This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 001365 
 
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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
THE TRIDENT II RVOSI DEMONSTRATION RESULTS, MAY 31, 2005 
 
REF: MOSCOW 3686 
 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-014. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  May 31, 2005 
                Time:  3:30 - 4:30 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on May 31, 2005, to discuss the results of the 
Trident II Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection (RVOSI) 
Demonstration conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base, 
February 7-9, 2005. 
 
¶4.  (S) Prior to discussion of the primary agenda item, the 
U.S. Delegation clarified the parameters under which the 
other Parties should consider the U.S.-proposed visit to 
Vandenberg to observe silos that have been reattributed from 
the Vandenberg Test Range to the Vandenberg Space Launch 
Facility.  Specifically, the United States had not intended 
to imply that the other Parties commit to the visit prior to 
listening to the U.S. proposal on the visit.  The United 
States recognizes that the other Parties may still have 
concerns after the visit was conducted. 
 
¶5.  (S) With respect to the results of the Trident II RVOSI 
demonstration, all Parties expressed agreement that the 
primary objectives of the demonstration had been met and that 
the measurement data obtained during the demonstration could 
be used during future inspections.  The Russian Federation 
conveyed that it was not ready to record resolution of the 
Trident II RVOSI issue until after the United States had 
presented it with procedures to use during an inspection and 
it had time to evaluate those procedures. 
 
U.S. CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE VANDENBERG VISIT 
 
¶6.  (S) Look began the meeting by clarifying a point 
regarding the parameters under which the other Parties should 
consider the U.S.-proposed visit to Vandenberg to observe the 
launch silos that have been reattributed from the Vandenberg 
Test Range to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility.  He did 
not want to imply that the United States wanted the other 
Parties to commit to the Vandenberg visit prior to listening 
to the U.S. proposal for the visit.  He emphasized that he 
was not trying to set any preconditions and that he 
understood that the Parties may either accept or refuse the 
offer at a point in the future.  He also stated that 
acceptance of the offer for the visit did not indicate that 
the Parties would not still have concerns after conducting 
the visit.  He emphasized that, due to a number of factors, 
the visit would need to be conducted prior to June 1, 2006. 
 
TRIDENT RVOSI ISSUE MIGHT ACTUALLY BE RESOLVED 
 
¶7.  (S) Look expressed his pleasure at the acceptance by the 
Parties of the Trident RVOSI demonstration that took place at 
the Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia, 
this past February.  He noted that members from Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine participated in the demonstration. 
Additionally, he was pleased to note that the Russian 
non-paper, dated March 31, 2005, stated that "the objective 
of the Trident II front sections could be considered to have 
been achieved" (REFTEL).   He concluded by stating that he 
wanted to obtain the views of the other Parties regarding 
reaching final resolution, as well as the next steps in 
documenting final resolution. 
 
RUSSIAN REACTION POSITIVE, BUT THEY HAVE QUESTIONS 
 
¶8.  (S) Boryak stated that the general reaction of the 
Russian Federation to the results of the Trident II RVOSI 
demonstration in resolving the issue of Trident II front 
sections was positive.  He noted that the use of methods, 
such as those used during the demonstration to resolve 
concerns, improved confidence and relations between the 
Parties.  He praised the high level of preparation and 
conduct of the demonstration by the U.S. side and stated that 
most of the issues related to the Trident II front sections 
were resolved.  The Russian Federation believed that the 
measurement from the top of the RVOSI cover to the top of the 
third-stage rocket motor could be used for future RVOSI 
inspections. 
 
NOW, THE QUESTIONS 
 
¶9.  (S) Boryak stated that he had some questions to ask 
regarding the actual inspection procedures: 
 
     - Would the three percent rule apply during the use of 
the RVOSI measurement device, as was usually the case in the 
Treaty?  (Begin Note:  During data update inspections a 
tolerance of three percent is allowed for measurements in 
order to account for manufacturing differences in accordance 
with Paragraph 19, Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. 
End Note.) 
 
     - What would the Parties do if the measurements obtained 
during the inspection differ from the measurements agreed to 
as a result of the Trident RVOSI demonstration? 
 
     - What record should be made by the inspection team 
chief within the inspection report? 
 
Boryak emphasized that the sides should elaborate on 
coordinated procedures for the conduct of inspections. 
 
TRIDENT TESTING ISSUE IS NOT RESOLVED 
 
¶10.  (S) Boryak made special note of the fact that, despite 
the positive results from the Trident II RVOSI demonstration, 
Russia did not consider the issue regarding the number of 
dispensing procedures for the Trident II during 
flight-testing to be resolved. 
 
SS-25 ONE-TIME POKE OFFER STILL ON THE TABLE 
 
¶11.  (S) Boryak reminded Look that the Russian side was ready 
to conduct a one-time demonstration related to the oversized 
cover used during SS-25 RVOSIs by pushing in on the center of 
that cover in conjunction with an RVOSI inspection. 
 
UKRAINE WANTS TO CONTINUE TO PLAY 
 
¶12.  (S) Shevtsov noted that Ukrainian experts participated 
in the Trident II RVOSI demonstration as part of a 
multinational group and that they had reached a common 
conclusion with the other participants that the objectives of 
the demonstration were met.  He stated that Ukraine was ready 
to record the results of the demonstration in any form 
desired and Ukraine was ready to participate in the Trident I 
RVOSI demonstration. 
 
LOOK PROVIDES PRELIMINARY RESPONSES 
 
¶13.  (S) Look thanked the other Parties for such a positive 
response and provided some preliminary answers to the Russian 
Delegation's questions.  Regarding whether the three percent 
rule would apply, he reminded the other Parties that the 
United States had established a value for the type A cover as 
demonstrated at Kings Bay, of 23 cm with a 3 cm tolerance and 
that the established value for the type B cover was 24 cm 
with a 3 cm tolerance.  He admitted that he had not 
anticipated this question and realized that the 3 cm 
tolerance was not within three percent of the total distance, 
 but did not know what drove that tolerance.  He would have 
to consult with his technical advisors.  Regarding what to do 
if the measurement obtained during an inspection differed 
from the established measurements, the United States would 
expect the Russian Federation to raise the issue within the 
JCIC.  He reminded the other Parties that the measuring 
device was intended to relate the results of the 
demonstration to future inspections and that, if it did not 
relate, the United States would expect the other Parties to 
have continued concerns.  Finally, in response to what record 
the inspection team chief would place in the inspection 
report, Look responded that the inspection team would simply 
record the results obtained during the inspection so that the 
Parties would have a clear record of the measurement values. 
 
U.S. UNDERSTANDS THAT TRIDENT TESTING 
PRACTICES ARE STILL ON THE TABLE 
 
¶14.  (S) Look said the United States recognized that the 
Trident demonstration did not take the issue of Trident II 
dispensing procedures during flight-tests off the table.  He 
reiterated that the objective of the demonstration was the 
same for all Parties, given that Russian inspectors had 
expressed two concerns.  One was the inability to confirm 
that the number of reentry vehicles was not greater than the 
number of warheads attributed, and the second was that the 
design of the Trident II hard covers did not provide an 
unobstructed view of the front section.  The U.S. 
understanding was that future use of the measurement device 
would alleviate these two concerns and comments would no 
longer be placed in the inspection report.  The demonstration 
was not designed to address the flight-test issue, but the 
U.S. expectation was that the two Trident II RVOSI issues 
would not be raised in the future. 
 
NEED FOR PROCEDURES FOR ADDED MEASUREMENT 
 
¶15.  (S) Boryak asked what the intentions were of the United 
States in documenting common Trident RVOSI practices.  Look 
asked whether all Parties were clear that the purpose of 
recording these measurements was to alleviate inspection 
concerns and that, by reaching agreement, there would be no 
ambiguities during future inspections.  Boryak reiterated 
that the Russian Federation believed that the objectives of 
the demonstration were achieved and now the task was to agree 
on procedures for conducting the inspections. 
 
IF AMBIGUITIES CONTINUE, THEN NO 
INTEREST IN DISCUSSING PROCEDURES 
 
¶16.  (S) Look explained that if measurements were taken 
during inspections and were within tolerance, and ambiguities 
continued to be written, then the United States was not 
interested in continuing with the measurement procedures.  If 
the goal of the Parties was that the end result of developing 
inspection procedures was that no ambiguities were written, 
then the United States would be willing to discuss such 
inspection procedures.  Boryak explained that, due to the 
simplicity of the instrument being proposed for use during 
inspections, there was not a one hundred percent assurance 
that problems would not arise.  Look emphasized that he was 
not requesting a commitment for the future, but rather 
resolution of past issues.  Ryzhkov chimed in, stating that 
the American side should propose inspection procedures that 
answered some fundamental questions like how many inspectors 
would be allowed to conduct the measurement and what the 
restrictions and limitations would be during the inspection. 
 
¶17.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None. 
 
¶18.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Dr. Look 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Dunn 
Col(sel) Emig 
Mr. Foley 
Mr. Herrick 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Jones 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Maj Mitchner 
Mr. Sessions 
Mr. Smith 
LCDR Woods 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baysuanov 
 
Russia 
 
Mr. Boryak 
Col Maksimenko 
Amb Masterkov 
Lt Col Novikov 
Col Razumov 
Mr. Shabalin 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Col Yegerov 
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Taran 
 
¶19.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley