This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 001363 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
VANDENBERG, MAY 31, 2005 
 
REF: A. STATE 53670 (JCIC-DIP-05-003) 
     ¶B. 04 GENEVA 02958 (JCIC-XXVI-036) 
 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-013. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  May 31, 2005 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:07 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on May 31, 2005, at which all Parties were 
represented.  The Parties discussed the Russian concern with 
the reattribution of ICBM silo launchers from the Vandenberg 
Test Range to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility.  The 
Russian Delegation said that the Treaty definition of "space 
launch facility" did not allow the launching of missile 
defense interceptors.  Such facilities could only be used to 
launch ICBMs and SLBMs for space launch.  The U.S. Delegation 
explained that the Treaty did not prohibit such use and that 
Treaty definitions do not create prohibitions.  In response 
to questions from the Russian Delegation concerning START 
silo conversion provisions, the U.S. Delegation explained 
that the reattributed silos had been or would be modified, 
but they would not be "converted" as defined in the START 
Treaty. 
 
REATTRIBUTION OF SILO LAUNCHERS AT VANDENBERG 
 
¶4.  (S) At a Heads of Delegation Meeting at the U.S. Mission 
on May 31, 2005, Look stated that, since the previous JCIC 
session, the United States had reattributed five ICBM silo 
launchers from the Vandenberg Test Range to the Vandenberg 
Space Launch Facility (SLF).  The United States had provided 
an explanation of this change through diplomataic channels 
(REF A); and, subsequently, the Russian Federation had placed 
the issue on the JCIC agenda.  Boryak stated that the United 
States had created a new entity by reattributing the five 
launchers to the SLF.  Referring to the long-standing Russian 
complaint regarding LF-21 and LF-23 at Vandenberg (REF B), he 
alleged that the United States was covering this violation of 
the Treaty by reattributing these launchers to the SLF. 
Russia was interested in learning which Treaty provisions had 
been applied, and in understanding the intended silo 
conversion process.  He asserted that the Treaty anticipated 
delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space from 
SLFs and that he was perplexed because the United States 
informed Russia that it would use these launchers for 
operational interceptor missiles, not for space launch. 
 
¶5.  (S) Look clarified that the United States had not created 
a new entity, but had added launchers to an existing SLF at 
Vandenberg.  The Parties had discussed the use of these 
launchers in detail for several years and the United States 
had explained why these activities were compliant with the 
Treaty.  Addressing the Russian position, he expressed 
concern that the United States and Russia have a significant 
difference in how we view definitions in the Treaty and 
whether basic prohibitions and limitations are imposed by 
those definitions.  Rights and obligations are contained in 
various parts of the Treaty, but not in the definitions. 
Look explained that the only Treaty limitation for SLFs is 
the prohibition against flight-testing ICBMs or SLBMs 
equipped with reentry vehicles from SLFs and that the United 
States complies with this prohibition.  Article V does not 
prohibit other activities at SLFs unless they are 
inconsistent with the Treaty or international law.  He 
concluded that the Treaty does not restrict the launch of 
non-START missiles at SLFs. 
 
¶6.  (S) Shevtsov opined that, when drafting the Treaty, no 
one considered this situation, so this action may be in 
conflict with the Eighth Agreed Statement (sic) and the 
Conversion or Elimination Protocol.  Look responded that the 
United States has not converted these launchers under the 
Treaty, and the launchers are still subject to the Treaty as 
ICBM launchers at the Vandenberg SLF.  The United States had 
been forthcoming in its plans because of other Parties' 
concerns with these launchers and not because the Treaty 
requires such information to be provided. 
 
¶7.  (S) Yegerov questioned whether the United States 
considered the definitions to be an equally legally-binding 
part of the Treaty.  Look replied that definitions were an 
integral part of the Treaty, but that different parts of the 
Treaty serve different purposes. 
 
¶8.  (S) Yegerov posed several technical questions.  He 
inquired whether the United States would convert all five 
launchers for interceptor use or retain some launchers for 
space launch.  Look replied again that we were not converting 
the launchers under the provisions of the START Treaty, but 
that the United States is planning eventually to modify all 
five launchers.  He added that, although not our immediate 
plan, we could not rule out future use of these launchers for 
space launch.  In response to questions by Yegerov, Look 
replied that re-modifying the launchers for use with ICBMs 
was possible, but it was not a simple process and would take 
several months at least. 
 
¶9.  (S) Fedorchenko questioned Look on the difference between 
modification and conversion.  Look responded that conversion 
is a technical Treaty term for changing a launcher from 
launching one type of ICBM to launch another type of ICBM. 
For the Vandenberg launchers, the United States has modified 
launchers to launch a missile not subject to the Treaty. 
Expressing concern about the Russian use of definitions, Look 
provided an example of how this logic could lead to problems 
for Russia.  He explained that the definition of "production 
facility" in the Treaty does not include producing missiles 
other than ICBMs or SLBMs; however, the Votkinsk Production 
Facility produces SS-26 missiles that are not subject to the 
Treaty.  He pointed out that this would be a prohibited 
activity under Russia's interpretation of how Treaty 
definitions are applied. 
 
¶10.  (S) Boryak replied that the Sixteenth Agreed Statement, 
as presented to the U.S. Congress, made it clear that silo 
launchers of ICBMs could only launch ICBMs.  He noted that 
many aspects of this matter were still open for Russia.  Look 
asked whether any of the Parties were interested in the 
United States' offer of a one-time visit to the five 
launchers (REF A).  Responding to a question from Boryak, 
Look explained that the purpose of the visit was to serve as 
a transparency measure because of the Parties' existing 
concern with these launchers.  Although the other Parties 
agreed to consider the visit, Boryak stated that any 
discussion of the visit remained an open question for later 
in the session. 
 
¶11.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None. 
¶12.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
Dr. Look 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Dunn 
Col(S) Emig 
Mr. Foley 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Jones 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Miller 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Smith 
LCDR Woods 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baysuanov 
 
Russia 
 
Mr. Boryak 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Kashirin 
Ms. Kotkova 
Amb Masterkov 
Mr. Maksimenko 
Mr. Novikov 
Col Razumov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Shabalin 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Mr. Yegerov 
Mr. Uspenskiy (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Taran 
 
¶13.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley