delegates, but problematic -- chaos, actually 
-- for the MPs." Gaylard reported that Prime Minister Ghedi 
had on June 16 submitted a list of all the MPs remaining in 
Nairobi, with a prescribed destination in what Ghedi had 
determined to be the home district in Somalia for each MP. 
MPs, however, presented themselves to the UNDP offices, 
refusing to abide by the PM's prescriptions, and threatening 
harm to UNDP staff if they were forced to go anywhere not of 
their own choosing, with most of these stating they intended 
to join the Speaker of the Assembly and other ministers/MPs 
in Mogadishu.  Gaylard stated that the PM backed down on June 
18 on the specifics of his list "as he climbed the stairs of 
his aircraft."  Since then, UNDP has been canvassing the MPs 
to determine their preferred destination in Somalia, with 
flights having already begun that morning.  Press reports 
filed from Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta International Airport told 
of a delegation of 22 MPs en route to the Puntland towns of 
Garoowe and Gaalkacyo.  Gaylard committed to I-CMC members 
that he would provide a complete list of MPs transported into 
Somalia, and their destinations, as soon as the operation is 
completed. 
 
------------------------------- 
PUBLIC STATEMENT WELL RECEIVED 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Somali Watcher on June 22 met with former Somali Army 
Colonel and current senior Al-Islah figure Mr.  Abdirahman 
Moalim Abdullahi (AKA "Badiyow"), at his request, to discuss 
the current situation in Mogadishu and Somalia.  Badiyow, a 
Somali Canadian who is currently resident in Montreal, had 
spent the previous 45 days in Mogadishu, and claimed to have 
been deeply involved in the civil society efforts to change 
the security equation in the capital.  Badiyow enthused over 
the June 21 public statement issued in Nairobi, saying it was 
constructive to see a clear endorsement of the legitimizing 
power of the Somali people.  (Badiyow was also extremely 
complimentary of the Secretary's recent speeches in the 
Middle East, expressing appreciation for language that he 
characterized as an "apology for an historical bias toward 
dictator-enforced stability, and away from popularly-based 
democracy.") 
 
-------------------------------- 
FUNDING NEEDED -- BUT THERE ARE 
NO SAFE DELIVERY MECHANISMS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Badiyow lamented that there was a real problem with 
the provision of financial assistance to any part of the 
Somali experiment -- whether that would be in support of 
Mogadishu's civil society, or President Yusuf's 
district-level reconciliation, or the warlord's cantonment of 
militias.  "No matter what the goal would be, or how 
desperately it is needed, money would only fuel conflict," he 
opined.  He critiqued European Commission funding, on the 
verge of disbursement through UNDP channels, for 
district-level reconciliation as the most dangerous effort in 
the making.  "Who will have control of the money in the 
villages and towns? It will have to be the MPs, but these MPs 
are not the choice of the people -- the warlords who 
controlled the outcome of the SNRC selected them.  So when 
these MPs show up with cash in hand, and a potentially 
hostile population, there will be no reconciliation -- only 
the buying of protection."  Badiyow stressed that, from his 
point of view, even the efforts of his colleagues in civil 
society should be left without outside resources, despite the 
desperate calls for assistance.  His logic: That the process 
of pushing the warlords into peace had drawn its power from 
the fact that it was entirely home-grown, and that whoever 
might receive funds from an outside source would be seen as 
in that source's pocket.   "Let civil society keep pushing 
this forward with our own funds, and those we squeeze from 
the businessmen." His one exception was the need for 
infrastructure in the militia cantonment camps, but even 
here, he acknowledged that funds to improve the situation for 
the "demobilized" boys would most likely end up in the 
pockets of the warlords. 
 
--------------------------- 
COMMENTS: 
CENTER OF GRAVITY SHIFTING 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) With the steady stream of Somali TFI members 
continuing into Somalia during the week of June 18-24, the 
number of those heading into the country they purport to 
represent and propose to govern is mounting.  Mogadishu 
appears to be acting as a magnet -- for some MPs, attracting 
them toward the capital and the Speaker, and for others, 
especially those originating from Puntland, repelling them 
toward their home regions. 
¶12.  (C) June 25 may prove telling in where the center of 
gravity has shifted.  The Speaker of the Assembly announced 
on June 12 (reported reftel A) that the next meeting of the 
Parliament, at its "temporary headquarters in Mogadishu", 
would convene on that day.  He had set forth an agenda 
without obvious political overtones -- establishing 
parliamentary committees and electing committee chairmen, 
approving the annual budget of the government, confirming 
numerous independent commissions.  Should the session go 
forward, whatever business might be discussed will be less 
important than the tally of who shows up, in what numbers. 
 
¶13.  (C) We have reported in some detail on the rumors 
surrounding apparently verifiable movements of militias, on 
press reports regarding "events" with implications for 
Somalia's neighbor to the west, and on the apocalyptic 
scenarios put forth to explain the alignment of various 
elements that could signal a resumption of outright civil war 
in Somalia.  As noted in reftel B, this is less a reflection 
of any credence we give to these rumors, than an indication 
of the kinds of worries that seem to be uppermost in the 
minds of Somalis, and upon which they base their plans and 
actions.  Although Al-Islah's Badiyow referred to President 
Yusuf as "a fine planner, but someone who rarely gets around 
to implementing his plans," it seems that Somalis of all 
stripes put such confidence in the many theories of what 
might be going on in the President's head that he does not 
need to do much of anything for uncertainty to be the 
principal condition in Somalia.  END COMMENTS. 
BELLAMY