This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 004172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015 
TAGS: PARM PHSA OIIP KNNP KSTC ETTC EG IAEA NPT
SUBJECT: EGYPT COMFORTABLE WITH "NON-RESULT" OF NPT REVCON; 
COMMENTS ON PSI AND EXPORT CONTROL 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 2740 
 
     ¶B. 03 CAIRO 1620 
 
Classified by Acting DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  In a June 1 conversation with a member of 
the Egyptian delegation to the NPT Review Conference, Poloff 
heard Egypt's view that the RevCon's inability to agree on a 
final document was a satisfactory outcome for Egypt.  "We did 
your work for you" in preventing discussion of intractable 
issues, claimed Adel Ibrahim of the MFA Office of Arms 
Control and Disarmament.  "Failure can be healthy for the 
system," suggested Ibrahim, by identifying systemic 
improvements to be addressed.  Ibrahim said Egypt, by 
pursuing its own interests, helped avoid an unproductive 
confrontation between the U.S. and Iran.  He said the U.S. 
clearly did not intend to compromise at the RevCon and should 
be happy with a "non-result" which did not set its interests 
back.  Ibrahim also commented on the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (see paragraph 9) and export control (paragraph 
10), showing greater willingness to work with the U.S. on the 
latter.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Poloff reviewed Egyptian views of the NPT RevCon 
June 1 with Adel Ibrahim, Director of the MFA Office of Arms 
Control and Disarmament and a member of the Egyptian 
delegation to New York throughout the May 2005 conference. 
Ibrahim was satisfied with the RevCon's inability to agree on 
a final document, given the fact that tough issues (including 
those of particular interest to Egypt or the U.S.) were 
simply not headed towards a resolution at the conference in 
any case.  "We did your work for you," he said, suggesting 
that Egypt's role as a spoiler of sorts drew attention away 
from U.S. policies which he said "were not compatible with 
international views" and would have gone nowhere if discussed 
in depth. 
 
¶3.  (C)  "Failure can be healthy for the system," said 
Ibrahim, adding that the "result" of the RevCon reflected the 
actual situation in the nonproliferation world. 
Nonproliferation and disarmament are "under pressure," he 
emphasized, and that was reflected in New York.  He also 
cited NGO participation, noting that the overall tone of the 
conference was a "barometer of reality" and sent the message 
to the world that "the system" needs to be improved.  Country 
groupings are in his view "dysfunctional," with one country 
being obliged to share the position of others with which it 
has few common interests.  Iran and Chile share a place in 
the NAM, for example, and the U.S. shares a grouping with New 
Zealand.  A non-outcome at the RevCon identified "loopholes 
in the system" and offered the building blocks for potential 
improvement, said Ibrahim. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ibrahim claimed that Egypt's vocal role prevented a 
direct (and unhelpful) confrontation between Iran and the 
U.S.  He said Iran was hiding within the NAM group, the U.S. 
was "hiding behind" the Western grouping, and the chair did 
not permit an open-ended consultation; these factors 
contributed to the avoidance of a clash.  Some delegations 
had accused Egypt of "protecting Iran" by taking the focus 
away from an inevitable confrontation between the western 
countries and Iran, Ibrahim noted; he rebutted by saying the 
RevCon was "by no means heading towards a condemnation of 
Iran" in any case, and Egypt was only protecting its own 
interests. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Noting the tradition of "give and take" at NPT 
conferences, Ibrahim said the U.S. was clearly not ready to 
"give" this time -- relying instead on "logic and philosophy" 
to hold its ground.  The U.S. had "nothing tangible" to give 
on the Middle East, for example, and the U.S. knew that Egypt 
could accept "nothing less than 2000."  Additionally, the 
U.S. was selectively turning from multilateral solutions and 
seeking "plurilateral" mechanisms, said Ibrahim (citing the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
and reform of the IAEA Board of Governors as examples), and 
had goals not conducive to a RevCon consensus in any case. 
The combination of these factors made a "non-result" 
acceptable to both the U.S. and Egypt, he said; the U.S. 
should be happy with an outcome that did not detract from its 
interests. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ibrahim added, without elaboration, that he sensed a 
certain "coordination" between the U.S. and Egyptian 
delegations, given the absence of complaints from the U.S. 
side and our mutual interest in avoiding confrontation. 
Ibrahim said the U.S. delegation "seemed satisfied" as the 
RevCon concluded; U.S. views towards the end of the 
conference and made it clear that our long-term goals were 
not hindered by the "failure" of the RevCon.  Ibrahim said 
the U.S. was always "quick to demarche" the GOE when critical 
issues were at stake, yet he sensed no urgency from the U.S. 
side and therefore felt the GOE could look back on its role 
at the RevCon with "no guilty feelings."  (He did note, 
without expressing any concern, that France had complained to 
the Egyptian Foreign Minister about Egypt's role.) 
¶7.  (C)  Asked who was the engineer of Egypt's approach to 
the RevCon, Ibrahim said internal debates within the GOE 
delegation were robust and constant.  The result of these 
"checks and balances" was the ultimate approach which Egypt 
displayed at the RevCon.  Ibrahim said other delegations 
noted the intensity of internal Egyptian discussions. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Note:  Members of the Egyptian Council for Foreign 
Affairs, an NGO which participated in the RevCon, told the 
Charge May 31 (septel/NOTAL) that in spite of disagreements, 
the NPT dialogue was useful.  They recommended a "track two" 
approach to keep parties talking even when intractable issues 
were not likely to be resolved.  End note. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Reminded of the second anniversary of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and ongoing U.S. 
interest in an Egyptian endorsement, Ibrahim said the 
Egyptian Ambassador in Washington had attended the 
Secretary's anniversary event the previous day.  He lamented, 
 
SIPDIS 
however, that the next announced PSI simulation exercise 
would be based on the scenario of chemicals shipped from 
central Europe to the Middle East.  He said Egypt had a 
"principled" reason for not signing the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (i.e., related to Israel's WMD programs and not 
due to any GOE interest in chemical weapons themselves) and 
was concerned by the optics of a PSI exercise linking 
chemical weapons with the Middle East. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Poloff noted that even prior to PSI, the USG sought 
consultations with Egypt on export control and border 
security (EXBS) programs, yet had seen little headway. 
Ibrahim said it might be time to revisit the potential for 
such consultations, which in any case could build upon 
relationships already established (through Sandia Labs, for 
example) and would be consistent with the implementation of 
UNSCR 1540.  Egypt was also eager to strengthen its national 
safeguards system, said Ibrahim.  He added that any further 
approach on EXBS would be easier for the MFA to coordinate if 
the Egyptian Defense Attache in Washington were convinced (by 
the USG) of the utility of the program, as the Attache could 
prepare the Ministry of Defense to take a more proactive 
stance in Cairo.  (Comment:  Ibrahim's approach, and candid 
insights, may help advance the EXBS discussion beyond the 
interagency delays noted ref B.  End comment.) 
 
 
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GRAY 
 
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