This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 004336 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL KPAL ASEC IS EG LTG
SUBJECT: GENERAL WARD'S DISCUSSION WITH OMAR SOLIMAN IN 
CAIRO 
 
Classified by Charge Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) LTG Ward and Omar Soliman, meeting in Cairo June 6, 
shared views on the need for a clear chain of authority in 
the revamped security services of the Palestinian Authority 
(PA).  Soliman said Israel's total disengagement from Gaza 
would enhance trust between Israeli and Palestinian security 
services, as would more frequent dialogue.  He hoped the USG 
would facilitate such a dialogue and temper over-ambitious 
expectations of Palestinian security capabilities.  Soliman 
also called on all donor nations to contribute, not simply 
pledge support, to the PA's practical requirements for 
uniforms, vehicles, and equipment.  He hoped Israel would 
permit donations to reach the Palestinians, although he cited 
cases to the contrary.  The PA security services needed 5,000 
troops to field 10 battalions in Gaza by July, asserted 
Soliman, adding that the forces needed equipment to be 
effective.  LTG Ward noted that the Palestinians do not have 
the ability to fund these numbers; Soliman replied that they 
can be taken from existing forces. 
 
¶2.  (C) Soliman lamented that Israel had not clarified its 
intent with regards to "the nature of disengagement" and 
whether its withdrawal from Gaza would be total.  Planning on 
the part of the PA and international coordinators was 
impossible without a clearer vision of Israel's intent. 
Soliman also said the GOI had not approved the deployment of 
Egyptian border guards to help secure the Gaza-Egypt border. 
The absence of Egyptian troops might give the IDF an excuse 
to remain in the Philadelphi strip, he said, likely 
contributing to a continued "cycle of violence."  Partial 
withdrawal could be worse than no withdrawal at all, said 
Soliman, calling for a total and coordinated Israeli pullout. 
 Partial disengagement would "not encourage the Palestinians 
to be quiet." 
 
¶3.  (C) Citing the three Palestinian priorities of rebuilding 
security services, improving the economy, and smooth 
disengagement, Soliman stressed the need for the Palestinian 
people to have hope in their future.  Jobs and expectations 
of an independent state were critical elements of that hope. 
He said Hamas would garner 70 percent of the seats in the 
Palestinian legislature if elections were held too soon; 
Soliman preferred a delay in elections and called for the 
strengthening of Fatah.  He said he might host another round 
of dialogue among Palestinian factions and said he planned to 
travel to Israel in mid-June.  End summary. 
 
¶4.  (C) U.S. Security Coordinator LTG William Ward met in 
Cairo June 6 with Egyptian General Intelligence Service 
(EGIS) Chief Omar Soliman.  LTG Ward was joined by the 
Charge, ORA Chief, Lead Ops Planner COL Buckley, Civil 
Affairs Planner LTC Cotton, and Poloff (notetaker). 
 
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Sunni Participation in Iraqi Politics 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Soliman began by expressing concern about weak Sunni 
participation in the new Iraqi government and the need to 
prevent excessive Iranian influence in Iraq.  He wanted the 
U.S. "to find a way to bring back the Sunni" to participate 
in the political process and in drafting the new 
constitution.  A larger Sunni role would "bring back 
stability," he argued, and limit Tehran's influence.  Soliman 
said the Sunni desired to "take part not as a minority, but 
as partners" in governance.  Soliman acknowledged efforts 
being made towards greater Sunni participation, yet seemed to 
appeal for increased mediation to facilitate it. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Building Effective Palestinian Security Forces 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  (C) Shifting to LTG Ward's security mission, Soliman said 
we needed to "secure disengagement" to restore trust and 
return a "good mood" to Palestinian relations with Israel. 
He endorsed LTG Ward's call for increased dialogue between 
the parties, adding his view that the U.S. had the most 
influence in pressing for such a dialogue.  "They listen to 
me 50 percent, to Jordan maybe 30 percent, and to the U.S. 
100 percent," he suggested.  Although "they may implement 
zero," at least, he said, the parties gave consideration to 
U.S. desires.  He called for a strong effort to build trust 
through a regime of regular meetings between Israeli and 
Palestinian security services, in which meetings the needs of 
both sides could be raised frankly and at all levels -- 
between ministers and heads of security services but also "in 
the field."  Soliman said Israel might accept a more robust 
exchange with Palestinian security services if the U.S. 
suggested it and offered to attend.  LTG Ward noted that 
exchanges "at echelon" were vital to maintain good 
coordination.  Nasser Yusif's desire for "full control" was a 
limiting factor, admitted Soliman. 
 
¶7.  (C) Soliman said we cannot expect Palestinian security 
services to "be heroes" overnight, but must be practical in 
building on their modest capabilities.  He cited Egypt's 
support for reform of the Palestinian security services, 
including a willingness to help equip them if other donors 
did not come forward.  Equipping the security services was 
difficult when donors did not follow through on their 
pledges, and when Israel did not permit donations to reach 
the Palestinians, he lamented.  Soliman said a more trusting 
relationship between Israeli and Palestinian authorities 
(bolstered through frequent dialogue) might lead to a 
situation in which Israel felt it could release more 
equipment to the PA, rather than deny the PA the materiel it 
needed to perform its security duties.  Soliman lamented that 
Israel had even refused delivery of fire trucks to the PA. 
He also called for donors to make concrete contributions -- 
with precise timetables -- rather than simply making pledges; 
he pointed to multiple offers of uniforms, for example, but 
none delivered.  "Be tough with the donor community," he 
said, or "we will wait a long time and they will do nothing." 
 
¶8.  (C) The PA security services needed to recruit enough 
personnel to field 10 battalions (a total of 5,000 troops) in 
Gaza by July, said Soliman, but even a force of that size 
could not offer security without rifles, ammunition, and 
equipment.  They cannot face Hamas "with a stick" and have 
any impact, he emphasized.  Responding to LTG Ward's caution 
that internal disputes and even violence between rival 
services dampened donor interest in supplying the PA security 
apparatus, Soliman said the culprit was often Hamas.  LTG 
Ward noted efforts to coordinate donor assistance, yet warned 
against using the lack of equipment as an excuse to do 
nothing.  "The clock is ticking" and the PA needs to begin 
with what it has, he argued, factoring in new resources as 
they become available. 
 
¶9.  (C) Returning frequently during the conversation to the 
need for a clear chain of command in the PA security 
services, LTG Ward and Soliman heartily agreed that more 
effective authority structures were a must.  Soliman said 
Palestinian officers operated more as militias than as a 
disciplined military and some compromise would be required 
(and it would take many years) to fashion them into effective 
security forces.  Nasser Yusif is "imagining things" if he 
thinks he can control them all, said Soliman. He said the 
goal of whittling Palestinian security organs from 11 to 
three was over-ambitious; "on the ground there are still 10," 
and six might be a fair compromise, he suggested.  It was 
imperative to Soliman that the services have a clear leader, 
effective chain of command, and clarity of mission. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Need Coordinated Gaza Disengagement 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The EGIS Chief lamented the lack of information from 
Israel regarding "the nature of disengagement."  He cited 
uncertainties about the extent of withdrawal from Rafah and 
the Philadelphi strip, for example, whether links to the West 
Bank would be established, and how "total" the withdrawal 
from Gaza would be.  Israeli approval for Egypt to deploy 
border guards in the Rafah area, which Soliman argued was 
vital for border security, was also uncertain.  Soliman said 
planning on the part of the PA and international coordinators 
was impossible without a clearer vision of Israel's intent. 
He worried that GOI hesitance to approve the Egyptian border 
guard deployment would lead to the Israeli security services 
arguing (successfully) in favor of keeping the IDF in the 
Philadelphi corridor -- and ensuring a continued "cycle of 
violence" by giving the Palestinians a "target" and inviting 
IDF retaliation.  "We have accepted their conditions" for the 
deployment, he stated, but "have received no reply."  Soliman 
said he had been told that Israeli Prime Minister Sharon was 
unable to get the approval of his government to finalize the 
Egyptian border guard deployment.  Partial withdrawal could 
be worse than no withdrawal at all, said Soliman, calling for 
a total and coordinated Israeli pullout.  Partial 
disengagement would "not encourage the Palestinians to be 
quiet." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Building Hope, Limiting Hamas, and Continuing Engagement 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Summing up priorities as coordinating disengagement, 
security sector reform, and building trust between the PA and 
GOI, Soliman stressed that we need to give the Palestinian 
people hope in their future.  He called on the U.S. to "keep 
insisting on a state for the Palestinians."  He also stressed 
the need for improving the Palestinian economy and said his 
advice to economic coordinator Wolfensohn was to create jobs, 
largely through infrastructure projects like roads and water 
systems, to enhance the hope of the Palestinian people. 
 
¶12.  (C) Wary of a "disaster" if Hamas' influence were to 
increase through Palestinian legislative elections, Soliman 
said a delay in those elections was necessary.  A legislature 
with 70 percent Hamas representation (which was his 
prediction of Hamas' current level of potential electoral 
support) would "not pass any laws" and be ineffective.  He 
called for the strengthening of Fatah before elections are 
held.  Soliman also said he might invite all Palestinian 
factions and PA President Abu Mazen for "another dialogue" in 
Egypt to build a greater sense of cooperation. 
 
¶13.  (C) Soliman said he planned to visit Israel in mid-June 
to discuss Israel's withdrawal plan more fully.  He wanted to 
ask "what they need exactly" to boost the transparency and 
coordination or disengagement.  He said "we can't help them" 
without knowing their intent and their timetable.  In 
closing, Soliman said he looked forward to meeting Secretary 
Rice during her upcoming visit to Egypt. 
 
¶14.  (U) General Ward has cleared this message. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
GRAY 
 
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