This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 001388 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON RUSSIAN 
SITE DIAGRAM PROPOSALS FOR ZLATOUST AND KARTALY, MAY 30, 
2005 
 
REF: JCIC-XXV-036 (03 GENEVA 2661) 
 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-012. 
 
¶2.   (U) Meeting Date:  May 30, 2005 
                 Time:  3:30 - 4:00 P.M. 
                Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶3.  (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the Russian 
Mission on May 30, 2005, to discuss Russian-proposed S-Series 
Joint Statements that would reduce the inspectable area for 
the Zlatoust SLBM Production Facility (a facility subject to 
Suspect-Site Inspections), and the Kartaly Silo ICBM Base. 
The U.S. Delegation undertook to review both proposals, 
stating that the Zlatoust proposal looked promising, but that 
the Kartaly proposal would be sent to Washington for analysis 
and consideration. 
 
RUSSIA ACCEPTS U.S. SUGGESTION FOR ZLATOUST 
 
¶4.  (S) Fedorchenko opened the meeting and announced that 
Russia decided to make a commitment not to build a rail line 
to structure 8 at Zlatoust, as the United States had 
suggested during JCIC-XXV (REFTEL).  He tabled a new draft 
S-Series JCIC Joint Statement, which included a statement 
that Russia does not plan to build rail lines to structure 8 
(text of draft Joint Statement is in para 8 below), as well 
as a new site diagram dated September 1, 2004.  Singer noted 
that, as a result, it appeared promising that we could reach 
agreement on this site diagram and S-Series JCIC Joint 
Statement during this session. 
 
KARTALY IS CLOSING 
 
¶5.  (S) Fedorchenko stated that Kartaly would soon cease to 
be a Russian strategic forces site, so to ease the work of 
inspectors, Russia was proposing a site diagram with reduced 
boundaries. 
 
¶6.  (S) Fedorchenko tabled a new draft S-Series JCIC Joint 
Statement (text of draft Joint Statement is in para 9 below) 
and a new site diagram, dated March 1, 2002, for Kartaly.  He 
stated that the scale was changed on the new site diagram, 
and that roads and railroads were shown, with each having a 
boundary.  The boundaries for the five structures shown on 
the diagram were the inner walls of the structures. 
Fedorchenko also said the silo training launcher was included 
on the newly-proposed site diagram and he asked that the 
United States respond to this proposal as soon as possible. 
 
¶7.  (S) Singer stated that, if the United States had received 
the new proposal on Kartaly during the intersession, the U.S. 
Delegation might have come prepared with a response.  He said 
the new Kartaly proposal would be sent back to Washington for 
review, to which Fedorchenko replied, "we have time." 
 
¶8.  (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed S-Series Joint Statement 
for Zlatoust): 
 
                                       Official Translation 
 
                                       JCIC-XXVII 
                                       Draft Proposed by the 
                                       Russian Side 
                                       May 30, 2005 
          JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION 
               JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER S-(BLANK) 
                On Changes to the Boundary of 
   the Zlatoust Facility Subject to Suspect-Site Inspections 
 
     The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data 
Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into 
account the information with respect to the Zlatoust facility 
subject to suspect-site inspections provided in Annex A to 
this Joint Statement, agree on the following: 
 
     (1)  The new boundary of the Zlatoust facility subject 
to suspect-site inspections shall be the boundary shown on 
the site diagram of the facility dated September 1, 2004, 
which is attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement. 
 
     (2)  The site diagram of the Zlatoust facility subject 
to suspect-site inspections dated January 1, 1995, shall be 
used only for the inspection provided for in paragraph 3 of 
this Joint Statement. 
 
     (3)  The portions of the Zlatoust facility subject to 
suspect-site inspections to be excluded, pursuant to this 
Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site 
diagram of the facility dated January 1, 1995, shall be 
subject to inspection using the appropriate procedures only 
during the first inspection conducted at this facility under 
paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Treaty after the date the 
change to the boundary becomes effective.  Henceforth the 
Russian side does not plan to build rail lines to structure 
No. 8, which, by the dimensions of the access, permits 
passage of items of inspection.  Subsequently the portions to 
be excluded shall not be subject to inspection unless such 
portions are included within the boundary of any inspection 
site. 
 
     (4)  The changes to the boundary of the Zlatoust 
facility subject to suspect-site inspections shall become 
effective on the date specified in the notification provided 
by the Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of 
Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the 
Treaty, or on the date such notification is provided by the 
Russian Federation, or on the date of entry into force of 
this Joint Statement, whichever is latest. 
 
............... (United States of America 
............... (Republic of Belarus) 
............... (Republic of Kazakhstan) 
............... (Russian Federation) 
............... (Ukraine) 
 
End text. 
 
¶9.  (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed S-Series Joint Statement 
for Kartaly): 
 
                                  Official Translation 
                                  JCIC-XXVII 
                                  Draft Proposed by the 
                                  Russian Side 
                                  May 30, 2005 
 
          Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission 
               Joint Statement Number S-(BLANK) 
              On Changes to the Boundary of the 
         Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs 
     The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data 
Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into 
account the information with respect to the Kartaly ICBM Base 
for Silo Launchers of ICBMs provided in Annex A to this Joint 
Statement, agree on the following: 
 
     (1)  The new boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the site 
diagram of this facility dated March 1, 2002, which is 
attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement. 
 
     (2)  The site diagram of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs dated January 1, 1999, shall be used only 
for the inspection provided for in paragraph 3 of this Joint 
Statement. 
 
     (3)  The portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint 
Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram 
of this facility dated January 1, 1999, shall be subject to 
inspection using the appropriate procedures only during the 
first inspection conducted at this facility under paragraph 3 
of Article XI of the Treaty after the date the change to the 
boundary becomes effective.  Subsequently the portions to be 
excluded shall not be subject to inspection if they are not 
included (sic) within the boundary of any inspection site. 
 
     (4)  The changes to the boundary of the Kartaly ICBM 
Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on 
the date specified in the notification provided by the 
Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section 
I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or 
the date such notification is provided by the Russian 
Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint 
Statement, whichever is latest. 
 
..... (United States of America) 
..... (Republic of Belarus) 
..... (Republic of Kazakhstan) 
..... (Russian Federation) 
..... (Ukraine) 
 
End text. 
 
(Begin comment:  Site Diagrams associated with each of the 
Russian-proposed Joint Statements are not included.  Scanned 
images of the site diagrams have been e-mailed to 
State/AC/SNI.  End comment.) 
 
¶10.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian-proposed S-Series Joint Statement for 
Zlatoust, dated May 30, 2005; 
    -- Russian-proposed S-Series Joint Statement for Kartaly, 
dated May 30, 2005; 
 
    -- Draft Site Diagram for Zlatoust (dated September 1, 
2004); and 
    -- Draft Site Diagram for Kartaly ICBM Base (dated March 
1, 2002). 
 
¶11.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Dunn 
Col(sel) Emig 
Mr. Foley 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Maj Mitchner 
Mr. Page 
Mr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baysvanov 
 
Russia 
 
Col Fedorchenko 
Col Razumov 
Col Maksimenko 
Lt Col Novikov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Mr. Taran 
 
¶12.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley