This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L  HANOI 001394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KIRF PREF ETRD VM PROV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Marine per 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Prime Minister Phan Van Khai's visit to the United 
States will be the first by a Vietnamese Prime Minister since 
1975, and will take place in the tenth anniversary year of 
the normalization of bilateral relations.  This historic 
occasion will give us the opportunity to highlight a growing 
and increasingly fruitful relationship while underscoring 
that our two countries' shared history, while not forgotten, 
is no longer an obstacle to the development of bilateral 
ties.  At the same, we will able to note at the highest level 
our remaining concerns about a number of issues, such as 
human rights, religious freedom and ethnic minorities. 
Although the Prime Minister will be chary to engage on these 
topics ) he will want his discussions to be positive and 
future-oriented ) the Vietnamese nonetheless recognize that 
these are important issues to us. 
 
¶2. (C) We should use the visit to: 
 
-- highlight our increasingly overlapping national interests 
and move toward expanding our bilateral dialogue on a number 
of global and regional issues of mutual concern; 
 
-- express U.S. support for Vietnam's continued regional and 
international integration, including WTO accession and 
hosting APEC 2006; 
 
-- make clear that success in Vietnam's efforts to stamp out 
corruption, increase transparency, guarantee intellectual 
property rights and promote rule of law is the best way to 
attract U.S. investment; 
 
-- welcome recent progress related to the issues of religious 
freedom, human rights and ethnic minorities, but caution that 
a slow-down or reversal of advances in these areas will 
negatively impact bilateral relations; 
 
-- highlight the critical importance of our joint efforts to 
combat HIV/AIDS and to prevent or respond to an Avian 
Influenza (AI) pandemic; 
 
-- thank the GVN for cooperation in Fullest Possible 
Accounting, including its recent commitment to allow access 
to the Central Highlands for survey and recovery operations. 
 
What the Visit Means for Vietnam 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Our Vietnamese interlocutors have told us that the 
visit will be a milestone in the bilateral relationship akin 
to the normalization of relations ten years ago.  Indeed, the 
Prime Minister's delegation, which will include one Deputy 
Prime Ministers, five Ministers, ten Vice Ministers and 120 
businesspersons (at last count), will be one of Vietnam's 
largest ever.  The Vietnamese have also reminded us on 
several occasions about the importance of the visit's optics, 
noting that the Vietnamese people will judge the state of 
bilateral ties based on the reception the Prime Minister 
receives.  Reflective of the importance the GVN attaches to 
this event, in an effort to "clear the decks" beforehand and 
to create the most positive atmosphere possible, GVN 
leadership has given the nod to try to conclude a number of 
government-to-government agreements, covering agriculture, 
maritime transportation, economic cooperation, scientific 
assistance, adoptions and military education and training. 
On the commercial front, Vietnam Airlines recently agreed to 
purchase four 787 aircraft and will issue insurance licenses 
to New York Life and ACE, success stories that will be 
highlighted at a Department of Commerce event.  A number of 
other commercial deals have recently been concluded or are in 
train. 
 
¶4. (C) The decision to schedule the Prime Minister's visit 
was a "high-level political one," according to our 
interlocutors.  In fact, the Prime Minister himself reviewed 
the draft joint statement and attached his handwritten 
comments.  One of the reasons for this visit's importance is 
how it plays into Vietnam's political calendar.  In the 
run-up to the Communist Party's quinquennial Congress in 2006 
- the main theme of which is an evaluation of 20 years of 
Vietnam's "doi moi" (renewal) policy ) the most important 
debate will be between those who favor increasing the pace 
and scope of openness and reform and those who would slow 
down the process.  Supporters of strengthened relations with 
the United States (and who are wary of China's rise) are more 
or less in the former camp, and those who prefer to cast 
Vietnam's lot with China ) and are suspicious of U.S. 
intentions - are generally in the latter.  How the Prime 
Minister's U.S. visit is evaluated back home will no doubt be 
a factor in Party debate and discussions and will strengthen 
 
the hands of some, while weakening others. 
 
¶5. (C) Furthermore, Khai's visit is the capstone to a 
five-year process of improving relations with the United 
States based on a reformist-driven foreign policy decision 
laid out in the last Party Congress and subsequent Plenums. 
There is a growing conviction in some circles that, in 
addition to being a vital source of financial and technical 
assistance and a huge market for Vietnamese goods, the United 
States represents an important force in the maintenance of a 
stable Asian geopolitical environment in which even "small" 
countries like Vietnam are assured their independence and 
freedom of action.  Finally, the visit is designed to 
reciprocate President Clinton's 2000 visit to Vietnam and to 
set the stage for a bilateral visit by President Bush in 
connection with the 2006 APEC summit in Hanoi. 
 
WTO/Economic Themes 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) At the top of Vietnam's foreign policy agenda is its 
desire to accede to the WTO.  As in China, the Vietnamese 
Communist Party's governing contract with the Vietnamese 
people obligates it to deliver continued rapid growth and 
economic opportunity.  The Party has determined that regional 
and international economic integration is an essential step 
for Vietnam's economic development, and WTO entry is the top 
manifestation of that.  Senior leaders in the Party and the 
Government will be evaluated by the Party Congress in terms 
of whether they have met Vietnam's WTO goals. 
 
¶7. (C) The GVN has committed to extremely ambitious national 
economic policy changes to accommodate the demands of its 
bilateral WTO negotiation partners; implementing those 
changes will require significant work in drafting and passing 
new legislation.  However, Vietnam is running out of time to 
make these necessary legislative changes, and the 
high-powered team it is sending to Washington this week to 
&be available8 during the next round of bilateral talks ) 
including five Vice Ministers and Deputy Prime Minister Vu 
Khoan ) reflects the seriousness with which Hanoi views this 
issue. 
 
¶8. (C) Our Vietnamese interlocutors often note that U.S. 
investment in Vietnam is "too low" and not "meeting the 
potential of the bilateral economic relationship," and the 
Prime Minister probably will make this point.  Although the 
level of investment appears low, in reality it is three times 
higher because the GVN's figures do not reflect investment 
funneled through third countries.  That said, the level of 
U.S. investment is still relatively low.  In large measure, 
this is because many American investors are waiting to see 
how Vietnam's economic reform efforts play out, whether the 
Bilateral Trade Agreement is respected by both sides and to 
what extent Vietnam's WTO aspirations move forward to create 
conditions more attractive for foreign investors.  A point we 
often underline is that, because Vietnam is competing with 
its neighbors for U.S. investment dollars, it has to create 
an economic environment in which corruption is stamped out, 
rule of law is the order of the day and transparency can be 
relied on. 
 
Increasing Overlap of National Interests:  China... 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶9. (C) In addition to Vietnam's economic and trade agenda, 
the recognition by Vietnam's leadership that our two 
countries increasingly share a number of regional and global 
interests isalso spurring on bilateral ties.  First among 
thse is the shared interest in ensuring that China rses 
peacefully and is nt allowed to dominate the region or 
regional orgnizations.  Although the subject of China may 
no come up directly, the Prime Minister will likely ote 
that Vietnam welcomes the role of the UnitedStates in the 
region and urge us to strengthen ou relations with ASEAN. 
Despite recent efforts topatch relations, Vietnam's 
relationship with Chia has seen better days, and this may 
provide us ith an opening to suggest expanding and elevating 
our bilateral dialogue to discuss issues of mutual concern. 
 
...Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement... 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) The Prime Minister may refer to our two countries' 
shared interest in combating terrorism, narcotics, 
trafficking-in-persons and international organized crime. 
Although we are pursuing modest efforts in these areas, they 
are nowhere close to meeting their potential.  The reluctance 
of security and other officials suspicious of U.S. intentions 
has stymied our attempts to pursue operational law 
enforcement cooperation and more effective information 
 
exchanges.  It would be useful to underline the importance 
the United States also attaches to these issues, while 
stressing that the promise of our cooperative efforts at the 
operational level remains largely unfulfilled. 
 
...HIV/AIDS, Avian Influenza and Humanitarian Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶11. (C) Our cooperative efforts in the fight against HIV/AIDS 
represent a success story that we never hesitate to 
highlight.  Since the June 2004 Presidential designation of 
Vietnam as the fifteenth focus country in his Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief, U.S. Emergency Plan funding for Vietnam has 
sought to build a sustainable, comprehensive national 
HIV/AIDS control program based on the Vietnam National 
Strategy and with a focus in the areas of HIV prevention, 
care and treatment. 
 
¶12. (C) We have repeatedly urged the GVN to address a problem 
of lack of capacity in the Ministry of Health (MoH) and its 
lack of authority to manage adequately the national HIV/AIDS 
program.  We believe that overall responsibility should be 
vested in an inter-ministerial coordinating body, with 
representatives from the Labor, Public Security and Defense 
Ministries, and with clear lines of authority from the 
central government.  Similarly MoH management and capacity 
problems hinder rapid GVN preparations for a possible Avian 
Influenza (AI) pandemic in Vietnam.  This detracts from 
excellent performances by many elements in the MoH and 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). 
 
Outstanding Issues:  Religious Freedom... 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) In the area of religious freedom, the Prime 
Minister's Instruction on Protestantism, the implementing 
Decree for the Ordinance on Religion and the decision to 
release a number of high-profile religious and political 
prisoners represent welcome and substantial progress.  These 
actions, and our two countries' recent religious freedom 
agreement, represent good progress in responding to our need 
to see Vietnam:  ban forced renunciations and punish those 
who violate this; re-open shuttered churches; release 
religious prisoners; and ensure that religious believers are 
allowed to practice their faith in peace. 
 
¶14. (C) One of the driving forces behind recent improvements 
in the religious freedom situation was the desire to remove a 
potential obstacle to arranging the PM's visit.  Indeed, the 
Prime Minister probably would prefer that the issue not come 
up at all save to win approval of the steps Vietnam has taken 
so far and be told that Vietnam is well on the path to being 
removed from the list of Countries of Particular Concern. 
While it is worth noting that the USG welcomes the steps 
Vietnam has taken to date, we nonetheless need to see 
effective, consistent implementation of Vietnam's new 
religious freedom-related laws and regulations, particularly 
in traditionally problematic regions such as the Central and 
Northwest Highlands. 
 
...Human Rights and Democracy... 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Vietnam is without question a freer and more open 
society than it was as few as five years ago.  People are now 
more or less free to choose the kind of life they would like 
for themselves, including where to live, what kind of job to 
take and what kind of lifestyle to lead.  The press and the 
National Assembly are also increasingly able to take on 
formerly sensitive subjects, such as corruption, fraud and 
bad policymaking.  Modest efforts are also underway to 
devolve power away from the central government and increase 
public accountability, particularly in budget decisions at 
lowest levels of local administration. 
 
¶16. (C) However, Vietnam is still an authoritarian, one-party 
State in which criticism of the Communist Party and the 
"system" is not tolerated, and efforts to challenge the 
Communist Party's rule are dealt with severely.  While a 
number of political and religious prisoners have been freed 
over the past several months, dozens remain in prison. 
Although Vietnam has shown a willingness to address specific 
issues of concern to us ) and has agreed in principle to 
restarting our Human Rights Dialogue ) in the short- to 
medium-term, there are no prospects for fundamental changes 
in one-Party, authoritarian rule. 
 
...Central Highlands... 
----------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) A continuing source of friction in our ties is the 
 
Central Highlands.  A volatile historical mix of ethnic 
divisions, separatist aspirations, economic disparity and a 
rapid growth in the number of Protestant faithful has led the 
GVN to pursue policies that have swung between promoting 
social and economic development and cracking down harshly on 
religious and other "unauthorized gatherings."  Organizations 
and individuals exist inside and outside of Vietnam that seek 
a separate state for certain ethnic minority groups.  Clashes 
between ethnic minorities and security forces in 2001 and 
2004 offered proof to the Vietnamese authorities that a 
separatist movement is a threat; these clashes also proved 
for those critical of the regime that Vietnam is a harsh 
oppressor of religious believers and ethnic minorities. 
 
¶18. (C) Neither side is completely right or wrong.  The GVN 
has expressed gratitude for our assurances that the United 
States supports the territorial integrity of Vietnam and 
condemns violent opposition to the GVN, a point that is 
included in the draft joint statement.  Convincing the GVN ) 
particularly its more conservative elements in the Party, the 
MPS, and the Army ) that the United States represents no 
threat to Vietnam's sovereignty or territorial integrity has 
been crucial in developing the concept of shared global and 
regional interests.  We continue to stress to the GVN that 
problems in the Central Highlands attract international 
attention and must be handled with maximum care.  We also 
make the point that pursuing equitable social and economic 
development policies towards ethnic minority populations and 
allowing international organizations to verify improving 
conditions is essential to dispel the impression that the GVN 
is engaged in repression in the Central Highlands. 
 
¶19. (C) Of immediate concern to us is our "follow-to-join" 
program for the family members of ethnic minority refugees 
whom we resettled in the United States.  A number of family 
members continue to face harassment and cannot receive or 
even apply for passports and our repeated efforts to deal 
with this issue at the local and central Government levels 
have been disappointing.  A related concern is for the fate 
of ethnic minorities who voluntarily returned to Vietnam 
after crossing illegally into Cambodia.  A UNHCR 
representative has been able to travel to the region to look 
into the situation facing the returnees, but we need to see 
more regularized access and monitoring. 
 
...and Agent Orange 
------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) The Prime Minister may raise "legacies of the war," 
code for Agent Orange (AO).  In fact, the GVN hopes to 
include a reference to this issue in the draft joint 
statement currently being worked by our two sides.  AO has 
long been a contentious issue in our bilateral relations, 
with intense media attention in the past few months in 
reaction to the dismissed lawsuit against Dow Chemical and 
other manufacturers by the Vietnamese Association for Victims 
of Agent Orange.  In February, the U.S. National Institute 
for Environmental Health Studies announced it would cancel a 
joint project to study the effects of Agent Orange/dioxin due 
to the lack of cooperation from the GVN.  You may wish to 
emphasize that further research is needed to get to the 
scientific truth of this issue, and that the USG has provided 
$35 million worth of assistance to the disabled in Vietnam 
since 1991, regardless of the cause. 
 
Fullest Possible Accounting 
--------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) We continue to have good cooperation with the 
Vietnamese in the fullest possible accounting of our 
personnel missing from the war.  During Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Peter Rodman's June 7-8 visit to Hanoi, the 
Vietnamese pledged to address four issues of concern for us, 
namely access to the Central Highlands for investigation and 
recovery operations, underwater recovery operations, better 
archival access and more unilateral efforts by Vietnam. 
These are positive steps worth noting, but we will need to 
see follow-through in the months ahead. 
 
¶22. (C) To sum up, this historic visit offers us the 
opportunity to strengthen the foundation of our bilateral 
relationship by confirming our shared interests in relevant 
regional and global issues, reassuring the Vietnamese about 
their highest priority issues and expressing at the highest 
level our thoughts on remaining issues of concern between the 
United States and Vietnam. 
Marine 
 
 
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