This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 001387 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR AN-1 
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC 
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR MILLER 
DTRA FOR OSA 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
SS-25/SS-27 AND MINUTEMAN III REENTRY VEHICLE ON-SITE 
INSPECTIONS, JUNE 1, 2005 
 
REF: 04 GENEVA 856 (JCIC-XXVI-005) 
 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-015. 
 
¶2.  (U)  Meeting Date:  June 1, 2005 
                 Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:45 P.M. 
                Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on June 1, 2005, to discuss SS-25, SS-27, and 
Minuteman (MM) III reentry vehicle on-site inspection (RVOSI) 
issues.  The U.S. Delegation confirmed that the Russian 
Federation had rejected the latest U.S. proposal to use INF 
radiation detection equipment (RDE) to resolve its SS-25 
RVOSI concerns.  The Russian Delegation reminded the U.S. 
Delegation that the Russian offer of a one-time demonstration 
and future use of the Karusel RDE were still on the table. 
When questioned, the Russian Delegation confirmed that there 
were no new elements to their offers. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. Delegation emphasized that the SS-27 RVOSI 
issue continued to gain importance to the United States, 
given the Russian open source material stating that the SS-27 
ICBM could be deployed with more than one warhead.  It was 
noted that the United States previously had provided a whole 
list of solutions, none of which had been responded to in 
detail by Russia.  The Russian Delegation explained that it 
could not understand how the United States could have an 
issue with their soft cover. 
 
¶5.  (S) On MM III RVOSI, the Russian Delegation explained 
that inspectors did not have an unobstructed view of the 
front section when conducting MM III RVOSIs.  The Russians 
suggested that the United States pull the front section 
completely into the payload transport (PT) van or move the 
front section to a special allocated site for viewing.  The 
U.S. side responded that the presentation of the front 
section was fully compliant with the Treaty and, in fact, the 
United States even had instituted additional procedures not 
required by the Treaty to try and resolve the Russian 
Federation's concerns.  The Russian Delegation said that the 
additional procedures were not helpful. 
 
SS-25 RVOSI:  LET ME ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS 
 
¶6.  (S) Look opened the meeting by reminding the Parties that 
the issue of SS-25 RVOSIs has been an agenda item for quite 
some time, and a solution eluded the Parties even though 
multiple proposals had been tabled by both sides.  The latest 
U.S. proposal was to include the use of INF Treaty RDE and 
procedures.  Look asked whether he had heard correctly that 
during an earlier working group meeting the Russians had 
stated that the INF RDE equipment was not accurate enough and 
the process was too complicated.  Boryak confirmed that this 
was the case. 
 
¶7.  (S) Look asked where the Parties should go from here. 
The United States, he said, has run out of ideas but 
continues to have concerns regarding U.S. inspectors' 
inability to confirm that the SS-25 was not deployed with 
more warheads than it was attributed with.  Boryak reminded 
Look that Russia's proposal for an SS-25 demonstration was 
still on the table.  Look asked whether the proposal had any 
new elements.  Boryak responded that the SS-25 was attributed 
and deployed with one reentry vehicle (RV).  It had also 
never been flight-tested with more than one RV.  The results 
of the demonstration, first proposed by the Russians in 1999, 
would confirm that the SS-25 was not deployed with more than 
one RV.  Boryak understood that the United States wanted 
procedures that could be demonstrated during every SS-25 
RVOSI, but he said the procedures were too difficult from a 
complexity and security perspective to be conducted during 
each SS-25 RVOSI, particularly with the road-mobile versions. 
 Boryak also reminded Look that, in March 2004, the Russian 
Federation had tabled a new proposal (REFTEL) that involved 
the use of new RDE called Karusel which was demonstrated to 
the United States in April 2004.  Use of such equipment would 
allow inspectors a non-intrusive way to confirm that the 
SS-25 was not deployed with more than one RV.  Boryak 
believed that the use of the INF RDE would be a step back, 
therefore, the March 1999 offer remained on the table 
unchanged. 
 
¶8.  (S) Look observed that neither side was willing to accept 
the other side's proposal.  Since the procedures proposed for 
the demonstration had already been seen by the United States 
during an earlier RVOSI, Look asked what the United States 
would learn from the one-time demonstration that was new. 
Boryak said the United States would be able to tell that one 
cone-shaped object was beneath the cover.  Look asked whether 
the proposal included any new or changed procedures that 
would be used during subsequent RVOSIs.  Boryak conferred 
with Fedorchenko, after which Fedorchenko replied that the 
demonstration, taken with all the other information the 
United States received regarding SS-25 RV deployment (i.e., 
telemetry, open source material, elimination of the RV 
platform during SS-25 elimination inspections) should be 
sufficient to satisfy U.S. concerns.  The demonstration would 
involve choosing a deployed missile at random and included 
unprecedented procedures (i.e., pushing in on the cover). 
Such procedures required special methods and personnel which 
could not be duplicated for every RVOSI. 
 
¶9.  (S) Look asked whether the Russian Federation expected 
the United States to state that the demonstration would 
satisfy U.S. concerns prior to the demonstration being 
conducted.  Boryak appeared to say it would, but then 
confused the response by drawing a parallel with the Trident 
II demonstration, which did not require that agreement be 
reached on the procedures as a prerequisite to Russia 
attending the Trident II demonstration. 
 
¶10.  (S) Look summarized his understanding of the Russian 
position as follows:  The proposal was the same; the demo 
would show what the United States had already seen during an 
inspection several years ago; there would be no new 
procedures used during the demonstration; there would be no 
additional procedures used during subsequent RVOSIs that 
would result from the demonstration; the procedures could not 
be done during each RVOSI; and Russia wanted the United 
States to agree in advance that the demonstration would 
resolve its concerns prior to observing the demonstration. 
Boryak confirmed that Look's summary was a correct 
understanding of Russia's position.  Boryak repeated 
Fedorchenko's arguments as to why the United States should be 
satisfied with the demonstration, but added that the Russian 
Federation is open to other solutions.  Look stated the 
Parties would need to return to the issue.  Shevtsov stated 
that he thought Fedorchenko's argument was convincing.  He 
could not understand why the demonstration, plus the use of 
the new Karusel RDE, would not satisfy U.S. concerns. 
Grinevich concurred with Shevtsov's assessment. 
 
SS-27 RVOSIs:  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
 
¶11.  (S) Look noted that the issue of SS-27 RVOSIs was even 
more important to the United States than the SS-25 RVOSI 
issue.  It was very important to resolve this issue because 
the United States continued to see open sources which 
described the SS-27 as having multiple warhead capability. 
Look quoted the Designer-General of Russia's SS-27s, Yuriy 
Solomonov, from the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, 
as stating recently that:  "The standardized Solid-fuel 
three-stage Topol-M missile can be fitted with a single or 
multiple warheads."  Look noted that the United States had 
proposed a whole list of solutions, citing the limiting of 
the diameter of the base of the cover as an example. 
However, the proposals had never been discussed fully, which 
showed that Russia had no interest in them.  The United 
States was willing to work on any new proposals to resolve 
the issue, but it had no knowledge of why the shrouding was 
so large.  Therefore, the United States had no other 
solutions to offer.  Look asked Boryak where the Parties 
should go from here. 
 
¶12.  (S) Boryak replied that the SS-27 had only been 
flight-tested with one RV.  He stated that Russia was now 
using a soft cone cover which allowed inspectors to confirm 
that there was no more than one RV on the missile.  However, 
U.S. inspectors noted in the official inspection reports 
(OIR) the use of a large oversized, non-conformal cover which 
would not allow them to confirm there was only one RV 
underneath.  Boryak stated that the Russian Federation, to 
date, had not received an answer to their question regarding 
why the cover must be conformal.  In the Russian Federation's 
opinion, the inspectors' conclusions were ungrounded and 
biased.  Look observed that the Parties were at a stalemate, 
but that additional discussions on the issue were required. 
 
MM III RVOSI 
 
¶13.  (S) Boryak listed the long-standing issues the Russians 
had with the way the United States presented the MM III front 
section during RVOSIs.  Since Russian inspectors could not 
obtain an unobstructed view of the front section, Boryak 
asked that the United States either pull the front section 
entirely up into the PT van or conduct the viewing at a 
special allocated site like Russia.  Look responded that he 
was puzzled why this issue was placed on the agenda.  Early 
after entry into force of the Treaty, the Russians complained 
about how the United States presented its front section for 
an RVOSI.  In response, the United States instituted 
additional procedures, believing they would resolve Russia's 
concerns.  The additional procedures were not required by the 
Treaty, but they allowed Russian inspectors to view below the 
floor of the PT van and see the rest of the front section. 
Additionally, Look noted that he had attended a mock RVOSI at 
Minot AFB.  In his opinion, the additional procedures 
provided an unobstructed view of the front section.  The 
bottom line was that the RVOSI procedures used by the United 
States were fully compliant with the Treaty and there was no 
question that the additional procedures provided a full view 
of the front section. 
TWO SOCKS ON, ONE SOCK OFF 
 
¶14.  (S) Boryak responded that he thought the Russian 
inspectors must have a different view from Dr. Look's. 
Ryzhkov noted that he had participated in a MM III RVOSI.  He 
added that when he looked over to observe the three soft 
covers, the wind blew, and one of the covers moved and 
revealed that there was nothing underneath.  Ryzhkov could 
not understand why the United States continued to present the 
MM III front section as they did.  He questioned whether the 
United States would have a problem if the Russian Federation 
removed only half of their SS-18 front section so U.S. 
inspectors could only see the top five warheads.  He thought 
the United States would have concerns.  It was up to the 
United States to demonstrate that the MM III did not have 
more than three warheads deployed on it.  To date, the United 
States had not done that.  Look asked whether the additional 
procedures provided during the MM III RVOSI helped at all. 
Ryzhkov stated that the Russian inspectors needed to see the 
whole front section.  The Russian Federation had no issues in 
the way the United States presented the Peacekeeper (PK) 
front stage because they saw the whole front section.  Since 
the additional procedures did not provide a full view, he 
believed that the additional procedures were not helpful. 
 
¶15.  (S) Look repeated that the MM III RVOSI procedures were 
compliant with the Treaty; however, he had no doubt that 
Russia would return to the issue.  Commenting on an earlier 
statement he had made, Boryak recognized that the United 
States had attempted to raise the front section completely 
into the PT van but it would not fit.  The attempt was a 
positive sign from the U.S. side but it still needed to do 
more.  Shevtsov commented that the sides were at a dead end. 
He understood Russia's concerns, but also understood that to 
change the way in which the United States presented the MM 
III front section would be difficult and would require 
changes to the technical procedures.  He offered that the 
United States might do a one-time demonstration like the U.S. 
Navy did with Trident II.  The Parties agreed to return to 
the issue. 
 
¶16.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None. 
 
¶17.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Dr. Look 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Dunn 
Col (Sel) Emig 
Mr. Foley 
Mr. Herrick 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Jones 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Miller 
Maj Mitchner 
Mr. Page 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Tiersky 
Mr. Hopkins (Int) 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
Kazahkstan 
Mr. Baysuanov 
 
Russia 
Mr. Boryak 
Col Fedorchenko 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Maksimenko 
Amb Masterkov 
Mr. Novikov 
Col Razumov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Shabalin 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Mr. Anisimov (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Gen Fedotov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Taran 
 
¶18.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley