This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 001394 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, JUNE 2, 
2005 
 
REF: GENEVA 1387 (JCIC-XXVII-015) 
 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-019. 
 
¶2.  (U) At a U.S.-hosted reception, held on June 2 at the 
U.S. Mission, Delegation members engaged the other 
participating Delegations' members from Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine on various topics under discussion in the 
JCIC.  Those conversations are reported below. 
 
THANKS FOR THE LAWYERS 
 
¶3.  (S) Dunn spoke with Sorokina regarding work in the first 
half of JCIC-XXVII.  She confirmed that the only items she 
was aware of that were to be completed were the Bulava 
documents, the draft Agreement on Replacement of RDE, the 
draft S-Series joint statement on Zlatoust, and possibly some 
work on Ground Transportation formats.  She did not indicate 
that there was anything else the Russian Delegation was going 
to raise.  She also commented on how helpful it was to have a 
lawyer on their Delegation, stating that was something she 
had pushed for after the last session (based in part on the 
U.S. request that Russia have a lawyer available).  She said 
it made it much quicker to get things done. 
 
¶4.  (S) On other topics, Sorokina indicated to Dunn that it 
was her impression that the Russians are committed to the 
June 28-30 Working Group One (WG-1) meetings (they already 
have their logistics confirmed, and are arriving June 27), 
and are fully expecting the United States to show. 
 
BULAVA 
 
¶5.  (S) Foley asked Ryzhkov when the flight-test for the 
Bulava could be expected.  Would it be conducted before the 
end of this year?  Ryzhkov answered that it would probably 
occur after the conversion of all the launchers on the 
Typhoon had been completed.  He stated that this is a 
different system and that a non-standard process was being 
undertaken to get it tested and deployed.  He allowed as to 
how the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement problem would have to 
be addressed, but conducting the initial flight is the 
imperative at this time. 
 
¶6.  (C) Fedorchenko told Singer, Page and Foley that Russian 
experts believed that, from a statistical perspective, data 
from a minimum of three RSM-56 flight-tests would be needed 
to accurately calculate the missile's throw-weight. 
 
SS-25 ELIMINATIONS 
 
¶7.  (S) Venevtsev asked Foley why the United States does not 
consider the SS-25s as eliminated.  The Russian view is that 
they will never fly again and, therefore, Russia considers 
them eliminated.  Foley responded that the Treaty describes 
certain procedures for the elimination of mobile ICBMs.  In 
the case of the recent SS-25 eliminations, those procedures 
had not been completed, specifically for the SCDM and 
nozzles.  Accordingly, the United States considers that the 
status of the four ICBMs remains open.  He added that there 
are significant differences of Treaty interpretation on this 
matter and, until they are resolved, the situation must 
remain open.  Venevtsev asked whether there could be common 
ground on the SCDM issue and suggested that the upper section 
in dispute could be presented for inspectors to view and then 
removed, but it would not be eliminated.  Foley responded 
that removal of the electronic devices and elimination of the 
airframe containing those devices would provide a basis for 
consideration.  Venevtsev did not indicate any enthusiasm for 
such an outcome.  Foley stated that it was hard to understand 
why those devices could not be removed from the airframe 
without damaging them, but Venevtsev only responded that the 
system was designed in that fashion.  Venevtsev expressed 
concern that the eliminations not be slowed down or halted as 
a result of this dispute, because the backlog would create 
serious problems with plans for elimination of the SS-25 
force.  Foley replied that the Parties needed to find a 
solution. 
 
¶8.  (S) Johnston had essentially the same conversation with 
Venevtsev on SS-25 elimination.  Venevtsev suggested that it 
would remove the issue, it was his view that Russia could 
make the guidance and control section available for viewing. 
However, Russia had no intention of destroying the unit. 
 
¶9.  (S) Buttrick asked Bolotov and Smirnov how soon it would 
be before U.S. inspectors would encounter burned-out 
first-stage rocket motors during SS-25 ICBM elimination 
inspections.  Smirnov said he anticipated that it could occur 
in the next batch of SS-25 eliminations, which should take 
place the last two weeks in July.  Bolotov said that he had 
developed the proposed procedures for measuring the exterior 
of the first-stage rocket motor in order to assist U.S. 
inspectors in determining the type of ICBM that was being 
eliminated during inspections.  Buttrick thanked Bolotov for 
suggesting this proposal, and said that it would be a helpful 
proposal for Washington to consider.  Buttrick said that he 
believed issues were easier to work in JCIC channels when 
Russia provided information to the United States in advance. 
It is more difficult to work an issue when U.S. inspectors 
are surprised during inspections.  For example, if Russia 
could have provided more information about its plans prior to 
the first SS-25 elimination inspection, perhaps U.S. 
inspectors would not have had such a difficult time during 
the inspection.  Buttrick said that it was a complete 
surprise to the United States that Russia had not planned to 
eliminate the entire section of the missile forward of the 
SCDM, and aft of the front section.  Bolotov said that this 
section of the missile was important for sustaining the 
remainder of the SS-25 ICBM force in the future.  Buttrick 
said that, since the Treaty clearly requires that the SCDM 
and the front section of the SS-25 be eliminated, it is only 
logical that the guidance and control section should be 
eliminated as well.  Smirnov said that Russia understands the 
U.S. position, but believes that Paragraph 2 of the 
Conversion or Elimination Protocol allows Russia to remove 
this system before the missile is eliminated.  Buttrick said 
that Washington would be reviewing this issue before the next 
elimination inspection. 
 
¶10.  (C) Smirnov told Singer and Page that Russia wants to 
retain intact SS-25 guidance and control sections so they can 
be used as spare parts.  He explained that there is almost 
nothing in those sections that can be serviced, and that they 
are essentially line replaceable units.  Many of the devices 
in the guidance and control section are miniaturized, and 
they are mounted in such a way that it would be nearly 
impossible to remove them from the airframe without breaking 
them.  Fedorchenko claimed that it has been Russia's 
understanding all along that it would be permitted to remove 
and retain the guidance and control sections intact.  Smirnov 
reiterated that they have a few more SS-25s to eliminate that 
have been the subject of experiments.  He believed that our 
concerns over the elimination of SS-25 nozzles will be 
resolved after those missiles are eliminated, because the 
subsequent nozzles will be presented intact for elimination. 
He was adamant, however, that providing photographs of the 
nozzles for U.S. inspectors to use during elimination 
inspections would be "excessive." 
 
¶11.  (S) Look noted to Boryak that Russia had informed the 
United States during this JCIC session of an additional 
complication in SS-25 eliminations, namely that the length of 
some SS-25 first-stages would be altered by the process of 
burning the fuel.  Russia had proposed a unilateral Russian 
statement to acknowledge this situation and provide for a 
different length measurement of these stages.  Look stated 
that he did not have guidance on this question and would need 
to take the proposal back to Washington for consideration. 
Hence, this issue could not be addressed during this part of 
JCIC-XXVII.  Look stated that, although he could not state 
how Washington would respond to the substance of the Russian 
proposal, he believed that procedurally any document on this 
subject would need to be done jointly, thereby recording a 
mutual solution to this problem.  Boryak stated that he 
agreed that the problem would only be resolved by a joint 
agreement of some kind. 
 
¶12.  (C) Smirnov told Singer, Page and Foley that he expected 
burn-through to be a problem only for the end domes of SS-25 
solid rocket motors that had their propellant removed by low 
pressure burning.  He explained that the cylindrical portion 
of the motor casing was reinforced, and that the end domes 
were substantially weaker.  This is why he believes that the 
new Russian proposal to confirm missile type in such cases by 
measuring the length of the cylindrical section of the first 
stage will be a good solution.  He reiterated that we must 
reach agreement as quickly as possible on procedures for 
confirming type for SS-25s that have been shortened in length 
by burning, because Russia has begun to prepare several such 
missiles for elimination. 
 
¶13.  (C) Johnston asked Venevtsev about the meeting on SS-25 
elimination where Venevtsev had interjected a correction to 
what the Russian interpreter (Yevarovskaya) had said.  Had 
Fedorchenko said that the guidance and control section of the 
SS-25 was part of the SCDM, or had the interpreter made a 
mistake.  Venevtsev said that the interpreter had made a 
mistake.  He added that the Russian Delegation was very 
dissatisfied with her work.  She routinely did not translate 
much of what was spoken in Russian into English.  It was hard 
for the Russian Delegation to understand this, given that she 
had spent some time in New York translating at the UN. 
 
SECOND PART OF JCIC-XXVII 
 
¶14.  (C) Boryak told Look that he thought a week would be 
enough for the concluding, second part of this JCIC session. 
Look said that he saw nothing developing that would take any 
longer.  Boryak went on to say that the Ukrainians had asked 
him about the timing and duration for the second part of the 
session and had told him that they had some agenda item they 
wanted to discuss that might require more than a week to 
conclude.  Boryak did not know the topic that Ukraine had in 
mind.  Look stated that he would talk directly with the 
Ukrainians about it. 
 
FUTURE OF START 
¶15.  (S) Venevtsev asked Foley about U.S. views on the future 
of START and whether it should be extended or somehow adapted 
to cover the three-year interval between expiration of START 
and expiration of the Moscow Treaty, or whether a new treaty 
should be pursued and who should be party to it.  Foley 
responded that the United States had not begun its 
deliberations on that subject yet, but eventually we would 
begin such a process. 
 
¶16.  (S) Venevtsev and Kashirin asked Buttrick whether the 
United States had considered extending the START Treaty 
beyond 2009.  Buttrick said that the issue had not yet been 
discussed in Washington, but the policy community was aware 
that this was an issue that needed to be discussed sooner 
rather than later.  Buttrick asked whether the issue had been 
discussed in Moscow.  Venevtsev said that it had not.  He 
said that this would be a controversial issue among different 
agencies in the Russian Government.  Buttrick said he 
expected that the same would be true in the U.S. Government. 
Buttrick asked Venevtsev if he envisioned the Treaty to be 
extended as a five-party Treaty or if it should be a modified 
Treaty that would continue with certain provisions of the old 
START Treaty.  Venevtsev emphatically stated that any future 
Treaty on strategic offensive arms should only apply to 
Russia and the United States, and that non-nuclear weapons 
states should not be a part of it.  Additionally, he believed 
that only a few of the inspection/verification provisions 
should be brought forward.  Kashirin asked Buttrick whether 
the U.S. Senate would need to ratify the extended Treaty. 
Buttrick said he believed that the Senate would have to give 
its advice and consent on any changes that were made to the 
START Treaty as it exists today.  Kashirin said he believed 
that this could pose significant problems for extending the 
Treaty. 
 
¶17.  (C) Grinevich asked Miller if he worked for the Ministry 
of Defense.  In an effort to elicit Miller's opinion on the 
future of START, Grinevich offered that he thought START had 
accomplished its purpose.  Miller agreed that many objectives 
of START had been met and that the Parties would have to 
begin discussing the future of START at least a couple years 
ahead of 2009.  Grinevich stated that it was up to us to 
determine whether START is extended, i.e., the United States, 
because all issues relative to his country were resolved. 
 
SS-24 ELIMINATION BY JAPAN OR SWEDEN? 
 
¶18.  (S) Shevtsov told Mullins that both Japan and Sweden had 
expressed interest in assisting Ukraine in the elimination of 
their SS-24 solid-rocket motors.  He said that both countries 
desired to be a partner with the Untied States, if the United 
States provided additional assistance.  Shevtsov said Ukraine 
wanted to eliminate the solid-rocket motors before 2009, when 
the Treaty ends; however, if Ukraine had to finance the 
elimination of the rocket motors by themselves, he did not 
believe they would be able to make that deadline. 
 
TRIDENT MANEUVERS 
 
¶19.  (S) An exchange of pleasantries by Yegorov and Foley 
about the good old days in the SCC abruptly morphed into the 
question of Trident maneuvers.  Yegorov and Fedorchenko made 
the usual assertions to Foley that they were procedures for 
dispensing.  Foley answered that they were not such 
procedures, they were made for range safety purposes, and 
were not Treaty violations.  The U.S. position was well-known 
on this and had not changed.  A short discussion about RSM-56 
flight-testing plans with Fedorchenko produced the expected 
reply that one could occur by the end of the year after 
conversion of the Typhoon launchers. 
ZLATOUST AND RDE SHOULD BE READY TO GO 
¶20.  (S) Kottmyer confirmed with Kotkova that the 
U.S.-proposed text on the S-Series Joint Statement regarding 
the site diagram changes at the Zlatoust facility for 
suspect-site inspections was acceptable to the Russian 
Federation.  Kotkova confirmed that Russia would provide a 
joint draft text as soon as possible so that the Parties 
could proceed to conforming.  With respect to the ad-ref JCIC 
Agreement on replacement of radiation detection equipment, 
Kottmyer provided Kotkova with a markup of the English text 
showing the minor editorial points where the Russian ad-ref 
text differed.  Kotkova said that Russia would correct its 
ad-ref text and provide the United States with a new version. 
 Specifically, she confirmed that "spare" batteries would be 
acceptable, as opposed to "replaceable." 
 
"ALTERNAT" AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES 
 
¶21.  (S) Kottmyer informed Kotkova of the fact that the 
Treaty Office in Washington had been consulted on the way the 
JCIC completes the "alternat" for its documents.  Kottmyer 
said she had followed up on a comment Kotkova had made at the 
conforming meeting held on June 1.  Kotkova had questioned 
Kottmyer on the JCIC method of completing documents.  She 
pointed out that it did not appear to be done in strict 
conformity with treaty practice.  She pointed to the example 
of the Moscow Treaty, where the Russians received an English 
and Russian version with Russia listed first, and the United 
States received an English and Russian version with the 
United States listed first.  In the JCIC, however, there are 
two versions prepared of each document:  an English version 
with the United States listed first, and a Russian version 
with the FSU Parties listed first in alphabetical order. 
Kottmyer said that State L/T advised that, since these 
documents were not treaties and the START Parties had 
established a long-standing practice (12 years and over 100 
documents), it was not critical for normal treaty practice to 
be strictly followed, and that the established practice 
should continue with no modification.  Kotkova agreed, and 
thanked Kottmyer for checking with the treaty experts. 
 
¶22.  (C) Sorokina and Johnston talked about accreditation of 
BIC and JCIC Delegation members.  Sorokina said that nothing 
new had occurred since the Delegations met in October. 
Russia had not had any difficulty getting visas this time 
because they worked directly with the Swiss in Moscow.  It 
was the Russian view that Russia and the United States should 
approach the Swiss jointly to ask for accreditation. 
Johnston said that the Swiss had provided a note saying they 
would provide privileges and immunities for BIC members, but 
would not issue the identity cards.  It was his view, 
however, that this was only someone's word and may not be a 
formal Swiss Government position.  If there were a real 
problem, some form of written proof that we had these 
privileges and immunities would certainly be required. 
 
TELEMETRY 
 
¶23.  (C) Razumov told Singer he was not aware of the April 
U.S. F144 NRRC notification informing Russia that we had 
resolved the cyclical synchronization problem with some 
Russian missile flight-test telemetry recordings raised 
informally by the U.S. at the last JCIC session.  Singer 
explained the cause of the problem and thanked him for 
Russia's efforts to find a solution.  Razumov said he hoped 
we would continue to try to resolve these types of problems 
through cooperation at the working level.  Although Russia 
does not plan to raise any telemetry issues during Part I of 
JCIC-XXVII, Razumov said they intend to discuss the March 12, 
2003 Peacekeeper flight-test during Part II. 
 
MMIII AND TRIDENT RVOSI ISSUES 
 
¶24.  (C) Ryzhkov further explained to Emig the Minuteman (MM) 
III RVOSI example that he had cited during the Heads of 
Delegation meeting on that subject (REFTEL).  He said that a 
cone-shaped RV cover was placed in the viewing area, 
apparently covering an RV.  A gust of wind blew, possibly 
through a crack or gap in the van, and moved the cover, 
revealing that there was no RV beneath the cover.  Ryzhkov 
appeared to suggest that the U.S. was hiding something.  When 
asked what he thought would solve this MM III issue, he said 
the United States must completely change its method of 
presenting the front section, citing the example of 
Peacekeeper.  Emig commented that it sounded like they would 
prefer that the United States leave the front section in the 
silo rather than lift it up into the van.  Ryzhkov said he 
thought that might be a step in the right direction.  Emig 
pointed out that the current MM III RVOSI procedures allow 
them to see more than if we left the front section in the 
silo.  Jones asked if they thought a demonstration, similar 
to the Trident II, was needed to resolve this issue.  Ryzhkov 
said he thought it might be useful. 
 
¶25.  (C) Ryzhkov told Emig that, for all intents and 
purposes, the Trident II RVOSI issue was resolved.  He 
expressed his personal opinion that the concluding agreement 
should not be too specific, but simply spell out the 
procedures.  He thought the new procedures would eventually 
resolve their concerns. 
 
¶26.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley