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Viewing cable 05DOHA1005, FRAN TOWNSEND'S JUNE 2, 2005 MEETINGS IN QATAR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DOHA1005 2005-06-06 09:16 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Doha
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 001005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARPI FOR STHORNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: ASEC KPAO MARR PREL QA
SUBJECT: FRAN TOWNSEND'S JUNE 2, 2005 MEETINGS IN QATAR 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (A) and (B) 
 
1. (S) Summary: Frances (Fran) Townsend, Assistant to the 
President and Advisor on Homeland Security, visited Doha for 
a few hours on Thursday, 2 June 2005.  In her meetings with 
Sheikh Tamim the Heir Apparent, with the Amir (in which 
Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim sat in), and finally 
with the Qatar State Security Chief Nasser Al-Ali and 
Minister of State for the Interior Sheikh Abdullah, Ms 
Townsend carried two main messages from the President:  (1) 
Al Jazeera remains a concern, but "the way forward" is to 
focus on counter-terrorism issues. She held out the prospect 
of warmer bilateral relations if Qatar gave her 
"deliverables" in the form of help with American citizens of 
Islamist leanings resident in Doha. In this she appears to 
have been totally successful, with swift, firm pledges from 
the Amir and Heir Apparent; and (2) Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) 
needs Qatar,s full economic and political support. The Amir 
and Heir Apparent likewise agreed to provide this help.  End 
Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Heir Apparent Sheikh Tamim 
-------------------------------------- 
2. (S) Ms. Townsend began the meeting by saying, "Al Jazeera 
is a perennial issue with us. I don,t want to take your time 
to discuss that. A good way forward is to focus on the 
counter-terrorism (CT) relationship."  She said that Qatar 
has not provided the US with interrogation reports from the 
19 March bombing of the Doha Players theater and could do so. 
She also mentioned the presence in Qatar of a number of US 
citizens of Islamist leanings, especially Dwight Theodore 
Thompson (Abdur Rauf Shakir), an AmCit convicted in 1988 of 
felony weapons charges in Kings County, New York, who fled 
the US prior to being sentenced in absentia to 3  to 7 years 
in prison.  Ms Townsend said that Qatar could help US CT 
efforts by turning Thompson over to US custody. "Because of 
the President,s concern," she said, "my ability to go back 
with real deliverables, things we can see, gives me the 
opportunity to be your advocate with him and to warm the 
relationship." 
 
3. (S) Sheikh Tamim swiftly concurred with Townsend,s 
request, saying, "I agree with you. It,s common sense that 
if they are American citizens and their country wants them, 
we can do it. I have no problem with that. It will be done." 
He had to repeat his decision, however, when his staff 
presented diplomatic and bureaucratic objections, 
specifically that no extradition treaty exists with the US. 
Ms Townsend said that she worked on extradition issues for 
the Justice Department and knows that "no treaty is required; 
it is not a violation of international law." She said the US 
could file a "red notice" request with Interpol but that 
these could take as long as two months, during which time the 
suspect could flee. "We can,t wait," she concluded. "If 
these people commit a terrorist attack while we,re 
negotiating an agreement, it will be devastating to the 
relationship."  The Heir Apparent,s staff promised to form a 
committee to work with RMAS and FBI officers at Embassy Doha 
over the next "two weeks" to try to find a way to get 
Thompson into US custody, while assuaging Qatari legal 
niceties. 
 
4. (S) On Palestine, Townsend said, "It is important for us 
all that Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) succeed.  Right now, Fatah 
is weak, and every dollar that goes to Hamas makes it less 
likely that he will succeed." She said there is a Hamas 
office in Doha and asked that it be closed.  Khalid 
al-Misnad, the Heir Apparent,s chief of staff (and maternal 
uncle) said there is no formal Hamas "office" but that there 
have been four Hamas leaders who lived in Doha at one time. 
Sheikh Tamim said, "We will do whatever we can to help Abu 
Mazen succeed. We will help him. I have no problem with that. 
When things are settled in Palestine, all will calm down. But 
you have to push the Israeli side." 
 
5. (S) The rest of meeting largely dealt with the Qataris, 
need for specialized CT training and the RMAS need for access 
to information arising from the 19 March bombing 
investigation. The day after the bombing, Sheikh Tamim 
promised the Ambassador and RMAS Chief that the US would get 
everything the investigation uncovered. But the RMAS Chief 
noted that Qatari Security Service (QSS) in recent weeks had 
not provided any updates, nor had it responded to requests 
for information, making it difficult for RMAS and the FBI to 
fully follow up on possible leads in the US.  To the chief of 
the QSS, Nasser al-Ali, the Heir Apparent said, "Nasser, 
please: If there,s anything, give it to them." Believe me, 
we don,t want to hold back. Anything they ask, give it." 
 
--------------------------- 
Meeting with the Amir 
---------------------------- 
6.(C) The Amir met with Ms. Townsend, accompanied by the 
Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani; Sheikha Miyyasa, the Amir's 
daughter and recent Duke graduate; and Khalid al-Mansouri, 
Director of European and American Affairs at the MFA.  Ms 
Townsend was accompanied by Ambassador Untermeyer, NSC 
Counterterrorism Director, and P/E Chief (notetaker).  The 
meeting was cordial; Ms. Townsend noted that Sheikha Miyassa 
was the only woman in any official meeting on her trip 
through the region. 
 
7.(S) Townsend thanked the Amir on behalf of the president 
for hosting U.S. forces in Qatar. She said that in her 
previous meeting with the Heir Apparent, Sheikh Tamim, she 
had examined ways to work more closely together on 
counterterrorism issues. She informed the Amir that in that 
meeting she had discussed the presence in Qatar of American 
citizens connected to the March 19 terrorist attack in Doha. 
The president wants to see "strong and quick" actions, she 
said, adding that it takes leadership to move quickly in 
these matters. She said the U.S. is willing to cooperate from 
its side and provide training to Qatari security forces. 
 
8.(S) The Amir characterized Qatari security services as 
"changing" after the March 19 attack. He noted that Qatar has 
had problems on the intelligence-gathering component of 
security, and that the security forces need training. He said 
that with adequate training, Qatar could have stopped the May 
19 attacker. The Qataris had "notes" on the individual from 
four or five years ago and had "chased" him for a while but 
had ended the pursuit. After the attack, he said the GOQ was 
in shock for a number of hours before recognizing that they 
had to face the reality of what had happened. 
 
9.(S) Townsend said that Qatar was wise to respond to the 
attack as a way to strengthen its security. She emphasized 
that training resources are limited, and that the US provides 
training based on the level of cooperation with a given 
security service. She expressed the hope and some optimism 
that the US could provide training and work more closely with 
Qatar, but that there were responsibilities on both sides. 
 
10.(S) Townsend returned to the critical subject of 
cooperation on turning over US fugitives in Qatar to US 
custody, reminding the Amir that the March 19 attack was 
potentially linked to American citizens.  Three things could 
result, she said, "all of them bad": An attack on U.S. forces 
in Qatar; an attack on allies in Europe; or an infiltration 
of the U.S. homeland by these dangerous individuals, where it 
would be harder to pursue them. 
 
11.(S) Townsend briefed the Amir on the President's recent 
meeting with Abu Mazen in Washington. The meeting was warm, 
and Abu Mazen felt stronger after his first White House 
visit. She said there was an opportunity for 
Israeli-Palestinian peace, but the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
remains weak. The PA needs to engage in good discussions with 
the Israelis and needs to show progress in developing its 
security forces. Hamas is a threat to the PA, and "every 
dollar donated to it undermines Abu Mazen," she said, calling 
for Qatari help on counterterrorism finance. 
 
12.(S) The Amir said that Qatar will support Abu Mazen, but 
that delaying the Palestinian elections was a mistake. Steps 
toward democracy will help the region change. "I had a hard 
time with (Hamas leader) Khalid Meshaal," to push him toward 
a democratic system. The Amir advised that Abu Mazen "focus 
on the West Bank" because the Palestinian mentality there is 
different. 
 
13.(S) The Amir called Iran the biggest problem for the 
region. He has engaged Gulf leaders on the issue, but he said 
most view it only in terms of distancing their countries from 
any American action against Iran. The Amir noted that the 
issue is much deeper, because any action would force a change 
in Gulf states' relations with their large neighbor. 
Townsend said that Iran's foreign policy is to use Hizbollah 
and terrorism as a tool, and this is unacceptable. Hizbullah 
gets more money from Iran than any other source. She called 
on Qatar and regional allies to make public statements 
against such policies: "You have more credibility in the 
region." 
 
14.(S) The Amir ended the meeting voicing the hope that the 
U.S. would not "retreat" from its support of democracy in the 
region. "People have hope now," he said. Townsend assured him 
that the president will not waiver from his policy of 
spreading democracy. 
 
15. (S) "I believe with all my heart that the will (by Qatar) 
is there. I believe we can improve the relationship. If the 
President sees progress on CT, he will respond in a positive 
way. There are always issues to work on. This is the most 
important right now. I am sure I will be back to say thank 
you!" 
 
16. (U) This message has not been cleared by Fran Townsend. 
UNTERMEYER